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Preface
The theologian and philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher was not
only the founder of modern Platonic scholarship, but also acknowl-
edged as his master by August Boeckh, who in his turn ranks with
Gottfried Hermann as one of the twin founders of modern classical
scholarship in general. In a striking passage of his Aesthetik, he remarks
about the need to ground the appreciation of a work of art in its
historical context:
So ist also eigentlich ein Kunstwerk auch eingewurzelt in seinen Grund
und Boden, in seine Umgebung. Es verliert schon seine Bedeutung,
wenn es aus dieser Umgebung herausgerissen wird und in den Verkehr
ubergeht. Es ist wie etwas, das aus dem Feuer gerretet ist und nun
Brandflecken tragt.
Really and truly then a work of art is also rooted in its native soil, its
ambience. It loses its significance, if it is wrenched out of this ambience
and put into circulation. It is like something rescued from the fire,
still bearing the marks of its burning.
This does not mean that the work of art does not possess absolute
value. But its origins can never be neglected.
G. W. F. Hegel, who lectured in the 1820s on aesthetics alternately
with Schleiermacher at Berlin, was to repeat this insistence. Even
though in the last analysis the identity of particular characters and
particular historical details taken up into the work of art may no
longer be important, we must check their credentials before they
disappear.
Nowadays a student in a typical department of philosophy would
probably scan the lecture lists for a course on aesthetics in vain. But
both Hegel and Schleiermacher were philosophers, and the striking
feature of their aesthetic theories is that they do not wish to exclude
philosophy— artistically presented philosophy, as Greek philosophy
is— from them. The form is part of the content and, in the Greek
world, the form raised certain expectations in its audience. A phil-
osophical poem, for example, was not simply a prose discourse coated
with literary, and on the whole rather regrettable, sugar. That is not
true even of the Lucretius who uses this image. Nor is a dialogue
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merely a convenient pedagogic means of setting out simply views
which otherwise might tax or fatigue the amateur reader with his
limited attention span. All ancient literary forms are grounded in
and structured by pre-literary, and certainly pre-philosophical, usages.
They presuppose at least one interlocutor: many of them presuppose
in that role the whole polis, even the pan-Hellenic community. A
polis might well offer a more motley and less schooled audience than
that of the university lecture. Yet the authors who present themselves
before it will be alert to their listeners' diversity. Schleiermacher was
a Prussian clergyman, but he understood amazingly well that literary
art cannot always be taken au grand serieux :
Die Kunst beweist daher ihre Freiheit durch die spielende und losere
Seite, und ihre innere Notwendigkeit durch die symbolische und
hohere. (Die groBten Kiinstler zeigen uns dieses Zusammengehoren
oft in einer sehr leicht mifiverstandlichen Unmittelbarkeit . . .).
Art therefore shows its freedom through the playful, less trammelled
side, and its inner necessity through its symbolic, higher side. (The
greatest artists show us this relation quite often with a very easily
misunderstood directness.)
Among the examples of this he cites Shakespeare, whose puns are
defended, and Plato.
Wilamowitz used to speak of the disaster that overtook German
education in the nineteenth century. It has taken a long time for the
modern interpreter of Plato or Aristotle to rise to Schleiermacher's
insight, that a Greek philosophical work is essentially an act of
dialogue. Schleiermacher added to the statement of his Aesthetik a
whole hermeneutic doctrine. It had a twofold import. The interpreter
must concern himself carefully with the elucidation of the meaningful
connections within language. He must also seek for the formation of
language and its thought-content within the creative individuality of
the speaker or author
This sanctions in the event both grammatical and psychological
explanation. Grammar will naturally concern itself not only with the
details of linguistic forms, but also with the entire context of language
and its spiritual content. Psychology will seek the origin of language
in the creative spiritual processes within the author's individuality.
The original creative process led from psychology— what Schleier-
macher calls the Keimentschluss or seminal decision— to grammar.
Understanding the author leads from grammar to psychology.
Yet, although every student of Wilamowitz or his pupil Eduard
Fraenkel on the poets will recognize these scholars as in Schleier-
macher's tradition, the literary or pre-philosophical approach to
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philosophers has often seemed arbitrary and irrelevant, as irrelevant
as talk about "spirit." Gottlob Frege said that logical explanation in
his day was "psychologisch verseucht," "sick to death with psychology."
If a man is concerned with truth, why trouble about his cast of mind?
And if he says what he means, in a close, naked, natural way of
speaking, do style and convention matter?
But the notion that we have access to the truth (whatever that
may mean) through abstractions, which really means in an inhuman
way, is an illusion. What is accessible is thought, and thought is
clothed in language. Hence the philosopher and the philologist do
in fact meet in a common quest.
The student of Greek philosophy then must know Greek. But
more than this. He must study the prejudices and expectations about
etiquette of a society often tantalizingly different from our own.
There is an etiquette even of the intellect. We have been taught to
crave the absolute, and wars have been fought by those who were
convinced they had this privileged key to reality. The Greeks certainly
fought enough wars. But their civilization in its best moments was
based on the recognition of compromise. There is no absolute right
in the Iliad, and the Odyssey ?, right is only that of a man to his wife
and family and home. The delicate reserve that pervades the Greek
of Plato and Menander, philosopher and poet, with its play of particles,
its optatives, its modal verbs, is a noble Athenian contribution to this
national insight.
Compromise is the basis of political life, and the dinner party was
peculiarly the place where such compromises were evident. Again,
already Homer knew this, when in the Odyssey he condemned the
Centaurs, and this is the symbolism of the meal at which Priam and
Achilles learn to accept death at the end of the Iliad. Xenophanes
shows that the religious and philosophical meal persisted, as it does
in the Symposia of both Plato and Xenophon.
But to accept this ambience and this language is already to place
limitations on the kind of truth at which such inquiries may arrive,
since who is very clear next day about what seemed so plausible the
night before? Who has not yielded a point for the sake of his table
companions and his host which more privately he might have cherished
to the death? What is important about these occasions is not so much
the absolute claims of whatever truth was agreed, since even agree-
ment may only be an agreement to differ, but our impressions about
the character of our fellow guests. And there we may well set more
store by the man who was able to lighten a heavy moment with a
well-timed anecdote that raised a laugh than by the professor who
set out to summarize the views of Kant for his glassy-eyed listeners.
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These are the kinds of boundaries between which Plato so often
moves, even when he abandons the formal setting of the dinner party
while retaining the essential dialogue (the "feast of words"). The
vexatious imprecision of his arguments is rightly pinpointed by
scholars. Paradoxically, it has never affected his status as one of the
greatest luminaries of our civilization. This is because everyone
recognizes that a-Kopia may sometimes be the right strategy in certain
kinds of discourse, in company, certainly, but also in encounter with
the numinous. St. Augustine's omnia exeunt in mysterium is simply
another way of putting this. Both sorts of discourse coalesce at a
locus with which, as the instance of Xenophanes already mentioned
proves, pagan antiquity was perfectly well acquainted, the sacred
meal.
We need not go as far back as Augustine. The end of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is familiar. Increasingly nowadays, when
we are seeking to do justice to the oeuvre, Wittgenstein's life and
character also enter into evidence; his quixotic village schoolmaster-
ing, his service as a hospital porter. Coming from the British empirical
tradition, Sir Frederick Ayer in the 1930s took the Viennese Circle
to which Wittgenstein belonged to be saying that metaphysical asser-
tions, since they could not be empirically validated, were worthless.
What they were really saying is that they were nonsense. But nonsense
has its rights too, and this is also part of one kind of British, or
English, tradition. It is curious that anyone from the same University
and College as Lewis Carroll, the mathematician Charles Dodgson,
should not have understood this. In the face of the mystery constituted
by the universe {''alles, was der Fall ist") perplexity is a proper
reaction, and statements in and about the presence of mystery may
well be technically nonsensical. There is no techne to deal with them,
and this is seen exactly at the moment in any civilization when
technical knowledge is promising its best fruits and is becoming best
understood. But since this means that the claim to reduce the universe
to a matter of technical expertise is fraught with uncharted difficulties,
absolute knowledge of the truth (to be totally sophos) is hybris for all
men. All that is left is philo-sophia, and the philo-sophos must exhibit
sophrosyne, not simply as a demonstration of disinterested morals, but
as the proof of his fitness for his profession. Pythagoras, another
mathematician, was the first to speak of the philosophos. It is part of
the same mentality that he also was a religious leader.
This is why Plato, mathematician and mystic, is so concerned with
the moral stance of his participants in dialogue. Whatever the va-
gueness and ambiguities of their conclusions, which may be regarded
as inevitable, the important question, after all, is whether they are
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living out their lives honorably, authentically, or not. That is a question
that may not be avoided.
The essays printed in this volume are offered as examples of the
modern approach to Greek philosophy. Already that philosophy is
more than a synchronous dialogue. When Plato makes Socrates
interrogate Parmenides, he is paying homage to the diachronic
possibly of a "dialogue des absents," even a "dialogue des morts." In
his turn, Socrates himself spoke ambiguously to posterity, and this
posthumous conversation between old and new has continued down
the ages with all the philosophers of antiquity just as much as it has
continued with the poets.
Greek philosophy began on the fringes of its world, and perhaps
in a too little explored dialogue with non-Greek world-views already
old. Asia Minor in particular had its own contribution to make
whether to religion or art. It is right that we should give pride of
place to an examination of the first fragment of Heraclitus of Ephesus,
since the influence of Heraclitus on Plato— and on Marx— is im-
measurable. But that is why the comparison of Aristotle and Descartes
on the soul is also profoundly relevant to our inquiry. In the
intervening perspective, one of our most exciting pieces shows that
a civilization too long silent in this inherited discourse, the Arab, is
now beginning to be heard. If the conclusions drawn there are
correct, how much the modern exegete will have to learn about the
reliability of his texts ! Elsewhere, a Christian apologist is shown to
be a repository of Platonic and Stoic doctrine. What another Christian
made of the tradition in Byzantium is now revealed in a poem
published for the first time.
In elucidating the Greek thinkers, we have of course to listen very
carefully to the idioms and patterns of a language not our own. Some
ofour most distinguished contributors excel in precisely this sensitivity.
There is no way round this. Translations simply will not do. As the
study of Greek diminishes and vanishes in the educational reforms
of our time, we are both cheating our children, and impoverishing
the understanding of our civilization, in a frightening way. Since the
end of antiquity, Europe has always striven towards Greek. This is
true even of the Middle Ages, so wrongly disparaged by the Greekless
Petrarch. Thomas Aquinas had William of Moerbeke to help him,
and Dante, whose poem has after all a Greek title, paraded what bits
he thought he knew. We will not return to Chartres by ignoring
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Greek, but to a remote barbarism unknown since the second millen-
nium before Christ.
How the Greek philosophers organized their work in genres is
another basic inquiry. Plato is a supreme literary artist glittering with
kaleidoscopic contradictions, and a number of our papers focus on
different facets of his iridescent genius, including his awareness that
there are different types of time (Bergson). Is there a genre that will
accommodate all these discrepancies, and is it perhaps what Plato
always said it was, dialectic?
His dramatic qualities are clearly an outgrowth of his dialectic,
and they commit him to a particular approach to truth, as the
irresolutions of the Attic dramas still attest. We are told that he was
an avid student of the mimes of Sophron, and this perhaps explains
some of his irony, which may be diagnosed as attenuated laughter
But in failing to resolve his problems more decidedly or logically, in
using faulty and imprecise methods, was he perhaps also more in
debt to the Sophists than his language prepares us to believe? Were
they much more influential as thinkers than we are commonly led to
suppose, and was the ambiguity of Plato's attitude to them the result
of the shock to the dialogic and musical principle they upheld
administered first by Aristophanes, and culminating, as he perceived
it, in the hemlock? How interesting, in any case, that he should have
sought to come to final terms with Aristophanes in a Symposium,
almost a Last Supper.
Aristotle, // maestro di color che sanno, "the master of those that
know" according to Dante, has enjoyed a chequered career in the
history of European thought. His universal brilliance is beyond
question. Is it heresy to suggest that he might have been less criticized
at certain periods if his literary dialogues with their aureum flumeyi
orationis had survived? What we have is still dialogic, one side of a
telephone conversation whose other end we cannot hear But his
laconic and staccato manner is heard too easily as dogma. This is
unfair to the teacher of Alexander the Great, and to the staggering
statement at the beginning of the Metaphysics that all men by nature
stretch out for knowledge, one of the most gloriously optimistic
remarks in history. Perhaps it is the proof that he was too much the
product of his own people, with their prejudices as well as their
strengths. Or perhaps again we have simply been in the habit of
distinguishing too sharply between the Greek and Hebrew meanings
of "know." Clearly Homer uses ei5a)q in more than an intellectual
sense, and when on the fagade of the Library of Celsus at Ephesus
we find the four allegorical statues of Sophia, Arete, Ennoia and
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Episteme we see that even in the age of Hadrian the intellectual and
moral were not separated.
Marx once asserted that he was no Marxist, and Aristotelians have
not always been faithful to their master's many-sided genius. Our
volume pleads for a continuation of dialogue, with him, with the
other thinkers discussed in it and, more largely, with all the indis-
pensable founders of our civilization who first asked the kinds of
questions that turned out to be best discussed "after physics"— after
physics and after dinner.
The Editor and Editorial Committee are grateful to the School of
Humanities, and its Director, Professor Nina Baym, for continued
interest and support.
At an early stage of planning Professor Richard Mohr of the
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Cham-
paign, rendered inestimable help. Sir Kenneth Dover, at that time
President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, generously secured
access for the Editor to the resources of the Oxford University
Computing Service— yet another instance of the warm hospitality
shown by the College during the academic year 1985-1986. Professor
J. L. Ackrill of Brasenose College, Professor of the History of
Philosophy in the University of Oxford; Professor R. Sorabji, Pro-
fessor of Philosophy, King's College, London; and Professor G. M.
Kerferd, Hulme Professor Emeritus, Manchester University, kindly
examined and evaluated the papers before the volume went to press.
To these distinguished scholars, and to all who helped in any way,
inadequate gratitude is now expressed.
Once again, I must thank Mrs. Mary Ellen Fryer for her labors in
putting on line some of our contributors' texts. Mr. Carl Kibler of
the Printing Services Office, University of Illinois, supervised the
PENTA side of our operations with his usual common sense and
perseverance.
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1The First Fragment of Heraclitus
LEONARDO TARAN
The interpretation of Heraclitus will always remain controversial.
The main reasons are his peculiar mode of expression, the fragmen-
tary character of the evidence, and the very way ancient authors
quoted his sayings. If progress is still to be made, it is necessary to
discuss the arguments given in support of one or another interpre-
tation in order to determine in each case what is probable, what is
merely possible, and what is unlikely or impossible. Such a discussion
should contribute to clarify the points on which scholarly opinion is
likely to differ and to eliminate poor and irrelevant arguments. The
following analysis of Heraclitus' first fragment has been prompted,
among other things, by the preceding considerations. The fragments
will be cited according to the numbers in the B section of chapter
22 of Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker.^ For the sake of
brevity my discussion takes its starting point from, and presupposes
knowledge of, the commentaries of Kirk^ and of Marcovich.^ This
explains the prominent character of my disagreements with these
' I refer to the 6th edition, 3 vols., Berlin 1951-52. The alleged later editions
are mere reprints. This work is referred to as FVS.
^ G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments (Cambridge 1954; reprinted, with
corrections, 1962; my references are to the latter). Hereafter = Kirk.
^ M. Marcovich, Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary (Merida, Venezuela
1967) and Eraclito. Frammenti. Introduzione, e commento (Florence 1978). Hereafter
these books are referred to as Marcovich' and Marcovich^, respectively.
The following publications will be cited by their authors' names alone: E. Zeller,
Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entu'icklung I, ii^ (Leipzig 1920).
Herausgegeben von W. Nestle; J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy'* (London 1930); K.
Reinhardt, Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (Bonn 1916); O.
Gigon, Untersuchungen zu Heraklit (Leipzig 1935); R. Walzer, Eraclito. Raccolta dei
frammenti e traduzione italiana (Florence 1939). Other references will be self-
explanatory.
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two scholars. For the reader's convenience I print the text with a
short critical apparatus in which purely orthographical variants have
been disregarded.
ToO" X6701; T0O6' ibvTOc, ai'ei'' a^wiroi yivovrai avdpuiiroi Koi irpbaOfv rj ocKOvaai
Kot ocKOvaavTec, to irpCjTOv yivofiivijiv yap iravTo^i'' Kara rov \byov rovbt
airiipoiaiv ioUaai -KiipdnevoL kol iireoju kuI Ipywv roioxnitiv oko'kjjp eycb dirfyevnou
Kara' <t>vaLi' diaipiiov eKaarov' koi (ppa^cjju OKU)q
€x*f tovc, 6t aXXovq audpCxKOvq
\avdavu OKoaa iyipOePTtq iroiomip OKuairep OKoaa (vbovreq iirikavdavovTai.
"rov Aristotle, Clement: rov bl Hippolytus: om. Sextus Wei Aristotle,
Clement, Hippolytus: om. Sextus TravTicv Hippolytus: om. Sextus
'Kara . . . (Kaarov Sextus: bupeuv Kara (f>miv Hippolytus (omitting eKaarov).
The entire fragment is cited by Sextus Empiricus {Adv. Math. VII.
132) only. It is possible that the omission of tov or rov bt (see infra),
of aid, and of ttocvto^v are due neither to him nor to his source but
to one or more scribes. Hippolytus {Ref. Omn. Haeres. IX. 9. 3 [pp.
241-42 Wendland]) gives the passage up to ex^^ omitting the final
comparison {tovc, b\ aWovq . . . einXavdavovTaL). Clement {Strom. V.
111.7 [II, pp. 401-02 Stahlin]) has the first sentence only, from tov
to TTpOiTov, and Eusebius {Praeparatio Evangelka XIII. 13. 39 [II, p.
214 Mras]) himself quotes this passage of Clement's. Finally, also
Aristotle {Rhet. 1407 B 16-17) cites the first sentence, but only from
TOV to audpooTTOL yiyvovTai (in this order).
Both Aristotle and Sextus tell us that this text occurred at the
beginning of Heraclitus' book. However, neither the former's Iv
apxy auToO'* TOV cvyypannaToq nor the latter's evapxbp.tvoq (sc.
'Hpa/cXftToq) . . . tChv irepl ^Oatcoq necessarily implies that those in our
fragment were the very first words of Heraclitus' treatise.'^ This topic
has been usually discussed in connection with whether at the beginning
of our text one should read tov Xoyov or tov 8e Xbyov. A majority of
recent scholars, including Kirk and Marcovich,^ has adopted the latter
reading, though it is transmitted by Hippolytus only. The reason
given is that advanced by Zeller' long ^go- it is easy to see that be
'* This is the reading of the MSS. Ross and Kassel in their respective editions of
Aristotle's Rhetoric, Marcovich, and others have adopted Richard's emendation avry.
To my mind the emendation is not at all necessary; but even if it is adopted, it would
really not affect the point at issue here, since even iv apxy ocvry tov avyypannaroq
would leave open the possibility that some words preceded 22 B 1 in the Heraclilean
original.
' Cf. F. Susemihl, ya/jr6. / Class. Philol. 107 (1873), 146, followed by Nestle in
Zeller-Nestle 1, ii^ p. 793, note; W. Capelle, Hermes 59 (1924), 202; W.J. Verdenius,
Mnemosyne, III sen, 13 (1947), 271; Kirk, p. 35.
'' Kirk, pp. 33 and 36; Marcovich', p. 2 = Marcovich^, p. 4.
^ Cf. Zeller in Zeller-Nestle, I, ii^, p. 792, note.
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was omitted by our other sources because for their purposes it was
superfluous and stylistically disturbing, whereas it is difficult to explain
why any one should have added it if it was not present in his source.
Yet the matter is not so easily disposed of. For one thing, such
connectives are sometimes added for no reason at all. Moreover, in
this case, the variant may be due to a scribal mistake. For it is possible
that the first Tovde in T0TAEA0r0TT0TAE0NT02 was caused by
dittography. On the other hand, 56 is omitted both by Aristotle and
by Clement, who does not depend on Aristotle,^ and there is no
reason to think that they both purposely omitted this word. Such an
omission would more probably be due to scribes. Consequently, it
seems to be just as likely that Heraclitus wrote tov 5e Xbyov as that
he wrote tov Xbyov. If I have printed the latter reading, it is only to
call attention to the fact that the prevailing opinion is not as certainly
right as its proponents believe it to be. And hereafter whenever I
cite TOV Xbyov as the reading at the beginning of our text, it is with
the understanding that Heraclitus may well have written tov 5e Xbyov.
If TOV be Xbyov is the correct reading, then be is either connective
or inceptive. The latter possibility is that preferred by most recent
scholars.^ However, even now there are some who believe that bk is
connective and that in what preceded frag. 1 Heraclitus must have
given a hint as to what he meant by this Logos. '° This last contention
seems to me more than doubtful," and even if the 5e is connective,
it is likely, given the statements of Aristotle and of Sextus cited above,
that not much preceded our text.'^ On the other hand, if Heraclitus
wrote TOV Xbyov, it is likely that those words came at the very beginning
of his treatise, and the same is true if be is the right reading and is
inceptive.'^
" This ought to be obvious, since Clement's citation is longer than Aristotle's.
' Cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 1, Verdenius, op. cit. (note 5 supra), pp. 274-75; Kirk, p. 36.
'" Cf. e.g. M. L. West, Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient (Oxford 1971), pp.
114-15.
" West (cf. note 10 supra) cites with approval Diels' suggestion that something
like 'UpoLKktiToc, 'E^eaioi; rabi Xiya preceded frag. 1. But he does so on the assumption,
shared by others (cf. e.g. Burnet, p. 133 with n. 1), that 6 Xoyoc, S5t refers to Heraclitus'
own discourse. Yet it was because of this that Reinhardt, p. 217, n. 1 rejected the
di, for there are strong reasons for thinking that in frag. I Logos cannot primarily
mean Heraclitus' discourse or doctrine (cf. the concluding remarks of this paper).
However, Reinhardt did not consider the possibility that the 8e may be merely
inceptive.
'"^ It is hardly likely that either Aristotle or Sextus' source, who knew the relative
collocations of the present fragments 1 and 2 (cf. note 37 infra), would have said
that what they cite of frag. 1 came at the beginning of Heraclitus' book if a long
and/or important statement had preceded.
'' For inceptive 8i cf. Ion of Chios 36 B 1 apxfi Se noi tov Xoyov and Kirk, p. 36.
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A more fundamental question is the construction of aUi. Aristotle
cited the first words of our fragment precisely to illustrate his point
that it is difficult to "punctuate" {biaoTi^ai) the text of Heraclitus,
since it is unclear {abr]\ov) whether aUi goes with what precedes or
with what follows it.'"* Modern scholars are not agreed on this: some
take aui with eovroq, while others attach it to a^vueroL. Prominent
among the latter are Reinhardt, Snell, Kranz, Kirk, and Marcovich.'^
Their main argument is (i) that aiei leading up to /cat . . . Kai is an
archaic figure typical of Heraclitus' style. To this Marcovich has added
two arguments: (ii) In aul a^vveroL yipovrat. avOpcoiroL— in contrast
to the rhythmical unit tov be Xbyov toW I'ovtoz,— -there is an intentional
alliteration a-a-g-a; (iii) The construction of ai'ei with iovroc, is a lectio
facilior prompted by the influence of the epic formula mev ibureq
(Homer, //. I. 290, etc.). Now the seconi argument may be dismissed
with the remark that it begs the question, since it simply assumes
that Heraclitus meant aui to go with a^vveroL. Moreover, the allit-
eration alleged by Marcovich is of no significance as it is vowel
alliteration only. The third argument implies a misuse of the notion
of lectio facilior, but I postpone its discussion for later. As for the first
argument, it is anything but decisive, aui followed and taken up by
Kal . . . Kai is a normal construction in archaic and in later Greek, but
so is also the use of Kal . . . Kai in the sense "both . . . and," even
without a preceding aui. The essential point that must still be
established is whether here Heraclitus intended aui to be taken up
by Kal . . . Kai. I submit that there are strong reasons for thinking
that he did not.
However, before we go into this question, it is convenient to
determine what would be the likely meaning of tov Xbyov toW eburoq,
if aui goes with a^vveroi. For, given Aristotle's statement mentioned
above, one must acknowledge that the construction of aui with what
follows it must be possible, and hence that the construction tov Xbyov
T0O6' ebvToq must also be so. Of those who take aui with what follows,
Kranz, Kirk, and others"^ take ro06' as predicative: "The Logos being
this." But in that case one would have expected toloW instead of
Tovb\ or, at the very least, the toD6' to come after and not before
ibuToq. Kirk argues that the fact that in the next sentence Tbvbe is not
predicative in KaTa tov Xbyov Tbvbe "does not tell against its predicative
'^ Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 14-15 and 17-18.
'
' Reinhardt. pp. 217-18; A. Busse, Rhexw.sches Museum 75 (1926), 206-07; B.
Snell, Hermes 61 (1926). 366 = Gesaimnelte Schriften (Gottingen, 1966), p. 139, n. 3;
Kranz, FVS'' I, p. 150, note; Kirk, p. 34; Marcovich', p. 9 = Marcovich', p. 10.
"^ Kranz, FVS'', I, p. 150; Kirk, p. 35; J. Bollack and H. Wismann, Heraclite ou la
separation (Paris 1972), p. 61.
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use earlier."" But the question is whether any reader who was not
defending an interpretation would detach roOS' from the rest of the
phrase in tov \6yov rovd'. Moreover, the passage from 6 \byoc, to 6
Xoyoq o5e in the next sentence would at least be unnecessary. The
probability then is that tov5' is attributive, and it is so interpreted by
Marcovich and others.'^ In that case, one must take eovroq existentially
and probably having concessive force: "This Logos, existent, or real
though it is.'"^ This meaning gives a reasonable sense, but it consid-
erably weakens the force of the whole first sentence of the fragment,
especially when it is compared to the sense yielded by that sentence
when aui is construed with ebvToq.
One of the main objections against taking aui with oc^vueroL is that
the former word, prominently emphatic here, and important for
Heraclitus, as frag. B 30 shows {riv aid Kal earip Kal eaTaL),^° would
be almost otiose. Its omission would not at all affect what he is saying,
since Kal irpoadev rj bcKovoai Kal ctKovaavreq to irpcbTov would suffice to
convey the notion that men fail to understand the Logos both before
and after they have heard it. There would be only slightly more
emphasis if aui were taken up by Kal . . . Kai. Kirk himself unwittingly
betrays the weakness of taking aui with what follows when he states
that aui with eovroc, makes sense "and expresses something that
Heraclitus believed" but that "it is to be rejected only on the ground
that aui goes rather with a^uj/eroi."^' Moreover, since Heraclitus says
that men are uncomprehending both before they have heard the
Logos and after they have heard it, it makes better sense to take
aui with eovToq. For, unless the assertion is made that this Logos exists
always, that it is always present in the universe, that is, also before
men have heard it^^ from Heraclitus, it would be pointless to reproach
" Kirk, p. 35.
'* Cf. P. Tannery, Pour Vhistoire de la science hellene^ (Paris 1930), p. 198; Reinhardt,
p. 217, SneW, Hermes 6\ (1926), 365-66 = GesammelteSchriften, pp. 139-40; Marcovich',
p. 9 = Marcovich^, p. 9.
'^ The meanings "existent" and "real" are frequently connected with each other
and with the meaning "true." In the present case the. last mentioned meaning is also
possible, if by "true" we understand what is the case in the sense of what is real; but
the meaning "true" as the opposite of "false" is, I believe, impossible. Cf. Busse
(above, note 15), pp. 205-06.
^° In 22 B 30 one must punctuate with a colon after tarai, cf. Kirk, p. 310 with
references.
2' Kirk, p. 35.
^^ This to my mind is a decisive reason for rejecting those interpretations which,
like West's (op. cit. in note 10 supra, pp. 1 15 and 1 16), take 6 Xcr^oc, Sdt to mean "This
discourse of mine." If that were Heraclitus' meaning, then he would be blaming men
only for not understanding the Logos after they have heard it. But the fragment as
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them for not knowing it even before they had so heard it.^^ Finally,
with ebvToc, aui Heraclitus in all probability meant his readers and/
or hearers to recall the epic formula auv eovroc, used of the traditional
gods,^'* and the similar use of aei by Pherecydes (7 B 1 Zac, nev /cat
Xpovoc, riaap ad Kal Xdouir]) and perhaps by other authors of cosmo-
gonies. Marcovich contends that (in Heraclitus) to take aui with
iovTOQ, is a lectio facilior,^^ but this is really a misapplication of a valid
principle of textual criticism. There a variant reading is considered
to be a lectio facilior when it can be explained as an intentional change
from a reading that is more difficult to understand. In the present
case, however, it is most improbable that Heraclitus placed aUi next
to iouToq without intending his readers and/or hearers to recall the
formula of immortality applied to the gods of traditional Greek
mythology.^'' And if he intended to allude to this formula, it was in
order to suggest that it is the impersonal Logos, in accordance with
which all things happen in the universe, that is eternal and not the
traditional, anthropomorphic gods. And there is other evidence of
Heraclitus' hostility to anthropomorphism and to traditional Greek
mythological thought.^'
The preceding are, I submit, valid reasons for thinking that
Heraclitus meant aUi to go with eouroq. If this is so, it is surely
noteworthy that, with the exception of Aristotle, the extant ancient
authors who in citing or alluding to this part of the fragment make
it clear how they construe aui, all took this word with I'ovtoc,. They
are Clement, Amelius, Hippolytus, and perhaps Cleanthes.^^ It must
a whole and other relevant evidence (cf. e.g. 22 B 2, 17, 34, 50, etc.) show that
Heraclitus supposed that men could understand the universe by themselves, since he
blames them for not doing so.
-' This second argument has been rightly emphasized by Gigon, p. 6; Verdenius,
op. cit. (note 5 supra), p. 279; H. Cherniss, Selected Papers (Leiden, 1977), p. 16, n.
13.
-' Cf. Homer. //. I. 290, 494, XXIV. 99; Odyssey I. 263; Hesiod, Theog. 21, 33; Op.
718.
-'' Cf. Marcovich', p. 9 = Marcovich'^, p. 10.
'-'' The notion that oih can go both with ibvToq, and with a^vvtroi (cf. e.g. Gigon,
p. 2) must be rejected. Such an airo koivov construction is impossible here, since in
reading the text we would have to make a pause either after tovToc, or after oad. This
is precisely the point Aristotle makes when he cites the first few words of our
fragment. His testimony is incompatible with Gigon's suggestion.
'-'' Cf. 22 B 5, 15, 30, 40, 42, 53, 56, 57, 62, 67, 104, etc.
'"* That Clement took met with iovroc, is clear from the way he cites the fragment
{Strom. V. 111,7 [11, pp. 401-02 Stahlin]): avriKpvc, 6< 6 tilv "Hpa/cXftroi; "toO \byov rovd'
i6vT0<; oi'ei," ^T/ffij/, "a^weroi ktX." Hippolytus for his part precedes the citation of B 1
with the words (Ref. IX. 9. 3 [p. 241, Wendland]) Sti. 5( \byoc, iarlv au to irav Koi bia
iravTOc, ui>, ovtuc, Xeya. Amelius, cited by Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica XI. 19. 1 (II,
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also be said that, contrary to what is sometimes asserted,^^ Aristotle
does not state, nor necessarily imply, either, that the ambiguity of
aui is incurable. For Aristotle was not concerned with analyzing the
part of Heraclitus' statement he quotes. He was merely trying to find
an example of ambiguity in "punctuation"^" in connection with the
general rule "that a written composition should be easy to read and
therefore easy to deliver; for it is the same thing."^' But this rule is
violated when there are many connectives, "or where the punctuation
is difficult, as in the writings of Heraclitus."^^ He claims, after citing
the beginning of Heraclitus' first fragment, that it is unclear (adrjXov)
whether aui goes with what precedes or with what follows it.^^ Hence
for Aristotle the very fact that two constructions of aui are possible
suffices to make the construction abr]\ov and therefore difficult to
read and to deliver, for we would have to stop and think and give
arguments in favor or against one or the other construction.^*
However, that something is adrjXov means simply that it is not self-
evident or obvious; it does not necessarily follow that Aristotle himself,
if that had been his purpose, would not have been able to decide in
favor of one of the two possibilities he mentions. In other words,
Aristotle is recommending that we write in such a way as to avoid
all possible ambiguity, a rule he himself not infrequently violated.
The next point is to decide how the initial genitive should be
construed. Those who take aui with what follows, however they
construe the words to06' eovroq, take tov \6yov as an objective genitive
depending on a^vveroi. Even some of those who take aui with eovroq
also take the initial genitive to depend upon a^vperoi, while taking
ibvToq aui as modifying tov Xoyov tov6\^^ However, if one takes aui
with iovToq, there are good reasons for taking tov Xoyov tov8' tbvToq
p. 45 [Mras]), says: koL ovto^ apa rfv b Xoyoc, Kad' ov met ovra ra yivoneva eyiviTO, uq av
Kol b 'UpaKXeiToc, a^iwaeu ktX. As for Cleanthes, if in line 21 of his Hy7nn to Zeus we
read uaO' iva yiyvtadai iravruiv Xoyov auv tovra (cf. G. Zuntz, Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology 63 [1958], p. 303), it is likely that he there had Heraclitus in mind and that
he read ocid with eovToq in 22 B 1
.
''' Cf. e.g. Calogero, Gior Crit. della Filos. Ital. 17 (1936). 196.
'" Given the context, with biaaTt^ai Aristotle seems to mean some sort of dot or
stop to be made at appropriate places of a text in order to facilitate the reading of
it. Cf. also note 26 supra.
*' Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 11-12.
'- Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 12-14. It is noteworthy that Aristotle says, not that
it is impossible to punctuate Heraclitus' written statements, but that it is difficult to
do so: TOt yap 'Hpa/cXeirou Siaari^ai tpyov ktX.
'' Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 17-18.
'^ Cf. notes 26 and 30 supra.
'' Cf. e.g. West, op. cit. (note 10 supra), p. 117.
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aiti as a genitive absolute, having concessive force: "Though this
Logos exists always men are uncomprehending both before they have
heard it and once they have heard it." In the first place, the assertion
of the perpetual existence of the Logos acquires emphasis from the
beginning, and greater prominence is given to the state of ignorance
in which men live. Secondly, the word a^vveroi, which for Heraclitus,
as Kirk himself says,^^ has a positive meaning and which he employs
in another fragment (B 34) in a similar way ("ignoramuses"), would
be used here too in an absolute, derogatory, and not merely negative
sense.
According to the testimony of Sextus, the second fragment of
Heraclitus in Diels' edition came soon after the first." If in the latter
aui was meant to be taken with iovroc,, and if the whole initial genitive
is absolute, then there is a striking parallel between tov \6yov to06'
(ouToq aui and tov \6yov 6' eovTOc, ^vuov in 22 B 2, which is certainly
a genitive absolute. ^^ It is in fact possible, perhaps even likely, that
the first part of Heraclitus' book contained a series of predicates of
the Logos, in the genitive absolute, followed by contrasting statements
in which men's failure to understand was emphasized. ^^
Two additional questions concerning the first sentence are the
meaning of the present yiuovrai and of to TrpobTou. To begin with the
latter, in all probability here it means "once" rather than "for the
first time.'"*" For it is Heraclitus' point that men are uncomprehending
both before they have heard the Logos and also after they have
heard it, not merely that they fail to understand it when they hear
it for the first time. This latter meaning would leave open the
possibility of men's understanding the Logos when they hear it for
the second or third time, etc., and such a meaning is precluded by
the rest of this fragment as well as by the rest of the related evidence.^'
As for yivovTaL, it is taken by Verdenius, who in this is followed
by Kirk,^^ as implying result: "men's coming across the Logos results
in incomprehension." This meaning is possible but not necessary, and
I doubt that it was here intended by Heraclitus. He thought that all
'•^ Cf. Kirk. p. 34.
" Sextus (Adv. Math. VII. 133), having cited B 1 and having commented on it,
says: 0X170 irpoaSuXOuv tVi^epa, and then quotes B 2.
^* I should like to emphasize that I do not base my interpretation of B 1 on the
parallelism between B 1 and B 2, as some scholars do (cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 3).
='9 Cf. 22 B 2.
^0 Cf. Kirk, p. 34 with his reference to LSJ, s.v. Ille.
" Both in this fragment and elsewhere (cf. e.g. 22 B 2, 17, 34, etc.) Heraclitus
speaks of men's failure to understand as characteristic of the human condition.
*^ Verdenius, op. cit. (note 5 supra), pp. 279-80; Kirk, p. 40.
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men live in a common world, but that they fail to see the common
law and system of the universe (cf. 22 B 1 14, 2, 30, SQ'*'); that is,
they fail to see how things are related to one another and, hence,
do not apprehend the Logos. Therefore, I think it preferable to take
a^vveroL yiuovTai to denote the state of ignorance in which men live
despite the fact that the Logos is always there and that Heraclitus
explains it to them. Like the above mentioned scholars, I see no
contrast between etvaL and yiyvecrdai implied in this fragment, as
Gigon thinks there is.*''
The purpose of the fragment's second sentence is not so much to
explain the state of ignorance in which men live as tojustify Heraclitus'
assertion to that effect. It begins with a concessive genitive absolute,
which tells us that "though all things happen according to this Logos,"
men are like people of no experience {airdpoKJiv), i.e. they are
ignorant. I believe the next participle, Teipwueuoi, is temporal-con-
cessive rather than purely concessive,"*^ and not frequentative, as Diels
and Marcovich, among others, take it.''^ It is not the case that men
are like the inexperienced each time they experience words and
deeds such as Heraclitus explains. Rather, though all things happen
according to this Logos, men are like the inexperienced even when
they experience (i.e. are acquainted with) words and deeds such as
Heraclitus explains. In other words, that men are ignorant before
they have heard the discourse of Heraclitus is bad enough; but it is
much worse that they continue to live in ignorance and fail to
understand even when they become acquainted with Heraclitus'
doctrine, for in this last case they had the opportunity to compare
Heraclitus' statements with the facts, as all things happen according
to this Logos.
The word-play aTreipoLaiu-TreLpicixeuoL is most probably intentional,
as are the similar ones in 22 B 2, 28, 48, 114, etc. According to
Kirk, "in the present case it is simply a stylistic trick and can imply
no underlying connexion of sense between the similar word-forms,
for the connexion is quite obvious.'"*^ Yet it is difficult to agree that
because a connection is quite obvious the word-play must be simply
a stylistic trick and nothing more than that. The word-play here does
convey the implication that men, though acquainted not only with
*'^ In B 89, at least the first part is, pace Kirk, authentic, cf. Vlastos, American
Journal of Philology 76 (1955), 344 ff.
^* Cf. Kirk, pp. 40-41 against Gigon, p. 3.
"^ Cf. also Kirk, pp. 33 and 41.
''*' Cf. Diels in earlier versions of FVS, an interpretation adopted also by Kranz in
the 6th edition. Marcovich', p. 9 = Marcovich^, p. 10.
'' Kirk, p. 41.
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the facts but also with Heraclitus' doctrine, nevertheless are like the
inexperienced in that they fail to understand. Other fragments, too,
stress men's characteristic inability to understand;''® but here, in 22
B I , the point is made that if one fails to understand the Logos, then
one cannot really possess any true experience, which among other
things requires repetition and memory, memory of the connection
between the things that constitute a single experience/^ Similarly,
men may become acquainted (Treipci/nej^ot) with Heraclitus' doctrine
more than once but they still fail to understand, and so are like the
inexperienced. To my mind this is the reason why in this context the
word airupoc, was used for "ignorant." In fact, this fragment, not
mentioned by Liddell-Scott-Jones, s.v. «7reipog (A), is evidence of the
connection between the literal meaning "without trial or experience"
and the absolute sense "inexperienced," "ignorant."
The words eTrecoi/ koX tpycjiv were probably meant to recall the epic
formula eVog KaX epyov. Kirk says that in Heraclitus "the words are
the means of explanation, the deeds or events are the things which
are explained."^" This is true, but only up to a point. For there is
here an implication that men could see the Logos in language itself
even apart from their hearing it from Heraclitus. Now Heraclitus
believes that his doctrine is instantiated in human speech (cf. for
example the connection made between fiioq and ^ioq in 22 B 48 and
that between ^vv v6<f and ^vuoq in B 114), and so I suggest that he
meant that men by themselves could see the Logos there as well as
in the facts of experience. If this is so, then it is likely that he used
eireoiv Kal epy(t)u as a polar expression for "the whole of human
experience," as Reinhardt and others have thought.^'
The verb dtriyevnai has received little attention on the part of
interpreters, even though there has been a lot of discussion as to
whether Heraclitus' book was a collection ofaphorisms or a continuous
exposition. ^^ 1 agree with Walzer (p. 42, note 7) that dir]yeiadaL
indicates, not a collection ofaphorisms but rather a descriptive writing,
i.e. a treatise. The first fragment of Heraclitus supports such an
interpretation and so do, among others, 22 B 114, 30, etc. It is
*^ Cf. note 41 supra.
*^ Cf. Aristotle's words in Metaphysics 980 B 28 - 981 A 1: yiyueraL 5' m rfiq nvrjuriq
invfipia Toiq avdpCj-KOic; ai yap iroXXal ^ivfifiai tov avTOV irpaynaToc, niaz, i^nrap'uxc; bwafuv
airoTiXovaii/.
^" Kirk, p. 41.
^' Cf. Reinhardt, p. 218, Marcovich', p. 9 = Marcovich^, p. 10.
*^ Cf. Zeller in Zeller-Nestle, I, ii*^, p. 788, n. 1 and the references given by




therefore likely that the aphoristic character of other fragments is
due to the way they have been transmitted to us and not to Heraclitus
himself. But even if some of Heraclitus' utterances were aphorisms,
it is unlikely that the whole book was merely a collection of such
utterances. It is noteworthy that oKoio^v eyo) diriyevnai Kara (f)vaiv
diaipeoov tKaoTov koI 4>pa^(i)v oKmc, e'xft must refer to the whole or to
most of Heraclitus' treatise and not merely to its first part.
The two participial phrases, {di-qyevnaL) Kara (})v<nv biaipewv (Kaarov
Kal (t>pcx^ijjp oKOjq ex^i, have given rise to several different interpreta-
tions. First of all one must decide what is here meant by diaLpelv.
Marcovich takes it in the literal meaning "to divide," in the sense of
"taking apart." As examples he gives the bow in 22 B 51 (it consists
of two arms and of the unifying string) and the analysis of a word,
as in 22 B 48 ("the name and the function are the two constituent
parts of every given thing"). ^^ However, even apart from the fact
that his interpretation of B 5 1 is questionable and that the implication
he sees in B 48 is too far-reaching,^^ it is doubtful, in the light of
our evidence, that Heraclitus devoted the essential part of his treatise
to the type of analysis Marcovich describes. ^^ But I think Marcovich
is right in his attempt to relate the two participial phrases to the rest
of Heraclitus' statements. However, if we are to take biaipdv eKaarov
in the sense "to divide each thing," I believe that Heraclitus was
thinking of his predecessors' procedure of dividing their main "ma-
terial substances"^'' into contraries. Thus, for example, Anaximenes
asserted (using the mechanism of condensation and rarefaction) that
all was air and then proceeded to divide this body into contraries:
hot and cold, humid and dry, etc.^' It is this procedure on the part
of his predecessors that Parmenides illustrates when he describes the
opinions of mortals. ^^ If this is what Heraclitus meant by biaipdv
tKaoTov, then we must think of his doctrine of identity-in-difference,
of the unity of contraries, etc., which presupposes not only some sort
of classification of things into contraries but also contrariety in the
^' Marcovich', p. 10 = Marcovich^, pp. 10-11.
^^ Even in B 48 itself I cannot see that Heraclitus implies that the name and the
function of the bow are its two constituent parts.
** Heraclitus seems to place more emphasis on the bringing of things together
rather than on "taking them apart." The unity of things, i.e. of contraries, seems to
be what he claims as his most original contribution. Cf. 22 b 2, 10, 30, 41, 51, 54,
57, etc.
^^ By this expression I mean to refer simply to the most widely distributed bodies
in the universe mentioned by the Presocratics, e.g. water, fire, etc.
" Cf. Anaximenes 13 A 1, A 4, A 5, A 7, B 1, B 2, etc.
^* Cf. Parmenides 28 B 8, 55-59 with L. Taran, Parmenides (Princeton 1965), p.
225.
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things themselves. This procedure could be illustrated by fragments
such as B 1 2 iroranolaLU tolclu avToioLV ifx^aiuovaiv erepa Kal erepa
vSara iirtppel, B 36 xl/vxV'^t-v Bavaroq vdoop yevecrdaL, vdari de dauaroq
yfiv yivtaOai, B 48 toj to^co duofia 0ioq, epyov de dauaroc,, B 61 daXaaaa
vdicp Kadap6)TaT0v kol fjLiapojTarov, txdvai ixiv ttotihov Kal atcTrjpiou,
avdpojwoic, di airoTov Kal oXedpiov, etc. However, it is also possible that
we must take diaipelu here in the more general sense "to distinguish,"
as Kirk.-'-' among others does, for Heraclitus may have meant merely
to say that each thing*^" is described by him Kara (pvaiu. But I cannot
agree with Kirk that diaipeicv here is (merely) the process of analysis
that leads up to a judgment. It seems to be rather the process by
which a thing is described and thereby is differentiated from anything
else, though of course in Heraclitus that very differentiation will show
it to be related to everything else. As for Kara (J)volv, I should prefer
to take it not as "according to each thing's origin," nor as "according
to each thing's nature," nor as "according to each thing's real
constitution," but in its true adverbial meaning "properly," "as it
ought to be (sc. described)."*^' One objection common to the rejected
interpretations is that at this stage in his book it is not likely that
Heraclitus would have written Kara (f)V(XLV diaipecov if he had meant
to ascribe to 4>v(nc, a technical meaning. 1 agree with Verdenius and
Kirk°^ that OKonq e'xei is not a different process from Kara (t)V(TLV
biaipioiv, but that the two are related. Heraclitus proposes to describe
each thing correctly and so to be able to state how it is.
In the third and final part of the fragment, Heraclitus proceeds
to describe the kind of life the rest of men (rouq 6e aWovc; avdpo^Trovq)
lead because of their ignorance of the Logos, in strong contrast with
Heraclitus' own condition (eyo) dLrjyevnaL ktX.). Kirk and Marcovich,
among others, take the final part of the fragment to mean that the
rest of men fail to understand what they do once they are awake
(taking eyepdevreq as an ingressive aorist participle), just as they forget
what they do when they are asleep: "But the rest of men fail to
notice what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they
do when asleep" (Kirk's translation). Before discussing this interpre-
tation it may be well to indicate a point of agreement: ttolovolv, which
must also be supplied with the second clause, should not be interpreted
too literally, iroulu here refers not only to what men actually do but
•" Kirk, pp. 33 and 41-42.
''" In any interpretation of the words in question ^Kaarov is a rhetorical exaggeration.
"' Cf. J. W. Beardslee, Jr., The Use of <t>vaic, in Fifth-Century Greek Literature (diss.,
Chicago 1918), p. 47.
"'^ Verdenius, op. cit. (note 5 supra), p. 273; Kirk, pp. 42-43.
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also to their mental and emotional life. Moreover, the second clause
refers to our dreams when we are asleep; it certainly does not refer
primarily to the motions or gesticulations we may perform while we
are asleep. ^^
The difficulties of the interpretation they have adopted have not
escaped Kirk and Marcovich themselves, and are indeed formidable.
If we take iinXavdavovTaL to mean "they forget," then Heraclitus
would be saying that men once they are awake fail to recognize, to
see the ever-present truth just as they, on waking, forget what they
did in sleep, that is, they forget their dreams. However, in the first
place, it is not the case that men always forget their dreams; quite
frequently they do not forget them. And so we would have a first
important inconcinnity. Heraclitus would be comparing the perpetual
failure of ignorant men to understand the truth with something that
happens to men sometimes only. And there is evidence in Heraclitus
himself that he did not think that we always forget our dreams.^"*
Secondly, and even more important, even if men did forget their
dreams, it is hard to see the propriety of comparing men's customary
failure to know the truth with the fact that once they are awake they
forget their dreams. This difficulty should not be dismissed with
Kirk's remark that "slight inconsistencies in complex images are not
uncommon in the archaic style."*^^ The comparison would not be
slightly inconsistent but rather a non sequitur. Marcovich for his part
betrays the weakness of the interpretation to which he subscribes
when he states that "the sentence would be complete in itself even
without i-KLXavdavovTaL, (which cannot mean the same as Xavdavu):
possibly Heraclitus added this word for the sake of balance or of the
word-play."^*' For we would have to suppose that for the sake of
balance or of word-play Heraclitus added a word, iTriXavdavovTai,
and ruined the whole point of the comparison, as without it the
statement would yield a good sense: "But it escapes the rest of men
what they do once they are awake, just as it escapes them what they
do while they are asleep." I agree with Marcovich that eTVLXavBavovTai
does not mean the same as the preceding XavQavti, but to decide
what Heraclitus had in mind it is necessary to see first what he meant
by the comparison in general.
One must note two points. First, that to the man who knows the
Logos, specifically Heraclitus himself {eyd), the nescience of the rest
®' Contrast West, op. cit. (note 10 supra), p. 116, who thinks that the reference is
to bodily movements which men make while asleep.
^^ Cf. 22 B 21 with B 26; B 75; B 89.
" Kirk, p. 44.
^^ Marcovich', p. 10 = Marcovich^, p. 11.
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of humanity in wakefulness is strongly contrasted. Secondly, Heraclitus
must have meant to compare men's failure to apprehend the Logos
when they are awake with what happens to them when they are
asleep and dreaming. In other words, he is comparing two states,
and we must keep in mind that to sleep and dream is for Heraclitus,
as Kirk himself says, "a real if diminished form of activity."*^' Now
iinXaudavonaL literally means "to let something which one previously
knew escape one's notice" ;*^^ here, used of what happens to men
while they are dreaming, it must refer to this: the successive images
we see in our dreams escape our notice in such a way that we do not
understand— because we are not conscious of— the nature of what
we do in our sleep. This is in fact the way in which some interpreters
have understood eTnXaudauouTai in this fragment. *^^ To Kirk's and
Marcovich's objection that there is no parallel to such a meaning,
one must answer that it is the context that is crucial for deciding
what a word means. Moreover, the middle iTnXavdavonaL or eTriXrjdofiaL
frequently bears the meaning "to forget" in the sense of "not being
conscious of." Thus, for example, when at the beginning of Plato's
Apology (17 A 2-3) Socrates says iyoo 6' ovv /cat avrbq utt' avTo:v oXiyov
enavTov i-KiXadb^irjv, he surely means to say that the effect of his
accusers' speeches was such that he almost "forgot himself" in the
sense of "not being conscious of who he really was." If this interpre-
tation is right, then the comparison makes sense: "(in contrast to
Heraclitus who knows the Logos) it escapes the rest of men what
they do once they are awake, just as when they are asleep they are
unconscious of (i.e. do not understand) what they do." Heraclitus
does not mean to say that the rest of men when awake have no
knowledge at all of what they do but only that the true significance
of it escapes them. For example, they see day and they see night, but
they do not understand that night and day are a single thing (cf. 22
B 57). The interpretation of the final comparison given here makes
better sense of e-yepdeureq as an ingressive aorist than that of Kirk and
Marcovich does. In their interpretation the comparison would be
between two things that happen when men are awake: they fail to
understand the Logos just as they forget their dreams. In my
interpretation, men, once they are awake, fail to understand the
Logos just as when they were asleep they did not understand their
" Kirk, p. 44.
**" Kirk, p. 44.
^^ Cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 6; Kranz FVS^ I, p. 150; Walzer, p. 41; H. Frankel, American
Journal of Philology 59 (1938), 318 with n. 18.
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dreams. The implication is that the waking life of the ignorant
majority has a dreamlike quality.
This fragment, then, implies the geometrical proportion-pattern
"the man who knows the Logos is to men awake who fail to understand
it as the latter are to those who are asleep and dreaming."'" The
pattern A:B::B:C was used by Heraclitus in other connections also,''
and the specific one implied in the first fragment is also to be
reconstructed with good probability from other texts. '^
This is not the place to discuss the meaning of Logos in Heraclitus,
since several other fragments would have to be taken into account.
Nevertheless, something can be gathered even from this fragment
itself, and belongs to the present discussion because it affects the
interpretation of our text. The main point is that the Logos cannot
be simply Heraclitus' discourse,'^ nor can it even refer principally to
it.'^ For it is clearly implied here that men could have known the
Logos even before they heard it from Heraclitus.'^ All things happen
according to the Logos, yet men are like the inexperienced even
when they experience such words and deeds as Heraclitus describes;
it follows that the Logos is always there but men fail to understand
it because they fail to see the connection that exists between all the
facts with which they are acquainted. In short, the Logos must be a
formula or pattern in accordance with which all things happen in the
universe. The discourse of Heraclitus expounds and explains this
Logos, but the Logos' existence is independent of it. The discourse
of Heraclitus "is" the Logos only in the sense that it describes the
formula according to which all things happen in the universe; but
the two are not identical, and they are clearly differentiated in frag.
B 50: ovK eixoi) aWa tov Xoyov aKovaavraq ktX.
Columbia University
'^
I do not mean to say that this geometrical pattern was the main purpose of
this part of the fragment, but that it is implied there.
" Cf. especially H. Frankel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," American Journal
of Philology 59 (1938), 309-37, though there is no need to follow him in all his
interpretations of individual fragments.
" Cf. 22 B 89 with B 72 and Cherniss, Selected Papers, p. 39 with n. 13.
'^ As e.g. West, op. cit. (note 10 supra), pp. 115 and 1 17 would have it.
''' As Burnet, p. 133 and n. 1, suggests.
" Cf. note 22 supra.

Anaxagoras and Infinite Divisibility
BRAD INWOOD
In 1957 John Raven announced that no one ever disputed the claim
that "Anaxagoras really believed in the infinite divisibility of matter."'
No doubt he was right about that, and Raven like all his predecessors
and most of his successors proceeded to interpret Anaxagoras' com-
plex and vaguely expressed theory of matter on the assumption .that
one central feature of it was the infinite divisibility of particles of
matter.
But times change, and we live in a more skeptical age. Malcolm
Schofield^ has recently challenged the claim that Anaxagoras used a
notion of infinite divisibility in his theory of matter. Unfortunately,
Schofield's skepticism is uncharacteristically timid here, and he never
provides a clear statement of his reasons for questioning the traditional
view, nor attempts a demonstration of its weakness or a sketch of
what the theory of matter would look like without this venerable
fixed point. Schofield restricts himself to redescribing it as "unlimited
smallness"^ and pointing out that "infinite divisibility" is not an
expression which represents ideas in which Anaxagoras shows an
interest.
Jonathan Barnes' recent discussion of Anaxagorean physics'*
' P. 377 in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers; first edition,
Cambridge 1957. In the second edition (1983, with additional material by Malcolm
Schofield), this claim is not altered (p. 367).
- An Essay on Anaxagoras (Cambridge 1980).
' P. 79. But infinite divisibility returns on p. 81.
^ In The Presocratic Philosophers, vol. 2 (London 1979). There is little change in
the second edition (in one volume, 1982).
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fills some of the gaps. For he argues that a central element in the
traditional view, the claim that Anaxagoras believed that matter had
particulate structure, is false. This, I think, is correct. For as Schofield
emphasizes, division of matter is not a prominent theoretical concept
in Anaxagoras' fragments;^ in its place we find mixture and separation,
which need not refer to particles of matter at all, but are equally
suited to the idea that matter exists in the form of non-particulate
stuffs which can be blended— as pastes or liquids are combined,
perhaps, rather than as grainy substances like salt and flour which
are sifted together.
I shall take as given, then, the view that Anaxagoras' notion of
the structure of matter does not include the belief that it is particulate.
On the traditional view, one reason why Anaxagoras believed in
infinite divisibility was that it was necessary to make the claim of
universal mixture (all is in all) consistent with the idea of particulate
matter. As William Mann points out in a recent article, abandoning
particles thus removes a powerful motivation for adopting a theory
of infinite divisibility.*^ Mann, unfortunately, fails to ask the obvious
question: did Anaxagoras, then, believe in infinite divisibility? He
tamely accepts the received dogma.
Further probing is still needed, and I want to do a bit of that
work in this paper. I will first buttress the view that there is no need
to posit infinite divisibility for Anaxagoras by outlining the reasons
for finding it prima facie implausible that he would believe in infinite
divisibility, and I shall suggest very briefly one reason why Anaxagoras
has been interpreted so often in the traditional way. This should keep
the burden of proof squarely on the shoulders of the supporters of
the traditional view. Here I shall principally use observations made
by others. Second, I shall try out some ideas about what will replace
infinite divisibility in Anaxagoras' theory of matter. For Barnes has
seen that if particles, infinitely divisible, are banished, then a new
understanding of "indefinite smallness" is needed. He offers such an
interpretation himself; but I think that one can do better. Moreover,
'' For a different view, see D. Sider, The Fragments of Anaxagoras (Meisenheim am
Glan: Anton Hain 1981 = Beitrage fiir Klassische Philologie 118), pp. 56-57, which I
find unconvincing. Professor Woodbury suggests that Anaxagoras' term iiolpa contains
a reference to division. But this is not a necessary implication of the term. The
reference to cutting with an axe in fragment B 8 is a metaphor for separation, not
a literal reference to the division of matter.
^ "Anaxagoras and the Homoiomere," Phronesis 25 (1980), 246.
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as Mann properly stresses, "indefinite largeness" is as important to
Anaxagoras as is smallness. Any story about the former should work,
mutatis mutandis, for the latter. I hope that one merit of my own
interpretation over Barnes' is that it will account for the use of
largeness and other quantity terms, as well as smallness. The key
point, however, is that giving up infinite divisibility creates a need
for fresh hypotheses about smallness and largeness in the fragments
of Anaxagoras; the field for new speculation here is still wide open.
The idea that matter is infinitely divisible, however familiar it may
now be or may have been to Aristotle, is not an intuitively obvious
one, nor is it a natural one. One would not expect any given
philosopher to employ it without a definite motivation, either in the
work of someone else or in his own. The possibility that Anaxagoras
developed the notion as a result of the theoretical demands of his
own analysis of matter cannot be dismissed out of hand. But recent
observations have, as we have seen, removed the familiar theory
about how such a doctrine arose from Anaxagoras' own problems
and positions. Most scholars until recently (I think particularly of
Cornford, Raven, and Guthrie) have seen the external stimulus in
the works of Zeno of Elea. Zeno did develop several dialectical
arguments against the possibility of motion and plurality which turned
on the infinite divisibility of matter and space, and it is often thought
that Anaxagoras was reacting critically to these in putting forth his
own theory of the infinite divisibility of matter. But there are problems
in this traditional view, both philosophical and chronological.
First, as David Furley, Malcolm Schofield, and Jonathan Barnes
have argued,' the "response" of Anaxagoras to Zeno, if that is what
it is, is feeble indeed. Their observations need not be repeated in
detail. Anaxagoras, if he is responding to Zeno, is indulging in mere
counterassertion and not employing arguments against him. Furley,
in fact, points out that the similarities indicate, if anything, a response
by Zeno to Anaxagoras.^
And it is just as well that we need not view Anaxagoras as reacting
to Zeno, since recent work has indicated that Anaxagoras' writings
were probably produced earlier in the fifth century than used to be
assumed.^ The most powerful case on this point is made by Wood-
^ Barnes, p. 35, Schofield, pp. 80-82, David Furley, "Anaxagoras in Response to
Parmenides," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. Vol. 2 (1976), 76-80.
^ Op. cit. (above, note 7), p. 78.
^
J. Mansfeld, "The Chronology of Anaxagoras' Athenian Period and the Date
of his Trial," Mnemosyne 32 (1979), 39-60; 33 (1980), 17-95, is the major exception
among recent authors. For discussion see L. E. Woodbury, "Anaxagoras and Athens,"
Phoenix 35 (1981), p. 306, n. 28.
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bury,'" who argues that Anaxagoras' philosophical impact began in
the 470s and that his activity at Athens was over by, at the latest,
450. It is noteworthy, Woodbury reminds us, that Plato represents
Socrates as having access only to Anaxagoras' book. By the time
Socrates was a young man the book of which we have fragments was
written and Anaxagoras was gone. Zeno, according to Plato, would
still have been able to talk with the young Socrates." Nothing in
Plato's picture of Athenian intellectual life in Socrates' youth en-
courages us to see Anaxagoras as replying to Zeno.'^
As to the absolute dates of Zeno's and Anaxagoras' books little
can be known. Both Schofield and Furley'^ point out the weakness in
the traditional argument that Anaxagoras wrote after 467 B.C., on
the grounds that his theory that the heavenly bodies are glowing
stones must have been influenced by the fall of the meteorite at
Aigospotamoi in that year. It is more likely that he wrote before the
meteorite fell, since he is credited with predicting its fall. This is
closer to the truth if the meteorite confirmed the theory rather than
suggesting it.
Furley and Barnes properly emphasize that all of the philosophical
characteristics of Anaxagoras are adequately accounted for if we see
him as reacting only to Parmenides. Schofield's book-length study
led him to similar views, and he sees Anaxagoras as an "archaic
sage," rather than as an up-to-date dialectician engaged in the
sophisticated debate of the mid-fifth century. O'Brien's detailed
examination of the relative dates of Empedocles and Anaxagoras
confirms this.''* Anaxagoras is the earlier thinker according to all of
the external evidence. Particular weight must be put on the evidence
of Alcidamas,'^ who made Zeno and Empedocles contemporaries and
pointed out that Anaxagoras had influenced Empedocles.
I conclude, then, that unless the best recent work on the subject
is all in error, there is no reason to suspect that Zeno influenced
Anaxagoras at all, and some to suggest that he in fact wrote after
Anaxagoras. At all events, we may take it that Anaxagoras wrote
'" See previous note. Note also Sven-Tage Teodorsson, Anaxagoras' Theory ofMatter,
Goteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1982, pp. 8-9.
'
' Although his book in defense of Parmenides is described as a product of Zeno's
younger days (Parmenides 128d-e).
'^ Teodorsson, pp. 70-71, supposes that Anaxagoras reacted not only to Zeno
but also to Leucippus.
'' Schofield, p. 34, Furley, p. 77.
'^ D. O'Brien, "The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles," yourna/ of Hellenic
Studies 88 (1968), 93-113.
'^ Diogenes Laertius 8. 56.
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independently of Zenonian influence. The external motivation for
Anaxagoras to develop a theory of the infinite divisibility of matter
is also gone.
Why, then, have so many scholars and philosophers been so willing
to see Anaxagoras in this light? In addition to the chronological error
with relation to Zeno, we may point to a feature of the Aristotelian
and Epicurean"' doxographical traditions. I refer to the tendency of
Aristotle and his commentators (especially Simplicius)" to group
Anaxagoras with the atomists because of certain alleged similarities
in their views about the apxou- In the Peripatetic scheme, Anaxagoras
and Leucippus and Democritus all held that the apxoci were aireipoL.
This is a tidy grouping, even though Aristotle correctly supposed
that the a-Ketpoi apxoct would be quite different in significance in the
two systems. Anaxagoras, on Aristotle's view,'^ held that the apxou
were an indefinite number of kinds of stuffs, while the atomists
believed in a literally infinite number of atoms. But the tendency to
see Anaxagoras as a believer in an infinite number of particles, which,
however, were not octoiiol, was so strong that Aetius, repeating perhaps
Theophrastus,'^ describes him in atomistic terms as believing in Xoyu)
de(jL>pr]Ta /xopta. So Anaxagoras becomes a non-atomistic particle theor-
ist, like Leucippus except that his particles are not aTop.oi. This
doxographical tradition is also prominent in Lucretius' famous ac-
count of Anaxagorean physics,'^" in which bones, for example, come
to be from "tiny and minute bits of bone" and flesh from "tiny and
minute bits of flesh," and so forth.
But this association with and alleged similarity to Leucippan ato-
mism is unsupported by Anaxagoras' own words. For there particles
are never mentioned.^' It is the doxographical habit of grouping
Anaxagoras with the atomists which introduces particles. And of
course, once particles are introduced into his system, it is inevitable
that they be interpreted as infinitely divisible, in order to account
"* See Teodorsson, pp. 20-21, who properly emphasizes both doxographic errors
throughout his short book.
" Simplicius, In Phys., p. 453. 1-3. 458. 26 ff., 461. 9 fF., 461. 30 - 462. 3, 1069.
20-25, 1120. 20-24, 1254. 20 ff., 1266. 33-36.
'» A 43.
'^ A 46; cf. Barnes p. 22. It is also possible that the Epicurean tradition is at work
here, since the terminology used is otherwise best attested for that school. Julia
Annas pointed out that at Sextus Pyrrh. hypot. 1 . 1 47 bfwiotitpri are mentioned alongside
atoms and ikaxitrra as candidates for being twc ovtwv aroixtux. This too suggests the
doxographical tendency of the Epicurean school.
2" A 44 = On the Nature of Things 1. 833-879.
^' The term nolpa is as close as one can get to an Anaxagorean term for particle.
See note 5 above.
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for what he does say about the structure of matter, in particular to
maintain consistency with the claim that there is a portion of every-
thing in everything.^^
My own hypothesis about Anaxagoras' theory of matter can best
be tested by applying it to the preserved fragments in detail; it
proposes new and rather special interpretations for Anaxagoras' key
theoretical terms referring to quantities. I concede at the outset that
some of these suggested interpretations are strange; but there has
yet to be an interpretation of his theory which did not have some
strange and perhaps incredible feature, and I doubt that there ever
will be. It is obvious, to me at any rate, that some of the difficulty
of Anaxagoras' fragments derives from his attempt to say quite new
and difficult things with the limited resources of ordinary Greek,
without coining new technical terms. This would have made his book
difficult for his contemporaries too and helps to explain why it was
so easy for his theories to be misunderstood by later doxographers.
Some re-evaluation of his words is essential if any progress is to be
made in understanding his theory. So I ask the reader to ponder the
suggested meanings for familiar terms as an hypothesis, and to
consider the economy and efficiency of this hypothesis in accounting
for Anaxagoras' fragments in the context of fifth-century intellectual
history.
The reasons for the various suggestions I make about the meaning
of quantity terms in Anaxagoras will be clear in the course of the
discussion. But it will be helpful if I state at the outset the proposals
I am making. I intend to interpret the following Greek terms thus:
irXridoq: amount, the total quantity of any stuff found in the
universe.
(xeyedoq: largeness, the characteristic of being separated out and
so distinguishable from other stuffs.
aniKpoTr^q: smallness, the characteristic of being mixed and so
not distinguishable from other stuffs.
These suggested definitions have emerged from a reading of the
^'^ Aristotle follows out this line of reasoning in Physics 1. 4. Teodorsson, oddly
enough (pp. 74 fF.), argues that Anaxagoras employed the concept of infinite divisibility
but not that of particle. I should also emphasize at this point that although Aristotle's
discussions are the source of the particulate interpretation of Anaxagoras' theory
(note for example oyKoi at Physics 1. 4, 187a37) Aristotle himself seems never to
attribute to Anaxagoras the idea of infinite divisibility. In Physics 1. 4 he pursues a
line of thought based on his own reflections about Anaxagoras, and in the course of
this (187b7-188al8) introduces the idea in question. But in his actual accounts of
what Anaxagoras believed the suspect notion is not to be found.
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fragments themselves, with no prior assumptions about the meaning
of these terms, which are obviously central to Anaxagoras' theory.^^
The interpretation I propose is not the only one possible; in effect,
it competes with Barnes' view. I claim that it is more plausible and
compatible with the fragments than that interpretation. But if it
seems to be at least a serious contender, then my present aim will
have been accomplished. Now to the most important of the fragments.
Fragment one:
All things*^'' were together, indefinite both in amount and in smallness.
For the small too was indefinite. And since all things were together,
nothing was distinct because of smallness. For air and aither covered
all things, both of them being indefinite— for these things are greatest
among the totality both in amount and in greatness.
The first observation to make is about the word irXridoq, which I
render "amount." As others have seen,^^ there is no need to translate
it as "number" with its implications of countable units, at least not
in fifth-century Ionic prose. ^'^ But even if it is translated in that way,
it does not follow that particles are meant; it could, as Aristotle seems
'^' The unusual interpretation I propose for fikyedoq and a/uKpcnriq is not without
support of a sort from another philosopher, Empedocles, who is also trying to grapple
with Parmenides' legacy of argument. His "roots" are always the same in total
amount. Yet they dwindle {(pdivd) into each other when they are mixed together (by
love) and grow {av^trai) when separated (by strife): B 26.2. Surely "dwindling"
suggests becoming "smaller" and "growing" suggests becoming "larger" in much
the same sense which I propose for Anaxagoras. Of course, the One of Empedocles
also "grows" as the elements shrink (B 17.1, 17.16). But the One is not a permanent
thing meeting Parmenidean standards, as the roots and Anaxagoras' x/owara are. It
is not clear whether mixing and separation in Empedocles involve particles of matter.
This is perhaps suggested by Aristotle at De Sensu 441a3 If., where he seems to be
assimilating Empedocles to an atomistic theory, and at Metaphysics A, 984a9-l 1: ravra
yap ad dianivHv /cat ov yiyptaBai aW fi irXfidH koi oXiyorriTL. But the way in which the
mixture occurs does not affect my point here. Quite possibly Empedocles did not
explicitly address the question whether his theory involved particles, just as he seems
not to have thought through the question whether his theory of pores should commit
him to a belief in the existence of void.
^^ When marked with an asterisk, "things" is a direct translation of xPWotra.
^^ E.g. Barnes, p. 16; D. Lanza, Anassagora: Testimonianze e Frammenti, Firenze: La
Nuova Italia, 1966, ad loc.
'^'' Herodotus uses irXfidoc, for "amount" in this way; see 1.204.1 for a parallel to
Anaxagoras' phrase "indefinite in amount." -iroXvq, in the singular, means simply
"much," and irXfiOoq is the corresponding noun for this sense as well as for the sense
"many" which is expressed by the plural iroXXa. In addition, Henry Mendell points
out that Plato uses irXridoc, to govern mass nouns as well as count nouns, confirming
that such a use is quite respectable even in classical Attic prose. Examples (many
more could be found): Phaedrus 279c, Theaetetus I58d, Politicus 269b. Sider's inter-
pretation of irXrfioq, (pp. 45, 58-60) is complex and, in my opinion, implausible.
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to have seen, refer to the number of kinds of basic stuffs found in
the original mixture and now in the world we observe. Still, I prefer
the interpretation of it as referring to the total amount of each stuff,
for reasons which will become apparent.
Second, what is meant by "smallness" when it is applied to the
apxoiU the adrjXa xP^o^TOi of the mixture? We are told that "since
all things were together, nothing was distinct [evdrjXov] because of
smallness." Traditionally this is taken to mean that the particles are
simply too small to be seen
—
just like atoms. On the other hand,
Barnes, focussing on fragments 3 and 6, understands smallness
differently. It is not particles which are "small," according to Barnes,
but portions or shares in mixed substances. ^^ But this, while perhaps
making sense in fragments 3 and 6, is clearly out of place in fragment
1. It is preferable to develop a view of large and small which will
apply to all the fragments and which will have it refer to the xPWo^Ta
themselves, rather than to portions or shares of them. For that is
how Anaxagoras speaks in fragment 1; Anaxagoras nowhere refers,
not even in fragment 6, to small and large portions, as Barnes' view
demands, but always to portions of what is itself large or small.
Consequently we look elsewhere for an interpretation of smallness;
and we have an explanation drawn from Anaxagoras' own fragments
which points in a different and more satisfactory direction. In frag-
ment 4b we read, "before these things were separated off [sc. from
the mixture], when because all things were together no color [or
surface, xpo(.y]] was distinct either; for the commingling of all things
prevented this." The xPVP-^Ta meant are then specified:^® they are
the pairs of opposites, wet-dry, hot-cold, etc. In fragment 1 "smallness"
was responsible for the indistinctness; here the mixture is responsible
for the same feature. Therefore I would hypothesize that smallness,
for the xP^o^To^y is simply the condition of being thoroughly distrib-
uted in the mixture. There need be no reference to the size of
discrete particles, as the traditional theory requires, nor even, as
Barnes' view would have it, to the quantity of a portion expressible
numerically or at any rate algebraically. Similarly, "largeness," to
which reference is made presently, will on this hypothesis be the
condition of being separated off and so distinguishable; not bigness
of the particles or of the portions of a stuff. Barnes' interpretation,
in fact, introduces the idea of numerically expressible fractional shares
and apparently does so only to give sense to the idea of large and
^^ The idea of small portions first appears on p. 33.
^^ Earth and the airkptuxra seem to be distinguished from the opposites— because,
I think, they are reducible to them; earth, seeds, etc. are derivative. See below.
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small shares of a stuff. But not only is the idea of fractional shares
not even hinted at in the fragments; the concepts which Barnes uses
it to explain— "small" and "large" portions or shares— are also not
Anaxagorean.
Fragment 1 itself says something about the reason for the lack of
distinctness of things. It is because air and aither cover or dominate
the mixture. Here I must take a position on a contentious issue. ^^ I
do not think that air and aither are identifiable components of the
mixture; i.e. they are not xPVI-'-<xTa in the sense that the opposites
are. Rather, like earth and the seeds mentioned in fragment 4b, they
are only "virtually" present in the mixture, by which I mean that
the opposites needed to make them up are present. After all, fragment
2 tells us that air and aither have to be separated off from the mixture
^^ Barnes retains the view that real stuffs {iovra xpi7M«7-a) include many ordinary
macroscopic stuffs, such as air, bread, and cheese. As far as I can see, Anaxagoras
never says this. Aristotle does, but I think that he misunderstands Anaxagoras. My
own view, that the iovra xPVhi^o^'roi (i.e. the elemental entities which alone obey
Parmenidean rules of permanence) are only the opposites and that everything else
including the seeds, the so-called Empedoclean elements, and flesh, bone, etc. is
derivative and disobedient to Parmenidean rules of permanence, is close to Vlastos'
position ("The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras," pp. 323-53 in R. E. Allen and D.
J. Furley edd.. Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, vol.2, London 1975). For he holds that
the seeds, flesh, earth, etc. arf just the opposites; his account of the relation of seeds
etc. and powers on pp. 337-38 is attractive and, I believe, correct, although I suspect
that it is inconsistent with other statements he makes about the status of seeds etc.
But because he accepts the authenticity of fragment 10 (now put in some doubt by
Schofield, op. cit., pp. 135 ff. and "Doxographica Anaxagorea" Hermes 103 [1975],
1-24), Vlastos presents his own position in a manner which I find unclear if not
contradictory. For while denying that the flesh or the seeds of flesh, e.g., are anything
over and above the powers, he still maintains that they are just as "primordial" and
"elemental." This would be redundant and to my mind implausible. It seems to be
a result of three factors: (1) the continued acceptance of the authenticity of fragment
10; (2) a degree of reliance on the doxographical tradition, which I believe distorts
Anaxagoras' theory on just this point; (3) a failure to see that the term XPW" should
be restricted to the opposites in all but a very few cases where it is loosely used to
refer to perceptible objects too. My own view is that Anaxagoras held that all
macroscopic phenomenal entities are derivative and do not obey Parmenidean canons,
that they are mere (paiuontva to be explained by reference to the underlying a8r)Xa
which compose them— i.e. that they are epiphenomena of true oma. This interpre-
tation of Anaxagoras would give point to Aristotle's claim {De Caelo 302a28-b5, Gen.
Corr. 314a 24-30) that the "Empedoclean" elements are treated as derivative {avvBiTo)
by Anaxagoras. It would also help to explain the interest of Sextus (fragments 21,
21a, A 97; cf. Cicero, Academica 1. 44, 2. 100) in him as a believer in the unreliability
of sense perception in grasping the truth about the physical world. Less important,
perhaps, but still not negligible is the fact that Aetius mentions nbpia aifiaroc, ytvirqTiKct
in A 46, which shows that one branch of the dubious doxographical tradition
preserved an awareness that the apxai were not meant to be the same stuffs as the
macroscopic objects made up of them.
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too (here referred to as the surrounding "muchness"— to iroXv to
TTipuxov); and fragment 15 describes how earth emerges from the
separating off and moving together of the dense, wet, cold, and dark,
and how aither emerges by the same process from the rare, hot, and
dry. Fragment 16 has similar implications.
Fragment 15:
The dense and wet and cold and the dark gathered here, where earth
now is, but the rare and the hot and dry moved out to the forward
part of the aither.
Fragment 16:
From these things being separated off earth is compounded. For water
is separated off from the clouds and earth from the water and from
the earth stones are compounded by the cold and these [i.e. the
stones] move out more than water.'"
Earth, air, etc. are in the mixture only in the sense that the
opposites (i.e. the xP^M^^a) sufficient, when separated, to make them
up are in the mixture. These non-elemental stuffs (i.e. the opposites
which constitute them) can be separated off, and then earth, etc.,
will appear. "Seeds" are probably of similar status; i.e. they are the
presence in the mixture of the opposites sufficient to produce, when
separated, the observable object of which it is said to be the seed.
The term "seeds" need not, as Barnes stresses,^' suggest a discrete
particle, although there must be something special about the seed.
Perhaps observable objects (like men and trees) which are individuated
and countable come from seeds, while stuffs like earth, air, etc. are
said to come directly from the "earth" which is in the mixture in
the form of the appropriate opposites. ^^ To say that earth is in the
mixture means only that there is enough dense, wet, cold, and dark
in it to produce what we see as earth; to say that the seed of x is in
it is to say that there is enough of each of the needed opposites in it
to produce x.
The reason why the virtual presence of air and aither helps to
"• Barnes (n. 18, pp. 295-96) denies that these two fragments imply the non-
elemental character of earth, aither, etc., following on this point Michael Stokes ("On
Anaxagoras," Archiv fur Geschichle der Philosophie 47 [1965], 218-21, 16-19). But
Stokes and Barnes, like Lanza and everyone else who relied on Diels' edition of
Simplicius, believed that (?; 7^) in fragment 15 was an emendation; thus they could
dismiss it. Sider however {op. cit., p. 115) points out that 7^ is in fact found in n<ery
manuscript of Simplicius; the words of Anaxagoras pretty clearly do imply that the
opposites are elemental and earth etc. are not.
''
P. 21.
'^ Perhaps, as Schofield suggests (pp. 126 fF.), only living things grow from seeds.
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make the mixture indistinct is presumably that the qualities which
make up these visible manifestations are in themselves more indeter-
minate to perception than others. The dominance of them in the
mixture, therefore, tends to account for the indistinctness of the
evenly mixed whole. The last sentence of fragment 1 , then, supports
the claim that these things are indefinite in amount and it does so
by appealing to observable facts about the present, separated state
of the world. For now (note the change in tense) "these are the
greatest among the totality of things, both in amount [irXridoc] and
in greatness [n'eyedoc]." Thus fragment 1 shows the inadequacy of
interpreting TrXridoq as number; air and aither may be the largest
visible masses, but they are not the most numerous. Moreover, on
the proposed interpretation the contrast between TrXrfdoq and ixeyedoq
is meaningful. These two things are both the greatest in total amount
(irXfidoq) and now the most separated (greatest in n'eyedoq).
Of course, only when the separation has occurred, now rather than
then, can one refer to greatness or largeness. For the separation has
produced discernible, countable bodies. The revolution which causes
the separation is to be envisaged as beginning in the center of what
is now the cosmos and expanding outwards. ^^ The surrounding
remainder, therefore, is still in the primordial state of mixture; and
this mass is indefinite in amount, as fragment 2 tells us.
For both air and aither are separated off from the "much" which
surrounds; and what surrounds is, itself, indefinite in amount.
This is a very old picture of the cosmogonic process— going back at
least to Anaximander—and Anaxagoras' acceptance of it hardly
singles him out as a revolutionary thinker. The terms ttoXv and TrXridoc,
here may thus be translated in accordance with our hypothesis, giving
them no reference to countable bits or shares.
So far I have said nothing about the central oddity of Anaxagoras'
system, his claim that in some sense the total mixture of all the
XPVuara or basic elements in his system is still a feature of our
present world of separated and differentiated objects, of "large"
objects as I am interpreting the term. This claim, of course, is the
key move in Anaxagoras' attempt to deal with Parmenides' demon-
stration that nothing could come to be from what is not or vanish
into what is not. There could be no "coming into being" or "being
destroyed" of any thing, be it substance or attribute (to use anachronis-
tic terms). So these apparent phenomena had to be reduced to a
derivative status, by interpreting them as the "mixing together" and
^^ See fragment 12.
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"distinguishing" of the xPWOira which truly exist and meet Parmen-
idean standards of permanence. Fragment 17 summarizes the position
Anaxagoras' theory is meant to support:
On coming to be and being destroyed the Greeks do not hold correct
opinions. For no thing* comes to be nor is destroyed, but is mixed
together and distinguished from existing things*. And thus they would
correctly call "coming to be" being mixed and "being destroyed"
being distinguished.
Since there can be no radical, genuine change and since observation
tells us that virtually anything can emerge from anything else even
now, as a spark from flint, water from stones (in dripping caves), air
from water and flesh from food, Anaxagoras concluded that it must
still be the case that everything is in everything. This is perhaps an
unnecessarily sweeping generalization, since there are some emerg-
ences which do not occur, but it is in keeping with Anaxagoras' bold
speculative temperament. Besides, as Simplicius pointed out (A 45),
if you follow a chain of emergences through serially it may perhaps
turn out that all things do emerge from all things indirectly. But
whether even this is true is an empirical question which neither
Anaxagoras nor Simplicius (nor I) had the patience to try to answer.
It is this requirement, imposed by the defense of change in a
Parmenidean framework, that all things still be in all things which
gives Anaxagoras' system its unique character and his interpreters
the greatest need for ingenuity. Here we must look closely at fragments
3, 5, and 6. These fragments present the quantity terms we have
been examining in a new light and will put any hypothesis about the
meaning of smallness, bigness, and "muchness" to its most severe
test.
Let us look first at fragment 3, which Simplicius explicitly says is
about the apxai, i.e. the iovTa xPW<^to(-
Nor is there something which is itself the least of the small, but it
[the small] is always lesser (for what is cannot not be); but also, there
is always a greater than the great. And it [the great] is equal in amount
to the small, but each is, with respect to itself, both great and small.
Let me point out first that this is one of the fragments which has
been thought to represent Anaxagoras' response to Zeno. Indeed,
Zeller inserted an explicit reference to division into the fragment by
emending the admittedly difficult to nrj in to yap ebu ovk €<jtl to ht)
ovK (Luai to TOfiy: what is cannot not be by division. This emendation
is widely rejected on the textual level, although Diels-Kranz persevere
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by saying that the idea of division is easily supplied from the context.
But is this so?^'*
"Nor is there something which is itself the least of the small." On
my hypothesis this states that there is no limit to how thoroughly
things can be mixed (while for Barnes it states that there is no limit
to how small a portion can be taken for consideration; but this raises
many problems, including one about how one could individuate,
count, or measure, such portions or shares; no such measurement is
needed on my interpretation). "The small" is what is well distributed
in a mixture; the term applies to xfiV^^-oiTot, not to portions or shares
{noXpai). And if everything is to come from everything, even on the
observable level, then there must be a bit of each XP^M« in each
thing. And if the hot, for example, is to be in ice,^^ then there will
be very little of it indeed: it must be very well mixed. To allow for
all possible cases, we must set no limit to the thoroughness of the
mixture. The point of the explanatory parenthesis ("for what is
cannot not be") will be that unless this kind of mixture is possible,
everything cannot be in everything, which would mean that anything
could not emerge from anything, which would mean that some cases
of change would entail radical coming into being or destruction (i.e.
what is would not be). But this is impossible, according to Parmenides;
so this kind of mixture must be possible. Thus on my reading the
observation that "what is cannot not be" is apposite here— it is not
the "simple truism" innocent of Eleaticism which it turns into on
Barnes' view.^^
The statement that there is always a greater than the great follows.
For the great (or the big) is what is separated off, and if there is
always more of x in y, then you can in principle separate more of it
off, producing a "bigger" product. The statement that the big is
equal to the small in amount also follows. For if it is always possible
to get more x out of y, the separated and the unseparated x must
both be indefinite (aTrttpoi/). As such they are "equal" in amount.
For it is reasonable to suppose that two amounts, both being indefinite,
are "equal" even if one does not give this a sophisticated arithmetical
^^ If emendation is needed, Schofield's excision (pp. 156-57, n. 15) of to is by far
the preferable attempt. Teodorsson's (p. 72) and Sider's (pp. 54-57) revival of rofiy
tiT) ovK aval is a superfluous intrusion into the text until we have independent reasons
for crediting Anaxagoras with the idea of infinite divisibility.
^^ Or in the cold— I do not think that it matters much whether the slogan "all
in ail" uses the word "all" univocally or applies it first to xP'?M«i'« and second to
observable entities. In so far as the latter are derivative, as I think, that they are, the
distinction is not significant.
3e
P. 34.
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precision. Here again TrXfidoq can refer to a non-countable amount,
not to a countable plurality of particles (which are infinitely divisible),
nor to a plurality of portions or shares expressible in numbers or
algebraic symbols, as Barnes' view would hold.^'
The fragment concludes, ^^ "with respect to itself each thing is
both great and small." The difficulty here is to decide what "each"
refers to. Is it "each XP^M« ' ie. each of the apxai? This is what the
context might suggest. Or is it "each thing" in the sense of macroscopic
objects? Or "each of the big and small"? The latter is less likely in
that one would expect tKocTtpov, although it would give the word a
referent in the immediate context, which neither of the other options
provides. On balance the question may not be too important, as the
sense of the fragment is underdetermined anyway. Still, I prefer the
first interpretation, if only because Simplicius tells us that this fragment
is about the apxocir'^
With respect to itself, one might say, each thing is large insofar as
it is separated off into identifiable objects, and small insofar as it is
not, being mixed either in the inpuxov or with all the other xPVfJ-OiTa.
This would be the result of taking "each" to refer to the xPW^^toc
and adopting my hypothesis. The hot, in its totality, is both large and
small simply because some of it is separated off and some of it is not.
On this interpretation, therefore, fragment 3 will be referring to a
time after the cosmogonic separation has begun; for otherwise there
would be nothing "large" in the postulated sense. But this already
follows from my interpretation of the rest of the fragment.
Fragment 5 also deals with this stage: "These things having been
distinguished thus," it begins. It goes on to deal with what is true of
all the xPVf^otra, presumably taken distributively.
These things having been distinguished thus, one must recognize that
all are in no way lesser or more (for it is impossible [lit. unmanageable]
for there to be more than all) but all are always equal.
Each one is always equal to itself, being neither less nor greater than
it is. It is better to see this as repeating the main point of fragment
3, that each xPVf^^ has equal bigness and smallness, rather than to
*' On both of these views Anaxagoras comes out as holding a suspiciously
sophisticated, although approximately correct, view about the equality of all infinite
sets— see, for example, Barnes, p. 35; Vlastos, pt. Ill and n. 75, and C. Strang, "The
Physical Theory of Anaxagoras," pp. 361-80 in Allen and Furley (above, note 29).
Such a modern insight is hard to attribute to our "archaic sage," who mentions
neither particles, nor small and large portions/shares, nor sets of such entities.
^« SeeSider, p. 61.
^^ This is Barnes' preference too.
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take it as merely saying tautologically that there are as many kinds
of xP^^^-dTot as there are.
Fragment 6 continues the exploration of the characteristics of
matter when separation has begun. In particular, it deals with an
important corollary of the thesis that total mixture is always a fact
about the xPVf^ocra despite separation, viz. the claim that nothing is
totally isolated {xoopiadrivaL) from other things. Thus it provides the
groundwork for fragment 8 and, less obviously, for fragment 7 which
says that one does not know the amount of things separated off either
in word or in fact. This ignorance is inevitable if one cannot isolate
and count discrete bits of matter or even distinguishable portions.
But to return to fragment 6:
(A) And since there are shares of the great and the small equal in
amount, in this way too all would be in all. Nor can it/they/something'"'
be isolated, but all have a share of each. (B) Since the least cannot
exist, it/they/something could not be isolated nor come to be by
itself, but just as in the beginning, so now, all are together.
The first point (A) Anaxagoras is making is that the equality of shares
{nolpaL) or portions of the big and small (i.e. the distinguished or
separated and the unseparated parts of each XP^M« or stuff) is a
reason for holding the thesis of total mixture. Since on the present
interpretation the equality in amount of big and small is a statement
of the perpetual possibility of further separation, this really is a
ground for holding the thesis of total mixture. For total mixture is
made necessary, among other reasons, by Anaxagoras' belief in the
perpetual possibility of further separation. Without such a belief, a
central reason for believing that total mixture still is the case, after
separation as well as before, would disappear.
The second point made (B) is that the fact that there is no least
(as asserted in fragment 3) is a reason for holding that the total
isolation of a XP^M« is impossible. It is because "there is no least,"
i.e. on my interpretation because there is no limit to how well
something can be blended, that we believe that isolation is impossible
and so that total mixture is still the case. Since the blending of one
XP7)m« into another cannot be limited, isolation or separation of a
XPWci cannot be completed.
Here we may claim an advance over the traditional interpretation
of fragment 6, which Schofield follows,"" and over Barnes.*^ For on
these readings the possibility of indefinite or infinite smallness of
''° It is unclear what the subject of the verb is or whether it might be impersonal.
^' Pp. 91-93.
"2 P. 36.
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countable particles or portions must be taken, not as a reason for
holding the non-isolation thesis, but as asserting a facilitating condi-
tion, as stating that one reason for not holding it does not obtain. For
on the traditional understanding of smallness (to which Barnes seems
to revert in despair), a limit to it, i.e. a form of atomism, would make
it impossible to accept total mixture. On such an interpretation
Anaxagoras is only entitled to conclude "it could be the case that it
is not isolated," not the stronger "it could not be the case that it is
isolated." On the present interpretation the stronger reading, which
is wanted here, ?5 justified.
The final sentence of fragment 6 is difficult on all interpretations;
indeed Barnes"*^ trivializes it. "And many things are present in all,
and [these things are] equal in amount in the greater and lesser of
the things separated off." I would expand it thus: in all things there
are many xP^M^^-o: (an understatement) and these xpv^i-<^toc are equal
in amount in both the greater and the lesser of the objects separated
off. The equality in amount of xPV^J-Cira in anything follows well
enough, but the terms greater and lesser must, I fear, be interpreted
differently here than they are when used in reference to xPVIJ-ocra.
For now they are used of the macroscopic distinct objects, not of the
XP^P-otTa themselves, and therefore they must have the ordinary sense
of big and small. This ambiguity of quantity terms, depending on
whether they are applied to macroscopic objects or to xp^P-^tol is an
annoying feature of Anaxagoras' style;*^ but it is not unparalleled.
For even the term xPVPoc is occasionally used of objects on the
macroscopic level,''^ although usually it refers to the stuffs or apxai
which are subject to total mixture and are the genuine, fully real
entities {eovra xPVP<^TOi) which obey Parmenidean rules of perma-
nence.
Here I must conclude. Although the fragments have not been
exhaustively reviewed, I have touched on the most difficult texts, the
ones which provide the most rigorous test for my theory about the
meaning of "small" and "large" in Anaxagoras. I believe that the
rest of the fragments can be readily fitted into the framework
provided. I should briefly review what I think are the strengths of
this interpretation. Anaxagoras himself never speaks of division,
infinite or otherwise (except for the figurative reference in fragment
8) and it is historically implausible that he should have conceived of
'' P. 36.
'•' Also found in fragment 12, p. 38. 4-5 DK. See also niyiara in fragment 1,
used in the ordinary sense.
^' As in fragment 9 (where vw signals the atypical usage) and possibly in fragment
17, p. 40. 21 DK.
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infinite divisibility. His central concepts are mixture and separation,
producing distinctness or indistinguishability of basic stuffs such as
hot and cold. He gives one clear hint himself in the surviving fragments
about how the quantity terms "small" and "large" are to be inter-
preted when they refer to the basic stuffs, and this hint involves only
the mechanisms of separation and mixture. I have tried to show that
this hint can be followed out consistently in the interpretation of the
fragments. If I am correct, there are no references to small and large
countable particles of matter in the fragments, or even to numerically
expressible smaller and larger portions of stuffs. This, I think, is
more what we should expect of an Ionian physicist who responded
first to Parmenides' challenge to the concept of change, without
reference to the work of Zeno or Leucippus. The resulting theory is
strange; but Anaxagoras will be that on any interpretation. The
theory has a good chance of being closer to the truth, I suggest, than
other currently held theories about Anaxagoras, if only because its
strangeness goes further toward providing an interpretation of his
work which is internally consistent and compatible with his position
in the historical development of Greek thought. ''^
University of Toronto •
^''
I wish to thank J. Annas, H. Mendell, J. M. Rist, M. Schofield, and L. Woodbury
for reading an earUer version of this essay and offering me their critical reactions.
Another version was read to the annual meeting of the Classical Association of
Canada in Vancouver, June 1983.

Proclus and the Forty Logoi of Zeno'
JOHN DILLON
At a number of places in his Commentary on the Parmenides, Proclus
seems to show knowledge of a treatise of Zeno of Elea's which is not
derivable from the text of the Parmenides, and the inference seems
possible that he has access to a document, whether genuine or
otherwise, purporting to be the original book of Zeno.
I propose in this article, first, to present all the references which
Proclus makes to Zeno's treatise, to see how many of them are
susceptible to such an interpretation, and then to draw some general
conclusions.
(1) At 619.30-620.3 Cousin, Proclus introduces us to Zeno's treatise:
'0 bi} Tov Ilapnevidov nadrjrfiq Zffvoiv avrodev nev Trwq to) tov StSacr/caXou
bbytiaTi avprjyopetv ov ^ovXbueuoq,, u)c, ov8h tov doyfiaroc, deonevov Tziartcjiq
aXX-qq,, ^orjOtiav de Tiua iropi^eiv KeKpvfinivrjv e-KiX'^iplhv
,
ypa(t>€i ti ^L0\iov, eV
« dainovicoq ideiKVvev ovk ikotTTui ivbmva dvaxf^PV rolq iroWa toc ovra Tidipkvoic,
7] oca Tolq ep to ov eLprjKomv eSo^ev onravTOV Koi yap 6p,otov KOii avbuoiov
TovTOv ibeiKW Koa UTOv Kot aviaov iabiieuov, kol iraaav bcTrXdc, avaipemv Trie,
t6c^€(i3c, twu ovTCiiv KOil TTCiVTwu eaopivqv avyxvarLi' irXtifiixeXfi.
Now Zeno, Parmenides' disciple, did not care to plead directly for his
master's doctrine, since he thought it needed no additional confir-
mation, but attempted to give it secret aid by writing a book in which
he ingeniously showed that those who suppose that beings are many
encountered no fewer difficulties than were alleged against those who
say Being is one. For he showed that the same thing will be both like
and unlike, both equal and unequal, and in general that there will
*I am most grateful to Jonathan Barnes for various helpful comments.
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result the abolition of all order in the world, and that everything will
be thrown into confusion.
Everything that Proclus states here is derivable from Plato's Parmen-
ides, 127d-128e, except the statement at the end that Zeno showed
that the same thing will be, not only "like and unlike," but "equal
and unequal" {loov koX avLoov). One might say that this is an easy
extrapolation from "like and unlike" (and that the final remark about
"the abolition of all order in the world" is likewise a natural deduction
from the text); but it need not be, and I think it may be regarded
as a straw in the wind.
(2) At 684.21-26, Proclus refers to Zeno's treatise as follows:
ToioOroq 6 Zr}voiiv icra)(; n\v Koii to; aoinari "x«P^€^ k-^u. evnr)KT](;," ttoXXo) 8e
irXtov Kara Tovq Xbyovc; oaa yap b Jlapntvibrjq ayKvXu}!; koI avviaTzapatihxaq
oiTTicpdiyyeTO, ravra 6ci>eXiTT(i}v ovroc, koo, tic, •Kap.nijKac, \byovc, iKTeivu)v irapebibov.
Such was Zeno, perhaps, in bodily appearance, "handsome and tall,"
but far more so in respect of his discourse {Xoyoi). For what Parmenides
had uttered in an intricate and terse style, Zeno unfolds and transmits
in a rather extended discourse {eic, iranfif)Kaq Xbyovq iKTeipuv).
There is nothing here, certainly, that could not be derived from the
text, though the adjective iramxrjKrjq is quite emphatic.
(3) The next substantive reference occurs at 694. 23 ff. (= 29A15
D-K), in connection with Socrates' questioning of Zeno:
IloXXoiiv 6' eiprjueucov virb tov ZrfVdiuoq Xbyoiv, kou. TeTTapaKOura tCop iravTOJU, . . .
Zeno had put forth many arguments, /or^y in all.*
He then reports the first one, in terms entirely derivable from the
text of the dialogue. Further down, however, he makes some remarks
which would seem more natural if he had a text of Zeno in front of
him. At 696.8-11 he says
nScpv Kot avurfprjuevoic, Koi aa^Oic, i^edeTO tov 5Xov Xbyov tov irpbc, ttjv virbdeoLV,
Tr}v irpuiTTiv vvbdeaLV aKpL^dq KaTavofjaaq Koi Otaaap,evoc, ti to TiXoc, icTi tov
iravTOc, Xbyov. . . .
Socrates has set forth the whole argument quite succinctly and clearly,
' Noted by Diels-Kranz (19A2), and by H. D. P. Lee in his collection of the
fragments, Zeno of Elea (Cambridge 1936), p. 7, but neither of these authorities
appears to have probed any further into the Parmenides Commentary.
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having accurately identified the first hypothesis, and seen the purpose
of the argument as a whole;
and then at 696.16-18:
Koi irapa lilv tQ) Zffuwvi tovtwv haarov dptirai bia iroXXuv, . . .
Zeno has developed each of these parts at length {6ia iroXKuv).
Both of the latter remarks could, certainly, be deductions from the
text of the dialogue (e.g. 128b2), but they are more naturally, I think,
taken as the statements of someone who is comparing one text with
another. As for the detail that the logoi amounted to forty, Proclus
here is our earliest authority for this. Our only other authority, the
sixth-century commentator Elias (also 29A1 5 D-K) gives no indication
of deriving his information from Proclus, and may thus be regarded
as an independent source.
(4) At 696.28 f. we have a reference to
. . . dLCK re TOVTOiv koi tuv aWcov tov Zfjvcovoc, Xoyuv
this and Zeno's other arguments,
which seems to indicate Proclus' acquaintance with a series of them.
(5) More substantially, in Book 11.725.22-39, we find a passage where
an argument of Zeno's against plurality is given which could not be
derived from the text. In Plato's text we simply have the statement
that, if things are many, they must be both like and unlike. We have
no indication how Zeno argued for this conclusion, or what he meant
by it. Proclus explains this as follows (29-39):
Et' apa TToXXa eariv kvoc, aixkroxot, KaB' ev hi] tovto, ttjv afiedi^uxv X€7a; tov
evoq, Koi Ofioia earai Koi avbuoia, Lie, nlv koivov ocvto exovra 5p.oia, ioc, de nrj
(XOfra avbuoia- bibri nlv yap ocvto tovto Treiropdi to evbc, nv ^erexetJ', avbp,oia
eoTTf biOTi hi KOIVOV ocvTolc, TO nrfdev ex^iv koivov, 5p.oia ioTiv, oxTTe to. ocvtoc kou.
Ofioia Koci avbp,oia. toTiv okoic, yap avTO to firjbev ex^i-f kolvov, avTO KOivbv cffTiJ'
avTolc,, axTTt avToq iavTOv b Xbyoc, aw^priKe. . . .
[In essence] If things are many, they will be unlike one another, since
they will have no share in unity or sameness; but they will also be
like, in that they will possess the common characteristic of not partici-
pating in any "one" (characteristic).
The terminology which Proclus employs here is certainly not
primitive (talk of "participation" is hardly Zenonian), but the basic
argument surely is. Indeed, using "like and unlike" as if they described
attributes of a subject would be absurdly primitive at any time after
logic had been developed in the Academy and Peripatos (unless we
are dealing with a very sophisticated forger). The argument can only
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be effective at a time before the logic of predication was understood.
I would suggest, therefore, that Proclus had before him a document
which, however reworked, is of Zenonian origin.
(6) At 760.25-761.3, o propos of 129b6-8, we find the following:
MfTor TOiiq irepl oiioiottjtoc, koL avofiOibrriTOc, Xbyovq iirl to ev /cm to irXridoc,
H(Ta^€0riK( iraXiv, Koi ravra airb tCov Zfjvojvoq Xoyuip Xa^dv. (.khvoc, br] yap
Kadairtp to ovto 8hkpv<; Snoiov koi avonoiov diJiXeyx^ toix; to. iroXXa x^pi-^ovTac,
Tov evoq, Tov ocvTOv TpoTTOv Kcix aTTO Tov €ubq Koi airb Tov irXfidovc, iirLX^Lpo^v
di-qycovi^eTO irpbc, ocvTOvq, airo(f>aiv(t}v 5ti ((/cara) Tb cscoto kou TrXriOoc, ecTTui kol
ip Tce iroXXa x^ph tov ivbc; to. yap ovTOjq exovTa irXr^dtj KaT outo to p.r)
p.iTex'ti-v ivaboc, Kca iroXka tOTV . . . Tb yap kolvov tivoc, fieTeiXrjxbc, ep eVn KaT'
avTb TOVTO TO KOivbv, (jJCTe el kolvov avTolq Tb ovx «', elxTai ev to. iroXXa KaTO.
TO ovx «' K^oci ttocXlv Tb ovx «'' aJO-auTOjq ev to? ev iramv etvai tovtov.
After the words about likeness and unlikeness, he shifts back to unity
and plurality, drawing upon Zeno's own discourse {koi Tavra airb tojj/
Zt]vcovoc, Xoyojv Xa^dv). For just as Zeno had refuted those who separate
the Many from the One by showing that Likeness and Unlikeness
become the same, so likewise he argues against them by starting from
the One and from Plurality, and shows that apart from the One the
same thing will be many and the many one. For a Plurality apart from
the One is a many by the very fact that it does not partake of unity,
for what is not controlled by unity is many. And since they have in
common their not being one, they will be one by this very fact, for
things that share a character in common are one by virtue of this
common character. So that if not being one is common to them, the
many will be one by virtue of not being one; and inversely their not
being one will be one because it is present in them all.
Once again, Proclus professes to be checking the course of the
argument in Plato's dialogue off against the sequence of arguments
in Zeno's original work. The argument presented is similar to the
one presented above about like and unlike, and presupposes a similar
level of logical primitiveness, when one has abstracted the later
(Procline?) terminology of participation.^
(7) At 769.22-770.1, a propos of Socrates' mention of Rest and
Motion at 129el, we find the following:^
^ The manuscript tradition, by the way, both Greek and Latin (Moerbeke's
translation) becomes confused at 76L2-3 Cousin, as is perceived by Chaignet in his
translation (p. 218). For /cm tvoXlv to ovx *" waaurciJ^ iv tw ev iraaiv [ovk] tivai Todnbv/et
omne quod non unum eodem modo in eo quod unum omnibus inest idem (rendering /cat kcw
to ovx iv i}aavT(j3Q, iv tu ev waaiv ivelvai tovtov?), we should read /cai iraXiv to ovx i"
loaavTftic, ev, tw iv iraaiv etvai tovtov, since what we need is "and inversely their not
being one will be one, because it is present in them all."
' This passage I have discussed already in Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie 58
(1976). 221-22.
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Kpoaidr]K(^ yap 8fi ravra rate, eipriniuaic, trv^vyiau;- (ird kocv 6 Zfivuip, ov novov
i^ (Keivoiv, aXKa kol eK T^q tovtojv ocKoXovdiaq airr^Xeyx^ ''V ocTOTriav TUiv ra
iroXXa Tov kvoc, X'^P'-^v'^v- ov yap p,bvov « tov bfioiov Kal auonoiov iircn-oirfTO
Tr)v iinx'^ip-qaiv, ovbl av nbvov Ik tov ivbc, Koi tov irXr^Bovq, aXX ribt] Koii airb
(TTOtaeijiq Koi Kivrjatuiq. To yap ovto koi kutoc to avTO koi ioTayitvov kolI
Kivovtitvov aire4)j]vev, «' to. iroXXa ixfi nerexoi tov ivbc; irav to iaTap,€vov ev tivl
tOTiv evl, Koi irav to nvovnevov e^ioTaTai tov evbq, oicFTt to. KoXXa a nfj neT^xoi
Tivbq evbq aoTaTa ioTr koi -KciXiv «' ovto tovto exot KOivbv to n-q niTiX'^'-v Tt-vbq,
€v TivL eaTar TavTrj odv iraXiv aKivr\Ta- Ta ovtoi apa koH nvov/j-eva iOTai koi
iaTorra- ovk apa ttoXXq; eVTU/ iprjfia vavTT] tov evbq. 'AXX' 6 p.tv Zrjvoivoq Xbyoq
Kal ivTavOa TOiovToq- . .
.
These last two (sc. Rest and Motion) he has added to the pairs
previously mentioned, since Zeno also had used them as well as the
former pairs to prove the absurdity of separating the Many from the
One. Zeno's refutation has been based not only on Likeness and
Unlikeness, Unity and Plurality, but also on Rest and Motion. He
showed that if the Many does not participate in Unity, it follows that
the same thing in the same respect will be both at rest and in motion.
For everything at rest is in a one something («/ Tivi ioTiv ivi), and
everything that is in motion is departing from some one (position); so
that if the Many do not share in a Unity, they will be unresting; and
again, if they have in common the character of not sharing in some
Unity, they will be in some one (state); hence again will be unmoving.
The same things, therefore, will be moving and at rest; so that the
Many are not altogether devoid of Unity. Such was Zeno's argument.
This argument uses the ambiguity of the expression iv hi, which can
be taken to mean "in a place," "in a state," or "in a position," to
construct an argument of similar form to the previous ones.
(8) At 862.26-34, while commenting on Socrates' attempted analogy
of the daylight (131b3) Proclus says:
K(xi OTL nh eK TOV Zf)V(i}voq Xbyov Tb irapabeiyna eiXri())e, briXov eKeiPoq yap
brfXuiaai ^ovXbp,tvoq oir(t)q Tct iroXXa fifTix^L Tivbq ivbq, . . .kocv a buioTrfKei
KoppoiTaToi air' aXXifXcou, eiirev tv tw eavTOv Xby<j) piav ovaav tt)v XevKbTrjTa
irapdvai Kal t)ijuv Kal Tolq diVTiTzoaiv ovToiq, coq Tr)v €v<t>pbvriv Kal tt)v ijnepap.
It is clear that he has taken his example from the discourse of Zeno;
for Zeno, in his endeavor to show that the Many participate in some
One, and are not devoid of One, even though greatly separated from
each other, has said in his discourse that whiteness, which is one, is
present both to us and to the antipodes, just as night and day are.
This passage has a number of interesting aspects, which I have
discussed in an earlier article,'' but which may be repeated now. The
" "New Evidence on Zeno of Elea," AGPh 56 (1974), 127-31.
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point of the argument was presumably that "white" is taken to be
"one thing," and yet the many say that there are many white things,
so that, "if there are many," "white," which is one, would have to be
in various different places at once. The Antipodes are brought in, I
assume, as being the most remote people from us, but they are a
strange and notable feature, since, if Zeno really mentioned them,
this would be their earliest attested occurrence. Certainly, the form
of the argument, with its ignorance of predication, is primitive enough
to be Presocratic.
(9) In Book V, 1024.12 f. Proclus tells us that Zeno used to call some
of his arguments "true" and others "tactical," or "useful for the
purpose at hand" (xpficiSetq). This detail seems to be recorded
nowhere else, but on the other hand it is hardly the sort of thing
that Zeno would admit in the course of presenting his Forty Logoi,
so I would not wish to claim it as a further testimonium to that work.
This seems to complete the references to Zeno's work which are
not clearly derivable from the text of Plato. What are we to make
of them? And how is this work that Proclus talks of to be related to
that which was available later to Simplicius? I see no reason that the
arguments should not come from the same work as was available to
Simplicius, at least in respect of the arguments he quotes against
Plurality (there seems to have been a separate treatise against the
possibility of motion, cf. Zeno A15 D-K). If these seem puerile in
comparison to those, then we may perhaps take refuge in Zeno's own
reported distinction, just mentioned above, between Logoi that are
a\r}6elq and those that are xpti'i^Sf^- To quote Jonathan Barnes:
Many modern interpreters of Zeno have argued that such and such
an account of a paradox is wrong because it attributes such a silly
fallacy to a profound mind. Zeno was not profound: he was clever.
Some profundities fall from his pen; but so too did some trifling
fallacies. And that is what we should expect from an eristic disputant.
If we meet a deep argument, we may rejoice; if we are dazzled by a
superficial glitter, we are not bound to search for a nugget of
philosophical gold. Fair metal and base, in roughly equal proportions,
make the Zenonian alloy.-'
I quote this eloquent passage with a certain relish, since Barnes
does not accept the genuineness of (7) and (8) above. ^ He may be
right, but he is also right to suggest that philosophical naivete need
not be a bar to genuineness. Furthermore, all Greek thinkers were
' The Presocratic Philosophers I (London 1979), pp. 236-37.
^ Ibid., p. 236, note 8.
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prepared to throw bad arguments as well as good at a thesis in the
hope that something would stick. It did not necessarily mean that
they were persuaded by the arguments themselves.
Barnes states just below: "We do not know how Zeno argues for
the proposition (a) 'If P, then everything is alike, and (b) if P, then
everything is unlike'."^ I suggest that we do, and that it is contained
in passage (5) above.
My conclusion is that Proclus certainly had a document in his
possession called the Forty Logoi of Zeno, or something such—
probably, though not certainly, the same document that was available
to Simplicius a century later—and it seems possible to me that it at
least contained genuine material, though perhaps worked over at a
later date, or even incorporated from another, genuine source, into
a pseudepigraphic work.
Trinity College, Dublin
^ Ibid., p. 237.
I
Protagoras, Gorgias and the Dialogic Principle
J. K. NEWMAN
When Protagoras published the 'AXrjdeLa rj KarafiaXXovTeq [A6701],
his title looked like a gesture of the most blatant cynicism.' This was
not the only evidence to support such an accusation. He was also the
author of the 'Avri-XoyiaL, and the theme of the two books of this
treatise, we are told, was that, on any given question, arguments of
equally compelling logic could be advanced both for and against. In
that case, "truth" as something objective— a concept familiar even
to such a non-philosopher as Pindar^—appears to be completely
destroyed. It is in this sense that a passage in Euripides' Bacchae
(200-03) is often interpreted, where we learn that long established
things are not overthrown by any logos:
' Indispensable older treatments of the Sophists remain: M. Untersteiner, The
Sophists, tr. K. Freeman (Oxford 1954); W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy
III (Cambridge 1969). More recent work includes: F. Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments
of the Greek Enlightenment (Princeton, New Jersey 1975); C. J. Classen ed., Sophistik,
Wege der Forschung 187 (Darmstadt 1976, with full bibliography); G. B. Kerferd, The
Sophistic Movement (Cambridge 1981); idem ed., The Sophists and Their Legacy, Hermes
Einzelschriften 44 (Wiesbaden 1981): cf. especially Professor Kerferd's introduction
(pp. 1-6), "The Future Direction of Sophistic Studies." The great merit of Professor
Solmsen's book is to handsel the topic of the history of ideas in the fifth century.
Obviously a Geistesgeschichte des 5. Jahrhunderts (in English ! ) is sorely needed. This
study will heal the quarrel to which Plato refers {Rep. X. 607b), for in it the poets
and particularly Pindar, so often dismissed as no thinker, will play an essential role.
^ 'AXadaa was first made a goddess by Pindar, according to M. Nilsson, Geschichte
der griechischen Religion I (2nd ed., Munich 1955), p. 748: cf. U. Holscher, "Pindar
und die Wahrheit," in Wandlungen: Studien zur antiken und neueren Kunst (Munich
1975), pp. 90 ff.
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ovSeu ao<f>i^ni(T0a rdiai baifioatv.
iraTpiovc, irapaSoxcxq, Sec, d' onffXtKaq Xp'ov(^
KiKTtfutd', ovd(t(; avTct Kara^aXXet. Xoyoq,
au5' tt 5i' aKpoiv ro ao<f)bv rfvprjTai (ppevQiv?
The artistic point— again familiar from Pindar— is that Truth is
unveiled by Time,"* and that if something is long established it must
therefore have enhanced— even unchallengeable— claims to be true.
Comforting though this doctrine might be to poets who professed to
eternize, and to their patrons, it was evidently denied by the apparently
new and outrageous implication that everything remained always an
open question (dtaaol Xoyoi).
Although the charge of "ethical relativism" and of a general assault
on received values is so often brought both against Protagoras and
the Sophists as a whole, it is of course too simple to believe that the
thinkers and teachers who descended on the heart of the Greek world
from its periphery in the later years of the fifth century were nothing
but iconoclasts. Both Protagoras and Gorgias had quite respectable
philosophical credentials. Sicily, the forcing-ground for new ideas,
had inherited the problems of the well established Italian Eleatic
school of philosophical skepticism about claims to know. Zeno of Elea
was credited by Aristotle (fr. 65 Rose) with being the founder of
dialectic. In Protagoras' native city of Abdera, Democritus too was
an Eleatic. It was in this tradition and in reaction to Parmenides that
Gorgias had begun as a philosopher before he turned to the study
of rhetoric, and thereby forfeited, according to E. R. Dodds, his
claims to be a "Sophist" at all.^
' Murray's text seems superior on the whole to that printed, for example, by
Jeanne Roux, Euripide, Les Bacchantes (Paris 1970), although I have accepted her
Kara^aXXti in line 202, already weighed by Dodds ad loc. In considering the style of
Euripides, Aristotle's remarks {Rhet. III. 1404b24-25) can hardly be over-emphasized.
In line 200 ao<i>i^otiai is constructed with a following dative, by a bold extension, as
if it were naxonai: cf. the motif of deonaxioi in the play (vv. 45, 325, 1255). The
asyndeton at 201 marks the speaker's emotion as he utters his solemn declaration of
faith. There is nothing inadmissible in colloquial style about the resumptive avra at
201. It is not merely Kara^aXXa which encourages one to think about Protagoras
here, but that verb allied with (ro<f>i^onai before it and <to<})6v following.
^ Cf. 01. 10. 53-55. The long history of this motif is discussed by F. Saxl, "Veritas
filia temporis," Essays Presented to E. Cassirer (Oxford 1936), pp. 197-222; E. Panofsky,
Studies in Iconology (repr. New York 1972), pp. 73 ff.
^ Plato, Gorgias, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1959), pp. 6-7. Contrast Kerferd, The
Sophistic Movement, p. 45 and note.
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Aristotle was unsympathetic to history, as the ninth chapter of the
Poetics shows. Is it perhaps the reading of Aristotle which convinces
the modern student of ancient philosophy that "style" in his discipline
has nothing to do with content? Obviously, no one could derive this
opinion from reading Plato ! And, even in the case of his disciple
Aristotle, everyone understands at least notionally that what we have
from him is only part of the record, lacking the aureum flumen
orationis. How much one would give, for example, to read the HtpX
I\.olt\tO:v ! But, if Albin Lesky is right in suggesting that Thucydides
deliberately echoes Protagoras*' in introducing the first pair of con-
trasting orations in his History, that between the Corinthian and
Corcyrean ambassadors at Athens, what has to be admitted is that a
"Sophist" and alleged skeptic about the truth handed to the greatest
of ancient historians, one who claimed that his work would be an
everlasting treasure precisely because it offered access to the truth
(I. 20-22), a basic tool of historical analysis, the speech and counter-
speech. Is not this already a philosophical achievement of the highest
order, and one that makes a refreshing contrast with the Poetics} And
the form of these speeches is moreover in debt to Gorgias ?
Obviously twin speeches occurring in real life called for the
judgment of an audience. Set now in the record, thesis and antithesis
have to be synthesized by the reader for himself. But this evidently
lends another interpretation to Protagoras' doctrine of (xKi]dua. It
was not after all blatant cynicism, but an emphasis on the dialogic
principle which his work proclaimed, however much it may have
been misinterpreted by Euripides (as Euripides was misinterpreted
himself, for example by Aristophanes^).
The dialogic principle states that all dogmatic and would-be final
formulations are betrayals, and hence the importance to it of the
term airopia already found in Pindar {Nem. 7. 105: cf. Eur., Bacchae
800), and another proof of the modernity of the world in which he
moved. There is only, for the seeker after truth, the ay6)v, which
may take various forms, and eventually becomes the presentation of
a particular point of view by a speaker aware of its partiality, and the
courteous wait for an opponent to develop his reply (but not, of
course, his refutation). In Thucydides, by what the Formalists would
call a denudation du procede, this technique (which explains why his
speakers echo one another's phrases) is eventually manifested in the
^
'Ai'TtXcryiac, 31.4: cf. Lesky, History of Greek Literature, Eng. tr. (London 1966),
p. 476.
' See especially Solmsen, pp. 83 ff.
« Hippolytus 612: cf.Thesm. 275, Arist., Rhet. IH. 1416a29-35.
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so-called "Melian Dialogue," otherwise such an anomaly in the struc-
ture of the History.^
This pre-Platonic, historical use of dialogue form by Thucydides
shows certain typical features. The "courteous wait" to which allusion
has just been made is evident at V. 86: ri ntv eTruUeLa tov bibaaKtiv
Kad' rj(rvx'i-c(v aXXrjXovq; the concern with truth at 89: ra dwara 5' e^
wu tKOLTdpoL aXTjdibq (f)povovn€u bLaTvpaaatadat; the seriousness of the
topic at 101: ayiiiv . . . irepl . . . aoiTijpiaq. Clearly we are confronted
with a "threshold" situation, quite literally a matter of life and death,
which deploys forjudgment an argument about a religious and ethical
question: do the gods protect the just but weak cause, or is might
right? The resemblance of the Athenian case to positions attributed
to Thrasymachus in the first book of Plato's Republic is clear.
It is part of the genre (as old in fact as the Book of Job) that no
satisfactory answer is stated. The Athenians behave exactly as they
intended all along. The Melians are defeated, the men murdered,
the women and children enslaved. If the story of the Sicilian Expe-
dition which begins the next book is the proof that the gods do after
all avenge the right, that is small consolation for the Melians, and in
any case a conclusion that we must draw for ourselves. All we can
observe here and now is the character of the participants.
Sophistic elements have been noted in the Hippocratean corpus.'"
The dialogic form used here by Thucydides quite independently of
Plato is also illustrated in the novel of Hippocrates, the first epistolary
novel of European literature," the first with an ideologue as its hero
(Democritus, the "laughing philosopher"'^), and interestingly, an
exploration of madness. The dialogic form could be used then as
heuristic and empirical, a tool to grasp at rather than fix an elusive
truth. Democritus symbolizes the absence of "seriousness" in this
quest, which does not make it frivolous, since seriousness may be
^ Yet subtly integrated by W. Robert Connor, Thucydides (Princeton, New Jersey
1984), pp. 147-57. Thucydides shows such familiarity with the idioms of the dialogic
style that a careful examination of his History for more hidden ("estranged") features
of it would clearly be rewarding.
'" Cf. Kerferd, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
" For an indication of its contents, see Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker
(repr. Berlin 1974), II, pp. 225-26. It should obviously be taken much more seriously
as a literary and philosophical phenomenon than the commentary implies. Its alleged
lateness, for which linguistic evidence is a very uncertain guide, is no proof of its
unimportance, and it is glossed by Maloney and Frohn (see below, note 13) with the
rest of the corpus.
'2 Cicero, De Oral. II. §235, is especially relevant. Cf. Diels-Kranz II, p. 28, no.
81.
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inapposite to the last things. Perhaps all one can do at the end is
laugh.
Democritus, with Leucippus the author of the atomic theory, was
like Protagoras a native of Abdera, and like Gorgias an Eleatic.
Abdera was normally thought of as the city of fools, and yet his
laughter evidently was compatible with the most committed interest
in philosophical truth. Whatever the date of the Hippocratic Novel,
it has symptomatic value. It shows that ultimately it was plausible to
credit the Abderite Democritus with having inspired in the medical
science of his day both a method and a literary form— but for
exploring foolishness, madness.
It is tempting to suppose that the Abderite Protagoras did the
same thing for history, for the madness which was the Peloponnesian
War. Thucydides was certainly interested in abnormal states of mind.
Cleon symbolized the negation of the Periclean ideal of wise states-
manship, and his "mad promise" to capture the Spartans on Sphacteria
is described by a Hippocratic word (IV. 39, /xavLOi^driq).^^ Naturally, in
spite of the epic thrust of his narrative, and of the many battles he
describes, the rationalist Thucydides avoids the fiaivoum which is so
common for "blood lust" in Homer's apLarelai. But at this juncture
in his narrative, when rationality appears to have failed, he tellingly
uses on a unique occasion about Pericles' ape Cleon (he echoes
Periclean language, as has been often noted: cf. II. 63. 2 and III.
40. 4, avdpayadi^eadai) a piece of medical terminology, of which
there are five examples in Hippocrates.
The historian's interest in avveatq may also be seen in this context.
Themistocles is praised for his possession of it (I. 138. 2), but it is a
quality which cannot save Phrynichus (VIII. 27. 5). It plays a great
role in Diodotus' answer to Cleon (III. 42). Iivveroc, occurs four times
in Hippocrates, and avveaiq fourteen. 'Aavueroq is both a Heraclitean
(1 and 34, Diels-Kranz) and a Hippocratic word.
This complex of ideas also explains to a.4>pov at V. 105. 3, an
accusation brought by the Athenians against the Melians, and a token
of topsy-turvy values in a context showing Sophistic influence.''' There
are ten examples of a<t)pu}u in Hippocrates.
"Avoia, of which there are two examples in Hippocrates, is another
important concept. Democritus had already condemned it as a civic
'^ The examination of Hippocratic vocabulary here has been greatly facilitated
by the five volumes of the Concordance des Oeuvres Hippocratiques by Gilles Maloney
and Winnie Frohn (Montreal 1984).
''' Kerferd notes (p. 1 12) the anticipation of Plato's Gorgias 483e3 at Thucydides
V. 105. 2.
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vice, and praised its opposite.'^ At II. 61 (iroWri avoia iroXenriaaL)
Pericles uses the word in this Democritean way to suggest that, though
normally war is folly, it is the only course now open to the Athenians.
Later, Diodotus in the speech already mentioned uses it to dissuade
the Athenians from following Cleon's advice about the Mytilenians
(III. 42 and 48. 2). Both these arguments are reasonable enough.
But in V. 111. 3 the Athenians warn the Melians against the avoia
of rejecting their proposals, and in Book VI, Alcibiades both uses
avoia about himself (16. 3; 17. 1) with a kind of boastful bravado,
and later at Sparta describes the Athenian democracy as onoXoyovfxevrj
oipoia (VI. 89. 6). Cleon has won, in spite of Diodotus. In Alcibiades'
parody of the Funeral Oration of Pericles, the world of moral discourse
has been turned upside down. We can see both the terrible decline
from the earlier part of the story, and the paradoxical proof of the
rightness of this description of the modern democracy in Alcibiades'
own career.
The debt to Abdera and Protagoras suggested by this internal
dialogue culminates in Book VIII, where the complete absence of
speeches has long been noted. But this silence is a profoundly
significant gesture. As madness deepens, the dialogic principle is
totally denied. How little this is understood by those who insist on
dividing form from philosophy, and philosophy from historical anal-
ysis, and all three from the Sophists.
Thucydides' family owed its wealth to Thracian goldmines, and
his acquaintance with Abdera may easily have been gained firsthand.
His interest in medical terminology is well attested. But it looks as if
he found in Ionian medicine not just terminology but a method of
diagnosis. In fact, the Abderite and Protagorean dialogic form evinces
a primitive principle of thought deeply embedded in the most
elementary Greek way of approaching the world, as the national
fondness for /lev and de clauses shows. At the level of action, it shows
itself in the preoccupation with what J. Burckhardt calls "das Agonale,"
but in the Greek case, never the solitary wrestle of Jacob with the
angel in the wilderness, but the witnessed rivalry of champions for a
prize. The Games channelled these rivalries into a stylized alternative
to (not preparation for
!
) war, and of course competitors wanted to
win. Yet it is not the winning which the vase-painters, for example,
typically show us, but the contest.
The Games also provided a rich source of imagery for literature.
Even here there was mutual interaction between Xoyoc, and epyov.
Pindar, as concerned as Thucydides and Plato after him with character,
'^ Fr. 282, Diels-Kranz II, p. 204.
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explains the role of the poet in holding up a mirror to the deed, in
seeing, in providing witness."^ It is not surprising then that they
became also the venue for pamphleteers and publicists, for a war of
words. And should not as much attention be given to those words as
athletes gave to their bodies? Gorgias, who had noted that his
countrymen found poetry immensely persuasive, sought to lend the
same poetic persuasiveness to prose, and with this, prose too entered
the realm of the ayi^v. But this agonistic prose itself bore the marks
of its intent. Even its insistence on antithesis, parisosis and homoeo-
teleuton may now be seen, not as decoration for its own sake, but as
yet further underscoring of the dialogic principle."
One of the great strengths of the Greek genius is that its flowers
never lost contact with its roots. A recent study for the non-specialist
remarks of the history of Greek philosophy in general:
Two lessons can be drawn from this example [Epicurean physics],
which are crucial to the interpretation of Greek philosophy. First, its
dialectical character: Greek philosophy is primarily a dialogue or
argumentative encounter, not only between contemporaries, but also
and perhaps more interestingly, with thinkers of the immediately
preceding generation. The questions which a philosopher tries \o
answer are typically raised by his dissatisfaction with theories that are
currently on offer. Aristotle's philosophy is in large measure a critical
response to some of Plato's most ambitious theories. In order to assess
the interest of Aristotle's ethics or metaphysics, we need to consider
both his arguments and the dialectical context in which they are
placed. Aristotle himself makes this very plain, but it is a point that
applies no less strongly to other Greek philosophers whose work is
less well preserved. As summarized in ancient or modern handbooks
the cut and thrust of philosophical argument, responding to real or
imaginary opponents, too easily turns into a catalogue of doc-
trines. . . .'®
'«
"EffOTrTpw, Nem. 7. 14. This is also St. Paul's word: NT 1 Cor. 13:12. This
religious concept demands a separate monograph. MapTvc, too is a religious idea, also
found in the seventh Nemean (49). We already noted airopia in this densely textured
ode (105). It was the reaction of Herod to his conversations with John the Baptist:
riirbpa, NT Mark 6:20. But they were nevertheless enjoyable {vSiwc,, loc. cit.). In the
concept of the "Zuschauer" Greek vases (see K. Schefold, Goiter- und Heldensagen der
Griechen in der spatarchaischen Kunst [Munich 1978], p. 272) and Pindar come together:
cf. Pyth. 9. 26 fF. and, in general, J. K. Newman, The Classical Epic Tradition (Madison
1986), pp. 233-34.
" And his insistence on composing encomia of the most trivial or challenging
objects shows that he had not forgotten (any more than Erasmus did later) the
element of make-believe and fun which that genre implies.
'* A. A. Long in The Greek World, ed. Robert Browning (London 1985), pp.
102-03.
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The dialogic principle persisted into the most sophisticated phil-
osophical explanations of cosmology. Parmenides' motionless universe
of Being and Not-Being was differentiated and paradoxically recon-
ciled by Heraclitus' "Love" and "Strife," and by Empedocles'
pt^oonara ("roots" or elements). "Dialectical materialism," itself a
reaction to Hegel, has made our century familiar with these notions
in a way far from theoretical. But they have in fact certain implications
for philosophical form, since the primitive consciousness could not
by definition handle abstracts. This is already shown for Western
Greek thinkers like Parmenides and Empedocles by their choice of
medium: not the prose of Ionia, although even there Eduard Norden
noted in Heraclitus certain strivings towards artistic polish, but the
hexameter of Homer and Hesiod. Empedocles indeed, although the
intent of his work puzzled Aristotle, merits from him the highest
praise as an artist, and passed as the "founder of rhetoric" (Diog.
Laert. VIII. 57). At the same time, Empedocles was a mystagogue
and wizard ("shaman") of a primitive and extraordinary kind, pro-
voking hostility as well as admiration, as the opposite reactions to
him of Lucretius and Horace still attest.'^
Some of these formal implications may be listed here:
1. Time is not apprehended in the dialogic complex as a sequential
series, but as a dimension of space ("vertical time"). There is only
710W, and everything, past and future, is available in the present.
This primitive concept, when driven to extremes, explains Par-
menides' insistence on the impossibility of change.
2. Yet primitive man is all too aware of change. He solves his problem
by his practical observation of nature. The child is father of the
man, the acorn is already under the woodman's gaze an oak. At
an elementary level, this means that metamorphosis is a valid and
even dominant conceptual mode.^° Everything carries with it the
map of its own past and future, and this map may be scanned now
by the discerning eye of the wise.^'
These modes persist into more abstract formulations. Empe-
docles answered Parmenides by his doctrine of four roots moved
by Love and Strife. Aristotle followed this ultimately biological
model, when he argued that the bvvafiic, is present to the entelechy
to govern its development.
'^ De Rer. Nat. I. 729-33; Ars Poetica 463-67.
^^ Cf. J. Burckhardt, Griechische Kulturgeschichte (4th ed., Berlin-Stuttgart 1902),
pp. 5-18, "Die Metamorphosen." The Pythagorean metempsychosis and Empedocles'
various avatars (fr. 1 17, Diels-Kranz) attest the same concept.
2' Cf. Empedocles, fr. 129, Diels-Kranz 1, p. 364.
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3. Primitive societies like to assist the not so discerning eye however
by the wearing of masks. ^^ The mask de-individualizes the partic-
ular, and emphasizes, though not of course intellectually, the
universal. The mask, and the mime or ritual action in which masks
or disguises of some sort are deployed, are important tools of
primitive thought, and evidently for the Greeks led on to comedy
and then to developed drama of the kind we know in Athens. But
Athens was not the only center of some kind of performances,
and we are told that, sophisticated thinker though he was, Plato
was a devotee of the mimes of the Sicilian poet Sophron to such
an extent that he slept with them under his pillow. The mime,
like all dramatic performances, finds the truth between its characters.
It also finds the truth laughable, and this idea too, the ancestor
of both Democritus' Eleatic skepticism (and Abderite foolery) and
the Socratic irony, is important for Plato.
4. A certain kind of suspended time is privileged, because this
mentality has no interest in the time of the (as yet non-existent)
mechanical clock (Bergson). These are the times which signal
change, momentarily caught as it were in the act; festivals of
various kinds connected with the harvest, with the enhancement
of the tribe that comes from eating, drinking, sex: in more refined
parlance, the symposium; the funeral ("wake"), and its annual
commemoration at the grave; the wedding and the acceptance of
new members into the clan.
5. We saw under (3) already in the case of the mime that a certain
kind of reaction to the perception of change is privileged, and
that is laughter. This happens even in the face of what to the
refined sensibility looks like "tragedy," since tragedy, at least in its
purest form, is the transitory invention of quite advanced urban
societies like fifth-century Athens and seventeenth-century France
(and even in fifth-century Athens the tragic trilogy was normally
followed by a "satyr" play to redress the balance). Laughter, which
may be stylized in that special type of ritual known as the game,
must be understood as anything but dismissive. What is laughed
at is meant to be preserved and saved. This is easily seen from
Aristophanes' gibes at the society of his native Athens, or the
Roman satirist's gibes at Roman life and manners. In this sense,
the inconclusive ending of the game of words ("dialogue") is part
^^ The rich material assembled by Katerina J. Kakouri, UpdCaropia tov Qtarpov
(Athens 1974), deserves the closest study.
52 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
of its very essence. '"^^ Only the man with no sense of time wins, or
rather thinks he has won.
6. Certain kinds of space are privileged, in particular, the public
square or circle, often situated before the door or threshold,
because that is the space through which access is available to the
numinous. This is why games and feasts have often been held at
tombs, or in churchyards, and why the theatre has such close
connections with religion, even in its physical form. Later, as
religious awareness fades, the numinous degenerates into merely
the unknown. But perhaps even the unknown may best be ap-
proached through the game, and in this context the student of
literature must remember Huizinga's remark that every verse
form is a form of play.
7. Truth (in so far as it is legitimate to introduce such an abstract
into this discourse) is polysemous, and is grasped musically (Py-
thagoras) or polyphonically. "Sophist" meets us for the first time
in Greek with the meaning "musician," "lyric poet" (Pindar, Isth.
5. 28), in an ode which also emphasizes the value of Xb'^oc,.
Herodotus calls Pythagoras a sophist (IV. 95), and in view of later
developments it is interesting that we are told elsewhere (Cicero,
Tusc. Disp. V. 8-10) that Pythagoras abandoned the claim to be
wise, and instituted instead the claim merely to "love wisdom,"
i.e. to approximate, but asymptotically, to the desired goal. It is
not the correspondence of some statement with "reality" which
determines whether an utterance is true or not, since ideality is too
fluid a concept to be immobilized in this way. Heisenberg's Un-
certainty Principle, itself a rediscovery ofa Heraclitean and Platonic
position, ^^ would in any case rob any reality so immobilized of its
objectivity. Rather, the coherence theory decides what is true. This
is another way of saying that Time decides. Does the allegedly
true statement fit the experience of the tribe, fit the contours of
a four-dimensional nou^ This primitive adherence to the established
truth explains the reaction of the astronomers who refused to look
through Galileo's telescope. Of course they were obscurantists.
But perhaps they were also conscious of how much that was
important would have to be surrendered in order to gain the
trivial knowledge that Jupiter had moons. How often did even the
greatest of the Greeks fail to look through that telescope ! If the
^^ Beautifully caught by Tacitus, Dialogus 44, cum adrisissent, discessimus.
^'* Cf. Werner Heisenberg, The Physicist's Conception' of Nature (London 1958), p.
60.
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truth is what "cannot lie hidden" (a-leth-eia),^^ it is not we but
the nature of the historical process itself that best produces reliable
knowledge ("science"). Such an attitude is by no means hostile to
experiment, but it mistrusts the experiments devised in any lab-
oratory except that of the witnessed, public a'yicv.'^^
Although Plato so often signalled his hostility to the concept of a
mobile and shifting truth, paradoxically it is now possible to under-
stand certain formal features of his work, including both his use of
verbal repetition, already, as we noted, evident in Thucydides (it is
another form of vertical time), and the "dramatic" element (which
is simply another version of the dialogic). The Republic is said in fact
to have been contained almost in its entirety in Protagoras' Antilogka.^'^
In that case, how interesting that the first book, for example, contains
a number of details commonly regarded at best as picturesque, and
at worst as utterly irrelevant to the serious business in hand—
"philosophy," interpreted however by an understandable but inex-
cusable modern dogmatism as if it were sophia.^^ It may now be seen
that these details are essential clues to the intended meaning.
The first of them is the occasion, the feast of the Thracian ( !
)
goddess Bendis, held at the port of Piraeus, as it were the "gateway"
to Athens. The celebrations will resume in the evening with an
equestrian aniWa symbolizing the game of life,^^ but they are
suspended for the moment, while Socrates and his friends seek respite




. . dans certaines conceptions philosophiques aXfjdaa est oppose a Afidrj 'oubli'
. .
." (P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue grecque III (Paris 1968), p.
618).
-''' See Reflexivity: The Post-Modern Predicament (London 1985) by Hilary Lawson
and his important article in The Listener, vol. 115, no. 2948 (20 February 1986), pp.
12-13, "The Fallacy of Scientific Objectivity," with reference to the work of Simon
Schaffer. The conference chaired by Mr. Lawson at the Institute of Contemporary
Arts, London, in March 1986 was entitled "Dismantling Truth: Objectivity and
Science." The resemblance to Protagoras' 'AXrjdaa ^ YLara^oiKKovTic, is striking. But
of course the aim of the conference at least was to establish new insights into scientific
method. Heisenberg's treatise (above, note 24) continues to be relevant.
-" Diog. Laert. III. 37 and 57. Cf. Kerferd, p. 139.
^^ Julia Annas, for example, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford 1981), sees
only a picture of "complacency" (pp. 16 fF.). But this is to misunderstand the genuinely
religious nature of Cephalus' remarks about a-yaBri tkiri^ (on which F. Cumont, Lux
Perpetua [Paris 1949], has a whole appendix, pp. 401 ff.) and his quotation from
Pindar at 331a. He echoes in fact themes of 01. 2. 53 IF. If Polemarchus had been
judicially murdered when Plato was writing, had not also Socrates? This theme serves
to emphasize the "threshold" nature of the mise-en-scene , its fragility and at the same
time its privileged access to the truth rather than its complacency.
'^^ Quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt, Lucr. II. 79.
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Cephalus is a metic (one who has "changed his home"), he lives at a
harbor, with its constant comings and goings, and he talks about his
imminent death, describing himself as "on the threshold of old age."
He is only in conversation with Socrates from the threshold of another
activity, since he must be off to perform certain religious duties. He
evokes in his remarks a well-attested complex of traditional religious
ideas.
Plato has then already hedged his dialogue about with certain
quite clearly indicated limitations, tokens of its "transitory" nature.
Into this dialogue eventually intrudes the figure of Thrasymachus,
who betrays his ineptitude by his failure to understand dialogic
conventions. He abuses Socrates as a child, instead of recognizing
the privileged status which the child enjoys in the primitive community
(the "divine child"; Heraclitus had understood this concept when he
represented Time as a playing child, Diels-Kranz I, p. 162. 5). He
insists on delivering a long monologue, which is meant to establish
an incontrovertible, and therefore unavailable, truth. Of course, he
must in his turn be shown up as a clown, and that is why Plato
permits himself to poke a certain fun at his red face and sweaty
embarrassment (350d).
The most important use of dialogic symbolism however is reserved
for the end (354). We are carefully reminded that it is still the
Bendidia. Plato makes Socrates compare the previous conversation to
a meal at which he has snatched up this dish and that, without
however being able to say that he has satisfied his appetite. But this
unsatisfactoriness, this self-uncrowning by the hero, for which he has
been so often scolded, is the essence both of Socrates' "irony" and
of the open, dialogic manner. We cannot expect any final resolutions
in the nature of things. It is precisely the imagery of the meal which
is used by the philosophers to encourage us to face death (Lucretius,
Horace, Seneca).^'' But death is the most unsatisfactory of all our
arguments, because we can never win it, and yet eating is our only
approximation to victory. This is why Priam and Achilles learn an
accommodation with death over a meal, and why the Iliad ends with
a funeral feast. The presence of the dead at the annual celebration
of their deaths with the rinfresco is another part of the same skein of
ideas.
In the case of the ending of the first book of the Republic the
*" Lucretius III. 938 (cf. E. J. Kenney in his edition of this book [Cambridge
1971], pp. 212 ff.); Horace, Satires I. 1. 118-19 (where see Kiessling-Heinze's note),
Epp. 11. 2. 214; Seneca, Epp. 61. 4: in general, B. P. Wallach, Lucretius and the Diatribe
against the Fear of Death, Mnem. Supp. 40 (1976), pp. 64-65. Horace's rideat is telling:
Epp. 11. 2. 216.
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argument (conducted of course by the now dead Socrates) is not so
much at a banquet as identified with it. Like all these dinner debates,
it remains unsettled. In another sense, we may think of Thrasymachus
and Socrates as two contestants in a duel (and of course sometimes
that element was bodied forth in other circumstances and societies
in an actual combat before the assembled guests, even at the doors
of the tomb). But none of these occasions can ever end finally. In
spite of the duel between Thrasymachus and Socrates, a vital question
is "left on the table." How are we to live our lives? Only the post-
mortem "journey of a thousand years" can answer: and how revealing
it is for Plato's cast of thought that, when the good man has won
out at the end of that endurance test, he goes around collecting his
prizes like a victor in the Games. ^'
It is the business of the intervening books of the Republic to make
this dimension actual, so that we can now, as we pick up the text,
hold the answer quite literally in our hands.
There is then nothing discreditable about the first book of the
Republic, if we will attend to its form rather than merely to its
arguments. The ultimate challenge is not logical at all, but ethical,
which (to recall an earlier part of our argument) is another way of
saying that not the correspondence but the coherence theory of truth
determines the result ("time will tell": it is the demand shortly to be
put at the beginning of Book II). This is why the character of Socrates
is so important to Plato. No one acquires his character overnight,
yet precisely such a telescoped embodiment ("incarnation") of the
truth is required by this style. It would have been invidious for Plato
to advance himself as some sort of ideal fusion of wisdom and life in
his own work. But he can advance such a fusion in the person of a
revered master, and this is the symbolism of the inheritance of the
argument from old Cephalus by those whom he leaves to carry on
the discussion, and of Socrates' role in articulating their doubts and
puzzles. At the same time, by concealing himself behind the mask of
that master, Plato is able to shrug off any responsibility for the
ultimate truth of what is dialogically said. This "shrugging off" (most
visible at the start of the Phaedo (59b), a "threshold" dialogue par
excellence) is a kind of laughter (irony), laughter at the seriousness of
the claim to the absolute.
It is now possible to understand why Aristophanes' comedy the
Ecclesiazusae shows such extraordinary resemblances to certain argu-
ments of the Republic. Usually, Aristophanes and Socrates are taken
as opposites, and the one is sometimes thought to have contributed
^' X. 62 Id: cf. J. Adam's note on V. 465d.
56 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
to the end of the other. That can only have been because the Athenian
state had lost its sense of proportion, and of what an Aristophanic
comedy means. Part of the purpose of Plato's Symposium, at which
both Socrates and Aristophanes are guests, is to remind forgetful
Athenians of their dialogic good manners, and, because this reminder
is already too late for the feast, that contributes immensely to the
dialogue's tragedy-in-comedy, emphasized by Plato at the end. But
Utopia is a regular comic theme (borrowed also by the Sophists), the
double of our present society held up like a mirror to magnify and
mock our shortcomings. When Plato held up the same mirror as
Aristophanes, he had the same comic or satirical intent. Which of
them spoke first in this dialogue matters much less than realizing
that Plato too is deploying a comic ("ironic") apparatus.
Aristophanes shows that an essential and primitive part of comedy
is the assault on other literary men ("false prophets"), which is why
literary satire is such an enduring genre. It is part of the Republic
too. But we have to understand that, in Plato, the mixture of prose
and verse is not just the technique of the scholarly article, quoting a
source in order to comment. The motley look of the last pages of
Book II and early pages of Book III of the Republic is already a
heuristic device, a way of giving utterance to two voices that anticipates
the Menippean satire, or Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae . Homer
or Aeschylus is not after all silenced in this court. As in the case of
Thucydides' pairs of speeches, the argument must be settled by the
jury, and the jury is the individual reader.
In Book X of the Republic Homer comes under attack because he
both imitates what is bad, and because imitation is bad anyway. Here
(596d), the image of the mirror used by Pindar proudly about his
own komic art, and boldly adapted by Alcidamas to defend the Odyssey
(Aristotle, Rhet. III. 1406b 12), is interpreted in malam partem. But
the paradox by which a master imitator condemns imitation must
not escape notice. It too is part of the denial of ultimate truth, or
better, of human access to ultimate truth in words. ^^ Can Gorgias'
youthful declaration of the incommunicability of knowledge be so
far away?
Plato was not stopped by this inaccessibility any more than Gorgias
from exploring what transrational language could do to break out
of the philosophical impasse. He argues in the Republic that what we
think of as reality is really a shadow world, a flickering copy of the
hidden truth. In another striking image, he recalls Glaucus from the
sea, encrusted with weed and shells, to picture for us the soul
32 Cf. Letter VII, 341c; Phaedrus 275e ff.
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overgrown with this life's desires and pleasures, and utterly trans-
formed from its real nature. This poetry condemns our perceptions
of normality as corruptions or metamorphoses of a second and
superior world, precisely therefore a distorting mirror of the true
thing. It is only because the poet's mirror of this mirror is bigger
and more insistent than our lazy, routine looking that at long last we
begin to notice something is wrong.
This is the essence of the comedian's art. It is appropriate in an
essay so much influenced by M. Bakhtin to draw an example from
Russian literature. Both in Dead Souls and The Inspector General, N.
V. Gogol does exactly the same thing as Plato, and the motto of the
latter masterpiece is the Russian proverb "Don't blame the mirror if
your face is crooked." Gogol was the literary ancestor of Dostoevsky.
But, if he helps us to understand in what sense Plato's mimic and
comic art absorbs and outdoes the schematic dialectic of Protagoras,
he also secures recognition for Gorgias, and recovers for Gorgias his
claim to be a Sophist. The Russian writer was famous for his recitals
of his own works, and for that attention to word-play and euphony
which we associate with the Gorgianic tradition, in this case mediated
to Russian literature through Byzantium. But the profound desire of
the author oi Selected Passages from Correspondence with Frieyids (1847)
to influence through his art the morals of his countrymen cannot be
disputed.
We spoke earlier of Gorgias' philosophical beginnings. His early
work in this mode advanced three propositions: that nothing exists;
that, even if something did exist it could not be known; that, even
if it could be known, this knowledge could not be communicated to
others. ^^ On the normal calculus, Gorgias' subsequent turning to
rhetoric looks like an abandonment of these positions, or even worse,
another motive for cynical exploitation of ethical relativism. If knowl-
edge is impossible, why should not the prize go to the best guesser?
Why not, if guesswork is all we mortals can manage?
Plato rebelled against this, even though Isocrates defended it as,
in politics at least, nothing but common sense. Interestingly, Isocrates
was, after Thucydides, Gorgias' most impressive disciple, and his
influence in practical politics is attested by Cicero {De Or II. 94).
Once again, we have the same paradox as with Protagoras. His
' kvTLkoyiaL possibly inspired the Novel of Hippocrates, but they
certainly, or so at least it appears, handed Thucydides an extremely
sharp tool of historical analysis. And Gorgias' apparently empty
'' Sextus Emp., Adv. Math. 7. 65-87.
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preoccupation with mechanical figures,^'' what the Formalists call
"sound gesture," and abandonment of the claim to absolute knowledge
gave rise, through Isocrates, to a school of practical politicians and
men of action. How could such barrenness bear such progeny?
The answer is that, if truth is unknowable and incommunicable,
human society is not left entirely resourceless, and least of all Greek
society. Truth indeed is lost to abstract methods of recovery, yet it
is interesting that the statement that truth is unknowable only seems
matter for despair to an audience which has lost, or is beginning to
lose, its roots. To the religious and primitive man it is a commonplace,
accounting for the importance in his mentality of mystery, and for
the essential obscurity or masked nature of myth. It is only in late
antiquity that handbooks of mythology appear. The truth that is
unknowable may nevertheless be approached through indirection, by
what theologians call "apophatic" definition, and "apophasis" may
explain the paradoxical nature of Gorgias' own philosophical state-
ments, as well as the poetic nature of his stylized prose. There was
a way to approach the unknowable, and that was through the irrational
spell exerted by poetic discourse. This is why Gorgias developed his
theory of artistic prose after all as a philosophical gesture.
In primitive societies, truth may be approached through myth,
and that myth may be remembered in some sort of ritual discourse,
eventually in poetry. This is not a second best. What is second best
is the bloodless abstraction. Primitive realities are too important to
be disembodied in this way.
We can already see here a reason for Parmenides to write in verse.
Although he dismisses Not-Being as inappropriate to or ineligible for
rational discourse, verse enables such discourse to hint even at the
transrational, and therefore to establish a dialogue with what otherwise
would be unsayable:
TOJi travT' ouon{a) hrai,
oaaa ^poTol KaredevTO KeiroiObnc, uvai a\r)6r),
yiyvtadai rt kuI oXXvadai, eivai t« koi ovxU
Koi TOirop aXKaaaav 8ia t€ XPO« (l)avbv aniifiav.
^'* However it should be noted that the Gorgias of the phrase ax7]naTa TopyUta
was probably the teacher of Cicero's son in Athens {Ad Fam. XVI. 21. 6), who wrote
a book on the (Txvt^oi'ra, partially preserved in Latin translation. See especially
Quintilian IX. 2. 102; the article by Munscher in RE VII. 2, cols. 1604-19; and
Schanz-Hosius, Romische Literaturgeschichte II, pp. 741-43. The expression is not
definitely attested before his time. In this sense the opening pages (15-16) of
E. Norden's Antike Kunstprosa need refinement, since the activity of the younger man,
who was nothing but a rhetorician, has obscured the understanding of the Sophist,
who was far more.
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But does not this magnificent passage (Diels-Kranz I, p. 238, fr. 8,
vv. 38-41) already say something about nothing? And is that legitimate
simply because we have to understand that verse has special rights?
And must we not understand this also of Plato's prose poems?
Empedocles answered Parmenides in verse because a prose answer
to the verse of the master would have been unsatisfactory, empty.
The intended level of dialogue is too primitive and too profound for
prose, especially in the mouth of a mystic. His two poems "On
Nature" and the "Purifications" may be thought of as antithetical
presentations of two sides to the description of the world. In one
sense, it is possible to set out the truth in a form accessible (but not
too accessible, as we see from Aristotle's remarks about Empedocles
in the Poetics) to everyone. In another, such a truth is useless to the
impure and unprepared.
Yet Parmenides was said by Speusippus to have established laws
for his fellow citizens^^ and, on top of his shamanism, Empedocles
was also a politician, an enemy of the Emmenid tyranny at Acragas.
He cannot have supposed then that his wisdom was of a purely
abstract kind, in spite of its formal, hieratic, beauty, which might in
fact have secured him an attentive audience, had he been unconcerned
with practical consequences, from a monarch like Theron, for whom
Pindar wrote the second and third Olympians. Earlier, the disciples of
Pythagoras, the mathematician and musician, were credited with the
political takeover of certain communities. It seems therefore that
Athenian public opinion was right. When the Sophists, particularly
Gorgias, with his Western Greek tradition, but also Protagoras, who
was to draw up a constitution for Pericles' colony at Thurii, arrived
in Athens, they did have the intention of doing more than deliver a
course of lectures and leaving. They were the heirs of the Pythago-
reans, of the Eleatics, of Empedocles, and they meant to impinge on
political ideas, and this is why the young and ambitious flocked to
them: but impinge on these ideas through what should not so much
be called rhetorical as dialectical training, which would have to be
content with guesswork, crToxao'Ti/cT;, do^aaTLKt], uKaaiar'^ Pindar
praises the trainers to whom his young victors owed their successes,
and here were new trainers for new aydvec,. Their immediate con-
version of no less a historian than Thucydides not just to a style but
to a theory of truth proves the impression they made.
Attic vases give evidence of the social world in which young
'• Diels-Kranz I, p. 218, 18-19: cf. p. 220, 20-23.
" Cf. Thuc. I. 138 (and Cicero, Ad Att. X. 8. 7); Isocr. Or. XIII. 17; Plato, Gorgias
463a.
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aristocrats, the destined targets of this Kulturkampf, felt at home: the
komos, the drinking party, athletics, horsemanship, eros. The Symposium
of Xenophon unites some of these themes, and it is interesting that
the company is entertained there both by the 7eXcoro7roi6(; Philip, and
by a troupe of dancers, who present an erotic mime. Yet the
dinnertable conversation is concerned with ethics, and nothing in-
congruous is perceived about this combination.^' Xenophon was
concerned to present a portrait of the dialogic Socrates in action, in
exactly the kind of milieu which the Sophists frequented.
Precisely the same is true of Plato in his Symposium. Certain comic
features of the two dialogues are in fact shared. Like Philip, Socrates
arrives late. So does Alcibiades. At the end, so does a group of
KicixaaTai. There are threshold ("at the door") situations, mixed
emotions. Both dialogues resort to myth.
Plato also indulges in literary satire, significantly at Gorgias'
expense. ^^ In the philosophical effort to grasp the nature of Eros,
eloquence naturally takes wing. What is there here with which
Empedocles could have quarrelled? But we can perhaps see the whole
nature of Plato's war with the Sophists as an effort to beat them at
their own game, and that is why they must so often be represented
as bad characters bad at dialogue, unfairly, because dialogue was
their mission. The common man, as Aristophanes' Clouds shows,
viewed Socrates himself as a Sophist. His effort to differentiate himself
was in the first place, at least as Plato presents it, an effort to prove
that they had not understood their own epistemology. .
A truer account of the Sophists would, in giving them credit for
their public and political interests, also praise them for their attention
to the word, the faculty which, according to Isocrates, distinguishes
man from the animals. ^^ But the Sophists were not just interested in
their own word. In the verbal ay6)v no one side can claim to be
wholly in the right. An ideal dialogue evidently depends on the
acknowledgment of this moderation. Aristophanes' nerve failed even
before the Peace of Nicias, and this is why the Clouds ends with such
an ugly parody of dialogue, for which the poet invents a special
verb.^° After the defeat in the Peloponnesian War, the sophistic
" Ridentetn dicere verum / Quid vetat? Hon Sat. I. 1. 24-25.
** Cf. R. G. Bury's introduction in his edition (Cambridge 1932^), pp. xxxv-vi on
Agathon's speech. See also the pun at 185c.
^^ Antidosis (Or. XV) §§293-94. The theme echoes in Dante, De Vulgari Eloquentia
I. 2, and was then modified by Petrarch.
'"' AiaXt7rToXo7oO/im, 1496. This is Strepsiades' brutal perversion of the dialogic
principle. Whether Protagoras' books were burned at Athens or not, book burnings
were known both to the Greek (NT Act. Apost. 19:19) and Roman worlds (Tac.
Ann. XIV. 50), but this attack on learning is more sinister, since it is done in full
knowledge and contradiction of the civilized alternative. This is what seems to have
shocked Plato so much.
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hesitation and lack of commitment to the truths of the city seemed
to the Athenians in general to have been harmful and untimely. It
is telling that the common man took his revenge by executing for
this clouding of the obvious— Socrates. Without the partial advocacy
of Plato, would we be so sure that the common man, by his own
lights, was wrong? This was already a position defended by Kierke-
gaard.
The paradox is that Plato, who felt the unfairness of this death so
personally, sought to dispel that same hesitation by using some of the
Sophists' weapons. Like Thucydides, he borrowed from Protagoras'
and Gorgias' armory, for only that supposition explains the resem-
blance between his art and that of the Melian Dialogue. He was just
as interested as Gorgias in the transrational scope of language in the
face of the incommunicable, just as interested as Protagoras in the
possibilities of myth. Just as much as Pindar or the Christian evangelist,
he knew that airopia is a positive and religious concept. '*'
But, whatever the intended irresolutions of some of his own
dialogues, he had little mercy on the new masters of philosophical
discourse, of the game of words among the young and influential,
for they stood in the way of a "proper" presentation of Socrates,
and ultimately by their lack of commitment threatened a second
defeat when the city was under attack from outside. In this regard,
his dialogue with Aristophanes has led to major misunderstandings
of the dialogic principle, since his satire of the Sophists has been
interpreted as what it could never be, final truth. At this distance,
we must be chary of blaming him for the aura of infallibility his view
has acquired. Perhaps he could never have imagined that he would
be read in a society where dialogue and its conventions were atten-
uated or forgotten, drowned by the univocal blare of the radio
loudspeaker, the mechanized and deadly laughter of the sitcom.
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The Lysis is one of five short Platonic dialogues which address
themselves entirely to a question of definition. Besides the Lysis these
dialogues are the Charmides, Laches, Hippias Major and Euthyphro; all
of these ask a question of the type "What is x?" and make this
question their sole concern (unlike one or two longer dialogues in
which a question of this type appears in conjunction with other
questions of a different type). All these five dialogues were put by
Ritter on the grounds of style into the earliest of his three groups
of Plato's works; Ritter's establishment of these three groups' can be
followed with reasonable confidence, and his placing of these five
dialogues may be taken to be confirmed by Xenophon's and Aristotle's
statements that Socrates had been interested in problems of definition.
Plato in writing these dialogues each consisting solely of a search for
a definition was no doubt following up the interest of his master.
This is not to say that either the substance or the method of the
argument in these dialogues is directly derived from Socrates himself;
that is something we shall never know.
We shall never know either whether Plato wrote these five dialogues
deliberately as a group. Were they meant to complement each other
and provide a continuous study of methods of definition? Or was the
attack on certain concepts by means of a direct search for their
definitions simply a device which Plato returned to on separate
occasions when one or other of these concepts aroused his attention
' C. Ritter, Platon (Munich 1910), Vol. 1, pp. 236-37.
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for its own sake? The truth I think must lie somewhere between
these alternatives; Plato was both genuinely anxious to investigate
these concepts for their own sakes by discovering their definitions,
and also at the same time consciously experimenting with methods
of approaching satisfactory definitions. For this reason each of these
dialogues would be best studied not only in conjunction with other
places where Plato discusses the same concept, but also in conjunction
with the other definition-seeking dialogues.
It seems possible that some traces of a development in Plato's
conscious conception of definition might be discovered; if this were
possible it would provide some alternative to Ritter's later "stylistic"
attempt to subdivide his previously established first group of dia-
logues.^ Ritter himself was very tentative about this further attempt;
and it is certainly not as trustworthy as his broader division. But I
remain very tentative too^— the task of taking each dialogue strictly
on its own and estimating precisely how much it says for itself is
necessarily prior to any possibility of comparing dialogues.
The most obvious similarity of general structure between these
dialogues is that, though each attempts to discover a definition of a
particular concept, none of them succeeds; each of them after asking
"what is X?" concludes with the admission "But we have not been
able to find out what x is." The regularity with which this conclusion,
or lack of conclusion, is reached and frankly announced makes it
hard to believe that Plato quite simply viewed his attempts at definition
as one after another dogged by failure. Plato is therefore charged
with the crime of Socrates; he is held to have been ironical, and to
have withheld from us his real thoughts. Those whom Socrates
refuted assumed that Socrates himself knew the right answer but
would not reveal it. Readers of the "aporetic" dialogues assume that
Plato was not sincere in saying that he had failed to obtain a particular
definition, that he must have had in mind a satisfactory definition
which for one reason or another he does not state. Now those who
accused Socrates of irony were wrong; Socrates in his earnest search
^ C. Ritter, "Unterabteilungen innerhalb der zeitlich ersten Gruppe Platonischer
Schriften," Hermes 70 (1935), pp. 1-30.
^ Two points might be made: (1) Despite their final aporiai, Lys., Lack, and Charm.
seem more seriously concerned to offer positive suggestions towards defining their
subjects— friendship, courage and self-knowledge— than Euthyphro and Hippias Major
towards theirs; the latter pair seem to make negative points their main business
throughout; (2) Lysis contains no methodological remarks other than 2 13d 1-2 and
the final sentence. The other dialogues are all richer in this respect, and Euth. and
Hippias Major admit terminology such as idia, irapadayfia, ovaia and iradoc,. This
disinclines me to follow those who put the Lysis late in the first period; viewed purely
as a definition-dialogue it might rather be the earliest of the five.
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for the truth was passionately sincere in asserting his own ignorance.
Socrates of course was not a skeptic, but Socratic ignorance was as
conscious and as thorough-going a philosophical attitude as Cartesian
"doubt." Socrates was fully able to face the possibility that every
suggestion he had so far heard was open to serious difficulty. Are we
then perhaps also wrong in assuming that Plato's negative conclusions
are due to irony on his part? It is perfectly possible that the Platonic
dialogues ending in aporia ought to be taken by the letter to mean
what they say, namely that though a number of definitions may be
suggested, serious objections stand in the way of all of them. Plato
wrote much more positive-seeming dialogues at some periods later
in his life; but that is no reason why his early aporiai may not have
been genuine. Estimating the degree of irony in Plato's works is of
course a well-known and very wide-ranging problem. I merely restate
it here because I suspect that for these five dialogues a contribution
to solving it might be obtained from the examination I have already
asked for of Plato's theory of definition. I suspect it would be found
that Plato set standards for acceptable definitions which made them
genuinely difficult to discover, and that the negative conclusions were
due not to irony but to the rigor of Plato's demands.
This however may seem to promise more than I have to offer. I
shall concentrate in this paper on the Lysis alone, which asks ri eariv
TO (t)iXou; General conclusions will have to be preceded by detailed
discussion of how Plato attacks this particular concept. To plunge
then in medias res —
For a few moments we must be lexicographers and attend quite
simply to the meaning of the words (fyiXelv, 4>iXoc, and (t>LXLa as they
occur in Greek outside Plato and especially outside the Lysis."^
Let us start with the verb (f)LXdv. In the first of its normal senses
this is a fairly usual word for "liking" persons. It can denote quite
strong affection, but it is clearly weaker than epav (Xen. Hiero 2,
ware ov ixbvov (J)lXolo ocv aXXa koX epujo), and is without any suggestion
of sexual attraction. On the other hand it may be quite weak and
mean only to be politically "on the side of."
The second main sense is rather different; (j)LXelv can be the word
for being fond of, practising or pursuing certain activities; being fond
of (and indulging in) banqueting and song; or rather differently,
making a practice of certain kinds of behavior— aiaxpoKepbaa, for
^ A fuller lexicography of 4>i\oc, will be provided elsewhere.
' E.g. Homer, Od. XIV. 83; Theognis 67, 385, 739; Sappho 68. 25; Pindar, Pyth.
9. 9; Soph., Ant. 312, 1056, 1059. Note here and below that to parallel some of
Plato's uses of ^iktlv and 0iXoi; one has to turn to poetic usage.
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Nearly all cases ot <l)L\eli> are covered by these two senses; but
rather rarely 0tXeij/ can denote general approval of types or classes
of people and things. Archilochus says ov <t>LK€(ji /xeyav aTpaTrjyop—
"I don't like a tall general." Simonides couples ^iXfoj with lizaivrnn.:
TOV<:i 5' eiraiprjixL Kal 0iXcaJ, €K<hv oarLq tpbrf nrjdev aioxpov.^
The rather surprising gap among the normal uses of <t)iX€tv is that
it does not seem ever to mean "to like" individual, particular objects.
In English one says "I like that picture" of the particular picture on
the wall; this in Greek could not be 0iXaj rrivde ttjv ypa(f)'f]v, unless
perhaps the picture was of a beloved person. (pi-Xelv is certainly not
the word for commonplace "liking" of things. This might perhaps
rather be apicK^i ixoi.
Now to turn to the adjective (f)iXoq. Here we have to deal not only
with a range of varying meanings and applications, but also with
three logically distinct senses marking active, passive and symmetrical
(or reciprocal) relationships. Let us take the passive sense first.
(piXoq in its passive sense could often be paraphrased by the passive
participle from (f)LXelv, that is to say ({)iXovp.evo(;. Its first meaning in
its passive sense is of people, where it means "dear" or "beloved,"
"regarded with" varying degrees of "affection." In Plato's Symposium
Socrates begins a speech by addressing Agathon as a; 0iXe 'Ayadcov
(199c3) and ends with oj (f)LXovn€vt 'Ayadieu (201c8). The second
meaning of the passive sense of 0iXo<; is as applied to types of activity
or pursuit, daiq, eptq—much the same as the second meaning of
<i)LXdvJ Thirdly, what is approved or valued for general reasons can
be called 4>iXop: the Muses at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis sang
OTTL KaXov, (piXov iffTi, TO 5' 01) KaXbu ov (piXov lariv (Theognis 17). At
various places in tragedy to oolov, to diKaiov, veoTrjq and aXKr] are
called 0iXa— general qualities valued for various reasons.® Once to
(piXov is a noun; the aged Oedipus is warned by the chorus not to
trespass in the grove at Colonus but to (}>lXov ae^ecrdai, to respect the
wishes, in fact the religious scruples, of his hosts the Athenians.^ This
application to general characteristics meeting with approval is close
to the third use noted before of the verb 0tXett'.
The parallelism between the uses of (piXelv and 0tXo(;-passive
continues in that 0iXo<;-passive is in the same way unusual in application
to particular impersonal objects. It is not infrequently found of
impersonal objects in tragedy, but always denotes a strong emotional
« Archilochus 114 (West); Simonides 542. 27-28 (Page).
' Od. VIII. 248-49; //. V. 891, I. 107.
« Eur.. El. 1351-52, Her. 637-38, Ion 481-82.
» Soph., O. C. 184-87.
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bond with or valuing of the object: ^iXt; Trarpiq, (t>i\ov dCofia are
common; Hecuba can call Hector's shield ^iXoj/, Philoctetes refers to
his To^ou (f)i\ov.^° But (piXov is not the word for any ordinary object
that one happens to like. People one likes, activities one pursues,
qualities one approves of, special objects one values emotionally, are
(f)i\a, but not ordinary objects one has a moderate liking for.
Let us turn now to a sense of (f)L\o(; which must be marked off as
logically distinct from the passive sense. This is the common meaning
which we translate as "a friend." Xenophon says iravroou KTjjuocTitiv
KpariffTov . . . (t)LXoq cra(l)Tiq Kal ayadbc, (Mem. II. 4). This cannot be the
passive sense of ^iXoc,. Xenophon does not mean "the best of all
possessions is a man one likes who is unfailing and good." We value
an unfailing friend not merely because we like him but also because
he will be prepared to help us. Under "friend" the Oxford Dictionary
adopts Johnson's definition "One joined to another in mutual benev-
olence and intimacy." Johnson derived this from Hobbes and Hobbes
from Aristotle on (/)iXiq; in Rhetoric II (1381al-2), but it remains the
standard English definition of "a friend," and it emphasizes a vital
part of the meaning of the term. Friendship is necessarily mutual
and constitutes a logically symmetrical relationship: if A and B are
friends then A is B's friend and B is A's friend; if A is a friend of B
then it follows that B is a friend of A. This is true of friendship in
Greek also, and in the sense in which it means "a friend" <j)i\oc, is a
logically symmetrical term, separate from both the active and the
passive senses. Now if friendship is thought to be based on any active
feeling or service felt by one party for another, then it must be
remembered that there will only be 2i friendship proper if the feeling
or service of the one party is reciprocated by the other One-sided
relationships do not amount to friendship. This is a matter of fact
which is reflected in the meaning of the words "friend" and (t>L\oq.
Xenophon in his chapters on friendship in Memorabilia II often
mentions reciprocity as a characteristic of friendly services: iroXXaKLq
a irpb avTOV TLq ov diijvvae, ravra 6 0iXo<; irpb tov (piXov e^rjpKeaev (II.
4. 7). I might add here that the ordinary Greek, including Xenophon,
thought in terms more of mutual service than of mutual aff^ection as
the basis of friendship. Xenophon never uses the verb (piXdu in
discussing the relationship between friends (the one occurrence is in
a matter of homosexual attraction"); the ordinary Greek word for
the attitude of mind of one (t>iXoc, to another is evvoia; this is stated
'" Eur., Tro. 458, /. A. 1229. Tro. 1222; Soph., Phil. 1004, 1128.
'
' This doubtless means that Xenophon reserved (fnXdv for fairly strong affection,
but still not the same as tpwq.
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by Aristotle and confirmed by usage (including a place in Menander's
Dyskolos).^^ So the apparent etymological link between (piXdv and
0tXo<; has disappeared in usage as regards (piXoc, in its symmetrical
sense. It is also worth saying that the symmetrical sense of ^iXo? in
the meaning of "a friend" is naturally unusual in the neuter, since
only persons can be friends; but it can arise in certain idioms (see
below).
The active sense of 0iXo^ may perhaps have been derived from
the sense we have just discussed. The title of "friend" is often
conferred or denied according to whether the "friend" gives active
assistance as he should, and this leads to relatively frequent occur-
rences of the word (t>iXoc, where the emphasis is on active manifestations
of friendship. From this kind of emphasis in what are uses of (f)i\o<;
in its reciprocal sense, there does seem to be derived a separate sense
of (f)i\oq which is exclusively active. This must be the explanation of
cases which resemble Eur. Tro. 789 avaideia (piXoq, which must mean
<i)LKo)v avaideiav, "making a practice of shamelessness" (cf. Hel. 1263).
Some apparent cases can be explained as cases of (piXoq meaning
"friend" but carrying an emphasis on the active display of friendly
service or affection. Others are genuinely "active" uses.'^
On the noun 0iXiq; we can be very brief. What must be remembered
is that it is the noun from (piXoq = "a friend," and not from the verb
</)tXeii/. (piXia is always used of mutual relationships of friendship or
alliance. If it is followed by what looks like an objective genitive, it
in fact means "friendship with," not "liking for"; Democritus fr. 98,
evbq (}>iXLt) ^vverov Kpeaacvv a^vueTu^v ttcuvtcou, says that friendship with
one wise man is better than friendship with all stupid men, not (as
Liddell and Scott suggest) that it is better to like one wise man than
to like all stupid men. One exception (outside the Lysis) is Plato, Rep.
581a, where 0iXia: tov Kepdovq, "love of gain," is attributed to the
part of the soul which is (f)iXoK€p5(q; this is an abnormal use dragged
in for the etymological play.'*
I have spent a lot of time on this purely philological inquiry for
two reasons; firstly, the main discussion in the Lysis is done almost
entirely by the use of the word (t)iXoq, now in one sense, now in
another. Let me give an example of the difficulties this can create
'2 Aristotle, E. N. 1 155b32; Eur., Ion 730-32; Plato, Prot. 337bl; Men., Dysk. 720.
'^ Examine //. XXIV. 775; Eur., Or. 424, Hipp. 91-93, El. 265. Occasional attempts
to deny this sense are largely misled by the inadequacy of LSJ. It is of course perfectly
obviously present in the Lysis itself.
'^ In Homer <t>i.\oTr)c, was a euphemism for sexual relations, but this disappeared
later, except in the Lesbian poets (see Page, Sappho and Alcaeus [Oxford 1955], p.
10) and Pindar. It has gone from tragic lyric.
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for the reader; at Lysis 219b we meet the formula <i)i\ov tov <i>i\ov to
<t)l\ov yeyovev. This could mean either "the friend is the friend of
the friend" or "the liking likes the liked" or "the liked is liked by
the liking" (what is liked is liked by what likes). In any given context
in the Lysis the reader has to decide for himself what is the appropriate
sense in which to take the present occurrences of 0t\o(;. This he can
only do by observation of the examples which are cited of the
relationship at present under discussion. This might seem to be mainly
a linguistic problem of dealing with the Greek text; but the second
problem raised by the ambiguity of the word 0iXo(; is of greater
philosophical importance. Plato's main philosophical question in the
Lysis is tl eariv to <I)l\ov; He is trying to define the concept of to
<f)L\ov. But which is the sense of to (f)iXov in which he is trying to
define it? Probably at least two concepts could be suggested to a
Greek by the expression to (t)i\ov; firstly taking (t)i\ov in sense I, the
passive sense, the general notion of "what is valued or pursued or
approved"—remember ottl KaXbu 4)i\ov taTi. Secondly (since the
neuter may also be used in Greek to express the concept named by
an adjective which itself only occurs in the masculine or feminine),
TO (j)i\ov could be derived from ^tXoq in sense II and denote the
concept of "friendship." Which concept is Plato trying to define:
"that which is the object of value or pursuit" or "friendship"? Again,
the reader can only answer this by careful observation of the discussion
Plato provides, and especially of the examples he describes.
The dramatic setting of the dialogue itself is a meeting of Socrates
with some young men at a gymnasium, one of whom, Hippothales,
wants to show off to Socrates his boy-favorite. Now this setting has
led many interpreters into thinking the dialogue is primarily about
pederasty; but this it certainly is not. The discussion starts with a
little homily delivered by Socrates to "humble" Hippothales' beloved
Lysis, who has been "puffed up" because Hippothales has been
singing his praises. This little homily is of the well-known Socratic
tone, recommending Lysis to learn his lessons well and acquire as
much knowledge as possible, since this is the way to make everybody
his friends;'^ the implication I think is that Lysis has been used to
'^ It is as erroneous to believe that Socrates really thought that Lysis' parents did
not love him, insofar as he was useless, as to believe that the Persian king would ever
have trusted him with his empire. Gregory Vlastos, in Platonic Studies (Princeton
1973), pp. 6-9, failed to allow for the exaggerations of this little homily—though
his main argument, as he saw, could be supported elsewhere in the Lysis, e.g. at 215b
and 217a sq. The problem remains acute. Plato clearly knew o/ unselfish affection,
but failed to account for it in his theory. See the final sections of this paper. D. K.
Glidden in Classical Quarterly 31 (1981), 39-59, is even more misled by this passage.
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acquiring "friends" too easily by his beauty alone. At this point Lysis
is rejoined by his boy-comrade Menexenus. The pair have already
declared to Socrates that they are friends, which they obviously are
in a quite different sense from any in which Hippothales and Lysis
are "friends." This perfectly genuine example of friendship between
the two boys is the real starting point of the main discussion. Socrates
appeals to them, since each has the other as a firm friend, to explain
to him how one man becomes the friend of another. (There is no
difficulty in seeing that so far ^tXog means "friend" throughout.)
At this point, 2 1 2a-2 1 3d, there follows a rather puzzling discussion
which many interpreters have explained away as a parody of contem-
porary sophistry. These interpreters may I think be partly correct in
guessing Plato's intention; but the argument is worth examination
for its own sake. Socrates starts by asking Menexenus "When one
man 01X5 another, which of them becomes the other's (piXoq; is the
one who (piXy the (piXoq of the (f)L\ovnevo(;, or is the (f)i\ovfi€voc, the
(f)i\oq of the one who ^iX?); or doesn't it make any difference?" After
our examination of the word cpiXoq it will be clear what kind of logic-
chopping can be made to arise from questions like this. What happens
is roughly as follows. Menexenus allows Socrates to interpret him as
believing that if one man (t>tXy another, then both are (f)iXoL. Menexenus
in fact is thinking of friends as always coming in pairs. But isn't it
possible, says Socrates, that one man may like another without being
liked in return? Ah well, they aren't friends {(piXoi) in that case, says
Menexenus. So unless they both like each other, says Socrates, neither
is a (t)iXoq. But what about men who are (t>iXLTnroL or ^lXolvol or
<j)LXbao<i>oL, asks Socrates. They like all these things— horses, wine,
wisdom— without the liking being returned; but surely all these
things are (jyVXa to them (that is to say "valued by them"). Oh yes,
says Menexenus. So to become a (fyiXoc, all you have to do is to be
liked, become cpiXovneuoq. But in that case if I am liked by a man I
myself hate, he becomes my enemy just by being hated by me, and
I become his friend by being liked by him even though he is my
enemy. But being friends with one's enemy is absurd and impossible.
The only remaining alternative then is that one becomes a ^iXoi; not
by being liked but by liking; and this leads to the same absurdity: I
might like someone who hated me, and that would not make us
friends. So now what can we say? Men are not 0iXoi because they
It is quite different arguing that a twelve year old may not want what is best for him
from arguing (Stoic fashion? or not even that) that to MKetov is an adult's unconscious
purpose. Much that Glidden proposes is suggestive, but not to be found in the Lysis,
and perhaps not in Glidden's form elsewhere in Plato either.
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like other men, nor because they are liked by them, nor because they
both like and are liked. This is a swift but I think accurate summary
of this bewildering passage. Many interpreters have alluded to the
play on the active and passive senses of 0tXo(;; von Arnim'^ quite
rightly pointed out that there is also play on the reciprocal sense, or
some of the statements would not be at all puzzling. Some more
recent interpreters have said that there is in fact no proof that those
who both like and are liked are not 0iXot, and have argued that the
whole passage is designed to prove that reciprocity is necessary in
friendship. But Plato does refute this too by showing that objects or
persons can be 0iXoi, meaning "liked," even if they do not return
liking. What in fact happens is that Plato first rejects an explanation
of the reciprocal sense of (piXoc, by pointing out that there is a passive
sense, then dismisses the passive sense by playing on the reciprocal
sense, and finally dismisses the active sense by the same play on the
reciprocal sense. Now this is "antilogical" with a vengeance; but it is
really a very adroit piece of logical manipulation of the ambiguity of
the word 4)iXo<;, so adroit that it is certainly a temptation to suspect
that Plato here at least must have had his tongue in his cheek. It
could doubtless be argued that construction of paradoxes to exhibit
ambiguities was a method invented by Zeno (though this is unlikely
to be true, in my opinion). It could be suggested that in the absence
of any technical terminology of logic, this kind of paradox-construc-
tion was the only way open to Plato of displaying such a notion as
that of symmetrical relationship. It might be, then, that we have here
a deliberate analysis of the meaning of the word (j)i\o(; constructed
by Plato himself by offering paraphrases of each sense of (f)i\oq in
terms of the participles from the verb (f)LXeiu. When Plato says (213c5)
(I firjre ol (t)L\ovvTtq, (piXoL eaovTat ixr)Tt ol (t>L\ov^evoL fir]Tt ol (piXovuTec,
T€ KOil (piXovfievoL, what we are to take him to mean is roughly the
opposite, namely that </)iXoi can mean either ({)LXovvT(q or (f)LXovnevoL or
(piXovvTeq re Kal 4>1'Xovix€vol.^^ This would be quite a workable schematic
analysis of the three logically distinct senses of <t)iXoc,.
It will be better if I say now that I do not myself believe that Plato
did mean this passage to be read in this way. If Plato was fully aware
of all the ambiguities latent in the word 0iXo^ we would expect him
to keep clear of them himself and steer the reader clear of them in
the rest of the dialogue. Whether he does so or not we must discover
by examining the succeeding discussion, and only then can we return
'® H. von Arnim, Platos jugenddialoge (Leipzig and Berlin 1914), pp. 42-44.
'^ I. M. Crombie draws back from adopting this view: An Examination of Plato's
Doctrines (London 1962), Vol. 1, p. 20.
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to decide upon this first section. All I want to add now on this passage
is this; there is one point of view from which Plato's rejection of all
his paraphrases of (l)i\o<; is justified. Each paraphrase could stand for
(l)i\(K, in one of its senses; none of them is the equivalent of (t)iXoc, in
all its senses. Now this is the point on which the construction of the
passage hangs, even if it is meant ironically. Each paraphrase is
rejected because another sense of (f)i\oq can be produced which this
paraphrase does not represent. The only reason for this can be an
assumption that cpiXoc, has some one basic meaning. If one is setting
oneself the aim of obtaining one single equivalent of (piXoq in all its
senses, then none of these suggestions will do and a negative conclusion
is justified. This is certainly Plato's ostensible aim here; and I think
it may also be his real aim. However, we must proceed to the rest of
the dialogue, which for a short time is less bewildering.
I shall summarize most of the argument fairly briefly, and omit
discussion of several interesting but incidental problems. First Plato
deals with two suggestions he derives from earlier writers, poets as
well as philosophers, about the nature of friendship. For the most
part it is clear enough that the section from 213d to 216b tackles tl
eaTLP TO (l>'Ckov as a problem about mutual friendship between men.
First of all we must see whether men who are like each other
—
onoLOi— become friends. But clearly bad men cannot be friends with
each other; so the suggestion seems only to be half true. But it may
have been meant that only good men were o^ioloi. because only good
men are consistent in their behavior. But good men cannot be friends
because of their likeness to each other (I cannot find any way of
acquitting Plato of shifting uses of onowq hereabouts), since a man
who is like another will not be able to do anything for the other
which the other cannot do for himself. So perhaps good men are
friends not because of their likeness to each other but precisely
because of their goodness. But goodness implies self-sufficiency, and
the self-sufficient man will not need friends, so even good men will
not be friends with each other.
So Socrates tries the other approach, and inquires (215c-216b)
whether men who are unlike each other are friends. Hesiod said
potter quarrelled with potter, and cosmologists have suggested that
opposites attract each other. But friends and enemies are opposites,
among others, say the avTiXoyLKoi; and the just man cannot be friends
with the unjust man, or the temperate man with the licentious man,
or the good man with the bad man. (This only shows that not all
opposites are friends, and not that all friends may not be opposites,
but Plato rejects "oppositeness" so presumably he was looking for a
single sufficient cause of friendship.)
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So far Plato has shown that neither good men nor bad men are
friends among themselves, nor can a good man and a bad man be
friends. Precisely these same paradoxical conclusions about friendship
are put into the mouth of Critobulus by Xenophon in Memorabilia
II; but in Xenophon the arguments used to establish these conclusions
are quite different from Plato's. What to infer from that I cannot
discuss for the moment.'^ The most important arguments to remem-
ber out of those put forward by Plato so far are those showing that
good men cannot be friends; firstly, that is, because in so far as they
are alike they cannot do each other any service, and secondly because
being self-sufficient they have no need of any help.
Now if there were only good men and bad men in the world, the
conclusions so far reached would have exhausted all the possibilities,
and friendship would be completely impossible. Socrates is now made
to put forward a hunch of his own (216d ff.). He suggests that there
are three yeprj, kinds, the good, the bad, and the neither-good-nor-
bad (this last I shall call the "intermediate" for short, though Plato
usually uses the full formula). The bad by its nature excludes itself
from all relationships; so we must look to relationships between the
good and the intermediate. Instances of these are as follows. Whereas
the healthy body does not need medicine, the body, which in itself
is neither good nor bad, needs medicine, which is good, when it is
threatened by disease, which is bad. Similarly—and this is a very
famous Platonic tenet— the wise man does not need wisdom so does
not philosophize, any more than the man who is completely sunk in
ignorance. But the man who is neither already wise nor completely
ignorant but can still recognize his own ignorance is the man who
pursues wisdom.
These are examples of relationships between the intermediate and
the good. These relationships are still described by Plato by use of
the word (t)iXov; and at 218b7 Socrates is made to exclaim vvv
apa . . . iravToc, naXXov e^r]vprjKanev o eanv to (f)i\ov Kal ov. But there
are beginning to be points which should make the cautious reader
pause. The example of the sick man's need of help at first suggests
that he will strike up a friendship with a doctor, but quite soon it is
no longer the doctor who is described as ^iXoq in this example but
the art of medicine which is described as (piXov. At 2 1 7a it is further
established that vyieia, health, is (piXov. This is not a way of saying a
'* It would be pleasant to be able to believe that Plato and Xenophon were
recording direct reminiscences of a discussion with Socrates, but this paradox may
have been or become fairly commonplace. It is equally unsafe to conclude that
Xenophon had read the Lysis, though of course he may very well have done. We
have no evidence for the relative dates.
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sick man needs to become the friend of a healthy man. This would
do him no good at all. What he needs is health itself. Now one cannot
be "friends with" health because only persons can be friends and
health is not a person. This should be enough to warn us that though
Plato is still discussing relationships which can be described in terms
of the word 0tXo(;, he is no longer describing relationships which are
themselves friendships even if it is thought to be implied that they
lead to friendships. Two points confirm this. Throughout the dis-
cussion as far as 221d-e all the relationships discussed are what may
be called "one-sided." Socrates' whole suggestion of a relationship
between the good and the intermediate is based on the premise that
the good attracts the intermediate. There is nowhere any suggestion
that the intermediate exercises a reciprocal attraction on the good;
so we may suspect that the relationship Socrates is thinking of is not
reciprocal. Finally, perhaps the most startling point of all is that
though ol ayadoi have earlier been shown not to be <))i\oL, not to be
friends, in this section first of all various ayada such as medicine and
health are called (t)i\a, and then at 220b7 the suggestion is resumed
(in some sense) that to ayadou is (i>i\ov. This can only avoid being
flatly inconsistent with the earlier conclusion if <i)i\ov is now being
used in a different sense.
There is an excusable temptation at this point to abandon the Lysis
altogether as a riotous muddle. But the situation is perhaps less
desperate than it may seem. From 216c to 22 Id the discussion is
perfectly clear and unconfused so long as it is read as an attempt to
answer the question ri eanv to (J)l\ov; taking ^iXoj^ in its passive sense.
This is an inquiry into what objects are 0iXa in the sense of being
valued or pursued or approved. I shall translate the question tl tuTLv
to (f)i\ov; in this sense as "what is the object of pursuit," since this I
think suits most of the examples Plato mentions. I hope to make
sense, then, of the rest of the dialogue by treating it as discussing
for most of the time no longer "what is friendship"? but "what is
the object of pursuit"? Even though the terminology seems un-
changed, the examples discussed force us to read it in this way. I
shall return later to the problem of why Plato gives us no warning
of his change of topic.
The passage from 218d to 220b is one of considerable interest
which I shall have to leave without detailed discussion. Plato suggests
that anything that is pursued must be pursued eveKa tov Kal 5ia tl—
for the sake of something and because of something; that is to say
for some further end and on account of some prior cause. This
introduces the means/end distinction, and Plato argues that there
cannot be an infinite regress of objects pursued as means, but that
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some object of pursuit must ultimately be in view as an end. He then
attempts a rather alarming linguistic revision by claiming that only
the object pursued as an end is really "an object of pursuit," whereas
the objects said to be pursued as means to an end are only "objects
of pursuit" prjuaTL, in a manner of speaking. There is however a
close parallel to this in the passage at Gorgias 467-68, where it is
claimed a propos of the concept of ^ovXeadaL, "to want," that we do
not really want what we only want as a means; we only really want
what we want as ends and since the only things that are ends are
ayada, the only things we can really want are ayada. Plato in the
Lysis up to 220b develops his notion of the "object really pursued as
an end" without telling us what this object is, but then at 220b7
seems to suggest it might be to ayadov. Now various particular ayada
have been ruled out because they were only pursued as means (this
is jwt the same as in the Gorgias), so if some ayada are not (t)i\a but
TO ayaSbv is 4>'lXov perhaps we have to take to ayadbv here to mean
the quality of goodness itself as opposed to the good things in which
it is present.'^ The only further remark I want to make now about
this passage is that Plato states no reason why he should think, as he
apparently does, that there is only one object really pursued; his
regress argument proves not that there is oyily oyie end but that tliere
must be at least one end.^°
The last sections of the dialogue, from 221b to the end, become
alarmingly condensed; again I shall have to omit discussion of many
of the difficulties, to ayadbv is shown not to be the object of pursuit
by the device of imagining a world in which there was no evil. In
such a world there would be no need to pursue the good; but there
would still be objects which were pursued, such as food and drink,
'^
I leave this remark for the time being as it stands. I never intended to follow
those who find a fully developed Theory of Forms here. G. Vlastos {Platonic Studies,
pp. 35-37) has disposed of this view. Terence Irwin, on the other hand (in Plato's
Moral Theory [Oxford 1977], pp. 92-100), appears to believe that not only a irpwrov
<f)iXoi> but also a irpCoTov ayadbv is implied. That in itself is perhaps plausible, though
it is not the case, contra Irwin, that Plato in the Lysis says that e.g. health is not good
in itself. But in view of Plato's approach in Meno 87d-89a, Euthydemus 278e-281e
and Republic II. 357b-58a, it seems more plausible that for Plato the wpwrov ayaOop
would have been iin<TTr]ij.r} rather than (vbainovia. The difference of Rep. 357-358
from Aristotle, E. N. I. vii has often been observed. Even Gorgias fails to show Plato
calling evdaifiovia the trpwrov ayadbv. Plato perhaps recoiled from using ayadbv in a
sense in which it was manifestly incompatible with i^tXipoj'. I have argued this in a
paper still to be revised. I apologize for brevity here.
^^ Aristotle is accused of this same error in E. N. I. i and E. E. I. vii. In E. N. he
may be protected by various other arguments, e.g. that for a single science of TroXtri/c^.
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the desires for which can sometimes be neither good nor bad.^' So
the real cause of pursuit must be iindvuia, desire; now desire is for
what one lacks; one lacks what has been taken away from one; what
has been taken away from one is one's own, oUdov, so what one
desires and therefore what one pursues is that which is one's own,
TO oUdov. At this point Plato suddenly applies this conclusion to the
dramatic context and observes that since Menexenus and Lysis are
0tXoi they must be oUdoi. This new turn must rest upon the move
from ''to 4)i\ov is to olk^Xov" to "oi 0iXoi are ot/ceioi"; strict consistency
would require us to translate this move as that from "what is pursued
is what is one's own" to "people pursued are one's own (possessions)"
or perhaps "people who pursue each other belong to each other"
(strictly speaking, "as possessions"). But in fact of course ol <f)l\oL
eialv OLKUOL would be a normal Greek expression for "friends have
some affinity to each other," probably implying some congeniality or
matching of temperament. Now Plato no doubt meant this to be his
conclusion; certainly he goes on to suggest that oLKeioTrjq was such
that if one person was attracted to another by 0LKei6Tr](;, then since
oLKdOTTjc, is necessarily symmetrical the attraction must be mutual.
But the method by which Plato drags in this conclusion seems to be
no better than a step from 'Wb 4>'l^ov is oUeiov' to "oi 0iXot are
oi/cfiot" in which he changes not only the gender but also the sense
of both the words (f)L\oc, and oUeloc,. In particular the sense of oi/cetoq
in which a possession which has been taken away from one is oikuov
= "one's own," is not normally a symmetrical sense: my possessions
belong to me but I do not belong to them. So this part of the
argument really looks like a not strictly logical attempt by Plato to
return from the discussion of pursuit, during which the notion of to
oLKHov has entered in, to the discussion of friendship, where to oUdov
will provide an attractive solution if taken in a different sense. ^^ I
shall return to discuss this second change of topic. For the moment
let us finish the summary of the dialogue: the suggestion that oUdoi
are friends is tried out in two ways, firstly by equating oLKdoi with
oholol; but we already know that o/xoioi cannot be friends; then oUdoi
are equated with ayadoi; but we thought we had proved that ayadoi
could not be friends either.^^ So, says Socrates, here we are, three
^' And sometimes (presumably) not waiting to be caused by the bad.
^^ Stoic theories of oiKeiumc, seem to trade on more than one sense of UKeux;,
probably varying between symmetrical and non-symmetrical.
^^ There is very possibly also a rapid suggestion, not formally refuted, that the
good is (KKtiov to the intermediate. But if Plato took this seriously, he would have
been left with the continuing problem about reciprocity if he wished to apply this
sense of otwtOTTjq to the explanation of friendship. C. O. Brink, "Plato on the Natural"
(Han'ard Studies in Classical Philology 63 [1958], pp. 193-98) and Glidden fail to see
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friends, and we don't know what a friend is. outtuj 8€ otl (ctlv 6 (piXoq
OLoi re iyevofieda e^evpeiv. This is the regular conclusion to this set of
dialogues. Here the only softening of the failure is what may be a
hint that Plato thought something more could be done, where Socrates
says "I intended to bring one of the older people present into the
discussion" (223a 1). But I am not inclined to believe that Plato is
hinting that any adult reader can find an easy solution to all the
problems of the dialogue. Plato has left himself and us with real
problems.
In examining the course of the argument from 213d to the end
I have suggested that Plato is discussing two distinct topics: firstly
mutual friendship between men, and secondly, the pursuit by men
of things such as wisdom and health, or later, of food and drink.
Plato never gives any explicit indication that he thinks of himself as
changing at any point from one topic to another. He starts quite
clearly with friendship, but only the examples given at 217a-b and
218a reveal that he has moved to the topic of "pursuit"; and the
final return to the topic of friendship is extremely abrupt. This is
confusing for the English reader; and I am not sure that it was any
easier for a contemporary Greek reader, who could not clear things
up by translating the various senses of 0iXo(; into different English
words. But if we grant that Plato may have expected his readers to
follow all this, did Plato see a connection between his two topics? Is
"pursuit" meant to be closely relevant to friendship, or is this just
an informal chat which casually crosses from one topic to another
without insisting on logical relevance? I fancy it would be more
pleasing to find a unity of aim throughout the dialogue.
Here it will be helpful to turn to Aristotle. Aristotle in E. E. VII
and E. N. VIII and IX discusses friendship with a wealth of sociological
and psychological observation which is on a completely different level
from anything Plato was aiming at in the short compass of the Lysis.
But throughout his discussions Aristotle works rigorously within the
framework of a logical analysis which he presents at the beginning
of each of the versions. In the Nicomachean Ethics this framework is
stated at 1155bl7-1156a6. Aristotle observes briskly raxa 5' av
yevoiTo -jrepl avrOiv . . . (f)auepbv yvuipiadiVToq tov (fyCK-qTov: the problems
about friendship might be cleared up if we discovered what it is that
is (f)L\r]T6v, what it is that is liked or approved. The qualities which
attract liking, (f)iXr]<TLq, are to ayaBbv, to rjbv and to xPVf^i-t^ou. But to
XPWLfiou is only a means to one of the other two qualities, so it is
that Plato usually rejects the view that to oiKdov is ayadbv (though not, perhaps, the
view that to ayadbv is in some sense oikoov).
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the good and pleasant which attract liking as ends in themselves—
(f)L\r]Ta. av ei'rj rayadou re Kal to i]8v ccq reXtj. Then, to borrow a
sentence from the Eudemian version, "just as in the case of inanimate
objects we can like a thing for each of these qualities, so we can like
a man for each of these qualities" (1236al0-12). Aristotle is com-
paring our (t)iXr](nc, of impersonal objects with our (t>i\r](TLq of men; to
(f)i\r]Tbv, what attracts liking, includes the same qualities both in things
and in men.^'* Then, returning to the Nicomachean version, "there
being these three qualities which cause men to like what they like,
one does not talk about friendship in the case of liking inanimate
objects, because there is no returned liking. ... It is where good will
{tvvoLo) of person to person is mutual that there is friendship"
{(vvoiav yap eV avTiirtitovBoaL (})iKiav uvai, 1155a38). Aristotle thus
has the following account of friendship; we like men for the same
reason that we like things, because they have certain qualities. But
things cannot return our liking for them, whereas it is precisely this
mutual and returned "liking" which constitutes friendship between
men. So to explain the way in which friendships can spring up and
be maintained we must always investigate separately what reason
causes each one individually of a pair of friends to like the other.
Explaining why one man alone likes another does not show grounds
for talking of a friendship, unless the second also has a reason for
liking the first. There must always be 0iA?j(nq on both sides; each
party separately must be 0iXt7t6<; to the other.
This analysis of Aristotle's will give us a helpful means of assessing
Plato's discussion. Aristotle investigated to (PlXtjtov in both persons
and things before going on to concentrate on friendships between
persons: he believed in fact that (piXoL, friends, were pairs of (f)L\r]Toi.
Now TO (t)L\r}T6v is in fact Aristotle's equivalent for Plato's to <t)L\ov-
passive. Aristotle (in E. N., though not yet in E. E.) has used, and
perhaps indeed coined, an unambiguously passive verbal adjective
from (piXelv, and he has explained carefully the connection between
TO (t)LXr]T6u and (piXoL in the sense of "friends." Plato has not explained
any logical connections and has employed shifting senses of the same
word (i)iXov\ but if we apply Aristotle's logical analysis to the Lysis, we
can begin to see what may have been in Plato's mind in discussing
TO ^tXoj'-passive. Aristotle thought 0iXoi (friends) were ^iXt/toi; Plato
may have thought similarly that 0tXoi (friends) were 0iXoi in the
passive sense. So perhaps Plato made a general investigation of to
(J)lXov (passive) because he had in mind the same comparison as
Aristotle used between things that were <i>iXa and men who were
^^ E. E. does not yet have the helpful, because clearly passive, form ijuXijTbv.
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(piXoi (passive). This would explain why so much of the Lysis is about
the pursuit of things that are <pi\a (passive).
But here we must remember that Aristotle did not identify 0iXot
as (t)tXr]Toi without qualification; 0t\oi are pairs of men of whom each
has a quality which makes him (fnXrjToq to the other. Is this point in
Aristotle's analysis also present in Plato's mind? The answer I think
here must be no. The suggestion Plato sets out at the greatest length
about what might be (piXov (passive) is the theory that the good will
be 0iXoj/-passive to the intermediate; he mentions this as applied to
things. Perhaps by Aristotle's comparison this could be applied to
men, so that an intermediate man would be attracted to a good man.
But Aristotle would have asked: very well, and how is the good man
attracted to the intermediate man? To which Plato would have no
answer, since on the one hand only goodness is attractive, and on
the other the man who is already good is self-sufficient. Plato has
not, in his suggestion that to ayadov is cpiXou to the intermediate,
made any provision which would allow this one-way attraction to
become an element in a mutual friendship.
Now it may be that Plato was not after all investigating to <l)iXov
(passive) with a view to explaining to (j)iXov = friendship; but this
destroys the unity of purpose which we are trying to find in the
dialogue. It seems more likely that Plato does have part of Aristotle's
later framework in mind, that is to say he thought of <j)iXoL "friends"
as 0iXoi (passive), but that he did not keep in mind, as Aristotle did,
that friendship had to be based on mutual attraction and reciprocated
liking.
It looks very much as though Plato had not seen that this further
provision of Aristotle's was necessary because he had not attended
to the fact that ^tXog = "a friend" was a different notion and a
different sense of 4)lXoc, from 0tXo<;-passive. He rested on the assump-
tion that "friends" were 0iXoi in exactly the same sense as objects
could be 0iXa:, and that nothing more was needed for the explanation
of one sense of (piXoq than for the other. In view of the fact that the
word is the same in Greek, and also in view of the absence of any
recognition of the real dangers of ambiguity anywhere in Greek
thought before the Sophist, this is perhaps not too surprising. So
insofar as I have suggested Plato was making Aristotle's assumption
that friends were ^iXt/toi, or for Plato 0iXoi-passive, he was doing
this unconsciously because he had never seen the distinction, not as
Aristotle did, in order consciously to link friendship with the attraction
denoted by the verb of ^iXetj^.
At this point we must recall one problem that was left hanging in
the air. We must return to the question raised about the initial section
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of the discussion at 212b-2I3d. It might perhaps be argued that this
initial discussion is a deliberate analysis by Plato of the distinct senses
of the word (t)iXoc„ and that this was meant to act as a clue to the
reader by which he might follow the changes of topic and the
interrelations between the arguments in the rest of the dialogue. It
might be maintained that in suggesting one identification of 0tXot as
(j)L\ovuTeq T€ Kal (piXovnevoL Plato was showing himself fully conscious
of the symmetrical sense of 0iXo(; and the reciprocity of friendship.
The rest of the dialogue would then be intended for the careful
reader to sort out for himself; the value of the various suggestions
in application to different topics would be clear after brief thought.
In answer to this it can be said that the only reader to have used
the dialogue in this way appears to have been Aristotle. If these were
Plato's intentions, many learned commentators have missed the point
completely; only a few^^ have realized the full extent of the ambiguity
oi (t)iXoq, and none, even if they saw some of the elements of ambiguity
illuminated in 2I2b-213d, have applied what they learned there to
distinguishing the topics of the rest of the dialogue. Those scholars
who have succeeded in discovering the different senses of (f)iXoc,
underlying the discussion have very largely been following Aristotle.
If Plato did intend the Aristotelian framework to be discovered by
his readers out of his "ironical" construction of a casual conversation,
then surely (to apply R. Robinson's comment on this kind of view of
Plato's early dialogues) "the degree of irony thus attributed to him
is superhuman."^*^ If this was irony it took an Aristotle to see behind
it. If it is argued that a contemporary Greek reader would have been
much more sensitive to Plato's usage of (t>iXoq than a modern inter-
preter can be, against that must be weighed the advantage to a
modern interpreter of being forced to face the difficulties of trans-
lating (f)iXoc, into different words in his own language corresponding
to its various senses; furthermore modern interpreters should be in
general much more conscious than the Greeks were of the existence
of dangers to language and philosophy lying in ambiguity. The
difficulties of disentangling the strands of the Lysis might very well
have been greater to the average Greek reader than to us today,
even supposing the average Greek reader was likely in the first place
to think of words as able to have more than one sense. Finally, if
Plato was being ironical in first distinguishing the senses of (t>iXo<; and
^* Notably von Arnim (above, note 16).
^^ R. Robinson, "Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy," Mj«</ 51 (1942), pp. 97 fF. =
Essays in Greek Philosophy (Oxford 1969), p. 32. My arguments here owe much to his.
Other views are, 1 think, implausible, however disappointing this may be. But there
are degrees of difference between unconscious transitions and radical confusions.
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then leaving it to the reader to follow the thread of the dialogue
without further signposting, it must be said that he constructed a
highly teasing maze for the purpose of this exercise. In ordinary non-
philosophical Greek contexts anything so elaborately puzzling as the
Lysis must have been rare.
The alternative interpretation of the connection between
212b-213d and the rest of the dialogue is that Plato genuinely
thought his first attempt puzzling and unhelpful, and rejected all the
suggestions contained in it; he then proceeded to discuss the question
TL eoTLv TO (t)iXov; with more attention to the facts of the matter and
less to what he suspected were purely verbal quirks. Even if Plato
had seen that 2 1 2b-2 1 3d was a sound analysis of the ambiguity of
the word 0iXoq, he might have thought it of no importance. In the
Euthydemus, when the ambiguity of navdavw has first been played
upon by the two sophists and then explained by Socrates, Socrates
goes on to observe (278b2) ravra d-q rOiv ixadrjtiaroiu (scil. irepl
6vonaT(j>v opdoTrjToq (277e4) iraLdta eoriv . . . iraibLav b\ \67aj bia Tovra,
OTL
€L Kal TToXXa TLc, 7] KoX TTcxPTa TO. TOLUVTa fMOcdoL, TO. ^uv TvpotyixaTa
ovbeu av nocWov eibeir} iry exfi, Trpoairai^eiv be oCbq r' av eirj rolq
audpoiiroLC, bia ttjv tCiv ovoixaroou bia<i)opa.v VTtoaKtXi^oiv koI avarp'fKOiv.
Discussion of the application of words is merely an entertainment,
7rat5ta, and does not show us to. Trpaynara iry e'xei, how things are.
Plato may similarly in the Lysis too have ruled out the possibility of
getting any help from verbal inquiry, and proceeded at 213e to the
serious task of finding out ri earcv to 4>'lXov; in the sense of discovering
as a matter of empirical fact what the phenomenon of friendship
consists in. 212b-213d, quite apart from the unsatisfactoriness of its
"antilogical" results, was only an attempt at purely verbal definition,
at attaching the name ^iXoq to one or other of three already recognized
classes of men. Plato may well have thought the real task was not to
bother about the application of labels to phenomena already distin-
guished, but to pursue the "real" definition of the factors which in
practice create friendships. If he discriminated between 2 1 2b-2 1 3d
and the rest of the dialogue in this way, it is possible to understand
how he may completely have disregarded the genuinely important
results of the first inquiry in his attack on the second.
In rejecting his first attempt at definition as purely verbal and
unimportant, Plato missed what might have shown him that there
were two separate phenomena to be investigated in his subsequent
inquiry, which could either be completely separated or given a
systematic relation to each other, but could not be completely assim-
ilated. One-way pursuit may be taken as a basic element in friendship,
but is not in itself a sufficient description of friendship, and in some
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cases may be of a kind which does not lead to friendship at all. In
his search for the one basic element making anything <t>i\ov, Plato's
earnest desire to be satisfied with no mere partial explanation led
him to miss a difference which exists in the phenomena as well as in
the words. As a consequence of this difference no one simple
explanation will be found, but either two separate explanations or
one complex explanation such as Aristotle's are necessary.
Now I might perhaps restate my view that Plato's aporetic dialogues
are not aporetic purely as a device of irony, but as a result of real
difficulties Plato got into over definition. His difficulties, as I hope
has emerged, are in the Lysis at least due to his not realizing the
dangers of ambiguity in his definiendum. I suspect this is also one
source of his difficulties over to au)(t>pov in Charmides, to oaiov in the
Euthyphro and over to KaXou in Hippias Major.^'^ I would suggest that
Plato on the best philosophical grounds actually led himself away
from any chance of recognizing ambiguity by his own admirable
insistence on not accepting partial definitions. It is true that a
definition covering only a few cases of a general concept is inadequate;
Plato therefore was anxious to obtain comprehensive definitions in
terms of a single necessary and sufficient condition expressed by a
statement of equivalence. His explicit statement of this requirement
of his methodology in the early dialogues is found at Euthyphro 6d-7a,
where Socrates insists that all ooia must have something in common;
/xia ibiOL . . . TO. oaia oaia, and accepts Euthyphro's suggestion that
this idea is to toXc, deolq Kpoa<l)iXeq only if this gives an equivalence
such that oaiov = Tolq deolq Trpo(X(t)LXeq. Such a requirement is difficult
enough to meet for a word having a wide range of strength and
weakness of meaning within a single logical sense, but quite impossible
to satisfy for a word such as (piXoq which has several senses each
having a logically distinct application. There are indeed moments
when Plato seems to hanker after not merely a single analysis, but a
single exact synonym for any definiendum.
This will no doubt have seemed an unduly arid exposition of
nothing but the logical confusions of a dialogue which contains a
number of interesting substantial arguments. I can perhaps add briefly
that underlying the logical confusions of the Lysis Plato seems to have
had a substantial difficulty about the nature of the good. Here of
course we have to make subjective guesses about which of his points
he placed most weight on; but at the final twist of the argument,
where Plato says "we thought we had disproved the notion that good
^' It may well be that Smov, aib^pov and koKov are ambiguous in very different ways
from (f>i\ov (and from each other).
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men could be friends," it has often been guessed that Plato thought
it really ought to be possible to prove that good men were friends.
This is quite likely; Aristotle certainly thought the highest friendship
was that between good men. But Plato has earlier in the dialogue
spent more time than on any other suggestion developing the idea
that the good is pursued by men because they need it, not having
yet achieved it. This too, although dismissed here, seems to be a
serious belief of Plato's; men for Plato only need to realize that the
true object of all their desires is none other than the good itself, and
then they will pursue this one true aim. But in this case Plato was in
a real dilemma, since basing pursuit of the good on the need for it
felt by the not-yet-good is precisely a theory which implies the self-
sufficiency of the already good, and so precludes friendship between
good men. I hope you will have seen that Aristotle took the logical
framework for his theory of friendship from the Lysis (not without
some clarification); on points of substance Aristotle chose to believe
in the friendship of good men at the cost of having to explain at
some length why the good man is not self-sufficient. But Plato was
at all times anxious to prove that our desire for the good was based
on our real natural need for it, and furthermore that attainment to
the good would be the full satisfaction of all our desires. This plared
him in the real, and not "ironical," dilemma, of not being able to
believe that men who had achieved goodness could continue to need
friends. Confused though the argumentation of the Lysis may be,
there are underlying it real problems about the part friendship can





1. A Conflict in the Republic
At the end of Republic I Socrates persuades Thrasymachus that the
just and virtuous person will do well, live well and be happy
(353e4-354a4). Socrates at once admits that the conclusion is pre-
mature, and that he ought to have examined the nature of justice
before deciding whether or not the just person is happy (354bl-c3).
The rest of the Republic might seem to promise a fuller defense
of Socrates' claim that justice secures happiness. For Glaucon and
Adeimantus claim to "renew the argument of Thrasymachus"
(358b7-cl), with a better statement of his objections to justice; and
we expect them to ask Socrates for a better defense of the thesis
maintained against Thrasymachus.
We do not get what we expect. Glaucon and Adeimantus do not
ask Socrates to show that justice by itself makes the just person happy.
They ask him to show that justice by itself makes the just person
happier than the unjust (361c3-d3). And it is this comparative claim
that Socrates defends in the main argument of the Republic, in Books
II-IX.
The thesis of Book I and the thesis of II-IX are vitally different.
For the second thesis leaves open a possibility that the first thesis
excludes. It is possible for A to be happier than B even though
neither A nor B is happy; and so when Plato argues that the just
person is in all circumstances happier than the unjust, he does not
imply that the just person is happy in all circumstances.' He allows
' I translate ev8ai.fiovia by "happiness." This use of the comparative marks one
difference between eidainwv and the English "happy"; the comparative suggests that
fuSaifjMv has the logic of "straight" and (significantly) of "complete."
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that happiness may have components that are not infallibly secured
by justice. Though the second thesis is hard to believe, it is easier
than the first.
Plato probably sees the difference betw^een the two theses. In Book
X he claims that justice leads to happiness because it normally secures
honors, rewards and other external benefits in this life, and invariably
secures the favor of the gods (612a8-614a8). Here Plato assumes
that justice by itself does not secure happiness, and rejects the strong
thesis defended at the end of Book I (the "sufficiency thesis").
Plato has a good reason for making Socrates in Book I defend the
sufficiency thesis. On this point as on others, Book I presents a
Socratic argument for comparison and contrast with the rest of the
Republic. For the early dialogues clearly commit Socrates to the
sufficiency thesis.^ In rejecting it Plato rejects a central element of
Socratic ethics.
In later antiquity the interpretation of Socrates' and Plato's views
about virtue and happiness remained a controversial matter. Chrysip-
pus criticizes Plato for doing away with justice and any other genuine
virtue by recognizing such things as health as goods (Plutarch, De
Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1040d). On the other hand, the later Stoic
Antipater wrote a book arguing that Plato maintained the Stoic thesis
that only the fine is good (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta iii, Antip. 56).
Among later Platonists Plutarch seems to accept Chrysippus' inter-
pretation of Plato, and so finds that Plato and Aristotle agree on this
point against the Stoics. On the other side Atticus asci-ibes to Plato
a view much closer to the Stoic position, and so contrasts him sharply
with Aristotle: "He [sc. Aristotle] deviated from Plato first of all on
the common and greatest and most decisive point, by failing to
observe the measure of happiness and failing to agree that virtue is
self-sufficient for this [sc. measure]" (ap. Eusebius, Praeparatio Evan-
gelica 794c6-d2).^ "While Plato shouted and proclaimed on each
occasion that the most just person is the happiest, Aristotle refused
to allow that happiness follows on virtue unless one is fortunate in
family and physical beauty and other things" (794dl0-13). Here
Atticus assumes unwisely that Plato's acceptance of the comparative
claim commits him to acceptance of the sufficiency thesis.
Albinus is equally unwary; he reasonably finds in the Euthydemus
^ One way to explain the parallels between Rep. I and the Socratic dialogues is
to regard it as a Socratic dialogue. I think this solution is unnecessary, and that some
evidence of self-consciousness in Rep. I suggests that Plato wrote it deliberately as an
introduction to the Republic. See part 1 1 below.
^ Edited by E. H. GifFord (Oxford 1903, 5 vols.). Atticus' views are discussed by
J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London 1977), p. 25.
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a commitment to the Stoic thesis that only the fine is good, but claims
that Plato has demonstrated this most of all in the whole of the
Republic; "for he says that the man with the knowledge we have
mentioned is the most fortunate and happiest," even in adverse
circumstances {Eisagoge 181. 7-9).'* "Most fortunate" is Albinus'
addition to the Republic (perhaps under the influence of Euthydemus
282c9), and he assumes that the Republic's comparative claim is
equivalent to the sufficiency thesis.
This conflict in the interpretation of Plato is implicitly associated
with different views on the relation of Plato to Socrates. It is highly
probable that the Stoics recognized, as Cicero did {Parad. 4), the
Socratic origin of their views on virtue and happiness. The Stoics
are partly inspired by the Cynics, and the Cynics by Socrates. But
Chrysippus' debt to Socrates does not lead him to ascribe the Socratic
view to Plato; nor does his dispute with Plato lead him to ascribe the
Platonic view to Socrates. Chrysippus' care in distinguishing Socrates
from Plato contrasts sharply with Cicero's argument for finding the
Socratic position in Plato; Cicero appeals to the Gorgias and the
Menexenus, raising no question about whether these present Plato's
views {Tusc. V. 35-36).
I want to suggest that Chrysippus is right in his interpretation-of
Plato and right to distinguish Socrates from Plato. But to see why
Plato disagrees with Socrates we must see why Socrates believes the
sufficiency thesis. If we can find his reasons we will perhaps also see
the claims that Plato could not accept.
2. Socrates' Claims
To show that the sufficiency thesis is Socratic we can appeal to earlier
dialogues:
1. In the Apology Socrates affirms that a better person cannot be
harmed by a worse (30c6-d5), and that no evil at all can happen
to a good person, either in life or in death (41c8-d2).
2. In the Crito Socrates affirms an essential premise of his argument
about disobedience and injustice, that living well, living finely and
living justly are the same thing (48b8-9). Since living well is the
same thing as living happily, Socrates assumes that anyone who
lives virtuously (i.e. finely and justly) ensures his happiness.
3. In the Gorgias Socrates argues that the virtuous and just person
acts finely and does well, and thereby is happy (507b8-c7).
* Edited by K. F. Hermann in Platonis Dialogi, vol. 6 (Leipzig 1884). See Dillon,
p. 299.
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4. In the Charmides Socrates asks what sort of knowledge temperance
is. If it is merely the knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, it
will not produce happiness, since only the knowledge of good and
evil will do that (173d3-5, 174bll-c3). It is assumed that the
knowledge of good and evil ensures happiness; and if virtue is
identical to that knowledge, virtue must ensure happiness.
5. The same assumption is made in the Euthydemus. Though we find
it hard to describe the product of the kingly craft, we take it for
granted that there is a craft securing happiness.^
This evidence commits Socrates fairly clearly to the sufficiency
thesis. The first three passages are the clearest. The last two are less
clear; for the crucial assumption appears in an argument that runs
into difficulties, and we might say that Socrates wants to expose the
assumption as a source of the difficulties. But the first three passages
show that he cannot easily reject the assumption.
3. Questions about Happiness
To see why Socrates accepts the sufficiency thesis we must consider
especially his conception of happiness. His views on virtue are com-
paratively clear, since inquiries into the nature of virtue are his main
concern in the early dialogues. It is remarkable, however, that he
never thinks it is worth asking what happiness is. A search for a
definition would apparently be rather useful; but he never seems to
feel the need of it. The Republic displays some of the same insouciance.
At the end of Book I Socrates admits that his conclusion is premature;
he cannot claim to know that justice ensures happiness until he has
said what justice is. But he says nothing similar about happiness; and
the Republic never offers any explicit account of the nature of
happiness.
To see where Socrates and Plato fail we must turn to Aristotle's
discussion of happiness in Eth. Nic. I. Aristotle notices that people all
identify happiness with the highest good, but disagree about what
happiness is (1095a 17-22), and offer different candidates— virtue,
honor, pleasure and so on. But he thinks these disputes are tractable
because we can agree on something intermediate between the very
general claim about the highest good and the disputed claims about
candidates for happiness. His solution of the disputes proceeds through
three stages:
^ Socrates assumes that rJTiq, rinaq oinjaa, 288el-2, is equivalent to rjp JSfi mkttjm^'oi'?
rifwu; eudaifwvaq hpm, 289c7-8; cf. d9-10, 290b 1-2, 291b6, 292b8-cl, e5.
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1. Formal criteria for the highest good— completeness and self-
sufficiency (1097b20-21).
2. A conception of happiness meeting these criteria— activity of the
soul according to virtue in a complete life (1098a 16- 18).
3. A candidate for the happy life— the life according to the specific
actions and states of character described in the Eth. Nic.
These three stages make disputes more tractable. Even if we do
not initially agree on the successful candidates we can agree on formal
criteria, and use our agreement to form a conception of happiness
that allows us to reduce our initial disagreement about candidates,
by asking if they conform to a conception of happiness that meets
the formal criteria. Aristotle practises this method on the lives of
pleasure, honor and virtue to show that each of them is an unsuccessful
candidate.^
Even this rough idea of Aristotle's method of argument suggests
what is missing in Socrates and Plato.' They offer us many third-
stage remarks, about candidates for happiness. Sometimes they offer
second-stage remarks; Aristotle's argument about the human function
is partly anticipated in Republic I. But they offer no explicit first-stage
remarks to show us the appropriate formal criteria for happiness.*
If, however, we are to understand Socrates' reasons for his third-
stage claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness, we would like to
find the implicit criteria and conception that might support it. We
must ask him Aristotle's questions. Since Socrates does not ask them
himself, we must rely on some inference and speculation to decide
how he probably answers them. I will offer one account of his position,
and try to explain why I think it is preferable to the most plausible
alternative I can think of. But whether or not my account is right, I
** On the role of the formal criteria in this chapter see Nic. Ethics, trans. T. H.
Irwin (Indianapolis 1985), note on 1095b 14 fF.
' Some hints exploited by Aristotle appear in Phil. 20b8-22c4, in terms partly
derived from Rep. 505b5-dl. Helpful remarks on formal criteria: N. P. White,
"Goodness and human aims in Aristotle's ethics," in Studies in Aristotle, ed. D. J.
O'Meara (Washington, D.C. 1981), pp. 225-46, at pp. 231, 234 f.
* I believe that in the Protagoras Socrates is seriously committed to hedonism
(some grounds for this belief are ably urged by J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor,
The Greeks on Pleasure [Oxford 1982], pp. 58-68). It is important to explore the
connections of the view of happiness that I attribute to Socrates with the discussions
of hedonism in the Protagoras and Gorg. But I ignore the Protagoras here, because I
would like my arguments to be independent of the dispute about hedonism, and
because hedonism offers us only a conception of happiness that still leaves us to look
for the criteria that justify it.
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think it draws attention to a series of questions about Socratic ethics
that need closer study.^
4. Criteria for Happiness
When Socrates argues with interlocutors holding common-sense views,
he must begin from these views, and either appeal to them in his
own argument or explain why he rejects them. In the earlier dialogues
Socrates does not always show that he sees how controversial some
of his claims are. The Socratic Paradox, e.g., is taken for granted in
the Laches, but defended only in the Protagoras and Meno.^^ Similarly,
the sufficiency thesis is assumed in several dialogues; but only the
Gorgias indicates that Socrates thinks it is paradoxical (470c-e), and
only the Euthydemus defends it. We should not assume either that
Socrates (or Plato) must have had a clear defense in mind when he
first put forward the thesis or that the defense must have come later
than the first statement of the thesis. If we attend to the Gorgias and
Euthydemus, we can see that at least sometimes Socrates both sees
that the thesis needs defense and defends it. He would be unwise to
assume his view without argument; common beliefs about happiness
and virtue do not make the sufficiency thesis seem obviously true.
We should therefore see how Socrates might argue from common
beliefs to show that his interlocutor must accept the sufficiency thesis.
The Euthydemus is our best source for such an argument, but it
fails us at one essential point. Socrates does not begin with a statement
of the criteria and conception he accepts in his claims about happiness.
To see how the argument works, however, we must try to see his
criteria and conception.
He begins with an assumption that he takes to be uncontroversial,
that happiness is what we all want (278b3-6)." We achieve happiness
by gaining many goods (279a 1-4), and Socrates' list of goods is also
meant to be largely uncontroversial (279a4-7). The reputed goods
include bodily and social advantages, possessions and good fortune
^ My treatment of Socrates' views on happiness in Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford
1977) is open to criticism for not having faced these questions. It is justly criticized
by Gregory Vlastos, "Happiness and Virtue in Socrates' Moral Theory," Proceedings
of the Cambridge Philological Society NS 30 (1984), 181-213, at p. 207 note 54, and by
D. J. Zeyl, "Socratic Virtue and Happiness," Archiv fur Gesch. der Phil. 14 (1982), pp.
225-38. In this paper I don't defend the claim that Socrates does take virtue to be
merely instrumental to happiness and not an intrinsic good, but the weaker claim
that the sufficiency thesis is compatible with the purely instrumentalist conception of
virtue. (See Part 9, last paragraph.)
'" See Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, p. 72.
" Socrates identifies iv irparTew with evdainovtw, 280b6.
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(279a4-c8); Socrates recognizes some room for dispute about the
virtues and wisdom, but includes them too (279b4-c2).
To see the point of this list of goods we can usefully turn to
Aristotle. In Rhetoric I. 5 he presents "by way of illustration . . . what
happiness is, to speak in general terms, and from what things its parts
[sc. come about]" (1 360b7-9). He offers something closer to common-
sense views than he offers in the Ethics, where his views on the right
formal criteria and conception influence his presentation of common
sense; and for our purposes the less sophisticated account in the
Rhetoric is especially useful. To show what happiness is Aristotle offers
four answers. It is "(1) doing well together with virtue, or (2) self-
sufficiency of life, or (3) the pleasantest life together with safety, or
(4) prosperity of possessions and bodies together with the power to
protect them and act with them; for practically everyone agrees that
happiness is one or more of these things" (1360b 14- 18). After
presenting these conceptions of happiness Aristotle offers a list of its
parts, rather similar to the list of reputed goods in the Euthydemus.
He explains why they seem to be parts: 'Tor in this way someone
would be most self-sufficient, by having both the internal and external
goods, since there are no other goods beside these. . . . Further, we
think it proper for him to have power and fortune, since that will
make his life most secure" (1360b24-29).
Aristotle suggests that the reputed goods are plausibly taken to be
parts of happiness because they make someone self-sufficient; he has
all the goods he could want, and needs none to be added. He is
secure in so far as his good fortune protects him against sudden
reversals and loss of happiness. Self-sufficiency and security are
plausible formal criteria for happiness (1360b 14- 18), and they justify
the common conception of happiness as consisting in the possession
of all the goods there are.
In the Euthydemus Socrates' attitude to the popular candidates for
happiness is far more critical than Aristotle's. He agrees with the
popular view that it must include all the goods there are; but he
claims that wisdom is the only good, and is therefore necessary and
sufficient for happiness. To see if Socrates is right we should appeal
to the formal criterion assumed by the popular candidates. If Socrates
cannot show that his candidate for happiness achieves self-sufficiency
and security, then he violates an apparently reasonable formal criterion
for happiness. He must either challenge this criterion or show that
his own candidate for happiness satisfies it.
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5. Socrates' Argument
Socrates argues for the conclusion that wisdom is the only good and
makes a person happy. We have every reason to suppose that he takes
the conclusion seriously; for he identifies virtue with wisdom, and
we have seen that he takes virtue to be sufficient for happiness. To
justify his conviction about happiness he needs to show that there is
no genuine part of happiness that is not secured by virtue, and that
therefore the reputed goods that are independent of virtue are not
elements of happiness at all. (Let us call these "external goods,"
remembering that in Socrates' final view they are really not goods
at all.)
But though the conclusion is important the argument raises grave
doubts; its faults seem to be recurrent, gross and obvious.
Socrates rejects the external goods in two stages. First he argues
that good fortune is not an element of happiness that is independent
of wisdom, because wisdom by itself secures all the good fortune that
is needed (279c9-280a8). Next he argues that none of the external
goods is a good at all, because it is their right use that secures
happiness, and only wisdom ensures their right use (280bl-281e5).'^
First Socrates considers good fortune. He mentions two types of
crafts:
(a) flute-playing, writing and reading;
(b) generalship, navigation and medicine (279d8-280a4).
Though he does not mention it, a difference between (a) and (b) is
fairly clear; the Stoics, following Aristotle, formulate it as the differ-
ence between stochastic and non-stochastic crafts {Stoicorum Veterum
Fragmenta III. 19). In (a) fortune seems to be needed to prevent
antecedent ill fortune. An expert writer cannot produce good writing
without the appropriate material; and we may think that the supply
of it is sometimes a matter of fortune. But once he has it, the
'^ In examining reputed goods Socrates does not distinguish instrumental from
intrinsic goods. Indeed he does not describe evbainovia or ev irpctTTiiv as an ayadbv at
all in the Euthyd.; and it might be argued that here he confines ayada to instrumental
goods. The same is true oi Gorgias 467c-468e. Sometimes ayaBa may seem to include
intrinsic goods, Gorgias 494e9-495b4, 499e5, Protagoras 355c3-8 (contrast Gorgias
496b5-6). But this is not certain; I can see no clear reason for denying that, e.g.,
the pleasures mentioned in these passages are considered as goods because they are
instrumental to happiness. If this is so, then the claim in Rep. 357b5 that some goods
are goods because they are chosen for their own sak.es reflects a departure from the
Socratic conception of goods. The claim that happiness is not a good is not
unparalleled; Aristippus (Diog. L. II. 87) may be exploiting a Socratic distinction to
draw an un-Socratic conclusion.
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competent exercise of his craft ensures the right result. In the crafts
listed in (b) fortune also seems to be needed to prevent subsequent
ill fortune. A pilot might exercise his craft quite competently with
the right material, but still a sudden and unpredictable storm might
sink the ship.
Keeping in mind these two areas of ill fortune we can examine
Socrates' argument. He wants to show that good fortune need not
be added to our list of goods once we include wisdom, since wisdom
ensures the sort of success for which we wrongly think good fortune
is needed. He argues:
1. In each case the wise person has better fortune than the unwise
(280a4-5).
2. Genuine wisdom can never go wrong, but must always succeed
(280a7-8).
3. Therefore wisdom always makes us fortunate (280a6).
In this argument Socrates seems to move without warrant to
steadily stronger claims. Since (3) is supposed to eliminate good
fortune as a distinct good apart from wisdom, Socrates should show
that wisdom provides all the success that is normally taken to require
good fortune. But all he shows in (1) is that wisdom ensures mpre
success, other things being equal, than we can expect if we lack it.
The claim in (2) seems stronger. Socrates seems to ignore the problem
of antecedent ill fortune with both types of crafts; and even if this
point is waived, he seems to ignore subsequent ill fortune in crafts
of the second type. We might agree with Socrates that bad writing
with a good pen on good paper indicates lack of the writer's craft;
but we need not see any lack of craft in a pilot's failure to save his
ship from an unpredictable storm. It is just this sort of failure that
we avoid only if we have good fortune. These objections seem to
show that Socrates is not entitled to (2), if it is understood in a strong
enough sense to imply (3). Apparently, then, Socrates tries to prove
that good fortune, as an external good distinct from wisdom, is
unnecessary for happiness, but in trying to prove this ignores those
very cases that seem to show why we need good fortune.
Socrates now argues that the other external goods are not really
goods; and he needs to show this, since these external goods seem
to depend at least partly on good fortune, which Socrates has just
argued is unnecessary for happiness. In Socrates' view, the only real
good is wisdom, and so this turns out to be the only good that we
need for happiness. He argues:
1. It is possible to use the external goods well or badly (280b7-c3,
d7-281al).
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2. Correct use of them is necessary and sufficient for happiness
(280d7-281el).
3. Wisdom is necessary and sufficient for correct use (281al-b2).
4. Therefore wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness
(28Ib2-4).
This is the conclusion that Socrates needs. But he strengthens it by
a further defense of (1) and (2):
5. Each external good used without wisdom is a greater evil than its
opposite, and each used by wisdom is a greater good than its
opposite (281d6-8).
6. Therefore each external good and evil is in fact neither good nor
evil (281e3-4).
7. Therefore wisdom is the only good and folly the only evil (281e4-5).
At (3) and (4) two possibilities need to be considered:
(a) Given a reasonable supply of external goods, wisdom is necessary
and sufficient for happiness.
(b) Whatever external goods we may have or lack, wisdom is necessary
and sufficient for happiness.
In his examples Socrates considers only cases that allow (a); he remarks
that a supply of money and other external resources is still liable to
misuse. He might say that wisdom guarantees the right use, not the
initial resources; then he would have to concede the role of antecedent
fortune, and would simply be ignoring the role of subsequent fortune
in the exercise of some crafts. But if he concedes the role of antecedent
fortune, he cannot maintain his claim to have eliminated fortune as
a distinct contributor to happiness. The elimination of fortune re-
quires the strong claim in (b). And for this strong claim Socrates
seems to have given no sufficient argument.
A further question arises in (5)-(7). When Socrates says in (5) that
health, for example, is a greater good than sickness if it is guided by
wisdom, we might suppose he means that health, in these circum-
stances, is a good and otherwise is not. In that case Socrates can
deny, as he does in (6), that health taken by itself {avrb de Kad' avro)
is a good, and allow that it is a good when it is guided by wisdom.
But if that is what (6) means, the transition to (7) is blatantly
unwarranted, since (7) says that health is not a good at all.
We have two ways out of this unwelcome result:
(a) In (7) Socrates only means that health is not a good by itself, and
needs wisdom added if it is to be a good.
(b) In (5) he does not mean that health is a good.
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While (a) might seem to be a more reasonable conclusion, it would
not fulfill Socrates' main aim in the whole argument; for the reasons
we have already seen, he must show that wisdom is necessary and
sufficient for happiness, and hence the only real good.
If we look again at (5), we can see that Socrates is not committed
to regarding health as a good. If we adapt his remarks to show that
health is a greater good, we will say: if wisdom leads health, health
will be a greater good than sickness to the extent that it is more able
to serve its leader when the leader is good (cf. 281d6-7). This account
of how health is a greater good does not imply that health is good;
"greater good" may simply mean "more of a good," that is, "closer
to being a good." The explanation in "to the extent . . ." says that
health is more able to serve wisdom. If a wise person wants to act
he will often find it easier to act as he wants to if he is healthy than
if he is sick.'^ Socrates, then, can consistently claim that health is not
a good. But he surely has not justified this claim, or the sufficiency
thesis; for he has not shown that virtue can do without a level of
health that is not within its control.
After finding such serious flaws in this argument in the Euthydemus
we might remind ourselves that the dialogue as a whole is concerned
with eristic, and suggest that even the protreptic passages are not
free of the fallacious argument that is rife in the rest of the dialogue.
But if we dismiss the argument we will have dismissed our best
evidence of Socrates' defense of the sufficiency thesis. Before we
dismiss it we ought to see if Socrates can reasonably appeal to
assumptions about happiness that make some of his moves less clearly
illegitimate.
At this point we need to examine Socrates' criteria and conception
more closely. For our previous objections will collapse if Socrates can
justify two claims:
1. When we plan for happiness, we can always count on having the
right material, so that antecedent ill fortune can be ignored.
2. Happiness is the sort of end that is infallibly secured by the correct
exercise of wisdom.
To justify these two claims Socrates needs to show that he can
defend them from a conception of happiness that satisfies reasonable
formal criteria. If we return to Aristotle's general account of happiness
Socrates seems to be wrong; for the completeness, self-sufficiency and
'^ In Meno 88c6-dl Socrates concedes that external goods are in some circum-
stances actually beneficial. His claim here is different from the one in the Euthyd.,
though either claim is consistent with his main claims about virtue and happiness.
See Part 10 below.
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security of happiness seem to require just those goods that are exposed
to antecedent and subsequent ill fortune. Socrates needs to show that
he need not accept these inferences from the formal criteria.
6. Happiness and Desire
Aristotle takes happiness to be the self-sufficient and secure life. He
assumes that self-sufficiency and completeness imply each other; for
the list of reputed goods achieves self-sufficiency because it includes
all the goods there are (1360b26).
But how is completeness to be achieved? Both Socrates and Aristotle
assume, first, that happiness is what we all want, and, second, that
whatever else we want we want for the sake of happiness {Euthydemus
278e3-279a4).''' If we are concerned with happiness because it is
what we want, it will be complete in so far as it achieves all we want,
and self-sufficient if it lacks nothing that we need to achieve all our
desires. Aristotle sometimes explains the completeness of happiness
in this way, saying that it is what we must attain to fulfill our desire
{Eth. End. 1215b 17-18).'^
If we accept this account of completeness and self-sufficiency, the
formal criterion of happiness seems to explain why we need the
external goods, and why the loss of them will prevent happiness. If
1 lack the resources to satisfy my desires, or ill-fortune interferes with
their execution, I lose happiness because I have my desires frustrated.
The elements of my happiness, on this view, must include all that I
need for the satisfaction of my desires; and hence they must include
the external goods.
This conclusion, however, is open to challenge, for a reason that
is briefly stated by Hume. Hume denies that the failure of metaphysical
ambitions is a ground for unhappiness or discontent: 'Tor nothing
is more certain than that despair has almost the same effect upon us
with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the
impossibility of satisfying a desire, than the desire itself vanishes"
{Treatise, Introd.). Hume draws our attention to a familiar fact, that
we do not necessarily think ourselves unhappy simply because we
'^ The second assumption is not explicit in the Euthyd.; but no other object of
wish (ffovXofieda, 278e3) and no other basis for choice than happiness is mentioned.
Here, in apparent contrast to Gorgias 467c fF., ayaOa are not said to be objects of
/SouXtjctk;.
'' This is not a complete or fair account of Aristotle's conditions for happiness.
(This passage, e.g., raises a question about the relation between being aiptrbv and
filling desire.) But the fact that he speaks in these terms about happiness shows how
someone might interpret the demand for completeness.
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cannot fulfill clearly unfeasible desires that we might have had or
once did have. When we see that a desire is unfeasible we give it up,
and once we have given it up, we no longer suffer the unhappiness
of frustrated desire.
If we attend to Hume's point we can reply to the claim that
external goods must be elements of happiness. The loss of these
goods seems to cause unhappiness because it makes some of our
desires unfeasible, and it will cause unhappiness if we retain the
unfeasible desires. But the rational person will react by giving up the
desires that have become unfeasible; once he has given them up, he
is no longer unhappy because they are unsatisfied. The loss of external
goods seems to cause no loss of happiness, and the external goods
are therefore not necessary for happiness.
In reply to Socrates we might urge that Hume is not right about
every case; even if we realize a desire is unfeasible and that we would
be better off if we gave it up, we may retain it, and so continue to
suffer the unhappiness resulting from its frustration. While this might
be a fair objection to Hume, Socrates can hardly accept it. Since he
accepts the Socratic Paradox, he believes that everyone's desires are
all concentrated on his own happiness and the means to it; as soon
as we see that an action does not promote our happiness we will lose
the desire to do it. Socrates' moral psychology offers him a strong
defense of Hume's claim.
Just as the loss of external goods does not by itself cause unhap-
piness, their presence does not by itself secure happiness. We can still
misuse them; and however many we have, we may have such extrav-
agant and unfeasible desires that we are still unsatisfied. In favorable
conditions as, well as unfavorable we need feasible desires; and once
we have them, we can secure happiness through the fulfillment of
our desires.
We have seen, then, why external goods are neither necessary nor
sufficient for happiness; and at the same time we have seen why the
appropriate sort of wisdom will secure happiness. A wise person will
see that he is better off with feasible desires; and if changing external
conditions make some of his desires unfeasible, he will give them up.
By adapting his desires to suit the external conditions, he will secure
his happiness whatever the conditions may be.
A wise person is indifferent to external goods in so far as he does
not regret their loss, and sees that they are neither necessary nor
sufficient for his happiness. But he does not ignore them altogether.
For they are means to the satisfaction of some desires he has. If the
wise person wants a Rolls-Royce, and has the money to buy it, the
money will help him to satisfy his desires, and for that it will be
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useful to him. But if he loses the money, he will not suffer a loss of
happiness, since he will adapt his desires to suit his reduced resources.
We have traced a conception of happiness that accepts the Aris-
totelian formal criteria, and interprets them in a particular way that
leads to a non-Aristotelian conclusion, that external goods are not
elements of happiness, and so are not genuine goods. Aristotle leaves
himself exposed to this sort of argument as soon as he identifies
completeness and self-sufficiency with the complete fulfillment of
desires; for then it seems quite reasonable to adapt our desires in
ways that secure their satisfaction.
On further consideration we may even think the formal criteria
demand the adaptive strategy. For Aristotle recognizes security as a
formal criterion of happiness; and security seems to him to require
a reasonable supply of external goods, which in turn requires good
fortune. We might challenge Aristotle's inference and claim that only
an adaptive strategy properly fulfills his formal criterion. For the
happiness of a wise and well-adapted person seems far more secure
than the condition of someone who depends on the continuation of
good fortune; dependence on external conditions makes our well-
being insecure; and such an insecure condition can hardly count as
happiness. From the formal criteria of happiness we have reached a
conception of happiness as the complete fulfilment of desire, and an
adaptive strategy for achieving that fulfilment. Let us call this an
adaptive account of happiness; we have seen why it presents a plausible
challenge to the common-sense view that regards external goods as
elements of happiness.
7. Socrates' Account of Happiness
I have sketched an adaptive account of happiness to show how it can
plausibly be derived from the common-sense criteria presented by
Aristotle. I now suggest that this sort of account is presupposed in
the Euthydemus. If Socrates relies on an adaptive account of happiness,
he can answer our previous objections relying on external circum-
stances. He is free to ignore antecedent fortune; for the wise person
needs no particular external goods, but only needs to find the desires
that are feasible in the circumstances. If he suffers subsequent ill
fortune, that will not threaten his happiness either; he will simply
have discovered that some of his desires are unfeasible, and so will
eliminate them. Socrates can justifiably claim that wisdom by itself
secures all the good fortune that is needed for happiness, and that
while favorable conditions (e.g. being healthy rather than sick) make
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it easier to fulfill the desires I have, they are unnecessary for happiness
and do not contribute to it in their own right.
If an adaptive account of happiness allows this defense of Socrates'
argument, we have some reason to suppose he accepts or presupposes
it. This is not a decisive reason; we may be able to find other accounts
of happiness that explain this argument as well or better. To explain
the argument we should both be able to refer to formal criteria for
happiness that Socrates might be expected to assume, and be able to
answer the objections that arise at different stages in Socrates'
argument. I cannot think of any other account of happiness that will
pass these tests as well as the adaptive account passes them; and
therefore I am inclined to attribute the adaptive account to Socrates.
The implicit presence of an adaptive account in the Euthydernus is
one reason for ascribing it to Socrates. But clearly we will have much
better reasons if we can find other evidence to support us, and we
will have to think again if we find conflicting evidence in other
dialogues.
One argument in the Lysis assumes that the good person, as such,
is sufficient for himself and to that extent needs nothing else (215a6-8).
This assumption is not clearly challenged in the dialogue; and we
can see why Socrates accepts it if he believes that happiness is complete
satisfaction and accepts the sufficiency thesis.
In the Apology Socrates suggests that death is a good thing even if
it is like a permanent sleep (40a9-e4). There are few days or nights
in our lives in which we have lived better or more pleasantly than in
the nights of dreamless sleep (40d2-e2). Though Socrates first assumes
that death involves non-existence (40c6), his praise of death does not
rest on this assumption; and so he forgoes the Epicurean argument
that nothing bad can happen to us when we do not exist and are
unaware of anything."^ His argument is a different one— that death
is actually good for us because it is so similar to a condition that is
evidently better and pleasanter than most others. This claim is
intelligible if an adaptive account of happiness is assumed; for in
dreamless sleep we have no unsatisfied desires. The more seriously
we take this account of happiness, the more seriously we will take
Socrates' praise of death.
In the Gorgias Callicles claims that happiness requires large and
demanding appetites and their satisfaction (491e5-492c8). Socrates
asks him to consider the view that "those who need nothing are
'" 14. This passage is, quite reasonably, adapted to Epicurean use and strangely
conflated with some of the dualism of the Ale. in Ax. 365d-366a. See D. J. Furley,
"Nothing to us?" in The Norms of Nature, edd. M. Schofield and G. Striker (Cambridge
1986).
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happy" (492e3-4)." Callicles rejects this view because it would imply
that rocks and corpses are happiest of all (492e5-6). Since Socrates
has just suggested that a wise person will be temperate and self-
controlled, the conception of happiness that Callicles rejects is plainly
the Socratic conception.
Socrates says he wants to "persuade you to change your mind and
to choose, instead of the unfilled and unrestrained life, the life that
is orderly and adequately supplied and satisfied with the things that
are present on each occasion. But do I persuade you at all actually
to change your mind (and agree) that the orderly people are happier
than the unrestrained?" (493c4-d2). In this last sentence we might
take Socrates to be defending only a comparative claim (cf. 494a2-5),
so that he is not committed to the stronger claim that the self-
sufficient people are actually happy. The merely comparative claim,
however, is not enough for the Gorgias. Socrates has already asserted
the sufficiency thesis against Polus (470e9-10), and he reasserts this
claim against Callicles (507b8-c4).'^ If he maintains the adaptive
account of happiness, his argument is clear. For he takes virtue to
result from temperance, and therefore to result from wise planning
that removes demanding and extravagant desires (503c4-6). An
adaptive account of happiness strongly supports the sufficiency thesis;
without such an account the thesis is left with very weak support.
Here as in the Euthydemus we ascribe the adaptive account to
Socrates because he needs it; and such an argument is less than
conclusive. We are better off^in the Gorgias, however; for here Socrates
mentions an adaptive account of happiness, and closely links it to his
claims about virtue and happiness. It is striking that in the Gorgias
he fails to distinguish the sufficiency thesis from the comparative
thesis that is defended in the Republic; and the dialogue offers only
the adaptive account to support the sufficiency thesis.
These remarks in dialogues apart from the Euthydemus encourage
us to believe that an adaptive account of happiness is not confined
to this one dialogue. Indeed they suggest that whenever Socrates
" Here bdadai includes both wanting and needing. We might think, it is important
to distinguish the two, to insist that someone who does not want anything may still
need some things, and to urge that only not needing anything is a reasonable condition
for the self-sufficiency that is relevant to happiness. But for Socrates the distinction
will be unimportant, since what we need for happiness is just what we need for the
complete satisfaction of our desires; when we have no unsatisfied desires, then, in
his view, we will need nothing.
'*
I doubt if Socrates or Plato is (as often alleged) either confused by or deliberately
exploiting any ambiguity in eS KparTtiv. See Plato: Gorgias, tr. Irwin (Oxford 1979),
p. 223.
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appeals to a conception of happiness to support his argument, he
appeals to a conception that finds happiness in the complete satisfac-
tion of desire. An adaptive account of happiness is an important,
though largely implicit, element of Socratic doctrine.
I have suggested that the claims made in the Euthydemus about
external goods are properly explained by the adaptive account of
happiness accepted in the Gorgias. It is worth remarking, then, that
this connection between the two dialogues may have occurred to the
author of the pseudo-Platonic Eryxias. The argument here asks
whether such external goods as wealth are really goods or really
useful. The argument in the Euthydemus is used to show that these
goods are not always beneficial (403a2-c5). Later Socrates claims
that the happier and better person is the one who requires fewer
external goods (405b8-c6). Just as the healthy person is better off
and needs less than the sick person, so the person with fewer desires
is better off than the person with many desires who needs large
resources to satisfy them (405c6-406a3).
This argument fills the gap left in the Euthydemus, by explaining
why the wise person, who knows how to use external goods and
therefore will make the best use of those he has, will also be successful
and happy, no matter how few of them he has. Part of his wisdom is
his knowledge that he does not need any particular level of them to
secure his happiness, and that he secures his happiness by satisfying
the desires that fit the external goods available to him.
We do not know who wrote the Eryxias or when. But it is worth
mentioning for our purposes, since the author echoes both the
Euthydemus and the Gorgias, and sees how they might be combined.
I think the connections he finds reflect an important Socratic as-
sumption. It is easy to suppose that the Eryxias reflects the influence
of Cynic and Stoic arguments. But we need not assume this; it is an
intelligible, and to this extent not unintelligent, development of
Socratic views.
8. Interpretations of Socratic Happiness
If Socrates accepts an adaptive account of happiness, we can perhaps
understand better why he does not inquire curiously into the nature
of happiness. He realizes that his views about virtue and knowledge
and their relation to happiness are controversial; but he might well
believe that a conception of happiness as completely satisfied desire
is fairly uncontroversial, and that an adaptive strategy is a reasonable
conclusion from it. We can support Socrates by noticing that these
claims might not seem bizarre to all his contemporaries.
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The Menexenus recognizes self-sufficiency as a source of happiness.
A person's happiness is most secure if the things that promote it
depend on himself rather than on the good or bad fortune of others;
and such self-sufficiency is the mark of the temperate, brave and wise
person (247e5-248a7). I mention this passage not because I imagine
that this funeral speech is meant to express distinctively Socratic
doctrine, but for just the opposite reason. Such a remark in a speech
consisting mostly of moral platitudes suggests that an adaptive account
of happiness would not be bizarre and unintelligible (even if it was
not immediately obvious) to someone with ordinary views about
happiness. This is not to say that Socratic ethics is free of paradox;
it certainly outrages common sense at some points, but its aims are
not alien to common sense.
Some of Democritus' remarks on happiness suggest that one of
Socrates' contemporaries could accept an adaptive account. He says:
"If you do not desire much, a little will seem much to you; for a
small desire makes poverty equipollent with wealth" (B 284). For
similar reasons he advises us to "keep our minds fixed on what is
possible, and be satisfied with what is present" (B 191, DK p. 184.
9-10; cf. Gorg. 493c6-7). The claim about equipollence is just what
Socrates needs to explain why recognized goods are not really goods,
and why their loss is not really a harm; if I reduce my desires I will
no longer miss the wealth I have lost, and my reduced resources will
serve me just as well.'^
Democritus' advice makes it easy to infer that an adaptive account
of happiness will also be ascetic, advising us to reduce our desires to
the minimum. Xenophon associates self-sufficiency and requiring
nothing with Socratic asceticism (Mem. I. 2. 14, 6. 10). In fact,
however, the connection between an adaptive account and asceticism
is not simple. If asceticism requires the actual cultivation of limited
and undemanding desires in all conditions, it does not follow from
'' This apparent evidence of a contemporary view may be challenged; see Z.
Stewart, "Democritus and the Cynics," Harx'ard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958),
179-91. It is one of the fragments derived from Stobaeus, and sometimes taken to
be contaminated by Cynicism. At the same time this claim fits well with Democritus'
belief in the unimportance of fortune and the importance of wisdom and one's own
efforts; cf. B 119 and the well-attested B 3. The occurrence of the term "equipollent,"
Caoadtvia, otherwise attested only in later Greek, may provoke doubts, but perhaps
should not. It is a technical term of Skeptical argument (though this is not its only
use); but this may be an example of a Skeptical term introduced by Democritus. For
another example of such a term see P. De Lacey "oi) fiaXKov and the antecedents of
ancient Scepticism," Phronesis 3 (1958), 59-71. The appeal to equipollence may indeed
be connected with the use of ov fiaXXou, since both can be connected with a doctrine
of indifferents; see, e.g., Sextus, Pyrr. Hyp. III. 177 (cited by De Lacey, n. 19).
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an adaptive account of happiness. If I can easily afford a steak and
would prefer it over a bowl of porridge, an adaptive account of
happiness does not require me to prefer the porridge; it simply
requires me to give up the desire for steak if I cannot satisfy it. Still,
we can see why in some conditions Socratic adaptiveness might require
the actions that would be required by Cynic asceticism. We might,
therefore, both deny that Socrates is a Cynic ascetic and suggest that
his adaptive account of happiness made it easy to regard him as an
ascetic.
The Cynic and ascetic interpretation of Socrates' views on happiness
provoked a reaction. As Augustine remarked, the unclarity of Soc-
rates' views encouraged disagreement among professed Socratics.^"
Augustine was reasonably puzzled that the anti-hedonist Cynics and
the hedonist Cyrenaics could both claim to be Socratics.^' But the
dispute is intelligible if Socrates accepts an adaptive account. For
while the Cynics interpret this ascetically, Aristippus points out that
self-sufficiency and independence does not require abstention from
pleasures when they are available. Like Socrates' temperate person
who is satisfied with "the things present on each occasion" {Gorg.
493c6-7; cf. Democ. B 191), he "enjoyed the pleasure of things
present, but did not labor in pursuing enjoyment of things not
present" (Diog. L. II. 66).^^ While Aristippus' version of hedonism
would have surprised Socrates, he legitimately rejects the ascetic
inferences drawn from Socrates' claims about happiness and self-
sufficiency.
The philosopher who agrees most closely with Socrates on this
issue is probably neither Antisthenes nor Aristippus, but Epicurus. I
am not concerned here with Epicurus' hedonism, but with the account
of happiness that forms his particular version of hedonism. Epicurus
clearly accepts an adaptive account of happiness, and therefore
cultivates independence of external conditions: "We count self-suffi-
ciency as a great good, not so that in all circumstances we will use
only a few things, but so that a few things will suffice us if we do not
^^
"Quod [sc. summum bonum] in Socraticis disputationibus, dum omnia movet,
adserit, destruit, quoniam non evidenter apparuit, quod cuique placuit inde sumserunt
et ubi cuique visum esse constituerunt finem boni" (Cm Dei VIII. 3).
^'
"Sic autem diversas inter se Socratici de isto fine sententias habuerunt ut (quod
vix credibile est unius magistri potuisse facere sectatores) quidam summum bonum
esse dicerent voluptatem, sicut Aristippus; quidam virtutem, sicut Antisthenes" {loc.
cit.; cf. XVIII. 41).
^^ Probably the force of irapovruv is partly temporal, reflecting Aristippus' views
about prudence and the future. But it should also refer to Socrates' and Democritus'
use of the term, for what is available and feasible.
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have many, genuinely convinced that those v^ho enjoy luxury most
pleasantly are those who need it least" (Diog. L. X. 130).^^ Epicurus'
advice sounds quite similar to Democritus'; but, unlike Democritus,
he sharply rejects the ascetic inference supporting Cynicism. At the
same time he clarifies Socrates' claim about self-sufficiency. Socrates
left himself open to Cynic and Cyrenaic constructions, but committed
himself to neither.^^ Epicurus best appreciates the role of an adaptive
account in Socrates, and its consequences for the wise person's attitude
to exteral circumstances. As we will see, the Epicurean position also
captures some of Socrates' claims about the virtues, and reflects some
of the difficulties in them.
9. The Sufficiency of Virtue
We turned to the Euthydemus to understand the account of happiness
that is assumed in the sufficiency thesis. Having seen how Socrates
conceives happiness we can now return to this thesis.
Socrates needs to connect wisdom with virtue. We have seen why
knowledge of good and evil will be sufficient for happiness, if an
adaptive account of happiness is accepted. For the wise person will
be the one who knows that an adaptive strategy secures happiness;
and this wisdom will secure his happiness. If we agree with Socrates
in identifying virtue with the knowledge of good and evil, it follows
that virtue is sufficient for happiness.
But we may still wonder how this conception of virtue is connected
with the particular sorts of actions and states of character that both
common sense and Socrates count as virtuous. Can Socrates explain
why the wise person will characteristically be unafraid in battle,
moderate in his appetites and demands, and unwilling to cheat or
steal?
We can see the main line of argument if we consider why someone
might be attracted to intemperate, cowardly or unjust action. If I
am thinking about my happiness I might suppose that a particular
vicious action will secure me some external good that I need to be
happy, and that I will reduce my happiness if I deny myself that
good. If I cheat, I can get the money I think I need to satisfy my
desires; and if I do not cheat, and forgo the money, then apparently
I lose something I need for happiness. An adaptive account implies
that this argument is mistaken. If I forgo an external good, I simply
^^ I translate Cobet's attractive though unnecessary emendation apKCifuBa {xp^fifScx,
codd.), which makes the connection with the Gorg. and Democritus especially clear.
^^ The difference between the Socratic and the ascetic position is overlooked by
E. R. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias (Oxford 1959), on 492e3.
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need to adapt my desires to new circumstances, and I will not
necessarily forgo any happiness.
Socrates insists strongly that a virtuous person will allow nothing
to count against doing the virtuous action, no matter what the cost
may be; the only question he need ask himself is what the virtuous
action is, and his answer to that question should guide his action {Ap.
28b5-9)." His account of happiness makes this pattern of choice
quite reasonable; since the virtuous person will not see any threat to
his happiness if he pays the price of virtuous action in loss of external
goods, he need not concern himself with this price in deciding what
to do. If Socrates were to choose an external good over the virtuous
course of action, he would be choosing an action that is bad for him,
and he refuses to do this; that is why he refuses to propose an
alternative to the death penalty (Ap. 37b5-e2).^^ For the same reason
a good person cannot be harmed; no loss of external goods will
threaten his happiness.
When Socrates makes these strong claims about virtue, he is not
allowing himself a rhetorical exaggeration or an expression of un-
warranted faith. He is drawing attention to a consequence of an
adaptive account of happiness. A virtuous person can certainly suffer
the loss of external goods; such losses require him to change his
desires; but they do not threaten his happiness, since he adapts his
desires to fit the circumstances.
If this is a defensible account of Socrates' claim about virtue, one
consequence is worth noticing. It is easy to suppose that if Socrates
thinks virtue all by itself is sufficient for happiness, then he must
attribute some intrinsic value to virtue; it might be identical to
happiness, or a part of happiness whose presence is causally sufficient
for the presence of the other parts. If, however, Socrates holds an
adaptive account of happiness, he can maintain the sufficiency of
virtue without attributing any intrinsic value to it.
10. The Value of External Goods
We may hesitate to accept the sufficiency thesis because it seems to
imply that no external good is worth pursuit at all; since these alleged
goods do not promote happiness, they will not be genuine goods,
^^ This passage is appropriately stressed by Vlastos, "Happiness," p. 188, as
evidence of Socrates' belief in the "sovereignty" of virtue over other goods.
^^ In saying that it would be bad for him to choose imprisonment as a penalty
Socrates does not imply that there would be anything bad about imprisonment in
itself. For a different view of this passage see Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State
(Princeton 1984), p. 38 n.
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and so apparently not worth pursuit. This objection was raised against
the Cynics and Stoics who supported the sufficiency thesis. If we
ascribe the thesis to Socrates we may well suppose he is open to the
same objection; and if the objection seems cogent, we may hesitate
to ascribe the thesis to him.
We may hesitate still more when Socrates sometimes seems to
admit that external goods are goods. Sometimes he lists them as
goods without hesitation {Gorg. 467e4-6, Meno 78c5-dl, Lys.
218e5-2I9al). He says he would wish neither to do nor to suffer
injustice {Gorg. 469c 1). He allows the reflective pilot to wonder if he
has benefited or harmed people by saving them from drowning {Gorg.
51 Ie6-512b2). He even claims that virtue is the source of wealth
and any other goods there are {Ap. 30b2-4).^'
To admit that Socrates regards external goods as genuine goods
introduces conflict with some of his other views:
(a) He explicitly contradicts this view in the Euthydemus (281e3-5).
(b) If the sufficiency thesis is true, and if nothing is good without
contributing to happiness, then external goods cannot contrib-
ute to a virtuous person's happiness.
(c) We avoid this conflict if we say that external goods make the
virtuous person happier than he would be without them, and
that this is what makes them goods, though even without them
he would be happy. But if they are goods, then the loss of them
should harm the virtuous person, and we are in conflict with
the claim that the good person cannot be harmed.
We can remove any appearance of conflict if we deny either that
(i) Socrates makes virtue the only good, or that (ii) he accepts the
sufficiency thesis; or that (iii) he thinks the good person cannot be
harmed. Alternatively, we can understand the claims about external
goods so that they are consistent with (i)-(iii).
In the first three passages above {Gorg. 467e etc.) Socrates simply
asks his interlocutor about commonly-recognized goods, and nothing
in the argument depends on his agreeing with the interlocutor that
these are genuine goods. The passages therefore provide very weak
evidence for reinterpreting his explicit statement in (i). When he says
^' Vlastos, "Happiness," p. 208 n. 66, follows J. Burnet, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
(Oxford 1924), ad loc, in translating "from virtue wealth and the other things
become goods" (taking ayada as predicate). This provides a less exact balance with
the previous clause ("virtue does not come to be from wealth"); and the other
translation, if I have explained it correctly, does not commit Socrates to praise of
money-making. If Burnet's translation is accepted, then this will be a passage where
Socrates allows goods whose loss does not leave a person any less happy.
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he would not wish to suffer injustice Socrates refrains from saying
he would wish not to suffer it.^^ He has no reason to wish for it,
since suffering injustice is in itself no benefit to him, and he can say
this even if not suffering injustice is no benefit to him either. ^^ These
passages do not require us to reinterpret (i).
But there is a broader reason for wanting Socrates to modify (i);
we do not want Socrates to be a Cynic, believing that he has no
reason to choose external goods over their opposites. It is worth
noticing, then, that Socrates can consistently maintain that health is
preferable to sickness without rejecting (i)-(iii). As we have seen, he
is entitled to say that if I have a feasible desire, I have reason, to
choose a means to its fulfillment, and such a means is useful to me.
To this extent Socrates could say that the means are instrumental
goods. However, it is easy to suppose that if they are instrumental
goods, I will be worse off without them; and in Socrates' view this is
false. If I lack instrumental means to satisfy a desire I will just give
up the desire, and I will be in an equally good position to achieve
my happiness.
If, then, Socrates holds an adaptive account of happiness, he has
some reason for allowing that external goods are goods (they are
sometimes instrumental means to the fulfillment of my desires) and
some reason for denying this (their presence or absence makes no
difference to my happiness). Sometimes he compromises between
these two claims by speaking in comparative terms. Just as in the
Euthydemus he says health is a greater good than sickness for a virtuous
person, he says the person who is killed unjustly is less wretched and
pitiable than the one who kills unjustly {Gorg. 469b3-6), and that
doing injustice is a greater evil than suffering it (509c6-7). We might
insist that these comparative terms do not imply that external goods
and evils are genuine goods and evils, even if the presence of one
^^ Vlastos, p. 198, and Kraut, p. 38 n., explain the passage differently.
^^ Vlastos, p. 192 f., understands Socrates in Ap. 30c6-d5 to mean that death or
imprisonment or dishonor would be some harm to him, but a much smaller harm
than doing injustice, and when Socrates says that a better man cannot suffer harm
from a worse (30c9-dl) Vlastos takes him to mean that he can suffer no major harm.
We might be forced to suppose that Socrates does not mean exactly what he says if
we had compelling reason to adopt Vlastos's view in other passages, but this passage
taken by itself must be prima facie evidence against Vlastos's view, and 1 doubt if
other passages require us to take Socrates to be speaking inexactly here. As I explain
below, even if Socrates were to admit that these external goods are goods, he would
not have to admit that their loss makes him any less happy, and therefore would not
have to admit that their loss harms him (even if he also concedes, at first sight
paradoxically, that their presence benefits him).
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and absence of the other counts as a benefit (509dl).^° But it may
be better to allow that Socrates does count external goods as genuine
goods, and then to insist that they do not make a virtuous person
any happier than he would be without them. We need not, then, be
surprised to find apparent evidence of Socrates' speaking both ways;
and we need not infer that he must reject (ii) or (iii).
1 1 . Conflicting Views on Happiness
I have tried to show that Socrates holds an adaptive account of
happiness, and that it is consistent with his recognition of reasons for
choosing external goods. But even so I doubt if he sticks consistently
to an adaptive account. Some of his remarks seem to require a
different view that seems irreconcilable with the sufficiency thesis.
In the Crito Socrates compares justice in the soul with health in
the body; he wants to show that it is not worth living with an unjust
soul, and to show that he appeals to Crito's agreement that it is not
worth living {^lcjotov) with a diseased body (47d7-e5). The same claim
about health is affirmed still more strongly in the Gorgias. There
Socrates argues that it does not benefit a person to live with his body
in bad condition, since he is bound to live badly (505a2-4).^'
These claims raise difficulties for the view that virtue is sufficient
for happiness. For apparently the virtuous person could be in bad
health; if bad health deprives him of happiness, it cannot be true
that no evil can happen to him, and his wisdom cannot make good
fortune unnecessary for his happiness.
At the same time, these claims raise wider questions about the
nature of happiness. Socrates might maintain a conception of hap-
piness as the complete fulfillment of desire, and argue that bodily
sickness inevitably frustrates desires that we cannot help having; in
that case he must admit the failure of an adaptive strategy for securing
happiness. Alternatively, he might allow that we could cease to desire
the health we cannot have, and still insist that we are unhappy because
of how we are, not because of how we feel about it. In this case
Socrates must reject the conception of happiness as complete fulfill-
ment of desire. He will have to interpret the formal criterion of
completeness and self-sufficiency as requiring fulfillment of our nature
and capacities, not just of our desires.
'° Kraut, p. 38 n., may be over-confident in claiming that "469b3-6 suggests that
someone who is unjustly killed is to be pitied" and that "at 509c6-7 he [sc. Socrates]
calls suffering injustice an evil."
" Zeyl, "Virtue," rightly cites these passages as evidence for Socrates' views on
happiness; but he does not discuss their bearing on the sufficiency thesis.
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It is worth asking whether this "Aristotelian" conception of hap-
piness, referring to fulfillment of our nature and capacities, explains
more of Socrates' claims than we have explained with the adaptive
account. The main difficulty is its failure to explain the sufficiency
thesis. Socrates appeals to the Aristotelian conception to suggest that
virtue is necessary for happiness (Cri., Gorg. locc. citt.), but it is not
easy to see how it could also support the sufficiency thesis.
In Republic I Plato highlights this difficulty by relying on the
Aristotelian conception. Socrates asks, "Will the soul achieve its
function well if it is deprived of its proper virtue, or is this impossible?"
(353el-2). Thrasymachus agrees, as Crito did, that it is impossible,
so conceding the necessity of virtue for doing well. But Socrates
infers, "It is necessary, then, for a bad soul to rule and attend badly,
and for a good one to do all these things well" (353e4-5).^^ This
abrupt and illegitimate inference from necessity to sufficiency has no
parallel in earlier dialogues; and though the Republic refers again to
the Aristotelian conception (445a5-b4), Plato does not repeat the
fallacious inference. Its presence in Book I may be a further sign of
his self-consciousness in that book. Believing (as the rest of the
Republic shows) that Socrates is right in appealing to the Aristotelian
conception, Plato sees that this will not justify the sufficiency thesis;
and so he abandons the sufficiency thesis in the rest of the Republic.
The Aristotelian conception, then, will not by itself explain Soc-
rates' major claims about virtue and happiness. To explain these
claims it is reasonable to ascribe the adaptive account to him as well.
We have no reason to believe that Socrates sees the conflict between
these two views.
12. Objections to Socrates
I have argued that an adaptive account of happiness explains the
sufficiency thesis. But this result does not imply a satisfactory defense
of virtue. Some unwelcome results of Socrates' views show what
might be wrong both with his account of happiness and with his
claims about virtue.
The problem about virtue is a special case of a general problem
in the adaptive account of happiness. This account tells us what to
do with desires that we have; satisfy the feasible ones and get rid of
the unfeasible. It does not tell us how to choose between two equally
''^ On (V KpciTTav in this argument see above, note 18. The inference (indicated
by apa, 353e4) from necessity to sufficiency is still invalid whatever we decide about
the use of tv irpotTTtiv.
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feasible sets of desires. Indeed it must tell us that from the point of
view of happiness there is nothing to choose between them. If I have
the resources and capacities to be a musician, a politician or an
athlete, and I want to be one, the adaptive account of happiness does
not forbid me to try. But it does not explain why I should not want
to do nothing but lie in the sun or torture insects. The choice between
these two lives will have to depend on other grounds than happiness.
This conclusion might not surprise us. For it is not obviously false
that an admirable and a deplorable life can make different people
equally happy. But Socrates seems to think that happiness should be
our sole and sufficient guide in deciding between different ways of
life; and if happiness leaves so many questions open, it seems to be
an inadequate guide for him.
If we apply this point to Socrates' claims about virtue, we can see
where he faces questions. An adaptive account of happiness explains
the sufficiency thesis. In Socrates' view, a virtuous person has seen
that his happiness requires him to have flexible or feasible desires;
he therefore cultivates these desires and eliminates others, and so
ensures the satisfaction of his desires. He therefore ensures his
happiness, and loss of external goods is no threat to it. To this extent
Socrates can defend his claim that the virtuous person cannot be
harmed and will be happy. He will not lose any happiness by being
brave, temperate and just.
The same sort of argument shows why an opponent such as Crito
or Callicles or Thrasymachus is wrong to suppose that happiness
requires vicious action or vicious character. I will believe that happiness
requires me to be unjust or intemperate or cowardly if I want the
external goods secured by these vices, and I believe that these goods
are necessary for my happiness. But if I believe this, I must accept a
mistaken, non-adaptive account of happiness.
Socrates can argue, then, that virtue is sufficient for happiness and
vice is unnecessary for happiness. But this argument seems to give
him no reason to be virtuous rather than non-virtuous. He may
convince me that my happiness does not require me to profit at my
neighbor's expense. But I can still be happy if I am indifferent to
my neighbor's interests or unconcerned about the other people
fighting in the battle beside me. If my desires are flexible and feasible,
I can secure happiness for myself even if I refuse to do any of the
actions of the just and brave person. And if I feel greedy or malevolent
or cruel or extravagant, an adaptive account of happiness does not
prohibit the satisfaction of these inclinations.
This philosophical weakness in Socrates' position helps to explain
the historical puzzle we mentioned earlier— the sharp conflict be-
tween the views of professed Socratics about the right account of
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happiness. Socrates' adaptive account endorses neither the Cynic nor
the Cyrenaic view; but it is hard to see how Socrates can deny that
both views satisfy his account, or how he could justify preference for
one view over the other. The sharp conflict between the Socratic
schools reflects their common acceptance of a Socratic assumption,
and, as Plato (in the Philebus) and Aristotle see, we can resolve this
conflict only by rejecting the shared Socratic assumption.
Socrates, then, offers a weak defense of virtue. Though the
sufficiency thesis may seems to recommend virtue rather strongly, it
does not; for being virtuous is at best one of many possible results
of an adaptive strategy.
Even if we agree with Socrates that the happy person has no need
to violate the accepted rules of virtuous action, we need not agree
that such a person is really virtuous. Mere absence of temptation to
vicious action is not the same as a positive desire to do virtuous
action; and we might argue that the positive desire is necessary for
virtue. Further, we might argue that only the right sort of positive
desire is sufficient for virtue; perhaps the virtuous person must value
virtue and virtuous action for themselves, not simply as instrumental
means.
We might even doubt that virtuous lives will normally be a subset
of happy lives. Will a just person not desire to promote other people's
good, and will his desire, in unfavorable conditions, not be frustrated?
It looks as though a virtuous person will be less happy, according to
Socrates' conception of happiness, than someone who is wrongly
indifferent to the results of virtuous action.
For these reasons we might doubt if Socrates has an adequate
defense of virtue. If he has no answer to our objections, it does not
follow that he is wrong. It may be our estimate of virtue that is
wrong. But the objections should at least encourage us to reconsider
Socrates' case. Especially they should encourage us to reconsider the
adaptive account of happiness.
At this point we might argue that if the adaptive account of
happiness leaves Socrates open to such objections, we have good
reason for doubting that he accepts it. And indeed this would be a
good reason, if we also had good reason to believe that Socrates both
sees these objections and sees their bearing on his account of happiness.
But we have no good reason to believe either of these things.
13. Plato's Reply to Socrates
We may now return to the beginning of the argument, and the
conflict between Republic I and the rest of the Republic. I have argued
for these conclusions:
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1. Socrates believes the sufficiency thesis maintained in Republic I.
2. He believes it because he accepts an adaptive account of happiness.
3. Such a conception makes just lives at best a proper subset of happy
lives.
I now suggest a further conclusion:
4. Plato rejects the sufficiency thesis because he rejects the adaptive
account of happiness.
Plato sees that it is reasonable to maintain an apparently weaker
claim about virtue to avoid the price that must be paid for Socrates'
stronger claim. The most plausible defense of the sufficiency thesis
rests on an adaptive account of happiness. Once an adaptive account
is rejected, the sufficiency thesis must be rejected; and Plato defends
instead the comparative claim about virtue and vice.^^
To show that Plato rejects an adaptive account of happiness, we
need to understand the implicit criteria and conception assumed in
the Republic. In particular we need to understand Plato's reasons for
claiming that the people with unjust and disordered souls must all
be unhappy. If we examine these reasons, we will see that Plato's
claims about unjust people rest on an account of happiness that is
not purely adaptive.
I will not defend this suggestion here. I have simply suggested
why Plato might have good reasons for rejecting Socrates' sufficiency
thesis. The thesis should be rejected not simply because it is counter-
intuitive, but also because it rests on an account of happiness that is
more deeply in error. When we see that Socrates' account of happiness
leads him into error, we learn an important Socratic lesson that
Socrates apparently has not learned himself; we need a clearer account
of what happiness is supposed to be, and what would be a plausible
candidate for happiness. This is the lesson that Plato and Aristotle
learn, to different degrees. Once they examine happiness more
carefully, they abandon Socrates' sufficiency thesis.'*
Cornell University
*^ Plato's rejection of the Socratic Paradox gives him a further reason for rejecting
Socrates' account of happiness (see note 10), though it would not by itselfjustify him
in rejecting the conception of happiness as fulfillment of desires.
''' An earlier version of this paper was read to the Society for Ancient Greek
Philosophy in December 1984, and benefited from questions raised on that occasion.
Questions from audiences at Colgate University and at William and Mary College,
especially from Daniel Little, helped me to improve a still earlier version. I have also
benefited from criticisms by Gail Fine, and from a very helpful correspondence with
Gregory Vlastos. I am especially indebted to the papers by Vlastos and Zeyl cited
above.
Forms as Individuals:
Unity, Being and Cognition in
Plato's Ideal Theory
RICHARD D. MOHR
This paper, building upon the unique-world argument of the Timaeus,
interprets anew and makes coherent some central features of Plato's
theory of Forms, in particular the sense in which each Form is one,
the way in which cognitive access to Forms is a kind of acquaintance,
and the sense in which Forms "really are.'" The interpretation
advanced might be descriptively dubbed "extreme monadism."
The position stated starkly is the following. What it is about each
Form that constitutes it as the Form it is and as distinct from all
others is not analyzable into relations and attributes. This claim is
not that Forms have no relations to each other. The position is not
a patently self-defeating monadism. There are relations between
Forms and they are all necessary ones in consequence of the eternity
of each Form. Relations between Forms and the phenomena come
and go since the phenomena come and go. But relations between
Forms cannot be other than they are. Some of these necessary relations
are merely formal relations, like sameness, difference, and compati-
bility. But others are relations between the contents of Forms; one
Form would not be what it is if another were not what it is. But
relations between Forms do not constitute the core content of any
' The interpretation in general outline is intended to integrate with central tenets
of the American unity school of Platonic scholarship— in a way that spares those
tenets many recent critiques.
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Form. No Form can be exhaustively reduced to, analyzed into, or
derived from other Forms. This holds true of any Form regardless
of its degree of specificity or generality. It applies to both the Idea
of animal-in-general and the Idea of land-creature, both the Idea of
element and the Idea of fire.^
Conversely, Plato seems to hold that the relations which Forms
have among themselves are not entailed by what each Form is. This
admittedly is highly counter-intuitive. One usually thinks, for instance,
that one thing is different from another entirely by virtue of what
each is. But Plato explicitly claims just the opposite, at least for
merely formal relations. No Form is the same as or different than
another because of what it is: "Each one [of the parts of the Form
of difference, i.e., each and every Form] is different from the others
not by reason of its own nature {dia ttjv avroi) (f)V(nv) but because of
its participation in the Form of difference" {Sophist 255e4-6). What
a Form possesses of necessity, then, is sharply distinct from what it is
to be the Form it is.
More importantly and surprisingly, each Form is not distinguished
as the Form it is by virtue of possessing properties. Each is uniquely
distinguished neither by the possession of a set of properties nor by
the possession of some single, simple, unanalyzable property. Each
Form is fundamentally an individual, not a thing qualified. As the
Form it is, each is tl or tovto, not iroibv. It is only in relation to a
Form that something else has (or is) a quality, whether the something
else is a Form, soul or phenomenon.^ Such qualities, however, neither
singly nor in groups are constitutive of the core content of any Form,
though they entirely exhaust the content of any phenomenon.
'^ So correctly, H. F. Cherniss, who notes the sharp distinction for Forms between
necessity and "essence": "What Aristotle calls genus, differentia, and species are for
[Plato] all distinct ideal units, each other than the others, each having aspects which
imply the existence of the others or are compatible with them, but each being an
independent nature which cannot be exhaustively analyzed into the others" {The
Riddle of the Early Academy [Berkeley 1945], p. 54; see also more generally chapter
one of Cherniss' Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Early Academy I [Baltimore 1944]).
The unique-world argument itself has sometimes been construed as a denial of this
view. See, for example, R. E. Allen, Plato's 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms
(London 1970), p. 88, note 1. Against this denial, see R. D. Mohr, The Platonic
Cosmology (Brill 1985), pp. 29-33.
' In the case of phenomena, since they have the status of images of Ideas cast
onto the mirror of Space, it is more accurate to say simply that they are qualities (or
congeries of qualities) than that they are things which have qualities. Each is toiovtov
with no TOVTO {Timaeus 49c7-50b5).
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I. Forms as Unique
These conclusions, especially regarding qualities, are consequences
of Plato's claims in the unique-world argument {Timaeus 30c-31b)
that both the Form of animal-in-general and the world as animal-in-
general are unique and yet that the world is an instance or image of
the Form. I assume that uniqueness in the argument is an external
or metaphysical attribute of the Idea of animal, that is, that uniqueness
is a property of the Idea qua Idea, rather than qua being the particular
Idea it is."* Further, I suggest that the Idea of animal is thought to
be unique because it serves as a standard or measure. Plato twice
gives an argument that each Form is unique by virtue of its status as
a standard {Republic X. 597c, Timaeus 31a).
^
Further, as standards, Forms are the fundamental individuals of
the Platonic universe: everything else is dependent for its identification
and intelligibility upon them. But they do not stand in this relation
to anything. It is in this way, as self-sufficient, basic and independent,
that the Idea of animal is repeatedly said to be complete in every
way (Timaeus 30d2, 31bl), just as standards or measures in general
are said to be complete {Republic VI. 504c 1-3).^ The Idea of animal
is not complete in the sense of being a whole of essential constitutive
parts, a whole which is unique, if it exhaustively contains all the
instances of some type.' So Forms as standards turn out to be both
fundamental individuals and fundamentally individuals.
Imagine the following scenario. Someone introduces Romulus to
me, alleging that Romulus is an only child {novoyeurjq). Now if Remus
is standing nearby, birth certificate in hand, I would be in a good
position to say that the introducer was at least mistaken. If it further
turned out that the introducer was fully familiar with Remus, say, by
being his parent, then I also could reasonably claim that the introducer
• So, Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism, pp. 295-96 and David Keyt, "The Mad Craftsman
of the Timaeus," Philosophical Rexneui 80 (1971), 230-35. Those who take uniqueness
as a property peculiar to the Idea of animal derive their interpretation from R. D.
Hind, The Timaeus of Plato (London 1888), pp. 94-95; they include Richard Parry,
"The Unique World of the Timaeus," Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1979),
1-10 and Richard Patterson, "The Unique Worlds of the Timaeus" Phoenix 35 (1981),
105-19, against which see Mohr, Cosmology, pp. 15-16.
'' See Mohr, Cosmology, pp. 24-26.
^ On this important but little discussed passage and on the completeness of Forms
generally, see Mohr, Cosmology, pp. 33-36.
' Parry and Patterson construe uniqueness in this way, that is, as exhaustive
completeness (see note 4 supra). This sort of uniqueness, however, simply is not found
in Plato's account of the way the world is unique in consequence of its animality
{Timaeus 33b-37c).
116 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
either was crazy or was lying. If further the introducer, in self-defense,
claims that Romulus is an only child just exactly because he is an
identical twin to Remus, I would have to conclude that the introducer
is not crazy, but is intentionally being perverse, hoping perhaps for
a chuckle on my part.
Those numerous critics, who suppose that Forms have the prop-
erties of which they enable the recognition in other things, are
committed, it seems to me, to viewing Plato in the unique-world
argument as taking upon himself the same role as the introducer in
this Roman scenario. For if the Idea of animal is such that, when it
is copied, a formal similarity obtains between it and the world with
respect to animality, and if both the Idea and the world are claimed
to be unique each as being the sole possessor of animality-in-general
and if this is claimed to be so as a direct result of the similarity of
Idea and world, then Plato must be making a bad joke. For one
cannot without contradiction claim that two formally identical things
are each severally unique with respect to the very property they have
in common, and further one cannot in all seriousness draw attention
to the contradiction by claiming the two things are unique because
they are formally identical. Since the unique-world argument and its
surrounding pages are deadly serious, some way out of the Roman
paradox needs to be found.
One way out, which will not work, is to claim that the Idea and
its instance, though similar with respect to the very property of which
allegedly each is the only possessor, possess it each in a different
manner or in relation to some further distinguishing feature, such
that each is unique in possessing the common property in some way
the other does not. The Moon is unique in this way. It is unique not
qua moon, but in relation to the Earth. It is the Earth's only moon.
On this account, the Idea of animal will be the only animal-in-general
which is an Idea and the world will be the only animal-in-general
which is a phenomenal object. This way out will not work for it
marks a retreat from the explicit and emphatic claim that the world
is unique because it is like the Idea {Timaeus 31a8-b2).
The correct way out of the paradox is to recognize that Plato is
using "unique" in two subtly but importantly distinct senses. The
world is unique in the sense of being one in number and the only
instance or possessor of its kind. Thus Plato calls the world novoyevijq
{Timaeus 31b3, 92c9), which here has its root sense "only begotten"
(cf. Critias 1 1 3d2). Plato, however, crafts the unique-world argument
carefully so that this term is not used to qualify the model. He uses
rather the abstract coinage fiovcoaic, ("one-ness") to describe the
uniqueness of the model {Timaeus 31bl). In part the choice is perhaps
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governed by a desire to avoid associations of generation which attach
to novoyevrjq. In part the choice is perhaps an attempt to signal a
slight change of sense. However, because the term is a Platonic nonce-
word, its sense, which eventually comes to mean "singularity by virtue
of isolation or remoteness,"^ has to be gleaned from the argumentative
context.
When the context is scrutinized carefully, it turns out that in
ascribing uniqueness to the Ideas, Plato does not mean that each
Idea is one in number and the only instance or possessor of its kind,
but rather means that each Idea is one in number and the only one
for its kind, the kind or common characteristic of which it makes
possible the identification in its various instances. Each kind has but
one thing which makes possible the determination that the things
which possess the kind indeed do possess it. This one thing is the
Form for that kind (so Republic X. 596a6-b4).
Within the unique-world argument the subargument showing that
the Idea of animal is unique indeed establishes it as unique in the
sense of being one-/or-a-kind and not in the sense one-of-a-kind
{Timaeus 31a4-7; cf. Republic X. 597c). Important results follow from
this establishment. For the world can be unique in the sense of being
one-of-a-kind, which is the only way in which an instance of a F6rm
could be unique qua instance, and the world can be unique in this
sense without, as it were, "competition," since the Idea of animal is
no longer unique in this sense. But if the world alone is to have the
status of being unique in the sense of being one of the kind it is (i.e.,
of-Animal),^ then the Idea of animal will necessarily not be of that
kind. The Idea of animal, therefore, must be fundamentally an
individual since it is numerically one, and yet is independent of being
of a kind with respect to what it is. Though some things may be said
of it (e.g., its external or metaphysical properties and its merely
formal relations), its "essence" is not an attribute or quality.
Insofar as the uniqueness of the Idea of animal is an external or
metaphysical property of the Idea, what the unique-world argument
as a whole adds to Plato's arguments for the uniqueness of Forms is
a commitment (sometimes read even as implied in those arguments)'"
that each Form is not of the kind of which it allows the determination
in other things. Forms are fundamentally individuals.
« See LSf s.v.
^ The kind is determined by multiple occurrences of an asymmetrical relation
which individuals hold severally to a unique other individual, on analogy with the
way in which all the particular sculptures and paintings of Churchill constitute a
kind: of-Churchill.
'° For example, Cherniss, Selected Papers (Leiden 1977), pp. 332-34.
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Plato then resolves the Roman paradox by using "unique" in
subtly ambiguous ways when he ascribes it variously both to Idea and
instance. Each Idea is fundamentally an individual and is unique in
the sense of being one for a kind; whereas the world is unique as
being one of a kind, the only instance of its Form. This means,
though, that Plato is neither crazy nor disingenuous in asserting that
the world is similar to its Idea and yet that both world and Idea are
unique.
II. Some Problems and their Resolutions
If Plato indeed construes Forms fundamentally as individuals, new
problems may appear to crop up where old ones were resolved. For
the implications of this view for his logic and epistemology will have
a tendency at least initially to boggle the mind.
If it is asked, for example, in what way Forms for different kinds
differ from each other, it turns out that no ordinary vocabulary exists
in which to state the answer accurately. They are numerically distinct
to be sure. But if what has been said about Forms so far is true, it is
logically impossible to say that they are formally distinct. For they
no longer are to be thought of as having properties with respect to
what each is by means of which they might be formally distinguished.
And yet they cannot simply be bare particulars capable of being
interchanged without any subsequent effect. For they must be dis-
cernibly distinct in order to be each for its kind alone. So two features
of the unique content of Forms may seem to be severally paradoxical
and jointly contradictory: on the one hand, a Form's uniqueness
cannot be analyzed in terms of its possession of properties, properties
which might distinguish one Form from the next, and yet on the
other hand, the various contents of Forms must be fundamentally
individuals without, though, being merely fungible.
Some intuitive sense, however, can be made of these curious
conditions if it is noted that they jointly apply to pre-theoretical
understandings of the referents of mass nouns (gold, glass, water,
flesh, wood). Aristotle is on the mark when he gives these, rather
than the referents of count nouns (hors'^s, trees, golf balls) as paradigm
cases of matter— that of which predications are made. They are
metaphysically distinct as that to which properties or forms attach,
but are themselves neither simply properties nor form/matter com-
posites. For each is distinctively a stuff. The referent of a count noun
is not a stuff. A horse, a cow and a man are not three "stuffs" or
three kinds of stuff. Aristotle is therefore off the mark with his
doctrine of relative matters— the view that, for instance, gold is a
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qualification of yet another matter, water, in the same way that a
ring's shape is a qualification of its gold. On this view, "gold" would
become a count noun and gold would cease to be a stuff— would
lose its most distinctive metaphysical character. A form/matter or
attribute/thing analysis applies neatly only to the referents of count
nouns.
Indeed common understanding does not suppose that the referents
of mass nouns are things which have properties that account for their
various distinctive natures. Rather the properties which common
understanding associates most closely or "essentially" with the refer-
ents of mass nouns are properly ascribed rather to things other than
the referents themselves— things which, however, have the properties
by virtue of the referents themselves serving loosely as standards for
identifying the properties. Thus one says that water is wet, but really
what one means by wet is that a wet thing is one that has water on
it or in it in a way that can be felt. One uses water to identify things
as wet. Or one says that water is drop-forming, but really what is
meant when one calls something drop-forming is that it acts in air as
water does. Or one says that water is life-giving, when what one
really means is that for a non-artificial object, taking in water is
required to maintain it as the kind of thing it is. So similarly stand
to each other the items of the following couples: gold/golden, lead/
leaden, flesh/fleshy.
On the other hand, everyday pre-theoretical, pre-Bohr understand-
ing does not suppose that some deep, hidden, ultimately quantifiable
structure or "genotype" is metaphysically lurking in the nature of
things to guarantee and account for the unique natures of the referents
of mass nouns.
Common understanding tends to view the referents of mass nouns
as primitives. Water is a prime case. Once it is seen that the properties
most closely associated with it are not what make it what it is but are
consequences in other things of what it is, nothing is left to say about
it in the language of properties that gets to the heart of what it is.
And yet it is different than gold. The unique content of the referent
of a mass noun is neither on the one hand analyzable into properties
nor on the other merely a fungible particular. Something like this
understanding of mass nouns as indicating primitive contents, I
suggest, stands behind Plato's understanding of the unique contents
of Forms.
It also stands behind his understanding of the necessary relations
between contents of Forms. The descriptions in the late dialogues of
relations between contents of Forms are elaborated almost entirely
in terms of metaphors of artistic and natural production which apply
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chiefly and in some cases exclusively to mass nouns: blending, per-
vading, cutting, purifying, intermingling, interweaving, harmonizing.
These are metaphors of processes by which stuffs come to be related
or distinguished and help explain how Plato can both maintain the
view that the contents of Forms may necessarily entail each other
and yet that no Form's content is exhaustively analyzable into that
of other Forms.
The relations between contents of Forms may be viewed, as Plato's
metaphors suggest, on an analogy with blendings which produce
alloys. Brass would not be what it is if copper and zinc were not what
they are, and yet one has not exhausted or even much clarified the
nature of brass in saying that it is copper blended, pervaded, mixed
or infused with zinc. Zinc and copper are not said of brass, nor brass
of either of them. Neither of them is either a genus or a differentia
of brass, and yet they, in the distinctive ways of stuffs, are as "essential"
to it as anything might be. So too, I suggest, Plato views the contents
of Forms as "blending" and standing to each other in the ways that
the referents of mass nouns are distinctively interrelated. They may
stand in relations of necessary entailments to each other and yet not
constitute singly or in groups the "essence" of each other."
If Forms are unique individuals the contents of which are not
distinguished by properties, then not only will Forms not be essentially
described in Aristotelian definitions per genus and differentia but
also the names of Forms will not even be disguised definite descrip-
tions. For Forms are not what they are as the result of even partially
being solutions to sets of conditions which might be treated discur-
sively. If the names of Forms are names in any modern sense, they
" Besides the metaphors of blending, harmonizing and the like, Plato does use
another set of metaphors to describe some relations between Forms: embracing and
scattering— two metaphors which apply most aptly to the referents of count nouns
rather than mass nouns. But, he uses these metaphors not to suggest substantial
relations between Forms, that is, necessary relations of content by which one Form
would not be what it is if another were not what it is. Rather the two metaphors are
simply complementary ways of indicating merely formal relations of similarity: x
encompasses, embraces or surrounds) and z if it is a Form of which they are instances,
and V and z are scattered or dispersed if they have a formal identity between them
by virtue of each participating in some one Form x. Thus, "are scattered" is equivalent
to "participate in." Like the participation relation, the dispersion relation holds not
only between one Form and others (e.g., Sophist 260b8) but also between a Form and
its phenomenal instances {Timaeus 37a5, Philebus 15b5). Because similarity relations
hold most clearly between the referents of count nouns, not mass nouns, Plato's use
of the metaphors of encompassing and scattering to indicate such relations is well
motivated and clever, since it allows him to hold in reserve his metaphors of blending
to indicate substantial relations between Forms. On the encompassing relation, see
Mohr, Cosmology, pp. 27-29.
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are most like Russellian logically proper names, which pick out
individuals as individuals from a field of immediate acquaintance.
However, the invariably spatial determinations which provide the
distinctness needed for "this" and "that" in ordinary deictic discourse
are either completely inappropriate or hopelessly metaphoric when
applied to the "field" of Ideas. It will be the content of each Idea
showing forth itself as it is which constitutes the distinctness necessary
for their being picked out by "this" and "that." Further, though
names of Forms do not harbor descriptive elements, nevertheless,
since each Idea has a peculiar content, the names of Forms may be
used incorrectly. If one Form is called by a name, it will be incorrect
to call any other Form by that name.
It is frequently objected that if Forms are fundamentally individuals
and not primarily fulfillments of conditions or are not in some other
way subjects of significant descriptions, but are simply given individ-
uals which at best can merely be named rather than described, then
they lose their explanatory power and so too their very reason for
having been hypothesized in the first place, and so allegedly fail in
their metaphysical and epistemological mission.'^ The answer to this
charge is that the explanatory power of Forms as standards lies in
their relations to other things. Standards allow us to describe and
identify other things and insofar as standards form necessarily related
clusters, they can explain causal relations among other things. In this
regard, Plato is no more silly than Aristotle or any philosopher who
wishes to claim that some principles of explanation must themselves
be beyond explanation.
III. Acquaintance with Forms
It might be argued that, if Forms are fundamentally individuals and
not essentially things qualified, then, even with possible problems of
their causal inertness set aside, Platonic Forms will fail to be within
the category of the cognizable on pretty much any theory of cognition
which one might pick.
Since Aristotle's day, it has been hard to imagine that anything
could be, or could be perceived as being, one without it also being
one of some kind {Physics II, chapters 1-3, 7; De Anima II, chapter
12). However, some intuitive grasp can be had of what it is like to
take in something as being one without having also to consider it as
'^ For instance, this charge of explanatory vacuousness has been leveled by J. M.
E. Moravcsik, "Recollecting Plato's Theory of Forms," Phronesis supplementary volume
II (1976), pp. 18-20.
122 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
one of some kind, a kind which is capable in theory of multiple
instantiations, if it is acknowledged that something like this is how
an individual recognizes non-reflexively other individual people as
unique. One's immediate taking in of others is as their being each
numerically one but not of some kind. Even if one is pressed into
cataloguing a list of a person's accidental characteristics and quirks
which are sufficiently diverse to apply collectively only to this person
(gait, eye-color, gender, general location, sense of humor, pretensions,
etc.), one would be chary of calling this compounded predicable a
kind, even if the catalogued characteristics were jointly capable in
theory of duplication. Humans tend to perceive even Romulus and
Remus immediately as unique without appealing to their spatial
distinctness or the order of their births. The reasons for humans first
thinking of people as individuals rather than collocations of properties
are complex, resting probably at the intersection of theology, sociology,
biology and ethics. The point is only that people in fact do take in
other people fundamentally as individuals. Perceiving or grasping
Forms will be roughly analogous to the way one takes in people as
individuals.
Platonic knowledge, as a kind of seeing or apprehending with "the
mind's eye" {Republic VI. 508d4), will be strongly disanalogous then
to Aristotelian perception or perception-like passive thought {De Anima
II, chapter 12; III, chapter 4) in which processes the cognizer becomes
formally identical with the object of cognition. A Form just as the
Form it is has no qualitative nature with which to stand in a relation
of formal identity to a perceiver. For it is a "this" {tovto) with no
essential "such" {-kol'ov).
IV. The Third Man Argument
That the Ideas are fundamentally individuals rather than things
qualified spares Plato's two-tiered ontology from entailing the vicious
logical regress of the Third Man Argument (TMA).'^ The unique-
world argument helps pinpoint where Plato supposes the TMA goes
awry when directed at his theory of Ideas. The TMA assumes that
(a) any Form along with its instances can be taken as members of a
set of which all the members severally but in common possess the
attribute which makes the instances instances of the Form. The TMA
further assumes that (b) since in accordance with good Platonic
'^ For texts see Parmenides 132al-b2 and 132dl-133a6; Aristotle's On the Forms,
in Alexander (of Aphrodisias), In Metaphysica commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck (Com-
mentaria in Aristotelem graeca, 1) (Berlin 1891), 84.21-85.11.
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principles all attributions of properties to things are made by reference
to some Form beyond the set of things which consists of members
with a common property, there must be another Form over and above
the first. Given (a) and (b), and if in addition (c) the new Form too
is formally identical to the members of the earlier set, then there
will be an infinite regress of Forms. The regress will be vicious because
by virtue of (b) prior members of the regress presuppose (for their
identification) posterior members of the sequence, of which there is
no last member. Plato would reject (a) and a fortiori reject (c). He
accepts (b). In the vocabulary of the recent critical tradition, (a) and
(c) presuppose self-predication of Forms, that is, they assume that
each Form possesses the same property it defines in other things.
And (b) presupposes the non-identity of Form and instance, that is,
it presupposes that a thing which possesses an attribute cannot be
numerically identical with the Form by which one claims the thing
has the attribute it has.
Those who suppose that Plato is committed to the TMA argument,
in order to get the requisite premise (a) for the argument, must
assume that in the unique-world argument Plato is reproducing the
Roman paradox discussed above. They must claim that the Idea of
animal and the world severally but in common possess the attribute
"animal," so that Plato is being intentionally perverse in calling each
unique because the two are so similar.
If Forms are fundamentally individuals and are not things which
possess characteristics with respect to what each peculiarly is, Plato
is clearly not committed to and indeed would deny premise (a) and
its self-predication assumption. For one will not be able to make a
mental review of a Form and its instances in such a way that it turns
out that they are discovered to form a set the members of which
each possess some formal identity with every other member.
V. The Really Real
If Forms are fundamentally individuals, a fairly precise account can
be given of the Platonic sense of "to be" and of what Plato means
when he says that each Form "really is" {Republic X. 597d2, Philebus
59d4, Phaedrus 247c7).
The sense of the Platonic "to be" has been extensively debated.
Recently, the range of possible senses of "the Form of F is" has
become saturated. Every possible sense of the Greek "to be" has
been ascribed to the Platonic "to be." The possible senses of dtvai
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1. incomplete copula: "to be" = "to be F" (by far the most popular
critical view; taken as the Platonic "to be" by G. Vlastos et al.).^'^
2a. complete first-order veridical: "to be" = "to be so " "to be as it
is said to be," "to be the case" (i.e., "is the state of affairs which
true propositions describe") (C. Kahn).'^
2b. complete second-order veridical: "to be" = "to be true" (as
applied to propositions) (G. Fine)."^
3. complete existential: "to be" = "to exist" (old guard unitarian
critics)."
If Forms are standards or more especially are fundamentally
individuals, the Platonic "to be" will have to be a complete existential
sense. The old guard unitarians are right on this matter. The Platonic
"to be" is some sense of "to exist."
If Forms are not fundamentally (if at all) things qualified with
respect to what each particularly is, then the Platonic "to be" as
applied to the Form of F cannot mean "to be F," and so a fortiori the
distinctive way in which a Form is said to be, i.e., "completely" or
"really" cannot mean "to be F par excellence^ or "to be F to the
greatest degree possible" [therefore, not 1].
If Forms are fundamentally individuals then a Form by itself,
though it is said "to be," does not constitute a state of affairs which
can be captured in propositional form. So it does not seem that the
Platonic "to be" is a first-order veridical sense ("to be the case").
Only a network or combination of Forms could be said to be in this
sense. And it is clear that the Ideas as a whole are said to be because
each individual Idea is said to be and not vice versa. In general the
view that the Greek "to be" is a first-order veridical sense fails to
'•' Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton 1973), pp. 42-57 and especially
58-75; Richard Ketchum, "Plato on Real Being," American Philosophical Quarterly
(1980), 213-20; G. Santas, "The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic" in Essays in
Ancient Greek Philosophy II, ed. John P. Anton and Anthony Preus (Albany, NY 1983),
pp. 232-63; and Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, " 'Nothing' as 'Not-being': Some
Literary Contexts that Bear on Plato" also in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy II,
pp. 59-69.
"^ Charles Kahn, "Some Philosophical Uses of 'to be' in Plato," Phronesis 26 (1981),
105-34.
'^ Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in Republic V," Archiv fUr Geschichte der
Philosophic 60 (1978), pp. 121-39.
'^ Frequently only implicitly assumed, but see for example, Cherniss, Papers, pp.
131-32 and Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues" in
Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. Allen (London 1965), pp. 57-58.
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give full weight, or indeed any weight, to the role that unity plays
in defining "being" at least in Parmenides and Plato'® [so, not 2a].
When it is claimed that the Platonic "to be" is a second-order
veridical sense, which when taken together with the qualifiers "really"
and "completely," is solely applicable to the Forms, what is meant is
that all propositions which actually have a Form as their subject's
referent will invariably be true (whereas some statements about a
phenomenal object will be true, others false). But as with sense 2a,
a Form just by itself, though it is, does not establish the truth of even
a single proposition (regarding what it alone is) let alone establish
the truth of a whole field of propositions [so, not 2b].
Forms, therefore, must be said "to be" in some complete existential
sense. The Platonic "to be" is some sense of "to exist." However, if
Forms are fundamentally individuals, the sense of "exist" here cannot
be the post-Kantian sense in which "to exist" means "to be an instance
of a concept" or "to be the value of a variable."'^ If Forms are
fundamentally individuals with respect to what each one is, then they
are not even candidates for serving as things over which one may
quantify. On this modern account of existence, the instances of Forms
will exist, but Forms themselves will not. With respect to being the
Form it is, each Form possesses no properties which can be cast as
predicates in such a way that the Form's name may be said to provide
a value for their variables.
Further, however one construes those among the Great Kinds in
the Sophist which are dispersed to and said of all Forms (namely.
Being, Sameness, Difference, and Rest), it is clear that Plato supposes
Forms to exist because they participate in Being rather than because
they can be values for bound variables of the predicates "same,"
"different," and "at rest" {Sophist 252a, 254d, 256a, e, 259a). Iron-
ically, on my account Plato turns out not to be a Platonist, as
"Platonist" is used in current discussions of number theory, wherein
to be a Platonist is to be committed to quantifying over abstract
entities.
Because the Platonic "to be" applies directly to individuals as
individuals, it must mean something within the constellation of notions
"to be actual," "to be substantial," "to be there in such a way as to
provide an object to point at," and "to present itself." When the
adverbial qualifications "really," "completely," or "purely" are at-
'^ See Kahn, "Why Existence does not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek
Philosophy," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 58 (1976), pp. 323-34.
'^ For a denial that the modern sense of "to be" is the sense used by Greek
philosophers generally, see Kahn, ibid., pp. 323-25.
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tached to this sense of "is," the compounded designation means "is
this way (actual, self-presenting) on its own or by virtue of itselfy or "is
there to be picked out independently of its relations to anything."
These adverbial qualifications are basically equivalent to the Platonic
Kad' avTO, especially when it is contrasted with irpoq tl.
The main engine for the opposing, most widely held view that the
Platonic "to be" is a predicative sense— "to be F"— is the contention
that an existential sense would be incompatible with Plato's various
claims that different things may have different degrees of being or
admit o^ more or less being (e.g., Republic V. 479c8-dl ; VII. 515dl-3).2°
Only the predicative sense, so it is claimed, can properly capture the
notion of different things being in different degrees, since only
predicates (or at least some of them) pick out properties which can
be manifest in varying degrees. Allegedly existence cannot admit of
degrees, since "existence" is not a predicate. However, this allegation
will be true only if "to exist" is construed in the modern sense as
"to be an instance of a concept," "to be the referent of a subject of
which predications are made" or more formally "to be the value of
a bound variable." For admittedly a thing cannot partially be an
instance of a concept. This is clearly the case with concepts like cow
and seven. And even if one were tempted to claim that, say, a piece
of cloth might partially instantiate red or some concept that admits
of degrees, it would be more accurate to say simply that it is an
instance or token of the type or shade it is, say, puce. And yet, if "to
exist" is taken not in the modern sense, but as meaning "to be
substantial (independently of its relations to anything else)" or "to
be there on its own in such a way as to be pointed at" or the like,
then its sense is completely compatible with an understanding of
different things possessing different degrees of being—an under-
standing on which the various degrees need not form a continuous
scale.
The telling example of this understanding for the Platonic meta-
physics is the following. A shadow or an image in a mirror or a
dream object will be less {real), in the requisite sense, than its original.
And the original will be fully or be completely (real), again in the
requisite sense. For its substantiality is not further dependent upon
something else in the way the image is dependent upon it. And yet
there is no continuous scale of degrees between the grade of existence
of the image and that of its original. This account, then, of the
Platonic "to be," which simply appeals to intuitions that stand behind
some quite ordinary linguistic conventions concerning "being" and
^^ So Vlastos, pp. 60-63, 66, and especially Mourelatos, p. 65.
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"real," captures better than does Vlastos' the central metaphor of
original and image by which Plato chiefly conveys his metaphysics of
Forms.^'
Plato does not suppose that his talk of a thing admitting more or
less of something else entails that the something else consists of a
scale of continuous gradations. For in the Statesman Plato ranks number
(i.e., integers) along with length, breadth and thickness (or swiftness)
as examples of things that admit of more and less (284e) and yet he
is as fully aware as Aristotle that numbers do not admit of continuous
variation. Five fingers are not just sort of odd; they just are odd and
not even a slight bit even or a slight bit six (Phaedo 103e-104b,
104d-105b, 105d, 106b-c, and especially Cratylus 432a-b). For Plato,
being, like integers, may be manifest in non-continuous degrees.
Plato is a neo-Platonist to the extent that he thinks that being is
sometimes a predicate; however, he fails to be a neo-Platonist in that
he does not suppose that an examination of any two grades of being
will always reveal some third intermediary grade.
This reading of the Platonic "to be" also accounts nicely for what
Plato says about the sense in which things other than Forms are. The
phenomena or objects of opinion exist on this account, but they do
not "fully" or "really" exist {Republic V. 479c8-dl, cf. VII. 515^1-3;
Timaeus 28a2-4, 52c4-5). They are there to be pointed at, but not
by virtue of themselves. They are doubly dependent on other things.
For their ability to shine forth, they depend both upon the Forms by
virtue of which they are the images they are and upon the Receptacle
or Space, which serves as a medium for their reception (Timaeus
52a-c).
In calling the Receptacle itself a "this," Plato seems to want to
assign to it the same full reality which he assigns to the Forms (50a 1-2,
a7-b2). Plato's confessed trouble with designating clearly the mode
of cognition of the Receptacle (52b 1-2) then arises not because the
Receptacle lacks qualities or attributes (50b-c, d-e, 51a7), but rather
^' Vlastos and Mourelatos simply mistake the implications of Plato's use of the
image metaphor as a vehicle for explaining senses of "to be." They too hastily
assimilate the metaphor to the predicative sense of "to be." Neither author gives any
weight to or shows any awareness of Plato's exclusive use, as a vehicle for his ontology,
of non-substantial images, ones that is which, like shadows, images in mirrors, and
television pictures, but unlike photographs, sculptures, and paintings, require for
their existence— their "being there"— the persistence both of their originals and of
a medium in which they must appear. See Vlastos' analysis of the shadow images of
Republic VII. 515d, pp. 61-62 and Mourelatos' analysis of dream and shadow images,
p. 62. For a detailed look at the nature of non-substantial images and the implications
of their use in Plato's exposition of his ontology, see E. N. Lee, "On the Metaphysics
of the Image in Plato's Timaeus," Monist 50 (1966), pp. 341-68.
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because, though it is a "this," it indeed does not shine forth or present
itself. When one looks to it, one does not see it, one sees what is in
it (52b3-5). When one points at it, one does so indirectly.
If this characterization of the existence of Forms is correct, the
earlier account of their acquaintance is reinforced: the mode of
cognition of Forms must be a form of unmediated acquaintance,
operating on a rough analogy with the way in which without a
moment's reflection and really without doubt one spots an individual
or recognizes him as the individual he is.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
8A Dramatic Interpretation of
Plato's Phaedo
JAMES A. ARIETI
No scene which presents itself to the imagination excites greater
pathos than that of Socrates sitting on his prison couch and cheerfully
drinking his cup of poison. Long after the reader has forgotten the
wandering maze of arguments in Plato's Phaedo, he carries fixed in
his mind the heroism of Socrates during his last day, his persistence
in pursuing difficult arguments, and the nobility with which he meets
his death. And Plato has achieved his aim, for the dialogue is not
about the immortality of the soul— indeed, the arguments, as gen-
erally recognized, are unsuccessful— no, the dialogue is about the
heroic death of Socrates and the proposition that only the philoso-
pher— as epitomized in the person of Socrates— can meet death
heroically.' For only the philosopher knows that he cannot know about
the afterlife and the soul, and he is thus the only one who can die
courageously.
The Phaedo shows, perhaps more than any other dialogue, how
' Cf. Paul Friedlander {Plato, Vol. I, tr. Hans MeyerhofF [Princeton 1969], p. 122),
who says that all the Platonic dialogues are ultimately encomia to Socrates. Nietzsche
too saw the figure of Socrates as charismatic or inspirational. Hans-Georg Gadamer
{Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, tr. P. Christopher Smith
[New Haven and London 1980], p. 22) writes: "As Nietzsche has so aptly put it, this
figure of the dying Socrates became the new ideal to which the noblest of the Greek
youth now dedicated themselves instead of to that older heroic ideal, Achilles. Thus
the Phaedo's poetic power to convince is stronger than its logical power to prove."
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philosophy may be subordinated to drama in Plato. ^ Indeed, unless
one understands the arguments, and sees their weakness, he will not
^ Since Schleiermacher's insight that "Form and subject are inseparable, and no
proposition is to be rightly understood except in its own place and with the
combinations and limitations which Plato has assigned to it" (reprinted in Great
Thinkers on Plato, ed. Barry Gross [New York 1979], p. 71), there has been a great
deal of attention paid to drama in Plato. Friedlander, Jaeger (especially in Volume
II of Paideia, The Ideals of Greek Culture, tr. G. Highet, Oxford 1943), Leo Strauss
(The City and the Man, Chicago 1964), Allan Bloom (in the preface to his translation
of the Republic, New York 1968), Jacob Klein (A Commentary on Plato's Meno, Chapel
Hill 1965), and Drew Hyland ("Why Plato Wrote Dialogues," Philosophy and Rhetoric
1 [1968]) discuss the importance of the dramatical parts of the dialogue. Wilamowitz
{Platan Vol. I, Berlin 1919, p. 123) suggests that the purpose of the early dialogues
is poetic and imaginative— not profound or philosophical, in short, that their purpose
is dramatic. While I would agree with Wilamowitz that the purpose may be dramatic,
I do not agree that the purpose is not also philosophic or profound; as I hope to
show for the Phaedo each may serve the other.
In the case of the Phaedo, some, while admitting the brilliance of the drama, do
not admit its primacy. A. E. Taylor, for example {Plato: The Man and His Work, London
1926), says the dialogue shows Plato's dramatic art "at its ripe perfection" (p. 174),
but thinks the dialogue is about "the divinity of the human soul, and 'imitation of
God' as the right and reasonable mode of conduct" (p. 177). Raven {Plato's Thought
in the Making, Cambridge 1965) praises the drama in passing, but says that the
dialogue "is concerned as a whole . . . with the immortality of the soul" (p. 79).
The two who deal most with the dramatical qualities of the Phaedo are Kenneth
Dorter, ("The Dramatic Aspect of Plato's Phaedo [Dialogue 9, 1970: 564-580]) and
Gadamer {op. cit). Dorter points out, in the manner of the followers of Strauss, a
number of significant details (e.g., that 14 men were on Theseus' ship and 14 at
Socrates' execution); and while he discusses details with insight, he does not seem to
have a sense of the dramatic purpose of the whole. He argues that Socrates' purpose
is to convince his audience not to fear death (p. 574). But quite inconsistently, he
concludes that the lesson of the dialogue is that "If we wish to attain an immortality
more meaningful and personal than the objective immortality in which all temporal
things share equally, we must win it through a philosophical attempt to apprehend
and assimilate ourselves to the immutable ground of what is." Dorter points out a
number of details, and he is quite good at showing why some of the arguments are
specious, but he fails to ask the fundamental question: why does Plato allow Socrates to
use obviously specious arguments? Gadamer, having brilliantly shown that the arguments
are invalid, argues (pp. 36-37) that the point of dialogue is that science, even the
advanced science of Plato's day, cannot answer the important questions about human
life and our understanding of it. We must, he says, "think beyond the surrounding
world given to us in sense experience and beyond our finite existence." The growing
scientific insight of Plato's time "does not obviate the need for thinking beyond the
reality of the world, and it has no authority to contest religious convictions." Certainly
Gadamer is right, that the dialogue shows us that even the best scientists, i.e., the
Pythagoreans, cannot prove the immortality of the soul. But this is subordinate to
the dramatic point: that for Socrates to be courageous, he must be aware that he
does not know about the immortality of the soul; indeed, one of the reasons for the
true philosopher's courage is that he knows the limits of his knowledge, he alone
knows what he knows and does not know.
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understand the drama of the dialogue except superficially; and it is
towards the drama of Socrates' death that everything in the dialogue
points.^ But seeing the weakness of the arguments is important only
if one asks and then understands why the arguments are weak, and
why their weakness is essential if Socrates is to behave heroically, and
why, moreover, he is most heroic when his arguments are weakest.
Some of the master's arguments are refuted by the interlocutors,
some by the dramatic situation."* Socrates' initial statement was
twofold: that the philosopher welcomes death (61c) and that we ought
not to commit suicide because we are the property of the gods (62b).
' The dramatic purpose of the dialogue is therefore to inspire by a means other
than discursive reasoning. To be sure, one must see the faults in the arguments to
be so moved. As Jaeger (p. 36) put it: "We feel Socrates' intellectual power by
dramatically showing its more than intellectual effect on men" and again (p. 90),
"Plato had often felt Socrates' power to guide men's souls. He must have known
that as an author his own greatest and hardest task in recreating Socrates' teaching
was to make his readers feel the same influence he had once felt himself." Aristotle
had, of course, recognized the literary and mimetic quality of the dialogues, so much
so that he had called them poetry {Poetics 1447bl 1). Cf. Julius Stenzel, Plato's Method
of Dialectic, tr. D.J. Allan (Oxford 1940), p. 2. Indeed, Longinus, On the Sublime (13),
maintains that Plato competed with Homer in poetic mimesis— surely for an effect
that was emotional. •
^ I shall present here the merest outline of the arguments, just enough to show
where the arguments fail. That the arguments are unsound has been noted by most
scholars (see below), despite a few ingenious attempts to rescue them (on these also
see below). Here I wish merely to enable the reader to recollect the arguments and
their failings. What 1 wish to do is show why the arguments must be weak for the
dialogue to achieve its dramatic purpose, and why their intentional weakness is the
dialogue's beauty and strength. Of course, that the arguments inust be weak is also
one of the points of the dialogue, for it is not possible in this life to form absolute
proofs for the immortality of the soul.
The proofs are objected to generally by Friedlander (Vol. Ill, p. 36), who observes
that they do not reach their goal; by A. E. Taylor (op. cit., p. 103), who says: "In
point of fact, the first two proofs are found to break down and the third, as Burnet
observes, is said by Socrates (107b6) to need clear explanation. Thus it is plain that
Plato did not mean to present the arguments as absolutely probative to his own
mind." Raven acknowledges the difficulties though he will not discuss them (p. 103).
J. H. Randall, Jr. {Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason, New York 1970, p. 215)
declares: "The arguments are not to be taken literally: they are all myths and
parables." Norman GuUey {Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London 1962) discusses
difficulties with the arguments (pp. 32-33) and various inconsistencies (p. 47).
Hackforth {Plato's Phaedo, New York 1955, p. 19), Klein (pp. 26, 108, 126), and J.
B. Skemp {The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues, Cambridge 1942, p. 7) all
point out that Socrates hints at the inadequacy of his own proofs. Gadamer (p. 22)
sums it up well: "The proofs of the immortality of the soul which follow one another
in this discussion all have something deeply dissatisfying about them. . . . The argu-
ments themselves are unconvincing, however much the human presence of Socrates
is convincing."
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Cebes correctly perceives that if the second part of Socrates' statement
is true, then the first cannot be: a wise man would not be glad to
leave masters so good and wise as the gods. Socrates' first argument
on the immortality of the soul, the principle of generation from
opposites, is equivocal and faulty right at the beginning, as Socrates
shifts from all things which are born (70d) to things which have an
opposite (70e)— surely a great reduction from many things to just a
few.^ This argument is not refuted by the interlocutors, but Cebes
brings an abrupt end to the discussion and urges Socrates to move
on to another proof— that based on the theory of recollection.^ This
theory is not refuted by any dialectical exchange; it is, however,
effectively refuted by the dramatic elements of the dialogue: joke
after joke reminds us that nobody can, even after it is explained,
recall the doctrine of recollection.' First Simmias begs to have it told
to him (73a); later, after Socrates has explained the entire theory
again, Simmias laments that when Socrates is dead, on the next day,
nobody will be left who can explain the theory: in other words, it
will have been forgotten (78a). The theory is, in addition, inadequate
because, as Simmias observes (77a-b), even if it were valid, it would
explain the existence of the soul only before birth, not after death.
^
Socrates' third argument maintains that the soul lives free of the
body in the realm of ideas and cannot be destroyed with the body
because of its aloofness from things physical (and the death of the
physical cannot be at the same time the death of the non-physical).
The argument depends on the soul's having little or no communion
with the body (80d) even during life. But Socrates himself does not
seem convinced by his own argument, for if the soul were not
^ The argument equivocates by failing to distinguish properly between absolute
and relative terms (cf. Friedlander, Vol. Ill, p. 45).
^ Objecting to the theory of recollection {anamnesis) is virtually a cottage industry
among Plato scholars. On difficulties with the argument here see K. W. Mills' two
articles, "Plato's Phaedo 74b7-c6," Phronesis 2 (1957), 128-147 and 3 (1958), 40-58;
J. M. Rist, "Equals and Intermediates in Plato," Phronesis 9 (1964), 27-37; Dorothy
Tarrant, "Plato, Phaedo lAa^-hy Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957), 125; Kenneth
Dorter, "Equality, Recollection, and Purification," Phronesis 17 (1972), 198-218; and
Gadamer, pp. 26 if. The account of recollection is, according to these scholars,
incomplete and inadequate, and even Tarrant's variant reading won't save it. For a
summary of the inconsistencies and a citation of more literature, see Richard J.
Ketchum, "Knowledge and Recollection in the Phaedo: An Interpretation of 74a-75b,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1979), 243.
' On a similar joke on memory, see Meno 7lc and the discussion of the joke in
William S. Cobb, Jr., "Anamnesis: Platonic Doctrine or Sophistic Absurdity?" Dialogue
12 (1973), 604-28.
^ And, of course, the theory of recollection is mired in the problem of infinite
regress (i.e., whence the original knowledge?). See Cobb, esp. pp. 619-21.
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connected to the body in some way, why should the body be a prison
to it?^ And he seems to deny the non-physical nature of the soul as
he draws his argument to a close. He says, "Because each pleasure
and pain like a nail nails the soul to the body and affixes it and makes
it bodily . . ." (83d). '° If, then, a pleasure and pain can affect the soul,
why not death? That Socrates' principal interlocutors are dissatisfied
with the arguments— as they should be— is made abundantly clear
when Simmias and Cebes, whispering to one another, are interrupted
by Socrates, who says (84c): "Indeed, there are a good many doubts
and objections, if one cares to go through the argument with adequate
thoroughness." Simmias, thus prodded, agrees (85d): "You see, Soc-
rates, when I reflect on what has been said by me and Cebes here,
it does not appear quite adequate."
Socrates, after several important speeches to be considered shortly,
takes up Simmias' argument that the soul is an attunement and Cebes'
argument that the soul, like the last overcoat of a tailor, may outlive
its wearer. Socrates' refutation of Simmias depends on earlier argu-
ments, for the refutation rests on the soul's existence before the
body's; that is, the soul cannot be like an attunement because the
soul existed before the body, but the attunement did not exist before
the harp. But, of course, this argument depends on arguments which
were found unsatisfactory by Simmias and Cebes (in the passage
referred to above, where Simmias says the previous arguments have
been unsatisfactory)." If the previous arguments, which sought to
prove that the soul existed before the body, were inadequate, then
this refutation, which depends on those earlier arguments, must be
similarly inadequate. Socrates' refutation of Cebes' argument depends
on the proposition that souls, which by definition contain life, cannot
receive the opposite of life and remain souls: they must withdraw
before death and fly elsewhere.'^ Socrates draws an analogy with
^ See Burnet, Taylor, ad be. See also T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychology (Toronto
and Buffalo 1970), pp. 21-22; also Gadamer, pp. 27-29.
'" Translations of passages from the Phaedo are the author's. Others are as cited
in the text.
'
' For a severe criticism of the arguments on attunement, with a lucid explication
of its illogicality, see W. F. Hicken, ''Phaedo 92al l-94b3," Classical Quarterly 48 (1954),
16-22.
'^ The fallacies are subtle, but have not escaped the commentators. For a very
good discussion of how at the beginning of the argument aQ6a>aT0c, is the opposite of
Bavaroc,, but at the end it is the opposite of dvriToq, see David Keyt, "The Fallacies in
Phaedo 102a- 107b," Phronesis 8 (1963), 170 ff. The view is also that of T L.
Landmann, "Tendenz und Gedankengang des platonischen Dialogs 'Phaedo'," Gym-
nasialprogramm (Konigsberg in Pr., 1 87 1), p. 8 and of G. Schneider, Die Weltanschauung
Platos dargestellt in Anschlusse an den Dialog Phaedon (Berlin 1898), pp. 106-108. T.
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snow: when snow receives fire it will not remain snow, but it will
either retreat or be destroyed. Snow is, however, destroyed by fire
and does not, even if it is made into a snowman, get up on its legs
and run away. The argument is seductive, but is rather silly when
studied carefully.'^ And though Socrates' interlocutors seem to agree,
they do admit to doubts.'"* Simmias, at the end of the dialogue's
dialectical portions, when Socrates has completed his "refutation" of
Cebes, says (107a-b):
I myself do not find anything to disbelieve in what has been said. But
the arguments are about a great subject, and I do distrust human frailty,
and I am still compelled to feel doubt in my own mind about what we have
said.
After approving of Simmias' skepticism, Socrates launches into his
myth on the habitations of the soul after death and the description
of the earth. As various commentators on Plato have observed,
Socrates tells a myth when the arguments have gone about as far as
they can; where logical reasoning and certainty end, speculation in
the form of myth begins.'^
Elsewhere, when Socrates discusses the nature of the soul, he also
brings in myth, and the very act of telling the myth seems to be for
M. Robinson (pp. 27-29), having discussed the difficulties, concludes that "one
interpretation introduces as many anomalies as it is meant to solve." D. O'Brien, in
two long articles ("The Last Argument of Plato's Phaedo I and II," Classical Quarterly
17 [1967], 198-231 and 18 [1968], 95-106), while finding fault with the argument
sees some use in it for the historian of philosophy, since he says it anticipates Anselm's
ontological argument for the existence of God. See also Hackforth (p. 164), who
says that "from the standpoint of logic, the argument has petered out into futility";
I. A. Crombie {An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, Vol. II, London 1962), who calls
the argument "a nest of confusions" (p. 169) and says the conclusion follows "if we
do not look too closely" (p. 164); and J. B. Skemp (p. 8), who describes the final
proof as "a blatant petitio principii"; also Gadamer (pp. 34-36).
" The argument, however, is not without some defenders. Dorothea Frede, "The
Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato's Phaedo 102a- 107a," Phronesis
23 (1978), 27-41, thinks that Socrates is certain about the last argument. But Gregory
Vlastos ("Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo" [Modern Studies in Philosophy: Plato: I.
Metaphysics and Epistemology. A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City 1971]), while
defending what he sees to be the most important argument (that which takes place
in 95e-105e), admits that it is not "entirely clear or wholly true" (p. 133).
'^ Cf. Gadamer, p. 36: "As convincing as the discussion might have been, the
conclusion is drawn that the proofs are not sufficient and that one must continue to
test their premises insofar as is humanly possible. Evidently in questions of this sort
one cannot expect greater certainty." See also Stenzel, p. 8.
''' Cf., for example, Friedlander, Vol. I, pp. 189-90; J. A. Stewart, The Myths of
Plato (London and New York 1905), pp. 24-102 passim; S. Rosen, The Symposium of
Plato (New Haven and London 1968), pp. 207-11; W.Jaeger, pp. 151-52.
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him an admission that scientific knowledge is impossible. Hence it is
necessary to give a similitude, a metaphorical and speculative account
of the nature of the unknowable. In the Phaedrus, when Socrates is
delivering his "serious" speech on the nature of love, he says
concerning the soul:
What the nature of the soul is would be a long tale to tell, and most
assuredly only a god alone could tell it, but what it resembles, that a man
might tell in briefer compass (246a).
A bit later he extends our imprecision to the "immortal": " 'immortal'
is a term applied on the basis of no reasoned argument at all, but
our fancy (wXaTrofiev) pictures the god whom we have never seen,
nor fully conceived, as an immortal living being" (246c) [tr. R.
Hackforth]. Or, as Timaeus explains to Socrates when he is about to
tell his myth concerning the generation of the gods and the cosmos
(Timaeus 29c-d):
If then, Socrates, amidst the many opinions about the gods [the
immortals] and the generation of the universe, we are not able to
give notions which are altogether and in every respect exact and
consistent with one another, do not be surprised. Enough if we adduce
probabilities as likely as any others, for we must remember that I who
am the speaker and you who are the judges are only mortal men, and
we would do well to accept the tale which is probable and inquire no
further [tr. B. Jowett].
For Plato and Socrates, then, the realm of the divine was not
absolutely knowable by mortal men. The soul's immortality, which
caused it to be most like to the divine (Phaedo 80b), also prevented
it from being understood by human reason (logos). '^ Socrates' very
making of a myth, then, shows that he himself does not believe the
soul's immortality a matter which can be proven. This is not to say,
of course, that the myth has no value. As Friedlander and others
have argued, the real value of the myth lies in moving the soul
towards virtue by a means which bypasses discursive reasoning and
affects the soul directly, a means we may call, in a non-Platonic
context, "inspiration."'' And this is clearly a chief purpose of the
myth here, as Socrates discusses in the context of the soul's future
"^ On the equivalence of immortality and divinity, see W. K. C. Guthrie, A History
of Greek Philosophy, Vol. IV (Cambridge 1975), p. 330. Cf. Rosen {op. cit.): "The
Phaedrus, Phaedo, and Timaeus all teach us that it is impossible to grasp the immmortal
and divine by means of logos" (p. 209).
'^ Inspiration may be the way art in general functions: it does not work by shaping
the reason in men, but works instead by a direct grasp on the soul. Thus poets,
seers, and prophets operate by inspiration and deliver their messages without knowing
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habitations the need to make sure that the soul is pure and virtuous
in this world (107 fF.).
Thus the arguments, by their failure, and the myths, by their very
presence, point to the impossibility— at least in our mortal state—
of knowing about the afterlife. Indeed, time after time, repeated
through the dialogue is the insistence that we cannot know for sure.
Thus Socrates begins the dialogue (63b-c):
I will try to be more persuasive to you than I was to my judges. If I
did not believe, Simmias and Cebes, that I should pass over first to
other gods, both wise and good ... I should be wrong not objecting
to death; but know well that I hope I shall enter the company of good
men, even though I would not affirm it confidently; but that I shall
come to gods who are very good masters, know well that if I would
affirm confidently anything else, I would affirm this.
Later (85c), Simmias, voicing his objections to some of Socrates'
arguments, says:
For it seems to me, as perhaps also to you, Socrates, that to know
clearly about such matters in this present life is impossible, or at least
extremely difficult.
And at the end of the dialogue, when Socrates has described his
vision of the afterlife, he concludes (1 14d):
It is not fitting for a sensible man to affirm confidently that such
things are just as I have described; but that this or something of this
sort is what happens to our souls and their abodes, and since the soul
is clearly immortal, that this is so seems proper and worth the risk of
believing; for the risk is noble.
The dialectic on the immortality of the soul confirms these state-
ments that absolute knowledge about such matters is impossible. If
the arguments prove anything, it is this. But not all men, of course,
know that absolute knowledge about such matters is impossible.
Indeed, some believe certain legends (70c) that there is an afterlife,
just as others believe (70a) that when a man dies the soul leaves the
body and goes out like a breath or whiff of smoke; the many, however,
do not understand and do not think about these matters. That is
why, says Socrates (64b), the many do not understand the sense in
which the philosopher wants to die. The many think they know
what they mean {^Apology 22c). Statesmen, too, because of the absence of teachers,
cannot have been taught virtue and must have received it by a divine inspiration
{Meno 99d). Cf. also Laws 682a, 719c. And as Friedlander observes {op. cit., Vol. I, p.
190), Socrates in the Phaedo, Gorgias, and Republic often speaks of the purpose of
myths as inspiration to virtuous conduct.
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whether there is or is not an afterlife. But— at least if he has been
through the conversation of the Phaedo— the philosopher knows that
he does not know about the future habitations and state of the soul.
It is for this reason— that the philosopher alone knows that he
does not know the future condition of his soul— that the philosopher
is the only one who can die courageously.'^ An earlier dialogue, the
Laches, had grappled with the question of courage. That dialogue
appeared to be aporetic, for there courage was shown to be a kind
of knowledge, like the other virtues.'^ But if courage were knowledge
of the outcome, what bravery would be involved in the action? For
example, if a fully equipped army were going against one armed only
with toothpicks, the powerful army would have knowledge that it
would be victorious: no courage would therefore be involved; and
the weak army would have knowledge it was going to lose; and it
would therefore be rash, not courageous, in joining battle. But the
Laches did contain the clue to courage: it is knowledge of your
ignorance of the outcome, with a willingness to persevere. Only the
man who knows that he does not know the outcome will go into
battle courageously; and the philosopher will be the most courageous
of men— for he, like Socrates, is most aware that he does not know
the outcome.
Here lies, I think, the true meaning of the weak nature of the
arguments in the Phaedo. The dialogue is not, of course, about the
immortality of the soul; it is about the death of Socrates. It is about
the very things Echecrates inquired of Phaedo (57a): "What was it
the man said before his death? And how did he die?" The dialogue
is about the courageous way in which Socrates died; if one does not
see how and why the arguments fail to provide certain knowledge of
the soul, one cannot see the courage in facing death and Socrates'
heroism.
Socrates' courage is brilliant. When Cebes objects to his arguments
concerning suicide, Socrates is pleased (63a). And yet why should
Socrates be pleased? Socrates' argument that suicide is wrong rested
on the assumption that we have good masters here on earth and that
we should not violate their proprietary rights by killing ourselves,
'^ Socrates says too {Phaedo 68c) that only the philosopher is courageous in the
right way.
'^ In the Laches it is suggested that courage is an endurance of the soul; the
dialogue seemed aporetic because it seemed that courage could be neither knowledge
nor ignorance. My suggestion is in keeping with Socrates' position throughout the
dialogues: knowledge of ignorance is a kind of knowledge; courage is a special kind
of ignorance— ignorance of the outcome; it is also an endurance of the soul in
seeking the outcome.
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who are their property; but if our masters are so good, Cebes has
asked, why should the philosopher be glad to leave them? It was
necessary for Socrates' argument to be sound so that Socrates could
face death with confidence: Socrates should not therefore be pleased
that his argument was defeated. Yet he is pleased; and his pleasure
is heroic: it places in jeopardy his equanimity, but the promise of an
argument holds the prize of truth before him.
Crito warns Socrates that, if he talks, he may have to take extra
doses of poison. Socrates is impatient with such matters, and disdaining
Crito's concern declares (63e): "Oh, let the jailer be; let him do his
job and be ready to give me two portions, even three." After the
arguments on recollection, Socrates consoles his friends: yes, there
will surely be someone in Hellas, large as it is, who will help them
overcome their fear of death (78a).
But nowhere is Socrates more heroic than in the great central
portion of the dialogue, when Simmias and Cebes express their
penetrating objections to his theories. First, he must force them to
express their objections. Socrates is himself aware that the argument
may be weak (84c):
Indeed, there are a good many doubts and objections, if one cares to
go through the argument with adequate thoroughness.
Simmias affirms that he and Cebes are unsure of the arguments but
are reluctant to trouble Socrates in case he is distressed by the
approaching execution. As before, when Cebes objected to this theory
on suicide, Socrates displays good humor. Socrates laughs and launches
into his famous comparison of himself and a swan, the bird sacred
to Apollo (84e-85b). Again, as in virtually all the dialogues, Socrates
distinguishes himself from the many, who do not understand; in this
case what they do not understand is the nature of the swan's song.
Socrates' position is dangerous by any standards: he is urging his
interlocutors to come forward with the strongest possible objections
to his arguments. The greatest possible courage will be necessary to
confront them.
At this point (88c) the outer dialogue, the framing narrative, is
interrupted as Phaedo tells Echecrates that those present, while they
had been convinced by earlier arguments, were now beginning to
doubt the whole business. Echecrates asks Phaedo many questions
about both the discussion and Socrates' demeanor. Phaedo answers
that Socrates was never more wondrous than then. Philosophy, we
remember from the Theaetetus, begins in wonder; and surely philos-
ophy is provoked by the wondrous majesty of Socrates on the day of
his execution.
I
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Phaedo compares Socrates to Heracles with the advantage going
to Socrates, for Socrates will have to contest alone with two oppo-
nents— Simmias and Cebes— while Heracles had the aid of lolaus
in fighting the Hydra (89c). Socrates, with ironic modesty, jokes that
he is merely lolaus, but Phaedo corrects him. The comparison to the
mightiest Greek hero— with Socrates clearly named as the superior
(for he will fight single-handedly with two where Heracles fought
with only one)— shows that the others present also recognize that
Socrates is a hero.
No part of the dialogue shows Socrates more a teacher of philo-
sophic courage than the speech he launches into on "misology"—
the hating of argument (logos) (89d ff.). Repeated dead-ends in
argument may lead, Socrates warns, to a hating of arguments in
general; but a philosopher must stick to his post. The difficulty in
avoiding misology comes from having to engage in arguments to gain
the truth, but until the truth is gained the outcome is uncertain: one
cannot know the end of the argument— whether it will be a dead-
end or a live birth of an idea— until the argument is over. But if,
because of difficulties, the philosopher does persist in the argument
but comes to hate logos, he will certainly never get at the truth; to
persist in the argument requires courage: courage, the knowledge
that he does not know the outcome, but the persistence to endure.
The passage on misology is, really, more important than the arguments
on immortality insofar as it presents the doctrine of philosophical
courage while the arguments merely show that courage in force.
Socrates is himself providing the model of argument, for he is a lover
of logos; and despite the aporetic nature of his arguments, he dies
sticking to his philosophic post, pursuing the truth to the end.^° And
later, when he has taken up Cebes' argument, Socrates will heroically
exclaim: "Let us go attack like Homeric heroes, and see what strength
there is in what you say" (95b).
The arguments over, Socrates, nobly risking belief in the happy
futurity of his soul, cheerfully drinks the hemlock, and in that simple
action does his civic duty with the same courage we observed in
argument. How can Socrates face death with such calm, indeed with
^^ This courage was characteristic of Socrates in his youth, too. The exercise of
this youthful courage is the focus of the autobiographical passage: when Socrates
saw the difficulties in the positions of the various philosophers and especially of
Anaxagoras, whose positions were the most promising, far from becoming a misologue,
he began his independent search for wisdom. In a similarly heroic passage, Socrates
says in the Meno (86b) that it is far more courageous to find out what is not known
than to say that, since it is impossible to learn the truth, there is no need to try.
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such cheer? Why should knowing his ignorance enable him to be so
serene?
Socrates' knowledge of his ignorance is what has given him phil-
osophic life. Ever since Chaerephon told him of the Delphic oracle
that there was no man wiser than he {Apology 21a), Socrates' mission
has been to test the truth of the pronouncement. His life has been
spent going from one person who believed himself wise to another
and demonstrating to each that though he thought he was wise he
was not really so. Socrates found that he was wiser than the others,
for he alone knew that he did not know. Politicians claimed to know
about statecraft but did not really know; poets claimed to know about
poetry but did not understand their own poems. But Socrates at least
knew that he did not know— here lay his superior wisdom {Apology
21b-23b). In this sense he is true to his life's mission even here in
the Phaedo. He has spoken with students of philosophy, with followers
of Pythagoras (Simmias and Cebes), and we must not forget that it
was the Pythagoreans who claimed to know about the immortality of
the soul. And again he has done as always: he has shown those who
might presume to know that they did not know. In this sense the
dialogue is true to the form of the aporetic dialogues— those which
searched for but failed to discover the truth.
But in a larger and profounder sense, it was this knowledge of
ignorance which enabled Socrates to be a philosopher at all. For a
philosopher, we know from the Symposium, is imbued with philosophic
epoic,. That is, he is an intermediary between knowledge and ignorance.
As Diotima tells Socrates {Symposium 203e f.):
Love stands midway between ignorance and wisdom. You must un-
derstand that none of the gods are seekers after truth. They do not
long for wisdom, because they are wise—and why should the wise be
seeking wisdom that is already theirs? Nor, for that matter, do the
ignorant seek the truth or yearn to be made wise. [tr. M. Joyce]
Only the man aware of his own ignorance, the one pulled by love
towards wisdom, can be a philosopher. Socrates, knowing that he is
to die, believes that he will soon find this wisdom which he has been
seeking, if it is to be found. For this wisdom is not to be found in
mortal life. The truth about the immortality of the soul cannot be
discovered by argument: it must be discovered experientially. His
eagerness to learn and the possibility of learning the truth account
for his cheer.
And finally, Socratic ignorance is, of course, not absolute ignorance.
It is ignorance mingled with knowledge. The man courageous in
battle perseveres despite knowing that he is ignorant of the outcome—
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whether he will win or lose. But in another sense he knows the
alternatives and faces them nevertheless. Either he will be victorious
or he will die honorably— alternatives both noble. Socrates, as he
has said in the Apology (40c-d), also knows the alternatives: either he
will enjoy a dreamless sleep or he will go to that happy realm to
which his virtue and philosophy have entitled him. He knows the
alternatives and he knows his ignorance, an ignorance he had men-
tioned with great clarity in the Apology (29a-b):
For let me tell you, gentlemen, that to be afraid of death is only
another form of thinking that one is wise when one is not; it is to
think that one knows what one does not know. No one knows with-
regard to death whether it is not really the greatest blessing that can
happen to a man, but people dread it as though they were certain
that it is the greatest evil, and this ignorance, which thinks that it
knows what it does not, must surely be ignorance most culpable. This
I take it, gentlemen, is the degree, and this is the nature of my
advantage over the rest of mankind, and if I were to claim to be wiser
than my neighbor in any respect, it would be in this— that not
possessing any real knowledge of what comes after death, I am also
conscious that I do not possess it. [tr. Hugh Tredennick]
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates' friends weep at his fate.
Perhaps, had they been convinced by the arguments for the immor-
tality of the soul, they would bear calmly the master's death. Their
weeping seems to be a dramatic corroboration of their lack of
conviction that the arguments of the present conversation, at least,
have been airtight. It may be suggested, however, that there remains
a possibility at a later time of finding such a proof. Such a possibility
would not affect the drama of the moment: Socrates has done his
very best, but as so often in his life, the truth has eluded him and
again he has discovered that he does not know. Have the interlocutors
learned that they cannot know about the soul's immortality? Simmias
had spoken earlier (85c) about the impossibility or at least extreme
difficulty of such knowledge. Perhaps here at the end the weeping
of Socrates' friends is an acknowledgment that without Socrates they
may not be able to escape perplexity (aTropia) on this matter; or
perhaps it suggests that they are not up to Socrates' high standards,
that despite their wish to please the master, their courage is not so
great as his. This weakness was alluded to earlier, when Cebes admitted
that there was in him "a little boy who has a childish" fear of death
(77e) in need of a Socratic charm to purge the fear. Perhaps only the
master has so developed the man in his soul as to possess the courage
necessary to face the uncertainty in death. The friends' lack of
composure in the face of Socrates' calm perhaps shows that Socrates
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is the only true philosopher and shows too how lonely a condition
that is.
In the Crito Socrates had told of his dream in which a woman
came to him and said that on the third day he would be home in
Phthia (44b). The line, from Book IX of the Iliad (363), was originally
spoken by Achilles to the embassy, when Achilles declared to Odysseus
that he was leaving Troy the next day and would arrive home on
the third. That line could not help but contrast the situation of the
two men. Achilles had voluntarily left battle; his departure for home
would leave the Greeks in a state of perplexity concerning the conduct
of the war; indeed, his prayer would be fulfilled and there would be
nothing between the Greeks and destruction. Socrates, though con-
demned by his own people, did not flee Athens; but his departure
from life would similarly leave his people in great perplexity. The
failure to come to a conclusion in the dialogue made that perplexity,
that airopia, all the more apparent. When Socrates left his prison
house of Athens, the city's soul was departing, leaving for its eternal
home.
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The Timaeus on Types of Duration
T. M. ROBINSON
This paper casts another glance at a number of questions in the
realm of cosmo-theology that have divided students of the Timaeus
since the time it was written. Did Plato clearly distinguish, in this
dialogue, the concepts of eternity, sempiternity, and everlastingness?
If he did, with what sort of duration did he credit the Demiurge,
World Soul, the Forms, and the physical universe? What relationship
does the answer to the first question have to assertions, in such
dialogues as the Laws, that "soul" is both autokinetic and the source
of the motion of other things? And finally, why did Plato's unique
description of the eternal (as the "perpetuous" or "abeternal,"
Siaiobi/tot;) apparently fail to interest, except peripherally, the post-
platonic tradition?
I start from a partial statement of the problem in Cornford (p.
98, n.I): even at 37d, he says, "where [Plato] is contrasting eternal
duration {aiuiv) with everlastingness in time, [he] will not reserve
aiiovioq for "eternal" and ocibLoc, for "everlasting." aibioc, is applied
both to the model and to the everlasting gods." This apparent
conceptual sloppiness disturbs Cornford, who at 37d7 is tempted to
conjecture aevaov ("ever-flowing") for aidvLov. But this seems unnec-
essary: a willingness to use synonyms is no indication of an author's
conceptual confusion, and in fact a careful examination of Plato's
usage of these terms in conjunction with others shows, I think
conclusively, that he has in the Timaeus a clear and precise cosmo-
theology to express.
Let us begin with the supposed terminological inexactitude that
revolves round three adjectives: a.ibi,oc„ aiooPLoq, and dLai6)VL0c,. The
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first, a word going back to Homer and meaning "ceaseless," "without
end," is applied to the eternal duration of the specific Form dubbed
by Plato "Eternal Living Creature" and of the Form-world generally,
and to the unceasing duration, once they are formed, of the gods.
The second, meaning literally something like "age-long," is applied
to the duration of the same Eternal Living Creature and, if the
manuscripts do not deceive us, to the unceasing duration of the
universe once formed. The third is applied specifically and solely to
the Eternal Living Creature. Which term Plato is likely to use will
turn, one may conjecture, on perspective: when he wishes to stress
the unceasing nature of the Forms or the gods, the time-honored
word aidioq will serve the purpose adequately, being equally applicable
to both. When he wishes to emphasize the immensity of the duration,
numerical and non-numerical, of the formed universe and its para-
digm respectively, an appropriate term at his disposal is aL<jovLoq, a
word he may actually have invented for the purpose; apart from its
use here, and in a joking reference to aicovLoq nedrj at Rep. 363d2,
the first known use of the term in extant Greek writing is in the
writings of Plato's contemporary, Demosthenes (1. 13, 1. 19). When
he wishes to emphasize the "eternity," in the most exact sense, of the
formed universe's paradigm he applies what is undoubtedly a coinage
of his own, diaLWULoq, which one might translate, to catch the tone of
its initial strangeness, "perpetuous" or "abeternal"; the force of the
dia seems to be that the paradigm iravTa aiOiva Ictlv 6v (38c 1-2), in
the sense that its duration is for eternity as a plenitude, the force of
the (tenseless) Iotlv ov that the paradigm's duration is non-temporal.
The noun that parallels Siaiojj/ioq, "perpetuity" (= "eternity"), it
should be added, is for Plato aioiv (37d6, 38c2, etc.), a bold piece of
transference of a word which till that date had been understood by
most if not all Greeks as meaning something like "a very great length
ofti)fie." It is, like dLatcovLoq, a term he frequently, though not invariably,
uses as his word for eternity in the strictest sense.
In addition to the above terms, Plato has and makes use of other,
remarkably exact and consistent terminology for the concepts of
eternity, sempiternity and everlastingness. First, in talking of what he
thinks of as eternal in the genuine sense, i.e., in talking of the Forms,
the Demiurge, and Space (x^opa), he is careful to use either the
"tenseless" eari alone (37e5, of "eternal being"), or the tenseless
etvai with aet (27d6, of the world of Forms: 52a8, of Space: 34a8,
of the Demiurge), or the participial noun derived from etVai with
a€i (50c5, of the Forms of the four "natural kinds"). Eternity itself,
ai6:v, he describes as "abiding in unity" n'evovroc, iv hi (37d6), by
contrast with that which is subject to numerical progression.
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In the very strictest sense, only the Forms appear to be thought
of by Plato as eternal, since no manner of KLvqaiq can be attributed
to them. Hence the ascription to Forms, and to Forms alone, of the
term dtaLWPioq. The Demiurge, by contrast, is subject to at least the
KLvrioLq of thought and emotion, and in general of intellectual/moral
"process"— a KiurjaLq which is in fact avTOKturjcnc,,^ and the only exact
instance thereof in the dialogue, that Plato will describe elsewhere
as the condition of in fact all ypvxr)- Space, too, in eternal motion, is
forever moving and being subjected to (further) motion by that which
it contains (52e3-4). On these grounds Plato can use language of
the Demiurge which suggests both the changelessness of eternity and
"process"; while he is subject to the Kivqcnq of thought and emotion,
such that he can "intervene" to form the world, he nonetheless
(42e5-6) "continued to abide by the wont of his own nature" {eiieveu
h TO) eavToi) Kara Tpbirov rjOei: tr. Cornford). (Cf. 37d6, where Eternity
is described as nevovroq ev evi). Likewise Space, while still being dubbed
eternal, has a structure and manner of existence so different from
that of the Forms that it can only be ascertained by at best a "bastard
form of reasoning" (52b2).
When Plato wishes to speak of "everlastingness" (i.e., duration
without end but with a beginning in time and measurable by tirtie)^
he will still talk of "abiding" (ixevetu), but of abiding forever (ati) (the
astral gods are so described at 40b6), or of being "in motion forever"
(at 58c3 he talks of ij ael Kivrjaic; of the four primary bodies). The
crucial verb etuat., which would with aei have signalled eternity rather
than everlastingness, is conspicuously and to my mind studiously
avoided.
' See below, p. 149. Efforts by many to "collapse" Demiurge and World Soul (or
Demiurge and the uovq within World Soul) founder on this point. The entire description
of World Soul in the Timaeus emphasizes its dependence— whether in time or ab
aeterno; the argument is unaffected—on something other than itself. The Forms
moreover are portrayed as wholly paradigmatic; there is no hint of any supposed
role for them that might be understood as one of efficient causality. (Compare in an
earlier dialogue the Form of the Good, which, says Socrates, "produced" the sun.)
This can only mean that the Demiurge himself is expected to be seen as what he
purports to be— the formed world's efficient cause, including that of its soul. If he
is meant further to be understood as a personal divinity (and nothing in the text
suggests convincingly that he is not; the "account" is described as "likely," not
"unlikely"), then his soul, and his alone, can be said to possess the non-dependent
autokinesis that Plato will eventually extend to all rational soul in the Phaedrus and
to all soul as such in the Laws.
- By contrast with a stance adopted in an earlier article (see below, note 5), I
prefer now to talk for clarity's sake of "everlastingness," rather than of "sempiternity"
in some secondary sense of the word.
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For the sempiternal as such Plato does not have an exact term.
There are, however, it seems, four necessary conditions for the
ascription of sempiternity to X: these are (a) that X be a potential
object of perception; (b) that it be, from a beginningless past to an
endless future, dependent upon an entity that is itself eternal; (c) that
it be in a state of beginningless and endless motion; (d) that it possess
a form of duration not measured, except incidentally, by time. Space,
for example, is eternal (albeit in some less strict sense of the term:
see above) rather than sempiternal; it is in no way dependent on
anything else for its existence, and it is the object, not of perception,
but of (bastard) reasoning. The "traces" (Ix^rj) of the Forms that are
"in" Space are, by contrast, sempiternal, being (a) "visible" {opara,
30a3); (b) in beginningless and endless motion; (c) ceaselessly de-
pendent upon Space as a condition both of their activity and, in some
measure, of the quality of that activity; and (d) unmeasured by time,
except in the incidental instance of their ever being constituted, by
an external agent, into formed bodies. The dependence relationship
between the traces of matter and Space is further reinforced by
Plato's asseveration that it is the "nature" of the Wandering Cause
to "sustain (sc, in motion)" (0epeiy, 48a6-7).^
Strategic uses of verbs such as etvaL, n'evtiv and (i)epuv, with the
addition, where necessary, of the adverb aei, are in effect "fail-safe"
techniques adopted by Plato to guide the reader to his exact intentions
when more time-honored terminology alone might perhaps have
confused. At 40b6, for example, when discussing the manner of
duration of the astral gods, he uses the term atSioq, an adjective we
have already noticed him applying to the Form-world generally and
the archetypal Form Eternal Living Creature in particular. That it is
the gods' everlastingness that is in question, however, not eternity is,
as we have seen, made clear in the very same sentence when he talks
of their fievetv ad not their ttvai ad. At 37e4-6, by contrast, where
the manner of duration of Forms such as Eternal Living Creature is
described as aidioq, the case for the meaning "eternal" in duration,
as distinct from sempiternal or everlasting, seems clinched by Plato's
' Cf. [PI.] Epin. 983b, where Cornford, following Harward and followed by Taran,
translates </)€p€ij' as "set in motion," and Tim. 43a7, where he translates 0ia t<t>epouTo
Koi e<t)(poi> as "cause and suffer violent motions." But this places an intolerable strain
upon the verb 4>iptiv, whose natural sense is "support" (of a pedestal bearing a statue)
or "carry" (of a ship carrying a passenger). At Tim. 48a6-7 and Epin. 983b it is
probably best construed in terms of sustention, in the first case the sustention of
basic matter by the Errant Cause, in the second the sustention of all living things by
Bibc,. (See LSJ-', s.v., Al). At Tim. 43a7 the sense is surely that soul-circles both "carry
(along)" and are to their detriment "carried (along) by" the body and its movements.
T. M. Robinson 147
immediate statement, in the very next sentence, that he means by
the term aidioq that (and only that?) sort of existence to which to
eoTiu ixbvov Kara tou aXrjdri Xoyov Tvpoai^Ku. A little earlier, at 37d7,
he had talked of the formed universe as an aioivwv eUbva of eternity,
an adjective Cornford found so inappropriate (see above, p. 143)
that he was tempted to conjecture aevaou, as in Laius 966e. 1 have
already suggested, in terms of the immensity and perhaps awesome
duration of the universe and its paradigm, one possible reason why
Plato used the adjective aidLoq here, in spite of 2Lny primafacie confusion
it could have generated. However that may be, the status of the
formed world's duration as everlasting, not sempiternal or eternal,
whatever Plato's choice of adjective for it, is demonstrated by the
subsequent reference to it as that to which to ^v to t' fVrat . . . Trperei
XiyicBai (38al-2).
Fail-safe techniques of this type are, of course, unnecessary when
Plato's exact, technical terminology— aloiv, dLaio^vLoc,— is in question.
They signify, univocally, (a) "perpetuity" (= "eternity"), the manner
of duration of the Form-world in general and the formed universe's
paradigm in particular, and (b) "perpetuous," the noun's neologistic
adjectival counterpart.
Whether Plato believed, when he wrote the Timaeus, that the
world and its guiding Soul were sempiternal, rather than everlasting,
as many have thought, seems to me very doubtful. Here, as before,
Plato has what looks like a fail-safe technique to direct the reader to
his precise intention. This consists in the exercise of remarkable
carefulness in the use of the mood and tense of verbs, not least in
those contexts where he might be thought to be offering hints that
the dialogue is to be read figuratively rather then literally. At 37b5,
for example, the world is described as to KLvovjxtvov u0' avTov, and
scholars have been quick to find here a reference to the uncaused,
self-moving soul of Phaedrus 245c, the clear inference being that the
world and its soul are sempiternal, not, as the surface-interpretation
of much of the Timaeus might suggest, everlasting entities. But the
equivocity of the term "self-moving" is apparent in Cornford's own
description (note ad lac.) of "the heaven as a whole, which, as a living
creature, is self-moved by its own self-moving soul"; in what sense,
except some trivial one, is X self-moving if its supposed self-motion
is dependent upon the (real or supposed) self-motion of Y? As it
happens, Plato goes on (37c6-7) to make it clear that the Phaedrus
doctrine of soul is not in question when he says, "When the father
who had begotten it (sc, the world) saw it set in motion {Kivyjdev) and
alive," etc. (the mood and tense are significant); the "autokinesis" of
the formed universe is revealed, for anyone who had ever doubted
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his meaning, as analogous in all important respects merely to the
commonplace, non-technical type of self-motion Plato attributes to
any animal as distinct from any plant (77c4-5)— that is, it is dependent
self-motion (i.e., in the strictest sense not self-motion at all), and had
a beginning in time.
A second supposed hint of a doctrine of the sempiternity of the
world in the Timaeus is to be found at 30a3, where the pre-cosmos
is described as irav ooov rju bparbv. Since the organized cosmos had
already been called (28b 7-8) opaToq . . . airTOc, t€ . . . /cat acina exo^v,
some have inferred that talk of a pre-cosmos is clearly to be taken
as figurative only. No fail-safe technique, however, on Plato's part is
needed this time to see that the two descriptions are totally different,
in spite of the use of the common word "visible." The formed world
is composed of specified objects, and has bulk {awixa); that is why it
is both bparbq and airToc,. The pre-cosmos possesses merely "traces"
of reality. A strong hint of what Plato meant in nonetheless calling
it bparbq, despite the fact that it did not consist of formed objects, is
to be found at Phaedo 79a6 ff., where aiS^q seems to be a Platonic
synonym for "non-physical" or "non-corporeal." The pre-cosmos,
however, while not corporeal (it possesses no formed aojjLiaTQ; within
it), is not wholly incorporeal either; it is apparently something like
one of the ghosts Socrates describes at Phaedo 81c4, creatures hovering
somewhere between materiality and immateriality, but not graspable
{a-KTo) because they do not consist of formed bodies (aco/iara).
A third "hint" at 28a 1, where according to the Oxford text the
Forms are contrasted with a world described as yiyvbuevov ad turns
out to be illusory. Quite apart from the dubiousness of the manuscript
evidence and ancient secondary evidence for aet,^ parallel texts in
the Timaeus itself, where ad is conspicuously absent, make it clear
that Plato is attempting to contrast Forms, which do not have a
yeueaiq, with material objects, which do.^
One final point. On the far from obvious assumption that the
Phaedrus ante-dates the Timaeus, many have inferred that all KLvrjaiq,
whether the Timaeus is read literally or figuratively, must have as its
source some form of rpvxv^ since at Phaedrus 245c \pvxv is said to be
the self-moving source of all Kivrjcnq. This has led to various claims,
ranging from the existence of an Irrational World Soul behind the
motions of pre-matter (Plutarch) to an irrational element in World
Soul that is never fully mastered by rationality (Cornford). But Plato
himself offers an account, in the pages of the Timaeus itself, that
' See John Whittaker, Phoenix 23 (1969), 181-82 and ibid., 27 (1973), 387-88).
' See Tim. 37b2-3, 48e6-49al, and T M. Robinson, Phronesis 24 (1979), 105-109.
T. M. Robinson 149
suggests much more precisely what his thinking is. At 57e ff. we
read:
Motion will never exist in a state of homogeneity. For it is difficult,
or rather impossible, that what is to be moved should exist without
that which is to move it, or what is to cause motion {to Kivriaov) without
that which is to be moved by it. In the absence of either, motion
cannot exist; and they cannot possibly be homogeneous. Accordingly,
we must always presume rest in a state of homogeneity, and attribute
motion to a state of heterogeneity {avoipLaXbrr}Ta). Further, inequality
(awffOTT/q) is a cause of heterogeneity, and the origin of inequality we
have already described, (tr Cornford)
While for an instant the reader may imagine that the Kivriaov
mentioned here will be an existent of some sort— like, say, \l/vxr]—
the subsequent references, in the same passage, to aviaoTrjq and
avwuaXoTTjq make it clear that Plato is referring to particular conditions
under which, according to the passage in question, the "primary
bodies" operate. As it happens, exactly the same conditions obtain,
as Cornford sees (p. 240), for the movements in Space of the dvvaneic,
of the pre-cosmos, which are described (52e2-4) as "neither alike
nor evenly balanced" {nrjd' onoicov . . . /u^re iaoppbiToov), as having "no
equipoise within any region of it" {kut' ovbtv avrriq laoppoTreiv), and
as being "everywhere swayed unevenly" (avu^fiaXooq iravTrj raXavrov-
nhr]v). The natural conclusion to be drawn from this can only be
that, just as the eternal equipoise of a given Form (or of the World
of Forms as a whole) is the basis of its/their eternally unchanging
state, the sempiternal lack of such equipoise among the dvvafieLq of
pre-matter accounts for their sempiternal KLvr]OLq; no further doctrine
of a supposed presence of i/'ux'? need be imported.
I conclude from the above that for the Plato of the Timaeus the
Forms, God, and Space are eternal, the Forms in the most basic sense
and God and Space in another, logically difFerentiable sense involving
KLvqaiq, if only in God's case the Kivr](XLq involved in thought and
volition. The ixi'V or Urstoff that characterize Space are by contrast
sempiternal, and the formed world, including its soul, everlasting. It
is a scenario he sees only as "likely"; he is in no way bound by it,
and will in later dialogues, notably the Philebus and Laws, make
significant modifications to it. But that is another essay. For the
moment I wish to turn briefly to the post-platonic tradition and ask
what happened to some of the key transformations and neologisms
we have noticed in the Timaeus, particularly that of the "perpetuous."
The first thing that can be said is that the use of aiC^v to mean (in
certain contexts) "eternity" is largely accepted by subsequent philos-
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ophy; this group includes not only Aristotle (passim), Philo (1. 496,
619), and Plotinus (3. 7. 5), it also encompasses Epicurus (Sent. 20),
much exercised to allay "fears concerning eternity." The same goes
for the cognate adjective aioovioq and adverb aiuiuiox;, though a growing
commitment to a much more technical philosophical vocabulary is
very apparent. One notable exception is however Aristotle. The
omission of both words throughout the Corpus is striking, and can
hardly have been accidental. One can only assume that for Aristotle
the new terminology was superfluous; he himself is content to rely
on context and the time-honored Homeric word aidLoc, to describe
both the eternal life of God (Metaph. 1072''29) and the sempiternal
duration of the cosmos.^ The neo-platonic tradition, by contrast, sees
virtue in Plato's terminology. In a well-known passage Plotinus care-
fully distinguishes the "eternal" (aiwuLoc;) from the "sempiternal"
(aidLoq), and Proclus (Inst. 172) has the same commitments when he
writes of vovc, as being aKivrjToc, ai(j^vi(jo<; irapra oiv."^ They differ from
Plato in that the language is now truly technical; no fail-safe techniques
are needed to guard against possible misinterpretation. Their case is
aided by the relative simplicity of their own cosmology vis-a-vis Plato's;
once the doctrine of a pre-cosmos is discarded (as it was within a
generation of Plato by Xenocrates, if not by others), the notion of
temporal everlastingness, which only made sense in terms of such a
doctrine, can also be quietly jettisoned, leaving simply the notions of
the eternal (time-transcendent) and the sempiternal (time-measured).
With these two concepts now finally clarified, the concept of the
biaiicvLov can also be discarded as at best a superfluous synonym for
the aioiviov, dreamed up by Plato to cover his own failure to make
appropriate distinctions between the terms aiCivioc, and otibLoq. That
is, of course, to state the case most strongly; in practice, pietas toward
the master was such that a word like bLaiwvioc, was unlikely to be
abandoned in so unfeeling a manner. We find it used, for example,
o^ ivbaLnovia in Philo (2. 569), in Philodemus {de piet. 80), and nearer
the end of classical antiquity, in the Emperor Julian {Or. 4. 144c);
Philodemus also used it of "living creatures" {de piet. 111). Philo in
particular finds the word to his liking— so much so that he coins the
verb bLaLii)vi^€Lv (a coinage which, perhaps because Philo is not Plato,
enjoys a brief day of glory in his own works and is never heard of
again). It is only in the fifth century that Proclus (Theol. Plat. 5. 37)
and Syrianus {in Metaph. 103. 28) return to the use of the word in
the way that Plato had originally planned—and then in its adverbial
® For references see Bekker s.v.
^ See also SimpHc. in Epictet., p. 77D.
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form only. Even at this stage it still appears to be little more than
complimentary and complementary; its value is at best that of emphatic
synonym.
It is worth emphasizing that the distinctions with which Plato
wrestled in the Timaeus constitute one of the history of philosophy's
success-stories, not one of its failures. On the debit side, to be sure,
from Plato's point of view, lies the fact that his doctrine of the
everlastingness (measured in time) of the formed cosmos was largely
rejected, albeit by the rough technique of denying that he ever
espoused any notion of the world's temporal formation in the first
place. Parasitic upon this was the large-scale rejection of the notion
of the sempiternal as the non-temporal or perhaps extra-temporal
mode of duration that Plato considered to be a characteristic of the
world's pre-matter; the sempiternity of (formed) matter is understood,
from Aristotle onwards, as being unequivocally in the temporal mode,
though without beginning or end. On the credit side, the seminal
nature of Plato's discussion is such that the relationship of eternity
to sempiternity does in fact finally get clarified, and three of the four
basic neologisms and verbal transformations he employed to meet
the problem, aioiv, aibLoq and aioiiVLoq, have become, along with other
major Platonic coinages such as the notion of -KOLbT-nc,, part and pafcel
of subsequent Greek thinking, and in various translations part and




Psychagogia in Plato's Phaedrus
ELIZABETH ASMIS
From ancient times, there has been much discussion whether Plato's
Phaedrus is a unified composition. The problem is that the dialogue
seems to have a variety of topics— love, beauty, the soul, rhetoric,
dialectic, and writing—and that it seems to fall into two halves, the
first comprising three speeches, the second consisting of dialectical
discussion. In favor of the unity of the dialogue, ancient and modern
scholars have argued that the various topics are closely interwoven.'
' The Neoplatonist Hermeias (5th century ad.) discussed the unity of the Phaedrus
in his commentary on the dialogue. He notes that the dialogue has been thought to
be about love, rhetoric, the soul, the good, primary beauty, and beauty of every kind.
He agrees with lamblichus that the unifying topic of the Phaedrus is "beauty of every
kind"; and he proposes that there is a gradual ascent from Lysias' love for the beauty
of Phaedrus' body to Phaedrus' love for the beauty of Lysias' logos, then to psychic
beauty, to the beauty of the cosmic gods, to intelligible beauty, and finally to Eros
and beauty itself, with a subsequent reversal back to psychic beauty and then to the
beauty of logoi (pp. 8-12 of P. Couvreur's edition, Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis
Phaedrum Scholia, Paris 1901). I agree with Werner Jaeger that the Phaedrus is unified
by the problem of rhetoric (Paideia, tr. by Gilbert Highet, vol. 3, New York 1944, p.
184). I also agree in large part with Ronald B. Levinson that unity is achieved through
a series of "dialectical transformations and reconciliations" of a number of themes,
among them love and beauty, madness, rhetoric, and philosophy ("Plato's Phaedrus
and the New Criticism," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 46 [1964], 293-309). In
a perceptive, short note Robert G. Hoerber proposes that the unity of the Phaedrus
consists in the "proper Collection and Division" of the four topics: erotic passion,
Platonic love, current rhetoric, and dialectic ("Love or Rhetoric in Plato's Phaedrus}','
Classical Bulletin 34 [ 1 958], 33). Others who have argued for the unity of the Phaedrus
are: Gustav E. Mueller, who suggests that the real theme is the question "what is
man?," in "Unity of the Phaedrus',' Classical Bulletin 33 (1957), 50-53 and 63-65;
John L Beare, "The Phaedrus: its structure; the 'EPfiS theme: notes," Hermathena
17 (1913), 312-34; W. C. Helmbold and W. B. Holther, "The Unity of the 'Phaedrus',"
University of California Publications in Classical Philology 14 (1952), 387-417; and Paul
Plass, "The Unity of the Phaedrus," Symbolae Osloenses 43 (1968), 7-38 (reprinted
with numerous typographical errors in Plato: True and Sophistic Rhetoric, ed. by Keith
V. Erickson, Amsterdam 1979).
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This approach is, I think, correct. At the same time, the dialogue
seems to me more unified than has been thought. The underlying
theme that binds the whole dialogue is, I suggest, Plato's new
definition of rhetoric as a certain ''psychagogia'' (261a, 271c). The
dialogue begins with an illustration of the wrong type of psychagogia
and moves gradually toward a revelation of the right kind of psy-
chagogia; and throughout this progression Socrates exemplifies the
right kind of psychagogia by leading the youthful Phaedrus from a
fascination with the wrong kind of rhetoric to a contemplation of
the right kind. This progression leads from Lysianic to Isocratean
rhetoric and then to genuine, philosophical rhetoric.
The term psychagogia occurs twice in the Phaedrus, both times in
the final, dialectical section of the dialogue. Socrates bases his ex-
amination of rhetoric on the definition of rhetoric as "a certain
psychagogia through words, not only in the law-courts and all other
public meetings, but also in private meetings, alike in matters small
and large, and properly no more to be esteemed in important than
in unimportant matters" (261a-b).^ Later in the discussion, Socrates
reverts to this definition by reminding Phaedrus that the function of
speech is ''psychagogia'' (271c).
This new definition of rhetoric is immediately conspicuous as a
revision of the view presented in the Gorgias. Here Gorgias describes
rhetoric as "the ability to persuade by words jurors in the law-court,
councillors in the council, assemblymen in the assembly, and anyone
in any other meeting that is political" (452e).^ In the Gorgias, rhetoric
is the practice of public persuasion. In the Phaedrus, by contrast,
Socrates views rhetoric as a means of influencing individuals, in
private or in public, on matters of individual concern.
Plato signals this shift by alluding to the Gorgias both in the
discussion that leads up to the new definition and in Phaedrus'
^ Phaedrus 261a-b: . . . xl/vxaywyia tu, dia Xoyuv, ov fiouou tV diKaarrjpiou; koi S<toi aXkoi
drifioaioi avXXoyoi, aXXa Kot iv ibiou^, r} avrr] anLKpoiv rt koi (uyaXuv iripi, koi ovSef ivTinonpov
TO yt opOov wept airovdala 77 inpl <l>avXa yiyvbp.tvov;
' Gorgias 452e: to ireidap . . . oCbv r' uvat Totq Xoyoic, kuI iv SiKaaT-qpiu) diKacTTac, koi iv
0ovXevTijpiw ^ovXevTOK; Kal tu (KKXrjaia (KKXrjaiaaTa<; koi iv aXXu) avXKbyw Travri, Saru, av
KoXiTiKOc, avXXoyoc, yiyvqrai. Cf. 454b, 455a. P. Kucharski examines in detail how the
discussion of rhetoric in the Phaedrus is an outgrowth of the discussion in the Gorgias
in "La Rhetorique dans le Gorgias et le Phedre," Reime des Etudes grecques 74 (1961),
371-406. Antje Hellwig's Untersuchungen lur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platan und
Aristoteles {Hypomnemata 38, Gottingen 1973) is also a valuable contribution to this
topic.
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response to it. Socrates begins the discussion by asking whether the
rhetorician must know the truth (259e). This question is the focus
of Socrates' entire examination of rhetoric. As a possible answer,
Socrates sums up the position taken by Gorgias in the Gorgias: that
if an aspiring rhetorician lacks knowledge, he must acquire it, but
that knowledge by itself is insufficient for persuasion {Gorgias
458e-460a, Phaedrus 260d). Socrates also reminds Phaedrus that
there are arguments purporting to show that rhetoric is not a skill,
rex^rj, but an "unskilled routine" {arexvoq rpilSi]), lacking in knowledge
(Phaedrus 260e); Socrates used such arguments in the Gorgias (463b,
501a). Then, after stating his new definition, Socrates asks Phaedrus
whether this is what he has heard; and Phaedrus expresses surprise,
saying that he has heard no more than that rhetoric concerns lawsuits
and public speaking (261b). Phaedrus' surprise is itself surprising,
since all of the rhetoric exemplified previously in the Phaedrus has
been of a conspicuously private kind. The three speeches that pre-
ceded all dealt with the intimate question of the relationship between
lover and beloved. In expressing surprise, Phaedrus stands for the
general reader who is familiar with the discussion in the Gorgias and
who is now being alerted that a new view is being proposed.
Socrates responds to Phaedrus' surprise by arguing that his defi-
nition fits common rhetorical practice. Rhetoricians, he points out,
practice an art (if indeed it is an art) of opposition {ocvTLXoyLKr]), which
aims to make the same thing appear to be both one thing (such as
just) and its opposite (such as unjust); and this aim, which consists in
making anything resemble anything at all, is not confined to public
speaking (261b-e). Consequently, Socrates argues, since rhetoric is
the practice of deception, and since deception cannot be successful
unless the deceiver knows the truth, the rhetorician must have
knowledge.
Socrates draws no attention for the time being to the term
psychagogia, the key term of his definition. This term is another new
element in the definition; Plato did not use the term in any previous
discussion of rhetoric. The reason it does not strike the attention of
Phaedrus is that it is entirely compatible with the familiar view of
rhetoric as the practice of public persuasion. The term suggests
beguilement; and by emphasizing the deceptive nature of rhetoric in
his discussion, Socrates invites the reader to understand the term in
a pejorative sense for now, as the practice of alluring and beguiling
others. Later, he will reveal the full meaning of the term and the full
novelty of his definition.
The earliest attested meaning of the compound psychagog- is that
of "conjuring" or "evoking" souls of the dead. From this use, there
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evolved the notion of influencing the souls of living people, with the
connotation of "alluring" or "beguiling" them."* Using the verbal
form, Aristophanes combines the tw^o senses and gives his own twist
to them in a portrait of Socrates in the Birds, produced in 414 B.C.
Here the chorus of birds sees a strange sight: Socrates "is conjuring
souls" {\l/vx<xy(t}yd, 1555) by a lake among the "Shadow-feet." When
the cowardly Peisander comes to this place to get back the spirit
(^pvxv) that deserted him when still alive, Socrates slays a young camel
just as Odysseus had slain sheep: and Chaerephon is drawn to the
blood from the world below. In casting Socrates as a conjurer of
souls, Aristophanes is parodying Socrates' well-known ethical concern,
his care for the soul.
Plato uses the noun, psychagogia, only in the Phaedrus; but the
verbal form occurs in two other dialogues. In the Laws (909b), he
plays on the basic sense of "conjuring" souls of the dead to add to
it the notion of "beguiling" the living; and in the Timaeus (71a) he
uses the verb to refer to the beguilement of the desiring part of the
soul by means of images. His contemporary and rival, Isocrates, uses
the verb to describe the effect of poetic devices on the listener. In
Evagoras (10), he points out that poets can "charm" their listeners
with beautiful rhythms and harmonies even though their diction and
thoughts may be poor; and in To Nicocles (49), he remarks that
rhetoricians who wish to "allure" their listeners must use the crowd-
pleasing device of myth, just like the poets.
Gorgias did not use the term, as far as we know. But it is well
suited to convey his notion that speech has the power to effect "most
divine" deeds, as attested by poetry and magical incantations. It fits
even more directly his claim that words have the same power with
respect to the soul as drugs have with respect to the body; as a result,
Gorgias held, a speaker can shape a soul in whatever way he wishes
and in particular "drug" and "bewitch" a soul "by an evil persua-
sion."^
The term psychagogia in Socrates' definition thus agrees with the
familiar notion of rhetoric as a power that works on the soul and
may be used to deceive it. But as the argument of the Phaedrus
proceeds, a new meaning unfolds. Socrates gradually develops the
view that genuine rhetoric is an art by which a speaker guides another
to the truth by adjusting his words to the other's soul. Rhetoric no
longer appears as a pseudo-art of deception, but is shown to be an
^ Evanghelos Moutsopolos has a brief survey of the uses of ^uxaTWTta in La
Musique dans I'oeuvre de Platon (Paris 1959), pp. 259-60.
^ Praise of Helen 8-14.
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art of teaching individuals to discover the truth about themselves.
After considerable argument, Socrates is ready to drav^ attention to
the component psychagogia in his definition. The new term in fact
sums up everything that is new about his view of rhetoric. Reverting
to his definition, Socrates claims that "since the function of speech
is psychagogia''' (271c), the rhetorician must know the types of soul,
as well as be able to recognize actual occurrences. Socrates now relies
on the etymology of the term psychagogia to reveal its underlying,
true meaning, "guidance of the soul." Only sham rhetoric beguiles
others; real rhetoric guides souls to self-knowledge through a knowl-
edge of soul.
The notion of psychagogia thus has pivotal importance in the
Phaedrus. Its importance, moreover, is not confined to the latter part
of the dialogue. It serves as a theme for the entire dialogue. Just as
in his dialectical discussion Socrates moves from the notion of a sham
rhetoric to that of a genuine rhetoric, so the action of the dialogue
as a whole moves from a display of pseudo-rhetoric to a revelation
of genuine rhetoric; and this is a transition from psychagogia as
beguilement to psychagogia as guidance of the soul. Throughout this
progression, Socrates serves as an example of a true rhetorician and
true "psychagogue." Against Aristophanes' portrait of Socrates as
conjuror of souls, Plato sets a portrait of Socrates as a "psychagogue"
who guides souls to the truth by seeking it himself.
This psychagogia has four stages. First, Socrates joins Phaedrus in
an apparent celebration of Lysias' speech (227a-34c); second, Socrates
undertakes to deliver a speech of his own, to rival Lysias' speech
(234c-42a); third, Socrates opposes this speech with a mythical
recantation that reveals something of the truth (242a-57b); and
fourth, Socrates teaches by a dialectical examination, which exem-
plifies genuine rhetoric, that genuine rhetoric consists in a dialectical
search for the truth (257b-79c). Each succeeding stage is built on
the preceding stages; and the whole forms a sequence in which each
part is complemented by all the others. The remainder of this paper
will examine this relationship among the four stages.
The dialogue begins with a meeting between Phaedrus and Socrates
close to the city walls. Phaedrus is enthralled by a speech of Lysias,
in which the speaker attempts to seduce "someone beautiful" (227c),
whom he does not love, by pleading ingeniously that it is advantageous
for a person to yield to a non-lover, not a lover. Phaedrus is so
impressed by the speech that he has spent the entire morning
memorizing it. But we do not learn this fact from Phaedrus; we learn
it in time, and with precise details, from Socrates, who is invited by
Phaedrus to join him in a walk outside the city. When Socrates asks
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Phaedrus to recite the speech to him, and Phaedrus replies that his
memory can't possibly do justice to a speech composed over a long
period of time by the cleverest of present writers, Socrates exclaims:
"If I don't know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself" (228a). He then
reveals all: that Phaedrus first had Lysias recite the speech repeatedly,
then borrowed the manuscript to study it, and finally went outside
the city, manuscript in hand, to practice it. Socrates knows Phaedrus
well; and as a clinching demonstration of his insight, he makes
Phaedrus come up with the manuscript that he has been hiding under
his cloak. In exposing Phaedrus, Socrates shows that he recognizes
with whom he is dealing. We shall learn later that a knowledge of
the other's soul is a prerequisite of the true orator.
The opening scene shows us a Socrates who is no less enthusiastic
about getting to know Lysias' speech than Phaedrus is about learning
it by heart. Socrates describes himself as a "fellow bacchic reveler"
{(xvyKopv^avTLO}PTa)y who is so passionate a "lover of discourses" as
to be "sick" about listening to them (228b-c). Socrates' and Phaedrus'
walk into the countryside looks indeed like a bacchic revel, with
overtones of comedy, in which the two celebrants lead each other in
turn. First Phaedrus invites Socrates to lead on (227c, 228b) and
Socrates suggests that they turn away from the road to go along the
river-bed in search of a secluded spot (229a). Subsequently Phaedrus
picks out a spot and leads Socrates to it. The landscape takes on an
air of mystery, as Phaedrus recalls the story of Oreithyia being
snatched by Boreas (229b). It is as though the pair of worshippers,
too, has been carried off by some supernatural power. This impression
is reinforced when the spot, which Phaedrus picked out from a
distance, turns out to be a grove sacred to the Nymphs and the river-
god Achelous. Socrates duly celebrates the grove with a lyrical
description; and he thanks Phaedrus for leading him, like a stranger,
to an alien territory {e^evayrjTaL, 230c), the countryside. Phaedrus
acknowledges that Socrates is indeed like a stranger who has been
led {^evayovfievu)). Socrates' explanation for this xenagogia is that
Phaedrus has found a drug by which to lead him wherever he wishes:
this is to dangle "discourses in books" in front of him just as others
dangle fruit or branches in front of animals that are hungry (230d-e).
This Bacchic revel and xeriagogia is also a psychagogia. The souls of
both men have been conjured to an alien territory by the drug-like
power of words. On the surface, Phaedrus has acted as leader in this
journey: beguiled by Lysias' speech, he seems to have beguiled Socrates
and lured him to a place of estrangement. But in reality, as will
become increasingly clear, Socrates has been Phaedrus' leader: guided
by a divine power, he has guided Phaedrus to a place of purification.
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where both men may be truly at home. Socrates claims he is entranced:
in reality he has a perfect grip on himself. There is a glimmer of the
true state of affairs when, in response to Phaedrus' question where
Oreithyia was carried off, Socrates is able to give an answer ("two
or three stades downstream, where we cross to Agra," 229c). The
stranger, Socrates, knows the territory better than Phaedrus. Then,
in the discussion concerning Oreithyia, Socrates remarks that he is
still searching to know himself (229e). Although he seems to have
been swept away by Dionysiac enthusiasm, Socrates keeps in mind
his life's goal. Acting as a "psychagogue," he associates Phaedrus with
himself in a search for self-knowledge, by guiding him to a holy place
where Phaedrus may be healed of his evil enchantment.
The topography provides a suitable setting for the psychagogia. Not
only do the two men journey to an unfamiliar place, but there is a
physical boundary that separates their normal abode from the alien
territory. In order to reach the sacred grove, they must cross a river.
This river serves as a sacred border, like the body of water outside
Hades that separates the souls of the living from the souls of the
dead. Later Socrates will be prevented by his inner voice from
crossing the river until he has performed a ritual expiation (242b-c);
and finally both men cross the river after offering a prayer to- Pan
and the other deities of the place (279b-c). As though conjured by
a ritual act, the souls of the two men have been transported to a
realm from which they are normally excluded and win their release
through ritual purification. The extraordinary setting of the Phaedrus,
which has surprised and delighted the readers of Plato, introduces
the theme of the entire dialogue, rhetoric as psychagogia.
After Phaedrus has read aloud Lysias' speech, Socrates confirms
that he has engaged in a Bacchic celebration with Phaedrus {avve-
iSaKx^vaa, 234d). But he now attributes his enchantment, not to the
speech itself, but to Phaedrus' excessive delight at the speech. By
transferring his enthusiasm from the speech to the hearer, Socrates
now assumes the role of lover of Phaedrus.^ In order to lure Phaedrus
away from his admiration of Lysias, he also sets himself up as a
rhetorical rival to Lysias. His immediate strategy is to hurl an
apparently rash challenge: he claims that "ancient wise men and
women" (235b) have spoken and written more copiously on the same
® Anne Lebeck notes in "The Central Myth of Plato's Phaedrus" {Greek, Roman
and Byzantine Studies 13 [1972], 267-90, p. 281) that Socrates is here overcome by
the sight of his beloved, Phaedrus, in just the way that Socrates later describes in
the recantation (254b). V. Tejera aptly views Phaedrus as the "erotic . . . generator"
of both of Socrates' speeches ("Irony and Allegory in the Phaedrus," Philosophy and
Rhetoric 8 [1975], 71-87. p. 74).
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subject treated by Lysias and that he, Socrates, could do better
himself. Socrates is careful to attribute his own fullness of invention
to some source that he can't name just at present, "perhaps beautiful
Sappho or wise Anacreon or even some prose writers {<Tvyypa(t>€Oi}vy'
(235c). He says that he knows he is ignorant; so it must be that he
got his inspiration from elsewhere and that "because of my stupidity
I have forgotten this very thing, how and from whom I heard"
(235d).
Who, if anyone, is Socrates' source? Malcolm Brown and James
Coulter have shown in detail that the organization and content of
Socrates' first speech are Isocratean.' The most important Isocratean
features pointed out by them are: clear organization, based on a clear
determination of the subject matter, sometimes by means of a defi-
nition; the view that human beings are guided by opinion {86^a) or
desire (e7^l^u/x^a); the praise of "divine philosophy" (239b); and the
claim that nothing is more valuable for humans or gods than "the
education of the soul" (241c). As Brown and Coulter point out, Plato
considered this a debased view of philosophy and of human nature,
since it substitutes opinion for knowledge and cold calculation of
material advantages for a commitment to truth.
Another Isocratean feature, pointed out by R. L. Howland, is the
overall purpose of the speech, that of improving on a rival rhetorician
by composing .a speech on the same theme. ^ Isocrates' Busiris is
particularly pertinent. Here Isocrates attempts to outdo his rival,
Polycrates, by first defining what an encomium is; and he ends by
admitting that even though both he and his rival may be speaking
falsehoods, his speech is superior because it is properly an encomium.^
There are further indications that Socrates is using Isocrates as a
model for his first speech. With some emphasis, Socrates draws
attention to the rhythmic quality of his speech. Shortly after he has
started his speech, he breaks off by saying that he is already close to
speaking in dithyrambs (238d); and when he ends, he says that he is
no longer talking in dithyrambs but in epic verse (24 le). The use of
rhythm was a conspicuous feature of Isocrates' style. Well aware that
^ "The Middle Speech of Plato's Phaedrus," Journal of the History of Philosophy 9
(1971), 405-23.
^ "The Attack on Isocrates in the Phaedrus," Classical Quarterly 31 (1937), 151-59,
p. 153. The Helen (composed about 370 B.C.) and Busiris (about 390 B.C.) are two
outstanding examples of this endeavor. Another example is the Panegyricus (380 B.C.),
where Isocrates tries to outdo the many predecessors who have spoken on the same
theme by choosing the right starting-point (15).
^ Busiris 9 and 33. In the Helen (14-15), Isocrates likewise proposes to improve
upon a rival (Gorgias) by first making clear what an encomium is.
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poets charm their listeners by the use of rhythm, Isocrates demanded
in his programmatic Agaiyist the Sophists that the rhetorician must
speak "rhythmically and musically" {evpvdfiooq Kal )uoi;(7i/ca)^).'" As he
claimed in late life, his speeches are akin to poetry, that is, to works
composed "with music and rhythms" (/ucra novcrtKriq Kal pvdixcbv), and
have "a rather poetic and elaborate diction";" and they tend to be
adorned "with beautiful rhythms and elaboration" (evpvdniaLC, Kal
Moreover, Socrates seems to plant a clue in the very way that he
describes the source that, he says, eludes him. Isocrates was a prose
writer {avyypacjxvq) who advised his students not to be ignorant of
the poets and other "wise persons" {oo^lotCju) but to cull from them
what is best just as bees gather honey from flowers.'^ Socrates has a
convenient excuse for his forgetfulness: Isocrates' speeches are a
repertory of second-hand ideas; and it is hard to see anything original
in his speeches. '"*
The reader knows from other dialogues to be wary of Socrates'
confessions of ignorance and forgetfulness. In the Phaedrus, there is
'" Against the Sophists 16 (composed about 390 B.C., roughly the time at which
Isocrates founded his school). Isocrates demanded poetic rhythm in his Tfx«"/ (Sauppe
II 225), ntfuxOw irafTi pvdnw naXiara Cafi^tKu fi TpoxdUw. R. C. Jebb discusses the
importance of prose rhythm in Isocrates' rhetoric in his The Attic Orators, vol. 2,
London 1893, pp. 56-58. For the actual rhythms used by Socrates in his speech, see
Karl Mras, "Platos Phaedrus und die Rhetorik," part 2, Wiener Studien 37 (1915),
88-117, pp. 96-97.
'
' Antidosis 46-47 (dated 354-53 B.C.).
'- To Philip 27 (dated 346 B.C.).
'' To Demonicus 51-52 (dated about 374-72 B.C.); and To Nicodes 13 (dated about
the same time). In To Nicodes, Isocrates also mentions that Hesiod, Theognis, and
Phocylides are agreed to be "excellent counsellors for the life of men" (43). Isocrates'
praise of the poets is not unmixed; along with much wisdom, he also attributes to
them calumnies and lies (for example, at Busiris 38). On Isocrates' eclecticism, see
also the next note.
'^ There are, I think, other allusions to Isocrates in the way in which Socrates
leads up to his speech; but these are difficult to prove and carry weight only in
combination. There is, 1 think, an allusion to Isocrates in the friendly bargaining
that goes on between Phaedrus and Socrates prior to Socrates' delivery of the speech.
Phaedrus would have Socrates use none of the arguments used by Lysias; and Socrates
protests that he should be allowed to use those arguments of Lysias which are
inevitable in any treatment of the subject (235e-36a). Isocrates maintains in his
famous Panegyricus (8) that "one must not avoid those subjects about which others
have spoken previously but one must try to speak better than them" (8); and in To
Nicodes (41) he excuses his lack of originality by saying that in speeches of this type
one should look not for novelty, but for the ability to "bring together the greatest
number of ideas scattered in the thoughts of others and speak most beautifully about
them." Socrates, it seems to me, is imitating Isocrates' eclecticism. It is true that in
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special reason to suppose that Socrates is toying with his interlocutor.
Socrates has been playing with Phaedrus at uncovering Phaedrus'
devotion to Lysias. We saw Phaedrus hiding Lysias' manuscript and
protesting that he can't recite his speech; and we saw Socrates
uncovering the subterfuge and teasing Phaedrus about it. A similar
scene is now being staged, with roles reversed. Socrates now plays
the role of the enthusiastic and bashful student of rhetoric, and he
gives Phaedrus a chance at uncovering his rhetorical inspiration.
After boasting of his rhetorical capacity, Socrates suddenly becomes
reluctant: he says that he has been teasing Phaedrus, and that he
really can't deliver a more refined speech than Lysias'. Thereupon
Phaedrus sees through Socrates, just as Socrates saw through him
earlier. Phaedrus says: "If I don't know Socrates, I've forgotten
myself"; and he accuses Socrates of playing coy. Phaedrus uncovers
Socrates' desire to speak. In time, he also uncovers his source.
Phaedrus reveals the source to us at the very end of the dialogue
when, in response to Socrates' command to tell his friend Lysias
about true rhetoric, Phaedrus commands Socrates to tell his friend
too. Socrates asks coyly who this is, and Phaedrus replies: "The
beautiful Isocrates" (278e). Isocrates has not been named at all before
this; and his mention at the close of the dialogue may surprise the
reader. Isocrates has, however, been very much present throughout
the dialogue; and the first allusion to him is in the way Socrates
describes the source of his first speech.
Socrates delivers his speech, covered up "in shame," as he says.
The pose is appropriate because he is hiding behind Isocrates, whose
message is shameful. But Socrates also arranges very carefully that
he has nothing, really, to be ashamed of. In the first place, he
announces at the very beginning that the speech is addressed to a
"boy, or rather youngster {neipaKicrKoq), very beautiful" (237b) by one
the Helen (15) Isocrates announces that he will leave aside everything that others
have said. This has led Howland to suggest that in demanding the right to use some
of his rival's arguments Socrates in fact attacks Isocrates, by showing that his straining
for novelty is absurd (p. 154 of the article cited in note 8). 1 suggest that in the Helen
Isocrates is demonstrating that he can do what he normally chooses not to do. Plato
parodies Isocrates by having Phaedrus attempt to impose the conditions of the Helen
on Socrates, who is imitating Isocrates, and then having Socrates respond, appro-
priately, with an Isocratean position.
I suspect that there is another allusion to Isocrates, in particular the Panegyricus
(which was read at the hundredth Olympic festival in 380 B.C.), when Phaedrus
accepts Socrates' terms with the extravagant promise that if Socrates can outdo Lysias
on these terms he will set up a statue of Socrates at Olympia (236b). Phaedrus here
exalts Socrates to the rank of the famous rhetoricians who composed for the Olympic
festival, among them Gorgias, Lysias, and— most exalted— Isocrates.
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of his many lovers, who cleverly pretends not to be in love with him.
The speech is, therefore, an exercise in the professional rhetorician's
pseudo-art of deception. Socrates denounces this type of exercise
later in the dialectical discussion, when he points out that some
rhetoricians maintain that there is no need to know the truth, since
arguments from likelihood (ekoi;) are more convincing than the truth
(272d-74a). But Socrates differs from the ordinary rhetorician in
announcing his subterfuge at the outset. By using this stratagem, he
not only guards against the charge of deceiving his listener, but also
suggests that Lysias' speech is in fact a piece of deception perpetrated
by a lover who pretends not to be one.
Socrates invokes the "boy" at the beginning of his speech (237b)
and refers to him again later by saying that "we must return to the
boy" (238d). The same "boy" is invoked by Socrates at the beginning
of his second speech, the recantation. Socrates now asks where the
boy is to whom his previous speech was addressed, and Phaedrus
answers: "Here he is, next to you, always very close, whenever you
want him" (243e). The beautiful boy to whom Socrates addresses
both his speeches is none other than Phaedrus. He is listener and
addressee at once. Hence Socrates has another, subtler defense against
the charge of deception: he cannot be accused of deceiving the "boy"
of his first speech, because he is the very person he warns against
the deception. As the exchange at the beginning of the recantation
tells us, Socrates has succeeded in attracting Phaedrus' love. He has
done so in the manner of a genuine rhetorician by adjusting his
words to the soul of his listener: he has impressed Phaedrus by
constructing a speech which is on the surface no less ingeniously
deceptive than that of Lysias, but which is in fact designed to be
truthful.
Furthermore, Socrates bases all the arguments of his first speech
on a definition of love as an irrational desire for the enjoyment of
bodily beauty In his recantation later on, Socrates shows that the
definition is misguided: it defines a left-handed, perverse type of love,
as opposed to a right-handed, genuine love. Hence all his arguments
showing that a lover is harmful to his beloved are unsound. But to
the extent that the definition applies to an attitude commonly called
"love," the arguments are sound. Socrates is truthful in arguing: if
love is a certain irrational desire, then it is harmful to associate with
a lover. Because all of the speech hinges on an explicit definition of
love, and this definition corresponds to a certain attitude that passes
as "love," even though it does not state the truth about love, Socrates
is not in fact deceiving his listener.
Socrates deliberately does not give Phaedrus a chance to applaud
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his speech. He stops the speech abruptly at mid-point, after completing
his arguments against the lover and before adding any arguments in
favor of the non-lover. Socrates explains to the bewildered Phaedrus
that if he goes on, he will surely be possessed by the nymphs to
whom Phaedrus threw him (24 le). He feigns madness of the left-
handed kind, as he will make clear later, in order to let himself be
swayed subsequently by a prophetic power that exemplifies a right-
handed, or divine, kind of madness (242c).
Prevented by his inner voice from crossing the river, Socrates
undertakes to purify himself by a speech of recantation. This new
speech not only subverts, but also complements the preceding speech.
We expected a praise of the non-lover; but Socrates now offers a
praise of the genuine lover to balance the previous condemnation of
the debased lover. The new speech complements the other by showing
that there is a genuine type of love, the love of soul and of truth, as
opposed to the fake love that is directed at another's body. The two
speeches together show that the latter type of love is to be shunned,
the former to be pursued. The speeches thus form a carefully
constructed progression, in which the first speech turns out to be a
fragment that is completed and given new meaning by the second.
In his recantation, Socrates continues to aim his remarks at
Phaedrus, invoking him at intervals as "beautiful boy" or "boy"
(243e, 252b, 256e). Again he adjusts both content and style to
Phaedrus. He now uses myth to turn Phaedrus from falsehood to
truth; and he acknowledges his rhetorical strategy ironically at the
end by excusing himself to Eros for the "poetic expressions" which
Phaedrus forced on him (257a). The use of myth is intended to lift
Phaedrus' awareness from the narrow focus on human selfishness in
the Isocratean speech to a new cosmic vision, in which humans aim
to recover a divine condition of knowledge through love of another.
Socrates now shows Phaedrus that reason is the guiding faculty of
the human soul and that genuine philosophy is a search for divine
enlightenment.
In this praise of love, which turns out to be a praise of the love
of wisdom, philosophy, Socrates not only practices genuine rhetorical
psychogogia, but also makes psychagogia the subject of his discourse.
He shows that the lover guides the soul of another toward its former
divine condition and thereby guides and finds himself. The genuine
rhetorician, we will learn later, has the same aim as the lover; and
ultimately genuine rhetoric and genuine love will appear as one.
Socrates later describes his speech as a playful "mythic hymn"
which "perhaps" touches upon the truth and is not "altogether
unconvincing," and which honors "with measure and pious speech
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(nerpiuq re kol ev<i)rjij.(t)q) my master and yours, o Phaedrus, Eros, the
guardian of beautiful boys" (265b-c). Not only is the content of the
myth clearly anti-Isocratean, but Socrates sums up the difference
between his and Isocrates' rhetoric by the phrase "with measure and
pious speech." As we saw earlier, Isocrates demanded in Against the
Sophists that the rhetorician speak "rhythmically and musically"
{evpvdiiuic, Kal novaLKooq), and he took pride in his use of poetic rhythms.
In his previous parody of Isocrates, Socrates drew attention to the
use of poetic measures. In his new speech, Socrates replaces the
measures of poetry with genuine measure— the measure of truth
and piety. The phrase utTploic, re /cat
€V(t)r}fx(t)q serves as a signal that
Socrates is replacing Isocratean rhetoric with a rhetoric of truth. As
Socrates later states explicitly, this new rhetoric aims at pleasing the
gods, not humans (273e).
The succession of three speeches thus constitutes a transition from
Lysianic to Isocratean rhetoric and then to a new rhetoric that
repudiates both of these kinds. When Socrates finishes his recantation,
he has won over Phaedrus to the new rhetoric. Phaedrus joins
enthusiastically in Socrates' prayer that Lysias should abandon his
kind of rhetoric and turn to philosophy and that he, Phaedrus, should
devote himself entirely to the love that is accompanied by philosophy;
and he abandons Lysias as vulgar (TaireLvoc,, 257c). But Phaedrus has
little understanding of what the new love entails. Nor indeed is
Socrates' unfolding of a new rhetoric complete at this point. Socrates'
speech of recantation is itself a fragment: it must be followed by
dialectical discussion if it is to count as a contribution to genuine
rhetoric. Myth is but a step toward understanding: it needs to be
complemented by rational, dialectical examination if it is to be part
of a genuine philosophical search.
Socrates therefore detains Phaedrus in the sacred grove while he
teaches him by example and precept at once what genuine rhetoric
is. The issue raised by Lysias' manuscript at the beginning of the
dialogue is: how does one write well? Socrates tackles it by asking
the prior question: how does one speak well? As a prelude to the
discussion, Socrates invokes certain "noble creatures"—arguments—
to come "and persuade the beautiful boy Phaedrus {KaXXiirmda re
^albpov irddeTe) that unless he philosophizes adequately, he will never
be an adequate speaker about anything" (261a). In his reference to
Phaedrus, Socrates makes clear that the new section of discourse,
like his preceding two speeches, is aimed directly at Phaedrus.
Moreover, the juxtaposition of "beautiful boy" and "Phaedrus," with
the pun iraid- . . . ^aiS-, indicates that Phaedrus is identical with the
beautiful "boy" who has kept reappearing throughout the dialogue.
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The name "Phaedrus" signifies "bright" and "boy": Phaedrus is the
bright boy, the beautiful boy, who has attracted Socrates all along
and who, we may assume, attracted Lysias.'^ The beautiful boy appears
for a final time at the very end of the dialogue. Here Socrates prays
that he may become beautiful inside, and Phaedrus joins in this
prayer. The beautiful boy Phaedrus is to become beautiful in soul,
along with his dialectical associate and teacher, the lover of his soul
and of wisdom in general, Socrates.
We have already touched on some of the arguments of the dialectical
section. Appropriately, Socrates begins his argument with a definition
'^ The same pun, with the same identification of "beautiful boy" with "Phaedrus,"
occurs again at 265c: ..." Epwra, l) ^atdpt, KaXwv iraldwv ((popov. Paul Plass rightly
notes that KaXKiiraic, echoes the vocatives of KaXb(; irai; of Socrates' recantation (p. 37
of the article cited in note 1); in my view, the term echoes all references to "beautiful
boy" throughout the Phaedrus.
Some scholars have held that Phaedrus was too old at the dramatic date of the
dialogue to qualify as the "boy" of Socrates' two speeches. L. Parmentier argued
that since Phaedrus, who appears in the Protagoras (315c) as a disciple of Hippias,
must already have been about eighteen in 432 B.C., the dramatic date of the Protagoras,
and since the dramatic date of the Phaedrus is about 410 B.C., Phaedrus could no
longer have been young in the Phaedrus ("L'Age de Phedre dans le dialogue de
Platon," Bulleti7i de I'Associatmi Guillaume Bud'e 10 (1926), 8-21). G.J. de Vries agrees
with Parmentier that Phaedrus was not a young man in the Phaedrus, although he
thinks Plato had no precise dramatic date in mind {A Commentary on the Phaedrus of
Plato, Amsterdam 1969, pp. 6-7). R. Hackforth, who suggests a dramatic date early
in the period 411-404 B.C., thinks that Phaedrus would be about. forty {Plato's
Phaedrus, translation and commentary, Cambridge 1952, p. 8). De Vries and Hackforth
agree that such a mature age would not prevent Socrates from addressing Phaedrus
as "boy" (iral, 267c) and "young man" {veavia, 257c); and they explain Phaedrus'
response to Socrates at 243e as a "fiction" (de Vries, p. 113) and as something
"playful" (Hackforth, p. 53, n. 1). They also assign to/caXXi7rai6a(261a) the implausible
sense of "begetter of beautiful discourses" (De Vries, p. 202; Hackforth, p. 121).
This sense was suggested by the Neoplatonist Hermeias as an alternative to the
straightforward meaning "beautiful boy" (p. 223 of the edition cited in note 1).
As for the dramatic date of the Phaedrus, K. J. Dover has argued persuasively for
the period 418-16 B.C. {Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum, Berkeley 1968, pp. 41-43).
This brings the dramatic date of the Phaedrus close to that of the Syynposium, about
416 B.C. In this dialogue Agathon is depicted as a beautiful young man {viov at 175e,
HiipaKiM at 223a), whose charms are irresistible to Socrates and Alcibiades. The same
Agathon is presented in the Protagoras as "still a young lad" {viop tl Itl tiupocKiov) and
beautiful (315d). E. Zeller pointed out that there is a slight anachronism between
the description of Agathon in the Protagoras (about 432 B.C.) as still young and the
description of him in the Symposium as young (Uber die Anachronismen in den platonischen
Gesprachen, Berlin 1873, p. 86). There is an analogous anachronism, I suggest,
concerning Phaedrus. Since Socrates calls him "boy" (267c), "young man" (257c),
and "beautiful boy" (261a), we must suppose that he is a young person in the
Phaedrus. Phaedrus is also a young person in the Protagoras: his youth, it appears, is
just as lasting as the beautiful Agathon's.
I
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of rhetoric. He will specify later that any discussion that is to be
orderly must begin with a definition. As previously discussed, Socrates
offers a new definition of rhetoric as a "psychagogia in words" that
occurs both in public and in private (261a-b). The shift from public
to private rhetoric, we now recognize, reflects a new concern with
Isocratean rhetoric, whose primary aim is not to influence the public,
but to educate individuals through private communication. The threat
perceived by Plato is no longer Gorgianic demagoguery, but Isocratean
"philosophy." That is why Socrates undertakes to show Phaedrus
how one must practice genuine philosophy.
Although Plato does not mention Isocrates by name until the very
end of the dialogue, all of the demands stated by him in the dialectical
section imply a reform of Isocratean rhetoric. In the first place,
Socrates argues that since a rhetorician must know the truth in order
to be skillful at leading a person from one belief to its opposite, the
person who "hunts out opinions" (262c) will not possess a genuine
art of rhetoric. Isocrates maintained that the rhetorician requires
appropriate opinions, not knowledge; and Socrates previously ex-
emplified this point of view in his first speech.'*^ Socrates now responds
directly to Isocrates: given that the skilled rhetorician is able to make
the listener believe anything at all, the rhetorician must know the
truth, and not be content with plausible opinions.
Next, Socrates takes Isocrates' demand for an initial definition of
the subject matter and transforms it into a demand for dialectical
knowledge." The rhetorician, it now turns out, must have the
dialectical ability both to gather instances into a single form (idea)
'® See especially Against the Sophists 8, where Isocrates claims that those who rely
on "opinions" are more successful than those who profess to have "knowledge," and
Helen 5, where he claims that "it is much better to have suitable opinions about what
is useful than to have accurate knowledge about what is useless."
" There is a strong verbal similarity between the way in which Socrates sets out
the requirement for definition in the Phaedrus and the way Isocrates proposes to
define the function of a king in To Nicocles (dated about 374-72 B.C.). Isocrates writes:
"First we must investigate what is the function of kings; for if we encompass
(jipika^wtitv) the force {bvvatixv) of the whole matter in a summary, we shall speak
better about the parts by looking toward {airo0\i-KOVT%) this. I think that all men
would agree (b^oXoyfiaai) . . ." {To Nicocles 9; cf. 2, where the term bpiaai. is used).
Similarly Socrates uses the expressions bvvaniv, bfioXoyia Oitiivoi Spov, and airo^Xt-Kovnc,
in defining love in his first speech (237c-d) and later uses irepiXaix^6a>(ii> (273e). Late
in his life, Isocrates again uses the terms awofiXiiroi'Tic, {On the Peace 18) and iripiXa^ufiev
{Antidosis 217) with reference to initial definition. This similarity, together with other
similarities between the Phaedrus and To Nicocles (see notes 13 and 14), suggests that
Plato had in mind To Nicocles (along with earlier speeches) when composing the
Phaedrus. This view is in accord with the date now generally assigned to the
composition of the Phaedrus. Whereas most scholars of the nineteenth century assumed
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and to divide forms into types (262c-66d). Socrates illustrates this
transformation in his sequence of two speeches. In his first speech,
he uses Isocratean definition to delineate a perverse type of love and
to construct an example of perverse rhetoric. In the recantation,
Socrates uses dialectical skill to propose that genuine love is a type
of divine madness and to suggest that genuine rhetoric is a search
for truth. As Socrates himself points out (265c), it was dialectical skill
(for which he disclaims credit) that enabled Socrates to pass from a
condemnation to a praise of love. Like the pseudo-rhetorician, Soc-
rates moves from one position to its opposite; but unlike the pseudo-
rhetorician, he guides the listener from falsehood to truth.
The third main departure from Isocratean rhetoric consists in
Socrates' demand that the rhetorician must have a knowledge of soul
in general and of the soul of the listener in particular. This departure
is an added precision, based on the preceding two reforms. Here,
the initial Isocratean position is unmistakable. In Against the Sophists
Isocrates criticized his fellow rhetoricians for thinking that the whole
of rhetoric consists in a knowledge of its components, the types of
discourse, without there being any need for the ability to combine
them. Isocrates claims that "it is not very difficult to know the forms
(tSecoj^) out of which we make and compose all speches" (16). Then
he sums up his teaching about rhetoric:
But it requires much care and is the job of a manly soul that has
opinions {\(/vxri<i ocvdptKriq Kot do^acTLKTiq) to choose the forms that are
necessary for each subject and to mix them with one another and to
arrange them properly, and, further, not to miss the right opportunities
(fcmpoji/) but to elaborate the whole speech fittingly {irpeTrovTuq) with
thoughts and to speak rhythmically and musically {evpvdixwc, koI p,ovaiKU}<;)
in the choice of words (16-17).
After summarizing the duties of both student and teacher, Isocrates
concludes:
an early date (relying in part on Diogenes Laertius' report of a tradition that the
Phaedrus was Plato's first dialogue, 3. 38; and on the view of Olympiodorus, in the
sixth century ad., that it was first, Vita Platonis 3), Leon Robin {La Theorie platonicienne
de VAmour, Paris 1 908) and Hans von Arnim {Platosjugeyiddialoge und die Entstehungszeit
des Phaidros, Leipzig 1914) showed that its date of composition must be later than
the Republic. Hackforth dates the Phaedrus close to the Parmenides and Theaetetus,
with the conjecture that it was composed about 370 B.C. (pp. 4-7 of the edition cited
in note 15); and de Vries dates it a few years later, also close to the Theaetetus (pp.
7-11 of the commentary cited in note 15). I am inclined to agree with W. K. C.
Guthrie that it is "much more in the spirit of the middle group than of the Sophist"
{A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, p. 397); a date of about 374-370
B.C. seems to me appropriate.
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When all these requirements coincide, those who practice philosophy
will attain perfection. But to the extent that they fall short of anything
that has been said, those who approach it will be inferior.'*
It is not enough for a rhetorician, according to Isocrates, to know
the types of discourse. Instead, the essential features of good rhetoric
are: an orderly arrangement of types of speech; a recognition of the
right opportunity; fitting opinions; and harmonious expression.
Similarly to Isocrates, Socrates criticizes the writers of rhetorical
hand-books for teaching only the "preliminaries" of the art in teaching
just the components (268a-69c). He then goes on to draw out the
implication, which Isocrates never contemplated, that the genuine
rhetorician must know the various types of soul, as well as recognize
particular souls, in order to be able to know what type of speech is
suitable for a particular person (269d-72b). He sums up his teaching
about rhetoric as follows. Since the function of speech is psychagogia
(271c), the speaker must first know the types of soul and the
corresponding types of discourse, then observe both souls and speeches
and learn to recognize particular souls as requiring particular types
of discourse. When one has learned all this, and in addition recognizes
the right occasions (Kaipovq) for speaking and keeping silent, then
the art is beautifully and completely perfected, but not before. But if
anyone falls short of any of this in speaking or teaching or writing,
though claiming to speak with art, the person who is not persuaded
is the winner.'^
This summary, which hinges on the definition of rhetoric as
psychagogia, is a counterproposal to Isocrates' statement in Against the
Sophists. Plato knew this statement well. He first parodied it in the
Gorgias, when Socrates claims that contemporary rhetoric is not an
art {rex^t]), but flattery practiced by a "conjecturing and manly soul"
{\pvxfiq . . . oToxoccFTLKfiq Kal avdpeiaq, 463a). ^° In the Phaedrus Plato
'* Agaiyist the Sophists 16—18: to 5e tovt<j3v €</>' iKCxaTU) tuu irpayfiSiTwv aq 5« irpoiXeaOai
Kal iju^ai Trpoi; aXA^Xa? kol ra^ai Kara rpoirov, in hi twv Kaipibv firi bianapruv, aXKa Koi rdtq
ivdviir/naai TTpeTroi/Twq SXou rov \6yov KarairoiKiXai Koi rotq ovofiaaiv ejpvdfiwq koi hovoikCx,
aireli>, ravra 51 iroXXfic, iirifitXeiac, 5(t<T$ai Kal ^^x^*; otudpiKric, koI 6o|affTiK^ (pyov uvai. . . . Koi
TOVTwv piv airavTwv avpntiawTdiv TtXttwc, ?^ovaiv oi 4>i\o(TO<t)OWTfq- Kad' o d' av iWaipd^ ti tCiv
apr]fi(v(i)v, avajKri Taxntf x^pov biaKiurdai roiiq itXtjaia^ovTaq. Isocrates offers a briefsummary
of his main requirements at Panegyricus 9. He also stresses the importance of right
combination and right occasion at Helen 1 1
.
'^ Phaedrus 272b: . . . KaXw<; n koi rtXiwc, iarlv r\ rex"! ocirapyaanivri, irpbrtpov 8' ov.
aXX' S Ti au ocvtwu tic, iXXeiirr) X67a;/' ^ 8i5aaKwv fi ypoupuv, (py 8i rtx"!? Xeyav, b prj traddp-iixx;
KpaTtt.
^° W. H. Thompson points out this parody in his edition, The Phaedrus of Plato,
London 1868, reprinted New York 1973, p. 174.
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responds to Isocrates' statement in detail. In place of Isocrates'
evpvdnCoq Kal ixovaLKcbq, he puts nerpicoq re Kal eixprjfiooq, as we have seen.
In place of opinions, he puts knowledge. He transforms the require-
ment for orderliness and combinatorial skill into a requirement for
dialectical analysis and a knowledge of soul. A "fitting" speech thus
becomes a discourse adapted to teaching another the truth. Socrates
pointedly keeps the important Isocratean requirement for "right
occasion," Katpoc,, but transforms it into a requirement for knowing
when to use words of a particular sort to a particular person. Finally,
Socrates takes direct aim at Isocrates in his concluding statement.
Isocrates made the tautological claim that deficient rhetoricians are
inferior. Using words that carefully balance Isocrates' wording, Soc-
rates responds with the pointedly meaningful remark that the pseudo-
rhetorician's opponent is superior. Socrates here denies that Isocrates
has a genuine art of rhetoric and claims the superiority of his demands
to those of Isocrates.^'
Socrates has been shown throughout the dialogue as striving for
a "perfect" rhetoric that is opposed to Isocrates'. From the beginning,
he has demonstrated an insight into Phaedrus' soul. Moreover, he is
clearly engaged in a search for knowledge of the soul in general and,
most importantly, of his own soul. In his recantation, he presents a
general theory of soul in mythic form; and he announces right at
the beginning of the dialogue that he is still searching to know himself,
as he investigates whether or not he is a beast "more complex than
Typhon" (230a). As for knowing when to speak and when to be
silent, surely Socrates has shown this ability all along.
After setting out his requirements for a genuine rhetoric, Socrates
returns to the problem with which the discussion began: how does
one write well (274b)? He argues that the real value of writing lies
in words "written" in the soul for the sake of instruction (278a).
These are words of truth planted in the soul like seeds, which are to
bear fruit and sow seeds in turn in other souls (276e-77a). Socrates
condemns writing that is used to freeze a discourse into an object of
unthinking memorization.
^' Howland points out the correspondence between Isocrates' and Socrates'
conclusions at p. 158 of the article cited in note 8. He also points out the similarity
between Isocrates' requirements for the student and Socrates' demands at 269d.
Hartmut Erbse discusses this latter correspondence in pp. 330-36 of "Platons Urteil
uber Isokrates" {Hermes 99 [1971], 183-97), reprinted in Isokrates, edited by F. Seek,
Darmstadt 1976, pp. 329-52. Plato also appears to subvert Isocrates' notion of
"fitting" in the Euthydemus, where Socrates criticizes at length a rhetorician whom
he does not name, but who cannot be anyone but Isocrates. Socrates here attributes
to his opponent "ejirpiireiav rather than truth" (305e).
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This final discussion balances the initial scene of the dialogue,
where we saw Phaedrus mindlessly and laboriously memorizing a
written speech by Lysias. But more than that, it serves as a final
condemnation of Isocrates. More than any other rhetorician, Isocrates
relied on written discourse. He was notorious for not speaking in
public, but writing discourses to be read in public; and he instructed
his pupils by having them memorize and imitate his written compo-
sitions. In clear contrast with Isocratean teaching, Socrates has been
instructing his pupil, Phaedrus, by involving him in discussion. He
ends the discussion, moreover, with a final example ofproper teaching:
he asks Phaedrus to convey what he has heard to Lysias (278e).
Phaedrus is to foster the seeds of truth planted in him by planting
similar seeds in another soul.
We might expect the dialogue to end here; but there is unfinished
business. So far, Socrates has overtly opposed only Lysias in particular
and contemporary rhetoricians in general. There has been no mention
of Isocrates, who, it has been argued, is the primary target of Socrates'
criticism. Plato has put a puzzle to the reader, sowing clues throughout
the dialogue. It is now time to reveal the mystery. The astute Phaedrus
has figured it out. He divulges his discovery at last, when Socrates
asks him to inform Lysias about genuine rhetoric. Putting his discovery
as a puzzle in turn, he asks Socrates to inform his friend too. Socrates
continues the game by asking "who?"; and Phaedrus tells: "The
beautiful Isocrates."
Socrates' ensuing comparison between Lysias and Isocrates has
provoked much controversy. Some consider his remarks about Iso-
crates a bitterly sarcastic denunciation of the rhetorician; others
regard it as high praise, or at least as praise tinged with regret. ^^
^^ Erbse argues (in the article cited in the preceding note) that although there
are similarities between Plato's and Isocrates' views of rhetoric (including a similarity
in their demands for the correct combination of types of discourse), Plato's require-
ments are basically different; hence Plato does not praise Isocrates without qualifi-
cation, as many have thought. He suggests instead that Plato has sincere praise for
Isocrates as genuinely superior to other rhetoricians, and that Plato honestly regrets
that Isocrates did not rise to greater heights. By contrast, Howland, who considers
the "whole dialogue ... primarily ... a direct and comprehensive attack on the
educational system of Isocrates," takes Plato's evaluation as expressing "the most
comprehensive damnation with the faintest possible praise" (pp. 152 and 159 of
article cited in note 8). De Vries takes Plato's evaluation as a "bitter taunt" and
"mordant sarcasm" (pp. 18 and 264 of his commentary, cited in note 15; see also
his reply to Erbse, "Isocrates in the Phaedrus: a reply," Mnemosyne 24 [1 97 1], 387-90).
Similarly, James Coulter considers the remarks an insult showing "outrageous con-
descension" {"Phaedrus 279A: The Praise of Isocrates," Greek, Roman and Byzantine
Studies 8 [1967], 225-36, p. 233).
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Socrates notes that Isocrates is "still young," but that he will venture
a prophecy. Since Isocrates has a "nobler nature" than Lysias, Socrates
says, he would not be surprised if Isocrates would with advancing
years far surpass all other rhetoricians in the type of discourse that
he is attempting "now"; and "if this is not sufficient for him, [he
would not be surprised if] some more divine impulse {opixi] dewrepa)
were to lead him to greater things, for by nature there is a certain
philosophy in the disposition of the man."^^
What is the distinction between the speeches that Isocrates is
"now" attempting and the "greater" things that he might accomplish?
I suggest that the distinction lies within the dialogue, not in any
external historical circumstances. "Now" is the present, fictional time
of the dialogue; and the type of speech that Isocrates is attempting
"now" is the kind of psychagogia that Socrates practices (on the
surface) in his first speech. Socrates praises "divine philosophy" {deioc
<t)i\o(TO<i>ia, 239b) in this speech. But this "divine" philosophy, we
learn in the recantation, has nothing divine about it. In the recantation
and dialectical examination Socrates shows what a truly "divine"
impulse is, and what truly "divine" philosophy is. The "more divine
impulse" that Socrates hypothesizes is precisely the leap from the
vulgar "philosophy" of his first speech to the genuine philosophy of
the recantation and dialectical discussion.
Socrates leaves it open whether the "young" Isocrates will take
this leap. But the reader knows that Isocrates has not taken it, since
Plato composed the dialogue when Isocrates was over sixty years
old.^^ Plato, I suggest, judged Isocrates superior to Lysias in precisely
the way that the second speech of the dialogue is superior to the
first. But this superiority, Plato indicates, is worth nothing. Indeed it
is a liability. Despite its greater orderliness and smoother rhythms,
Isocratean rhetoric is still a pseudo-rhetoric, dealing in deception;
and because it is more effective, it can do more harm. Isocratean
rhetoric holds out a promise of better things. But the promise
unfulfilled is a far greater danger than Lysianic rhetoric ever was.
The University of Chicago
^' Phaedrus 279a-b: ... en rt «' ovtw fir) airoxpvaai ravra, fVi nu^w dt tu; ocvtw ayoi
bpfiri daoripa- (l>vau yap, i <t>iX(, evtari tic, <l)iXo(TO(f>ia ry tov avdpbq biavoia.





Jaakko Hintikka's influential paper, "On the Ingredients of an Aris-
totelian Science,"' suggests an interesting experiment. We should
select a bright and promising graduate student in philosophy who
has never read any Aristotle. We should then give our student
Aristotle's Prior Analytics for close study, add a little extra coaching
on "the role of existential presuppositions in syllogistic premisses"
(55), drop the hint that "syllogisms are the universal tool of any
systematic science" {ibid.) and then ask our student to predict "the
ingredients of an Aristotelian science." If what Hintikka tells us in
his paper is right, we could reasonably expect from such a student a
moderately accurate sketch of the Posterior Analytics}
Clearly any student who followed those instructions and produced
the sketch of the Posterior Analytics Hintikka himself offers in his paper
would deserve an "A"; for Hintikka's result is indeed what the student
in our experiment should have projected. But do the constraints of
the experiment fit the real Aristotle? Does the outline of an Aristo-
telian science that emerges in the Posterior Analytics actually conform
to the Hintikka projection? I think the answer to both questions is
"No."
' Nous 6 (1972), 55-69. Simple page references refer to this article. Line references
are, of course, to Aristotle.
^ ".
. . Aristotle's syllogistic theory, together with his belief that syllogisms are
the universal tool of any systematic science, naturally led him to a specific view of
the ingredients of a science. One is almost tempted to say that Aristotle's views on
the first principles of a science are predictable on the basis of his syllogistic theory,
including his ideas of the role of existential presuppositions in syllogistic premisses"
(55).
174 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
Hintikka is right to link the notion of demonstration in Aristotle
with that of explanation. Here there is an interesting parallel between
Aristotle and a modern proponent of the deductive-nomological
model of explanation, such as Carl G. Hempel. Just as for the modern
deductivist there is a certain symmetry between explanation and
prediction, so, for Aristotle, there is a symmetry between explanation
(giving the cause) and demonstration. On the modern deductivist's
view, to explain an event one must come up with a law, or lawlike
generalization, from which, together with appropriate initial condi-
tions, that event could have been predicted.^ What explains a given
phenomenon, on this view, is precisely what could have been used to
predict that the phenomenon would occur. On Aristotle's view, to
explain why every C is an A one must produce appropriate premises
from which that conclusion can be demonstrated. "Demonstration"
(aTTodei^Lq) Aristotle says, "is syllogism that can show the cause"
{deiKTiKoq aiTLaq) (85b22). So what explains the fact that p is, on this
view, precisely what can be used to demonstrate the fact that p.
What count as appropriate premises for demonstrating that every
C is an A, and hence for explaining why this is so? According to
Hintikka they are basically the universal, affirmative, categorical
propositions that link the species, C, to the genus. A, through the
mediation of some intermediate genus, B (57, 59).
There may, of course, be more than one intermediate genus, so
long as successive intermediates are nested in order of what they
encompass. Thus suppose the following propositions true:
Every C is a Bg.
Every B2 is a B,.
Every B, is an A.
Suppose further that the terms, "C," "B2," "B,," "A," constitute
what Solmsen has called an ''Eidoskette'';'* that is, suppose they are
nested in such a way that the comprehension of each (1) includes the
comprehension of all its predecessors but (2) is narrower than the
comprehension of each of its successors. The series, "isosceles,"
' Cf. Carl B. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1966).
pp. 48-50.
''
"The syllogism originated out of "Eidosketten," i.e., ideas arranged along a chain
in the order of decreasing extension, their normal relation being that of genus,
species, inferior species, etc. Chains of this kind had been worked out and theorized
upon by Plato and his pupils in the Academy, in connection especially with their
favorite method, the diaeresis" (Friedrich Solmsen, "The Discovery of the Syllogism,"
Philosophical Reinew 50 [1941], 410).
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"triangle," "rectilinear," "(plane) figure," may serve as an example
of such a chain.
Now the question,
Why is every C an A?
can be given this answer:
Because every C is a B2 and every B2 is an A.
Or this answer:
Because every C is a B, and every B, is an A.
I shall call the concept of explanation illustrated by these answers
the "mediating concept of explanation." The intermediate genus
locates the species within the genus by mediation.
What can be said for the mediating concept of explanation? Well,
we sometimes put it to work. Suppose a library catalogued on the
Dewey decimal system has its 1 00s on the first floor and its 900s on
the third. To an expression of puzzlement that Ralph Barton Perry's
The Thought and Character of William James is on the third floor, not
on the first, the librarian might explain, "A book devoted to the life
of a single philosopher will be on the third floor, because it's
biography." Or again, to a pupil puzzled over how it is that whales
are warm-blooded creatures we might point out that whales are, after
all, mammals and, of course, mammals are warm-blooded creatures.
Hintikka tells us that Aristotle "reduces all syllogisms to those of
the first figure" (57) and that the alleged "superiority [of the first
figure] is somehow due to the fact that syllogisms in the first figure
turn directly on the transitivity of class-inclusion" (ibid.). "Accordingly,
he says, "Aristotelian explanation will operate by making class-
inclusions clear through [the] transitivity of this relation, that is, by
inserting intermediate terms between the ones whose connection is
to be explained" (ibid.). No doubt the story about the first figure and
its importance to Aristotle is really somewhat more complicated than
this. But we can at least agree on a main point: what Aristotle's
syllogistic prepares us for is the idea of constructing explanations by
the insertion of terms intermediate between the comprehensions of
the "ones whose connection is to be explained." That is what our
mythical "A" student should anticipate from a careful study of the
Prior Analytics— namely, an account of science based on the mediating
concept of explanation.
What we actually find in the Posterior Analytics is something quite
different. To be sure, certain passages do suggest that Aristotle has
the mediating concept of explanation in mind. Thus, for example,
Aristotle says at 84a36-37, in a passage Hintikka cites, "It is by
adding a term internally, not externally, that a proposition is dem-
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onstrated." Even more striking is the schematic example near the
end of B17 (99a30-99b3); it certainly seems to presuppose the
mediating concept.
Yet to conclude from passages like these that it is the mediating
concept of explanation that Aristotle wants to build science on would
be a mistake. In fact Aristotle makes a special point in the Posterior
Analytics of rejecting the mediating concept. One could say that his
reason for rejecting it is that the mediating concept assures us only
of a sufficient condition for C's being A's, whereas what Aristotle is
really after in science is something much, much stronger.
For convenience's sake let us suppose that all Aristotelian dem-
onstrations can be cast in the form of the Barbara syllogism:
Every B is an A.
Every C is a B.
Every C is an A.
Thus one asks, "Why is every C an A?" and the answer is, "Because
every C is a B and every B is an A."
What Aristotle does in the Posterior Analytics is to place stringent
conditions on what can function as middle and major terms in a
scientific demonstration, conditions unanticipated in the Prior Ana-
lytics, and to some extent out of keeping with that work. For one
thing, the attribute expressed by the major term must be essential,
or per se {Kad' avra— A4), to the subject expressed by the middle.
Much more surprising from the perspective of the Prior Analytics,
and hence much more interesting for present purposes, is the re-
quirement that the major term be (as Mure renders ''katholou" in
the Oxford translation of the Posterior Analytics) "commensurately
universal" with the middle. This requirement is introduced and
explained at A4-5, argued for in A24, and referred to here and
there pretty much throughout the Posterior Analytics.
What the English expression "commensurately universal" brings
out most clearly is the extensional force of the requirement that
Aristotle has in mind. That is, what it best suggests is simply that the
major and middle terms must be coextensive, that they must be
"reciprocals" {ra avTL<TTp((f)ovTa), as Aristotle sometimes puts it (78a27,
84a24).
The additional force of the requirement Aristotle is interested in
is perhaps better put by saying that, if it is really because of being
B's that C's are A's, then it must be qua B that a thing is A (73b27,
74a35, 75b36. etc.); or again, B must be the first subject of A (73b39,
74a 12, 74a38, etc.). I shall call this requirement the "first-subject
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requirement" and the concept of explanation to which it leads the
"first-subject concept of explanation." But I should add the warning
that typically in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle uses "'katholou' ("com-
mensurately universal") to introduce in its full force what I am calling
the "first-subject requirement."
An example may help make the concept clearer. At the end of
Posterior Analytics A5 Aristotle considers why the brazen isosceles is
a figure with interior angles adding up to two right angles, or, as we
might say more simply, a 180° figure. Using the mediating concept
of explanation we might come up with the answer that the brazen
isosceles is, after all, an isosceles, and every isosceles is a 180° figure.
But Aristotle rejects that. His complaint is that other things besides
the isosceles have angles adding up to 180°. Isosceles is not the first
subject of 180° figure; triangle is. Equivalently, it is not qua isosceles,
but qua triangle, that the brazen isosceles is a 180° figure. So to
demonstrate that the brazen isosceles is a 180° figure, or to explain
why this is so, it is not enough to link brazen isosceles to 180° figure
by means of the mediating term, isosceles. Mere mediation does not
demonstrate, or explain. One needs to find the first subject of 180°
figure, which, according to Aristotle, is triangle. Thus it is by being
a triangle, he thinks, that the brazen isosceles is made to be a 180°
figure.
It would be understating things to say that Aristotle's theory of
the syllogism does not prepare us for this first-subject requirement.
Consider just the coextensional import of the requirement alone. In
at least one passage in the Prior Analytics (46a39 f.) Aristotle insists
that, in an affirmative syllogistic demonstration, the major term will
always have a comprehension greater than that of the middle. What
this passage brings out is the great importance to Aristotle's conception
of the syllogism that the idea of an Eidoskette has. In fact, of course,
there is no good reason to limit the application of syllogistic reasoning
to arguments made up of nested terms of ever increasing compre-
hension. A Barbara syllogism with convertible major and middle
terms is best viewed as a special case of Barbara— no more and no
less valid than Barbaras made up of terms that yield a bona fide
Eidoskette. But when the Aristotle of the Prior Analytics is willing to
do that (for example, in B5 or B22), it is by way of a concession,
and certainly not by way of constructing an ideal case.
So we have two quite different notions of explanation— the me-
diating concept and the first-subject concept. The first arises naturally
out of Aristotle's syllogistic; the second makes its appearance, unfore-
shadowed, in the Posterior Aiialytics.
No doubt Aristotle's interest in the first-subject style of explanation
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has something to do with his interest in eliminating competition
among putative causes of one and the same thing. To be sure,
Aristotle allows that one and the same thing might have several
different causes in several different senses of the word "cause"
("az/w"). They will seem to be competitors only to one who has failed
to note or take seriously the fact that "cause" is being used in different
senses. But if we stick with a single sense of "cause," Aristotle is
inclined to expect, or anyway to hope for, a unique cause.
We are thus meant to suppose that no attribute has more than one
first subject— that if G and H are distinct, it will not be both qua G
and qua H that A-things are A. By contrast, the mediating concept
of explanation guarantees non-uniqueness. If B is merely a species,
or subordinate genus, of A, there will be at least one other species
(or subordinate genus), B', such that being B' will be an equally good
way of being A. Thus if being a mallard is the cause of something's
being a duck, so will being a teal be the cause of something's being
a duck.
There is a related feature of the mediating concept of explanation
that makes it much less attractive than the first-subject concept. To
be a mallard is to be a duck of such-and-such a sort. The claim that
X is a duck because it is a mallard thus looks either trivial or false.
It looks trivial if we take "of such-and-such a sort" as so much extra
baggage. What we are left with is "x is a duck because x is a duck."
But the claim looks false if we suppose the differentia to be any part
of what makes something a duck. Being such-and-such a sort of duck,
one wants to say, is no part whatsoever of what it is that makes
something a duck.
It is worth emphasizing that simply requiring the major and middle
terms to be "reciprocals" would be insufficient to guarantee the kind
of explanation Aristotle is after in the Posterior Analytics. Since "All
and only triangles are 180° figures" is logically equivalent to "All
and only 180° figures are triangles," it would seem that being a 180°
figure is as much a cause of something's being a triangle as being a
triangle is the cause of something's being a 180° figure. But Aristotle
expects "is the cause of" to be asymmetrical; if B is the cause of A,
it will follow that A is not the cause of B. To use another of Aristotle's
examples, since all and only nearby heavenly bodies are non-twinklers,
it might seem that being a non-twinkler is as much a cause of being
nearby as being nearby is a cause of non-twinkling (78a30 ff.). This
seems clearly wrong to Aristotle and paradoxical, at least, to most of
the rest of us. It is, of course, a paradox familiar to anyone who has
tried to understand the notion of causation in terms of the idea of
necessary and sufficient conditions.
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Incidentally, it is one of the attractive features of the mediating
concept of explanation that it guarantees asymmetry by ruling out
commensurate universality. Being a mallard will be the cause of
something's being a duck, but obviously being a duck will not, of
itself, be the cause of anything's being a mallard. This sort of
consideration seems to underlie Aristotle's brief reversion to the
mediating concept at 99a30-99b3.
Pretty clearly Aristotle understands the "^wa" notion and the
"first-subject" idea in such a way that they guarantee asymmetry.
From "triangle is the first subject of 180° figure" it will follow that
180° figure is not the first subject of triangle. So recourse to the
mediating concept of explanation is not required to capture the
desired asymmetry. And the first-subject requirement, as we have
already noted, offers the additional promise of securing the uniqueness
of any adequate explanation.
The form of syllogism that an ideal Aristotelian explanation calls
for is thus Barbara-plus. But, contrary to what the Prior Analytics
would lead us to expect, the form is not Barbara plus the stipulation
that the minor, middle and major terms be nested in order of
increasing comprehension— far from it. We learn in the Posterior
Analytics that the form is Barbara plus the stipulation that the middle
term name the first subject of the attribute expressed by the major.
The ideal in science, according to Aristotle, is to discover, concerning
given attributes, qua what it is that things have them.^
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
^ An earlier draft of these comments was delivered in the symposium of the
American Philosophical Association, Western Division, at which Professor Hintikka
presented his paper. Those earlier comments had the benefit of a delightful discussion
with the late G. E. L. Owen. Whether that benefit accrues to these comments as
well, by a sort of nonlogical transitivity, I cannot judge.
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Some Comments on Metaphysics E. 2, 3
C. J. F. WILLIAMS
I wish to call in question a certain interpretation of sentences in
Aristotle's Metaphysics E, an interpretation which is enshrined in the
English translations most widely used. According to this Aristotle is
interested here in the contrast between gradual and instantaneous
change. It is my belief that this distinction has no relevance at all to
the passages in question.
begin with the first two sentences of E. 3:
"On 6' ua\v apxal Kal aiTia yevrjTa Kal (t>dapTa avev rov
yiyveadaL Kal (t>delpecrdai, (t)avtpbv. el yap fir) tovt', e'^ avayKr]q
navT ecrrai, d rov yiyuonepov Kal (pdeipou'evov p.T) Kara avp.^t^T]Koc,
aiTibv TL avayKH] uvai.
should translate this as follows:
That there are principles and causes which are capable of coming
to be and perishing without (actually) coming to be and perishing is
clear. For if this were not so, everything would be of necessity, given
that there must needs be a cause of what non-accidentally comes to
be and ceases to be.
Christopher Kirwan translates thus:
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It is obvious that there are origins and causes that are able to come
to be and to be destroyed without [being in process of] coming to be
and being destroyed. For otherwise everything will be of necessity, if
whatever is [in process of] coming to be and being destroyed necessarily
has some cause non-coincidentally.'
The words which Kirwan candidly places in brackets are central to
his interpretation of the entire chapter. The word "process," without
the warning sign of brackets, occurs also in the translations of Ross
and Warrington,^ and the interpretation it embodies is to be found
in, if it is not derived from, the commentary on this passage ascribed
to Alexander of Aphrodisias.^
The difference between Kirwan's translation and mine lies, not
only in the occurrence in his translation of this word "process," but
in the construal of the phrase nrj Kara avfi^efirfKoq in the second
sentence. Kirwan takes this with airibv n avayKt] dtvai; I take it with
Tov yiyvofievov Kal (pdeLpofxevov. Again Kirwan's construal conforms to
that of the other translators. If nrj Kara avixl3€^rjK6q is taken in this
way, with aiTibv tl ocvayKr} etvai, the heavy emphasis on the present
tense of yiyvou'evov and (f)d€Lponevov involved in including the phrase
"in process of" in their translation is more or less inevitable.* To say
without qualification "there must needs be a cause non-accidentally
of what comes to be and ceases to be" would be to rule out altogether
the existence of things whose only cause is an accidental cause. It
would contradict a sentence of the previous chapter: tcoj/ yap Kara
ovn^t^r}Koc, ovTOiv r} yiyvojxkvicv kol to alrLOv eoTi Kara (TvulSe^rjKoc,
(I027''7-8). There has to be some restriction on the generality of
"what comes to be and ceases to be." On my interpretation, however,
Aristotle is restricting the necessity of having a cause to non-accidental
' Aristotle's Metaphysics Books T, A, E, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford 1971).
The same interpretation is to be found in W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford
1924), Vol. I, pp. 362 sq.
2 The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford 1928), Vol.
VIII; Aristotle's Metaphysics, ed. and translated by John Warrington (London 1956).
' Alexander Aphrodisiensis, /n Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria , ed. M. Hayduck
(Berlin 1891). Hayduck (p. v) does not regard the commentary on Book E as a
genuine work of Alexander.
^ Not quite inevitable, since Aquinas manages to avoid it. He, like Ross and
Kirwan, construes fij) Kara avu^e^riKoc, with the succeeding, rather than with the
preceding words. But he does not interpret yiyvo^ievov and cpdaponkvov as referring to
process. His way out is to take the clause ti tov jiyvofievov . . . avayKt] tivai (1027^31-32)
as a genuine conditional, repeating the content of ei yap nfi roxno (1027^30-31).
Kirwan and I interpret it as a reason-giving clause, taken by Aristotle to state
something true, although we differ about what it states. (Aquinas takes the first
sentence of the chapter in the way I do.)
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comings to be and ceasings to be. The way is therefore open for the
backward-stretching chain of causality to come to an end with an
accidental coming-to-be: driXov apa otl fiixP'- tlvoc, ^adi^ei apxvq,
avTTi 5' ovK€Ti eiq aWo (1027M1-12).
If Ross and Kirwan's motivation for translating tov yiyuonevov Kal
(f)deLponeuov as "whatever is in process of coming to be and being
destroyed" is the construal of the second sentence, the immediate
consequence of it is their need to translate tov yiyueadai Kal (j>6tLpeGdai
in the first sentence in the same way. This makes the first sentence
an assertion of the existence of causes that come to be and perish
instantaneously. Kirwan has considerable difficulty in explaining how
the argument of the chapter as a whole can be taken to support this
thesis. On my interpretation the first sentence asserts the existence,
amongst possible causes, of some which are unactualized possibili-
ties— a rejection, in effect, of the Megarian modal thesis "If possibly
p, then p." This fits in admirably with the opening words of the
second sentence, which point out that admitting this thesis is tanta-
mount to admitting the determinist thesis "If p, then necessarily py^
It is, however, causal determinism that the chapter as a whole is
concerned to refute, and the third sentence of the chapter begins a
reductio argument against the thesis of causal determinism: suppose
every event is determined by some prior cause; then eventually the
series of causes of future events will reach back to the present or the
past; but what is or has been the case cannot now be otherwise; e^
auayKTjc, apa iravra iorai to. iabp-eva (1027''8-9). This is regarded as
absurd; and the statement of 1027''1 1-12, insisting that breaks occur
in causal chains, is brought in as the alternative. Where the break
occurs we have an apxv of which we can say: ecTai. ovv i] tov oTrorep'
fTi^Xf" ocvTT], Kal aiTLOv TT^c, ytv^oiicc, avTr}<^ aXXo ovdev (1027'' 12- 14).
Such principles and causes, before they occur, belong to the class of
things which are capable of coming to be and perishing without
having to come to be and perish. Now there would be no such class
if whatever could come to be did so. If "possibly p" entailed "/?," "/?,"
as we have seen, would entail "necessarily /?"; and if these were both
true, "possibly p" would entail "necessarily /?". So for there to be a
class of things which come to be, but which do not, in virtue of some
prior cause, come to be necessarily, there has to be a class of things
"which are capable of coming to be and perishing without (actually)
'" Aristotle shows himself aware of this equivalence, which, as I am about to argue,
is crucial to the understanding of this chapter, not only by his words at 1027''30-31,
but also by his attributing to the Megarian determinists, in Metaphysics 0. 3, the thesis
that potentiality is indistinguishable from actuality.
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coming to be and perishing"— which is how I translate the first
sentence of E. 3. The uncaused causes of 1027''12-14 do, of course,
themselves actually come to be; but they have to belong to a class of
ytvqTO. which, at a time when they have not so far come to be, includes
others which never will. It is the existence of these which the first
sentence of E. 3 asserts.
Ill
Support is claimed for the view that these sentences are concerned
with "processes" by a similar interpretation of a sentence in E. 2.^
The sentence is found at 1 026*^22-24:
TOiv n€P yap aXXop rpoTov optojp eoTi yepeaLq Kal (f>dopa, to)p bt
Kara crvn^e^riKoq ovk earip.
Kirwan translates:
with things-that-are in another sense there is [a process of] coming to
be and destruction, but with things [that are] coincidentally there is
not.
Again Aristotle's contention is supposed to be that accidental beings
come to be and perish instantaneously. If this were what the sentence
meant it would have little connection with the remarks which precede
it. These mention certain arguments of the sophists, which are said
to be for the most part concerned with the accidental. Examples
given are: Whether musical and literate, or musical Coriscus and
Coriscus, are different or the same; Whether everything that is, but
not always, has come to be, so that if, being musical, someone has
come to be literate, he has also, being literate, come to be musical.
Clearly the sophists were getting entangled, or entangling others, in
puzzles over being {eipai) and coming to be {yLyptadaL). They were
drawing attention to sentences like
(1) Someone musical is literate
(2) Coriscus is musical
(3) Someone being musical has come to be literate
(4) Someone being literate has come to be musical.
If (1) and (2) are taken as assertions of identity, the sophists used
what we should now call Leibniz's Law to derive from "Coriscus has
come to be musical" and from (3) and (4) the prima facie absurdities
^ See Kirwan, op. cit., pp. 192, 196; and Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame
(London 1980), p. 6. Cf. Ross, op. cit.. Vol. I. pp. 360, 362.
C. J. F. Williams 185
Musical Coriscus has come to be musical
Someone musical has come to be musical
Someone literate has come to be literate.
Aristotle's regular response to sophisms like this is to draw a distinction
between per se identity and accidental identity,' a distinction which
has close connections with two other distinctions, that between per se
and accidental unity and that between per se and accidental being. It
is the last of these which, in my view, is relevant to the sentence at
1026''22-24.
But is this view correct? Has the sentence at 1026^22-24 any close
connection with the preceding passage? Whether or not this is so
depends on the translation of the first part of 1026''22: br}\ov bt kol
€K T(bv tolovt(jov Xojoiiu. The phrase rcbv tolovtoov Xbyoii' echoes toiovtol
tO)v Xbyoov of 1026''20— the arguments of the sophists which I have
sketched. Ross and Kirwan, however, see it as having a different
reference. Ross has to defend with parallels his interpretation of
TOLOVTOOV as forward-looking against the more natural backward-
looking interpretation. He and Kirwan take it to refer to arguments
like that to be given in 1026''22-24. (What arguments would be like
this, and in what sense is it an "argument?") The presence of./cal
might be thought to support this, by indicating that we are about to
be given new evidence for the proximity of to avu^efirjKoc, to to nrj
6v. This view is encouraged if ^aij/crai in 1026''21 is translated (with
Kirwan) by "obviously": brjXov bi kol then comes out naturally as "as
is plain also." But 4>aiv(TaL yap to avu^e^rfKoq lyyix^ tl tov ixtj ovtoc,
should, perhaps, rather be translated "for the accidental seems (to
be) something approximate to non-being." The copula is here omitted
after (l)aiveTai, so we cannot know whether what we have is elliptical
for (j)aip(TaL ov or (t>aLU(Tai eivai. The rule ''4>otivoixai <jiv quod sum,
quod non sum (j)aivotxaL tLvai" is therefore inapplicable.
1 am, however, inclined to construe the sentence as if it were etvai
which was present after e'77Li(; tl— tl itself is a sign of reservation on
Aristotle's part. So "seems to be" rather than "obviously is" is
preferable as a rendering of ^aii^erat. Again, this sentence, as yap
indicates, is not a conclusion drawn from the exhibition of sophistical
arguments, tolovtol tCou Xbyoiv, but a comment on them. What it
suggests is only represented as a conclusion, as something shown to
' See Alan Code, "Aristotle's Response to Quine's Objections to Modal Logic,"
Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1976), 159-86; Gareth B. Matthews, "Accidental
Unities," in Language and Logos, edd. M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (Cambridge
1982), pp. 223-40; and my own interpretation of Aristotle's distinctions, "Aristotle's
Theory of Descriptions," in The Philosophical Rei'iew 94 (1985), pp. 63-80.
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be true, by the following words, dfjXov be ... , for which 1026''22-24
provides a backing, as the yap of 1026''22 makes clear. driXov be Kal
eK Tcbv TOLovTwv Xoyoju cannot, therefore, be introducing a further
reason for the conclusion. So the Kal here is not to be translated
"also," but by emphasizing in some way the succeeding words. My
own way of translating drjXov be Kal Ik tO^v tolovto:v Xbyo^v would be
"This is clear from such arguments themselves." The following
sentence explains this, by showing that the fallacy of some at least of
the arguments lies in the assumption that there is yeueaic; and (f)dopa
of ra Kara ovti^t^T]Koq, ovra. This harks back to a premise of one of
the sophistical arguments, ivav b av y, fir] ad be, yeyouev. It is
unbelievable that the remark about yeveaiq and ^dopa at 1 026*^22-24
has no connection with this premise. What then is the connection?
IV
The connection cannot be discovered without understanding the
structure of the sophism which, as I see it, 1026''22-24 is designed
to solve. This argument is not easy to reconstruct. Aristotle's sketch
of it is given in 1026''18-20:
ei TTCiv b av rj, fir] ael be, yeyovev, axrr' ei yLOvaiKoq (t)u ypannarLKOo,
yeyove, Kal ypafxixar ikoc, oiv novoLKoq.
The consecutive clause here is a hypothetical proposition, but the
sentence as a whole is an indirect question introduced by el: the
sophists query the apparently analytic "Whatever is, but has not
always been, has come to be" on the grounds that, if it is true, (3)
and (4) are mutually implicative. (It is clearly immaterial which is
taken as implying which.) However, the connection between "What-
ever is, but has not always been, has come to be" and its alleged
consequence is not immediately obvious.
The connection is quite overlooked in recent reconstructions of
the sophism.^ Here the propositions ixovaLKoc, oov ypa/xnaTLKoq y'eyove
and ypanixaTiKoc, oiv fxovoLKoq (y'eyove^ are translated "The musical
person has become the literate person" and "The literate person has
become the musical person." With "singular terms" in both subject
and complement position, and the truistic assumption that what a
person has become he now is, Leibniz's Law is thought to be enough
to license substitution of complement for subject, and vice versa. No
appeal to the principle Trav b av
f), /xr) ael be, yeyovev is needed.
^ By Code and Matthews, whom I follow, for the sake of argument, in my
"Aristotle's Theory of Descriptions."
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However, the absence of the definite article from Aristotle's actual
exposition of the sophism and the presence of the participle (bv suggest
that in any case another reconstruction is required. The following
has some plausibility:
(3) Someone being musical has come to be literate
(3A) Someone being musical is literate
(3B) Someone being literate is musical
(4) Someone being literate has come to be musical.^
Here the move from (3) to (3A) rests on the principle, already
mentioned, that what a person has become he now is; the move from
(3A) to (3B) relies on the convertibility of an I-proposition; and the
move from (3B) to (4) rests on the premise, explicitly stated by
Aristotle, irav o av y, nrj ael de, yeyovev, together with the commonsense
assumption that a person who is musical has not always been so
(musical technique has to be learned).
Set out in this way, the fallacy is made plausible in English only
by a clumsily literal rendering of the Greek, retaining the participial
construction "being musical" and "being literate." A more natural
English version would be
(3') Someone who was musical has come to be literate
(3A') Someone who was musical is literate
(3B') Someone who was literate is musical
(4') Someone who was literate has come to be musical.
The present participle, in Greek as in English, has to represent both
the imperfect and the present tense of the finite verb. When relative
clauses are substituted this distinction between the present and
imperfect tense can be made explicit; and now the fallacious reasoning
can easily be seen to occur in the transition from (3A') to (3B'). We
have a pair of propositions not of the form "Some As are B" and
"Some B's are A," but of the form "Some As are B" and "Some C's
are D."
It should not be thought, however, that the fallacy rests simply on
a superficial feature of Greek, its inability to make fine tense distinc-
tions at the participial level. It would have been possible to set out
the sophism thus:
(3") Some musical person has come to be literate
(3A") Some musical person is literate
(3B") Some literate person is musical
(4") Some literate person has come to be musical.
^ An equally plausible translation would be obtained by deleting "Someone" and
inserting "he" after the second word in each of these sentences.
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Here there is nothing amiss with the move from (3A") to (3B"), but
the other steps are invalid. (This would be strikingly obvious if we
substituted "illiterate" for "musical" in (3") and (3A") and "unmus-
ical" for "literate" in (3B") and (4").) They are invalid because the
unexpressed tenses involved in the "subject-phrases," "Some musical
person" and "Some literate person," are different in the case of (3")
and (4"), where "has come to be" is the main verb of the sentence,
from what they are in the case of (3A") and (3B"), where the main
verb is "is." If these were made explicit, (3") would begin "Some
person who was musical," (3A") "Some person who is musical," (3B")
"Some person who is literate," and (4") "Some person who was
literate." The fallacies arrive through failure to appreciate the quan-
tificational structure of propositions whose "grammatical subject" is
of the form "Some musical person," or, for that matter, "The musical
person." Aristotle's distinction between accidental beings and unities
and per se beings and unities is an attempt to trace these fallacies to
their source. It is an attempt remarkably similar to that constituted
by Russell's Theory of Descriptions. '° He presents a wide variety of
sophisms which can be solved by application of the per se jper accidens
distinction. (A variation on the theme of the sophism outlined at
1026''18-20 is given at Metaphysics K 1064''23-26, and the same
sophism is hinted at in Topics 104''25, sqq.) Thus the fallacious
inference from (3") to (3A") can be seen to be due to allowing an
expression like "Some musical person," which in Aristotle's terms
stands for an accidental being, to be substituted for x in "If x has
come to be F then x is F"— a valid schema if names, which, in
Aristotle's terms, stand for per se beings, are substituted for x. Again,
the inference from (3B"), even if expanded to "Some literate person
is musical, but has not always been so," to (4") fails to exemplify the
schema "x is F, but not always; therefore x has come to be F," because
the expression substituted for x stands for an accidental being: put
the name of a per se being (a "logically proper name") in this position,
and all will be well. Since the topic of Metaphysics E. 2 is accidental
being, one might well have thought that this would be the moral he
wished us to draw.
If we had merely the exposition of the sophism in 1026''I8-20,
together with Aristotle's general theory of accidental being and his
'" I have tried to establish this similarity in my paper "Aristotle's Theory of
Descriptions" (above, note 7).
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indication that this would provide the clue to solving the sophism,
we should perhaps be content with the reconstruction of his thought
given in the previous section. But, as I have already argued, the
solution is supposed to be given by application of the thesis of
1026''22-24. (The thought is: the thesis receives support from its
ability to solve such paradoxes, and itself lends support to the doctrine
of the proximity of accidental being to non-being.) This, I believe,
shows that Aristotle interpreted the sophism in a way distinct from
those put forward in section III. What is at stake is the distinction
between what, in De Generatione et Corruptione I. 3, he calls "coming
to be airXcbq' and "coming to be something." The reconstruction that
is needed is the following:
(3'") Someone literate who is musical has come to be
(3A'") Someone literate who is musical is the same as someone
musical who is literate
(4'") Someone musical who is literate has come to be.
What we have is simply an application of the Law of the Substitutivity
of Identicals (Leibniz's Law), which allows us to pass from (3'") to
(4'") on the strength of the identity statement (3A'").
Understood in this way, the argument might well be accepted as
valid. The evident invalidity of the argument depended on inter-
preting novffLKoq (hv ypafi/xaTLKoc, yeyoue and ypannanKoq ojj' novaiKoq
yeyove as (3) and (4), respectively. It looks as though the sophists took
these sentences one way and Aristotle another. It is important,
therefore, to see how these Greek sentences are ambiguous as between
(3) and (4), on the one hand, and (3'") and (4'") on the other.
I have discussed in my note on De Gen. et Corn I. 4. 319^25-26,"
the parallel ambiguity of audpwToc, 5' aixovaoc, iyhero, which occurs
in Aristotle's text at that point. The context there, however, is his
attempt to distinguish alteration, aXXoiooaLq, from generation and
corruption, yeveatq Kal <pdopa. He is arguing that if avdpojiroc, anovaoq
eyeveTo could be construed in the same way as vypbv ypvxpov iyevero
(which would describe the generation of water), where cold is not a
per se affection of wet, as unmusical is of man, it would report a case
of generation. As it is (319''30-31), it is a case of alteration. Unfor-
tunately, Aristotle does not stick to his distinction between yiyviadai
airXOiq and yiyvdadai tl, the existential and copulative senses of "come
to be," in order to disambiguate avdpoi-Koq ci^lOvaoc, eyevero and distin-
guish generation and alteration. He allows an existential interpretation
" Aristotle's "De Generatione et Corruptione," in the Clarendon Aristotle Series
(Oxford 1982), p. 101.
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of the sentence and transfers the distinction from yiyveadai to its
subject. In avdpoi-Koc, eyevero the subject, man, is a per se being, so the
sentence reports a case of generation; in audpwiroq ctfiovaoq eyepero
the subject, unmusical man, is an accidental being, so the sentence
reports a case of alteration. As I remarked in my note on the passage,
Aristotle thus cuts away the ground from under the feet of his own
distinction.'^
Here, in the Metaphysics passage, it seems to me, it is by interpreting
fxovoLKoc, <j)v ypannazLKoq yeyove as "Someone literate who is musical
has come to be" and ypamxaTiKOc, o)v (xovaiKoq (ykyovi) as "Someone
musical who is literate has come to be" that Aristotle argues that the
one entails the other. For the "literate musical" is the same accidental
being as the "musical literate" (3A'"), and if "has come to be" is
truly predicable of the one it is truly predicable of the other. Moreover,
so the argument goes, since this accidental being "is, but not always"
(for there was a time, according to (3), when the musical was not
literate), "has come to be" must be truly predicable of it under either
description. Aristotle's answer, that there is no coming to be of
accidental beings, challenges the premise of this last part of the
argument. Accidental being is not covered by the phrase "is, but not
always," since accidental being is not fully entitled to be said to be',
in some ways, Aristotle holds, it is closer to what is not. This seems,
if anything, to be his misleading way of saying that a sentence like
IxovaiKoq (hv ypanfianKOc, yeyoue cannot be understood in the sense
"Someone literate who is musical has come to be," but only in the
sense expressed by (3).
However, there is a sentence in De Generatione et Corruptione which
seems flatly to contradict this interpretation o{ Metaphysics 1026''22-24,
At 319''29-30 the text reads:
bib avdpoiTTOv p.lv ravra iradt}, avSpCiivov bt hovglkov KaX audpooirov
bifiovaov yeveaiq Kal (pdopa.
TavTOi are musicality and unmusicality. "Musical man" and "unmusical
man" are often said to be names for accidental beings, and this
sentence attributes to them, explicitly, yeveatq Kal (pdopa. But at
1026''23-24 Aristotle says there is no ykveoiq Kal (t>dopa of accidental
beings. When I was preparing my notes on the De Generatione et
Corruptione, I was not aware of this sentence in the Metaphysics. Had
I been so aware, I should have felt more inclined than I was to regard
319''29-30 as an alien intrusion into the text. Philoponus and Joachim
are both unhappy with the text as it stands, and Philoponus suspects
'2 Op. cit., p. 102.
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a scribal error. However that may be, the doctrine of De Generatione
et Corruptione demands that there be a sense of ytveaiq in which it is
contrasted with aWo'niiaic,, and in this sense what avBpoiitoc, ocfiovaoq
iyevero and (3) and (4) report are not cases of generation or corruption,
but of alteration. Whatever the verbal clash with 319''29-30, the
overall doctrine of De Generatione et Corruptione I. 3-4 fully justifies
the interpretation of 1026''22-24 as denying that there is generation
and corruption of accidental beings. The reason for the denial is not
that such changes are instantaneous, but that there are no such
changes. The sophist argues for the paradoxical conclusion that either
(3) entails (4) or the principle "What is, but not always has come to
be" must be abandoned. Aristotle's reply is that we need not fear
that the truth of ixovoiKoq <hu ypafifiar lkoc, yeyove will entail that of
ypannariKoc, oov ixovaiKoq yeyove, since, in the sense in which the former
will entail the latter, in the sense, namely, of (3'"), the former is not
going to be true at all. Accidental beings, such as "Someone literate
who is musical" is supposed to stand for, are not subjects of yeveatq
or (t)dopa. We have no need to jettison the principle irav o av y, iirj
ael be, y'eyovev, because in the only sense in which it is relevant to
that principle, /xovaiKoq o)v ypaufxarLKoq eoTLv, ovk ael de is false. The
principle should be interpreted, Aristotle is suggesting, as equivalent
to TTQiJ' av
J) airXibq, fir] ael de, airXC^q y'eyovev. But novaiKoq Lov
ypannariKoq eariv dcTrXcbc, would be asserting per se being falsely of an
accidental being; so the principle has no application in this case.
VI
My argument has been that neither E. 2 nor E. 3 is concerned with
the distinction between gradual and instantaneous change. The point
of the sentence in E. 2 to which this distinction was thought to be
relevant is, I maintain, to restrict yeveacc, to what elsewhere Aristotle
calls bcTrXr] yeveaiq, "coming to be simpliciter!' The sentences in E. 3
for whose interpretation translators have thought it necessary to use
the word "process" are, in my view, saying that some comings to be,
namely those which are accidental, are not necessitated by prior
causes. But, it will be objected, these interpretations of E. 2 and E.
3 are incompatible with each other. In E. 2 I make Aristotle say that
only per se beings come to be. In E. 3 I attribute to him a theory
about the coming to be of ovra Kara crvfxlSefirjKoq.
On the surface the incompatibility is there anyway. In 1026''22-24
Aristotle denies that there is yevecnq of ovra Kara avu^e^rjKoq. But in
1026''33 and 1027''7, before we have even reached the end of chapter
2, Aristotle is using yiyveadai to refer to accidental beings. Little
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wonder that he does so again in chapter 3! The point is that Aristotle's
use of Yfj'fcriq and yiyueadaL is far from uniform. Sometimes aXXoiojaiq
is described as a subordinate species of yeveaiq; sometimes yeveatq is
a species co-ordinate with aWoiojaLq. I am not, in this paper, concerned
to affirm that there is a single sense of yiyveadai or yeveaiq, to be
found in the sentences of E. 2 and E. 3 we have been examining:
rather, I am concerned to deny that these words are used in these
sentences in the single sense of a "process" of coming to be, in a
sense which rules out instantaneous change. My belief is that passages
in Aristotle's works that have been interpreted as devoted to the
distinction between gradual and instantaneous coming to be have less
unity than has been supposed. The passages in Metaphysics E which
have been thought to require this interpretation should, I have
argued, be understood in other ways, though not in just one other
way. To deal thoroughly with the "process" interpretation it would
be necessary to examine the long list of passages cited, e.g., by Ross
in his note on 1026*^22-24, to see how many of them require us to
talk of gradual or instantaneous change. If they all do, my interpre-
tation of E. 2 and 3 is called in question. I think in fact that many
of them do not; but there is hardly room here to justify this claim.




Job and Other Poems*
L. G. WESTERINK
I. Life and Work
Leo the Mathematician and Philosopher (b. 790/800, d. after Jan.
869) has now a firmly established place among the leading figures of
the ninth century Byzantine revival of classical culture and science.'
His claim to it, however, rests, rather than on his own record, on the
accounts of various chroniclers, in which historical fact is mixed with
a certain amount of legend.^
From their sometimes conflicting information the following bio-
graphical outline has been pieced together by P. Lemerle. Born,
probably, at Constantinople, Leo received some kind of higher edu-
cation from an unnamed scholar on the island of Andros; for the
* This paper could not have been written but for the generosity of R. P. Joseph
Paramelle, of the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes (Paris), who drew
my attention to the poem and gave me his own transcript of the first hundred Hnes.
' On Leo, see in the first place, E. E. Lipsic, "Vizantijskij ucenyj Leo Matematik,"
Vizant. Vremennik2 (27), 1949, 106-149, and P. LemeT\e, Le premier humanisme byzantin,
Paris 1971, 148-176; further literature in Lemerle, p. 148, n. 1; add H. Hunger, Die
hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, 2 vols., Munich 1978, in various places
(see index), esp. I, 18-19 and H, 237-239; N.G. Wilson, Scholars ofByzantium, London
1983, 79-84.
'^ In particular, Theophanes Continuatus, ed. L Bekker, Bonn 1838; Ps.-Symeon,
ibid. pp. 603-760; Scylitzes, ed. J. Thurn, Berlin 1973.
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rest he is said to have been self-taught. His fame reached the caliph
al-Ma'mun (813-833), who invited him to Baghdad. The emperor
Theophilus (829-842), now realizing Leo's true value, appointed him
to teach at the Church of the Forty Martyrs (of Sebaste). A fire signal
chain between Constantinople and Cilicia (the Muslim frontier), the
meaning of the signal depending on the hours when it was given, is
said to have been his invention. Eventually (840) he was ordained
metropolitan of Thessalonica by the iconoclast patriarch John the
Grammarian, a relative. His incumbency came to an end when, in
the regency of Theophilus' widow Theodora, the tide turned in favor
of image worship (843). During the personal rule of Theodora's son
Michael III (855-867) and on the initiative of the emperor's uncle
and chief advisor Bardas (d. 866), he was appointed to the chair of
philosophy at the newly-founded school in the Magnaura Palace. The
last known date is the earthquake of January 869, which Leo is said
to have survived by locating the only safe place in a collapsing church.
To this second-hand information can be added the tangible evidence
of stray notes in some manuscripts, which connect Leo with our texts
of Plato, Ptolemy, Archimedes and Euclid.^ Epigrams I-VI (reprinted
below) must have figured originally in Leo's copies of the authors
they present: Cyrinus + Marcellus on mechanics, Paulus' Apoteles-
matica, Theo + Proclus, Achilles Tatius (either by Leo or by Photius),^
Porphyry (most probably the Isagoge, in which case the volume must
have contained the entire Organon) and Apollonius of Perge. There
is, however, no explicit testimony to the effect that Leo himself edited
or revised these texts, except in the case of Plato.
^
The amount of extant writings from the hand of this eminent
scholar and scientist is disappointingly small. After the elimination
of the work of two namesakes and near-contemporaries, who until
recently were often confused with him,^ Leo Choerosphactes, magister
and proconsul (ca. 850-ca. 920), and the emperor Leo (VI) the Wise
(born 866, ruled 886-912), this is all that remains:
^ Details in Lemerle, pp. 167-171.
* Photius is mentioned first, Leo only as an alternative claimant; the verse technique
(paroxytone ending) does not favor this claim, see below p. 204.
' See the note at Plato, Laws 743b in O (= Vat. gr. 1), in G. C. Greene, Scholia
Platonica, Haverford 1938, p. 322; further particulars in Lemerle, p. 168, n. 73.
'' The error still prevails in K. Krumbacher, Geschichte der byzant. Litteratur, 2nd
ed., Munich 1897, 722-723; it was set right chiefly by E. Lipsic, op. ciL, cf. G. Kolias,
Leon Choirosphaktes, Athens 1939, 65-68.
L. G. Westerink 195
In prose: (1) a sermon on the occasion of the feast of the
Annunciation;' (2) a four-page note on Euclid;* (3) some extracts on
astrology and related subjects, many of them, as is often the case
with this kind of material, of doubtful attribution or authenticity.^ In
verse: (l) Job, a didactic poem in 638 hexameters, which until now
has escaped notice, and is presented here for the first time; (2) ten
or eleven epigrams, which I have added to round off Leo's poetical
work, as well as for convenient reference and comparison.
II. The Epigrams
With only two exceptions, all the epigrams have been preserved in
the Anthologia Palatina. Numbers I-VI are book epigrams, serving
either as headings or as colophons to manuscripts. The genre is well
represented in the Anth. Pal. (in particular, IX. 184-214); it had a
long past (starting with Callimachus) and a long future (well into the
eighteenth century); in the ninth century examples are especially
frequent, ranging from distichs to effusions of over 200 lines.'" Those
by Leo may have been gleaned directly from his own library, perhaps
by himself. The puzzling vvv in III. 13 ("Theo, who noiv instructs
the city of Alexander") has led to the conclusion that these epigrams
and their poet belong to the fifth century; but, as Lemerle has pointed
out, since Theo lived in the fourth century and Proclus, who shares
the poem with him, in the fifth, the "now" cannot possibly refer to
the time of writing."
Epigram VII is an enigma for which no satisfactory solution has
yet been offered. It may originally have been a technopaignion , the
three lines, which are of nearly equal length (35, 35, 34 letters),
representing the herald's wand: one line (the first?) for the staff, the
' Edited by V. Laurent, "Une homelie inedite de I'archeveque de Thessalonique
Leon le Philosophe sur I'Annonciation (25 mars 842)," Melanges Eugene Tisserant, II
(Studi e Testi 232), Rome 1964, 281-302.
" Euclid, ed. Heiberg, vol. V, pp. 714-718 (= Heiberg-Stamatis V. 2, pp. 341-345).
^ Listed and discussed by Lemerle, pp. 171-172.
'" Cf. L. G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, I, Amsterdam
1976, 30-31; long prefatory poems, e.g., to the anti-Manichaean collection in Laur.
9, 23 (Alexander Lycopolitanus, ed. Brinkmann, Leipzig 1895, XVI-XXII) and to
Xenophon's Anabasis in Paris, gr. 1640, f. 123' (14th cent.; the poem is addressed to
Leo VI).
" Christ-Schmidt-Stahlin, Griechische Litteraturgeschichie, vol. II, Munich 1924
[1961], p. 980, n. 6. Lemerle, op. cit. 169, n. 80.
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remaining two for the serpents. I have failed, however, to discover
any letter pattern. The addressee who is invited to contemplate this
figure is apparently a Sicilian living in Constantinople; one possible
candidate would be Leo's ungrateful student, Constantine the Sicilian,
about whom later.
The Homeric cento, VIII ("The Rape"), also stands by itself,
unless Stadtmiiller was right in attributing Anth. Pal. IX. 381 ("Hero
and Leander") and IX. 382 ("The Echo") to the same author
All these poems are from Book IX of the Anthology; one more
(Number IX) has survived in Book XV. 12, a short meditation on
the best way of life by "Leo the Philosopher, surnamed the Pagan."
Whether Leo must be held responsible for some of the palindromes
in the Appendix Planudea (= Book XVI. 387c) and in the larger
collection edited by L. Sternbach,'^ is doubtful. Some manuscripts
mention Leo the philosopher or Leo the rhetorician as the author;
in the lines themselves the names Leo and Photius occur.
The two remaining epigrams have been preserved elsewhere.
Number X is from the so-called Sylloge Euphemiana ,^^ a small collection
of epigrams (most of them also in the Anth. Pal.) compiled in the
reign of Leo VI. Writing to his doctor, Leo points out the absurdity
of a regime of cold water for an old man of a naturally phlegmatic
temperament, in an unusually cold month of February and in an icy,
drafty house.
The last. Number XI (also published by Sternbach, loc. cit.),
exemplifies the Byzantine notion of satire: crude, brutal insult in
verse. The speech defect which Leo indicates is clearly a problem
with the r-sound, but not the substitution of / for it, as in the
TpavXi^eLv of Alcibiades (Aristophanes, Wasps 42-46); the sound
produced is described as a turtle-dove's cooing, perhaps a soft uvular
r. Leo seems to consider it an odious mannerism rather than a speech
impediment. Chronologically, it is unlikely (though not quite impos-
sible) that the student in question was the quaestor Anastasius 6
TpavXoq, another poet of the Anthology (XV. 28), also known as a
composer of hymns and as a hagiographen'"* In the title of the
'2
"Analecta Byzantina," Ceske Museum Filologicke, 6, (1900), 299-303.
'* Edited by F. G. Schneidewin, Progymnasmata in Anthologiam Graecam, Gottingen
1855; the poems in question already in Boissonade, Anecdote Graeca, II, Paris 1830
[Hildesheim 1962], pp. 470-471.
'^ H. G. Beck, Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich, Munich 1959,
605.
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Anthology poem, 6 TpavXbc, figures (practically) as a proper name, and
Arethas, in some unfriendly comments on one of Anastasius' poems,'^
also uses it as such: 'Avaaraaiov tov Ttoic, KoiaiaToopoc,, w to TpavXoc,
yvcopKTua. The date of Arethas' letter is unknown; if Kougeas' guess
is right, '^ the unnamed individual who (some time after 920) accused
Arethas of high treason," and who is described in similar words, was
this Anastasius. On this assumption, there would be a difference of
at least fifty years between Leo and Anastasius.
To the genuine epigrams, I add three more which are certainly
not by Leo, but have been repeatedly printed as his, thus introducing
biographical errors. Number XII follows (in Vat. gr. 915) two poems
written after Leo's death by his former pupil Constantine the Sicilian;
the first, in elegiac couplets, accuses Leo of paganism; in the second
(in iambic trimeters) Constantine defends himself against the reproach
of ingratitude to the memory of his teacher, but the title describes it
as ' XiroXoyia Aeoproc, (f)LKo(Tb4>ov, Kad' riv XpLarop p.€v acjSei, ra '^Wrjvoiv
be (f)avXi^€L, a description totally irreconcilable with the content of
the poem.'^ In consequence, the epigram following it was also taken
to be by Leo, who thus in his old age bade farewell to poetry and
became a student of rhetoric under Photius. In Photius' correspond-
ence there is a letter to Leo concerning a point of Biblical Greek,
but we have no evidence of any closer contact.'^
Items XIII and XIV are the dedicatory poems of the Sylloge
Euphemiana, already mentioned. Since in the manuscripts and in
Boissonade's edition they are preceded by Leo's epigram X, Leo
became their author and thereby a native of Hypata in Thessaly and
a contemporary of Leo the Wise, which led to further confusion with
Leo Choerosphactes, even after Schneidewin had pointed out the
'=^ Scripta minora, ed. Westerink, I, Leipzig 1968, 322. 29-33.
'•^ S. B. Kougeas, 'OKaiffapdac, 'ApiOaq, Athens 1913, 22.
" Arethas, op. cit., 288. 7-20; 231. 3-12.
'* The poems were published by P. Matranga, Anecdota Graeca, Rome 1850, II.
555-559; on the episode see, besides Lemerle pp. 172-175, R. Anastasi, "Costantino
Siculo e Leone Filosofo," Siculorum Gymnasium, N.S. 16 (1963), 84-89; M. D. Spadaro,
"Sulle composizioni di Costantino il Filosofo del Vaticano 915," ibid., 24, 1971,
175-197.
'^ Photius, Ep. 208, ed. Laourdas-Westerink, vol. II (Leipzig 1984).
2" Op. cit. (above, note 12), pp. 6-7.
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I. AeovToq 0tXoo-60ou eiq ^ifiXov (xr]xoiviKy]v
BijSXoq nTi]xotVLKr)- KvpLvoq de ^lu i^eirovrjae
Map/cfXXou yvo)TOLO avuepxo/xeuov Kara noxdov.
II. Toil avTov AeouToq (t)LXoa6(l)ov eiq rrfv fii^Xov TLavXov aarpoXdyov
Qeaipara fiavTu^rjc, ^otlSrjidoq, opyia rex^rjc,
aarpoXoyiCVy liavXbq p.' edLda^aro Kvdipoq avrjp.
III. ToO avTov AeovToq dq raq ^i^Xovq UpoKXov Kal Qkccvoq, rriq
peu Qeojuoq acrrpovoptKriq, Trjq de Hpo/cXou yeo^perpLKriq
Bi^Xoq (de(t)voq Kal Hpo/cXou tcou Tvavab4)(jiv.
^L^Xoq woXov T6 Kal x^ovoq (pepei perpa'
Qewv iroXov pep Kal lipoKXoq perpel x^'ova,
Wp'oKXoq pev ovv yr}v koI Qeojip perpel ttoXov.
ap4)U3 6' eV larjq T(hv e-jraivccp a^LOL, 5
ap(t>o) 6' apoi(3i]P rCbp Xoyoop rerevxctTOP.
Qeoop UpoKXov yap Xap^aPiCP oo<t)aq deaeiq
beiKPVOL ravTatq rovq bpbpovq to)p aarepiCP'
UpbKXoq be bei^eLq tov Qeoi^poq Xap^apoup
Tavraiq apaXvei Kal Trpo^aXXet raq d'eaetq. 10
aXX' o) oocpTf ^vpccpi, X(^w'^ Moi Xiap'
XaipoLq, Qeoop apiare, TraP(TO<pop Kapa,
b pvp TTVKa^iCP TTjp 'AXe^apbpov irbXiP'
XCtipotq be Kal av, Ilpo/cXe, tov liapTrrjbbpoq
apicTTOP alpa Tolq bXoiq ^o<jopepop. 15
IV. ^(jotlov iraTpiapxov KooparaPTLPOVTrbXecjoq, aXXoi be (f)aaLV
AeoPToq tov (l)iXocrb(t)ov, eiq ttjp pi^Xop AevKLTnrr]q
"E/ocoTo; TTLKpbp, aXXa au)(i)popa ^iop
b KXeiTO(j)ibpToq coairep epcpaipei Xbyoq'
b AevKL-Kirrjq be aoocppopeaTaToq ^ioq
airaPTaq e^iaT-qai, Trcbq TeTvppePt]
KeKappePT] re Kal KaT-qxP^i-^tJi-'^VTl-, ^
TO br] peyioTOP, rplq Bapova eKapTepei.
eiTrep be Kal av (Toxppopelp deXrjq, (f)iXoq,
pi] TrjP irapepyop rriq ypa(t)fiq a/coxei deap,
Tr}P Toi) Xbyov be irpCbTa avpbpoprip pade
pvp(t)0(jToXe'l yap Tovq Trodovpraq ep^pbp(X)q. 10
I. Anth. Pal. IX 200. II. Anth. Pal. IX 201. III. Anth. Pal. IX 202. || 13 vvv]
perh. vu). IV. Anth. Pal. IX 203
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V. AeovToq (f)LXoa6<t)ov dc, tov (f)i,\d<TO(f)ov U.op<t>vpLov
Ty T(bv Xoyoiv (TOV KoyxvXr), Ilop^upie,
ffaiTTeLq TO. x^^Xtj koX (TToXi^eiq raq <t)ptvac,.
VI. keovToq <t)LXoa6(t>ov eiq toc KoiVLKCt ' AiroXXooviov
^Up rj8e ^i^Xoq tvbov oibiv(jo, 0tXe,
^advq xoipocKTrjp /cat TreptaKeXrjq ayav
ddraL KoXvix^rjToi) be TravTccq ArfXiov.
€L 6' av KV^LCTTTjaeL TLC, iiq ifiovq fivxovq
Kol Ttav neraXXevaeiev ocKpL^Coq ^adoq, 5
yeoonerpcbv to. TrpCora Xr}\l/eTai yepa,
(TO(f>bq 8' auan4>iX€KToq eL<TKptdr]a€TaL.
TOVTOiV b\ napTvq iyyvrjTrjq re HXaroov.
VII. Tov avTov eLq KrjpvKiov
2x^M« TraXawTCiTOiv avbpOiv KTipvKtov adpei,
QpLvaKiTfc, OLKiffTct Kopiudie, oc, ttot' eiTLueq
an(t>t,fi6r}Ta peedpa H/VprjKoairjc, ' Apedovarjq.
VIII. AeovToq (t)LXoab(j)OV eiq Trapdevov (t>dapelaap, 'OnrjpoKevrpa
Mrirep e/xr] bvanrjrep, airrfuea dvnov e'xovaa,
Xirjv ax^op-ai eXKoq, 6 p,€ ^porbq ovracrev avrjp,
vvKTa bi 6p4>vair]v, ore 6' evbovai iSpoTol aXXot,
yvfMubq arep Kopvdbq re Kal acFTriboq, ovb' k'x^u eyxoq.
nav 6' viredepixavdr] ^i(f)oq atparc avrap eireira 5
ovpbv T€ 7rpo€7)Kev oc'KT]p.ova re Xtapbv re.
IX. KiovToq (f)iXoab(f)ov eiq eavrov tov eTvovofxa^on'tvov "EXXTji'oq
^vye TvxV Mf TToeiq airpayfioavvrj yC 'Ettikoupou
rjbiaTjj Kop.€ovaa Kal rjavx'ij} repirovaa.
TLTTTe be noL xP^oq aaxoXir]q iroXvKrfbeoq aubpo)v;
ovK edeX(x> ttXovtov, TV(t)Xbv (t)iXov, aXXoirpbaaXXov,
ov Tifiaq' TLpal be ^pordv ap.evr]vbq oveipoq. 5
eppe poL, oj KipKTjq bvo(f)epbv a-Keoq' aibeopai yap
ovpavLoq yeyacbq fiaXauovq are drjpiov eadeiV
piacc A(ji)TO(l>ay(jCiv yXvKep7]v XnTOTraTpLU eboobriv,
Hieipiivitiv re p'eXoq Karayoiybv avaivofiat exOpCbv
V. Anth. Pal. IX 214. VI. Anth. Pal. IX 578 || i Diog. Laert. II 22 || S cf. Elias,
In categ. 118.18. VII. Anth. Pal. IX 579 || 2-3 cf. Anth. Pal. XIV 73.3. VIII. Anth.
Pal. IX 361
II
1 Od. 23.97 || 2 //. 5.361 || 3 II. 10.83 || 4 II. 21.50 || 5 //. 16.333 j
Od. 1.123
II 6 Od. 5.268. IX. Anth. Pal. XV 12.
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aWa Xa^elv deodeu ypvxooobov evxoficuL avdoq, 10
flCbXv, KaKO^V 8o^Cx)V a\KTT]plOV it)Ta 5f KtfpQ)
a(T(l)aX€(joc, KXdaac, irpoipvyelp ytveTrioiov bpp,i)v.
ravra Xi'ywv re ypa(t)ijiv rt irepaq ^lotolo KLX^irjv.
X. AeovToq 4>L\oob(t)ov
'^vxpbv TO yr)pac„ rj r' eixi] Kpaaic, <f)va€i
(060) 4>\eynaT<jo8r}c,- p,T)v 6' 6 ^e^povapLoq
^pvxpbq ixaXiara, ^o)5lou 6' 'Tdprjxbov
TO vvv TToXevou Kal (Tvvov n€d' ijXiov
Trriyvvai Kal top oivov ev tktlv tottolc, 5
Tovq T an(t)opdq priyvvaiv e'/c Tr}c, xl/v^eooc,.
6 6' OLKoq e'pda vvv KaTaaKrjvcb ttolXlv
cxyavvL(f)b<; rt Kal Xiau bvox^ip-^poq.
b dpaoKLaq Se dpcuvq (Vrt Kal iriKpbq,
b^vq, dvaarjq, TapTapov Trvobtq e'xooi'" 10
6 yap vbToq XeXonrev riixCov to KXifia.
TTOJ^ OVV, TOaOVTitiV XpVXPOTrjTUiV €U /i€(TCO
bpa)v fie avax^devTa top TaXavTaTov,
vboop KeXevetq 7rpo(T06peo'^ai, (f)iXTaTt\
ft yap n€ TreiaeLq, rj xito" yevr^aoixai 15
77 Kal x^^oi^oi, Kal davicv vtKpooTbXoiq
arpavoToq b:q KpvcTaXXoq (hv 4>oivr](jop.ai.
TT) cry TreiroLdctiq xpvKTLKy irapaLveati.
aTreXde tolvvv dq Tbirovq Triq 'Ivbiaq
(iq T ' Ayr]avnl3ii)v etq Tt BXefivuiv irbXeiq, 20
OTTOV Xeyovaiv afxireXovq nrj ^XaoTavnv
(KelcTi del^ov arjv laTpiKrju, ao(t)e.
rjulu yap ovk eveoTi XP^i-Oi rriq T^x^'^'ii
€t ^v deXoLfxev Kal top riXiov fiXeireiv.
XI. AeovToq (f)LXoob4)OV eiq TpavXov p.adr}Tr]v avTOV
S] TpavXoprjuov tpavXiitiTpavXe yvade,
TpavXbXaXov iravTpavXov iVTpavXov CTbp.a,
X. Boissonade pp. 469-470; Schneidewin pp. 7-8, Cougny IV 77, pp. 412-413
II
20 read 'Ayiavfi^wv \ BKinnvwv Boissonade. XL Sternbach pp. 297-303 (L = Laur.
5, 10, f. 214^; M = Paris. Suppl. gr. 690, f. 108^; P = Paris. 1720, f. 73^; also in V
= Vat. gr. 1276, f. 100' || tit. as in LV: arixoi. ac, tov <l>vaijvadov P, aq TpavXov M || i
TpavXtirri TpavXtyuade L || 2 om. M | rpavXlXaXov P (read rpauX^XaXoj'?) ||
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rpavXriyopovv avapdpov rpvyovoc, rpoirop,
avpi^e, Kpa^e, rpv^e aov rpavXbv neXoq,
Kpov Kpov KeKpayuiq ev Trpvfivoiq devdpojv KXcadoK;. 5
*XII. (by Constantine the Sicilian)
Olov 8ri Koi tovto to rfpoSCKoeXeyelov avrov'
"Eppe HOI, oj TpLTOcXaiva HoXvixvLa, eppere Movaai,
avTotp eyoou cxtto vvv pr]Topi.Kf}q epafiai,
^6}TL0v apxi-ipvoi yepovTobLbaoKoXov €vp6)v,
6q lit yaXaKTi eccv dpe\{/e ddcov vaixaTUiv.
*XIII (by compiler of Sylloge Euphemiana)
Et(; 'EiV4>r)ixiov
TavTOL <J0L lodXa vodv, E,v<pT]ixu, eadXa xoi^Pocttu
Movao-KoXoq ^fti/oq an4>ayaTra^6fievoq,
oq irpoXeXoLTre iraTprjv ifd' 'EXXada KaXXiyvvaLKa
Kal yXvKeprjv KaXvfirju QeTraXiKriq 'T-Karrjq,
Koi vvv acxTV kXvtov Bv^cxvtlov an<f)LiroX€vet. 5
TTLarbq licv depairoov KOLpavirjq fieyaXrjq,
ijv pa Aecjop ixedeirei b oo<t)WTaToq iv ^aoiXtvaiv
iv diKrj, €v cro4>ir), ev irvKLvalq TrpaTriaiv.
*XIV (by the same)
*'AXXa eiq tov avrov
Baia ixev t'^ 'EXlkcovoc; aTrrjvdL(Tap.r]v, iravv jSaia
XeipLa, Mov(Ta(x}v, Ev0t]hl€, wayKXvra bOipa.
III. Job
The poem Job, or. On bidifference to Grief and on Patience, has been
preserved by the late Byzantine author John Eugenicus, who included
it in a collection of miscellaneous material which he copied in 1439,
now Parisinus Gr. 2075. Though this particular item (ff. 396'^-410'^)
3 TpavXriXaXow M | rpoir^ L || ^ upa^i, rpv^e (rpift P), avpi^i LPV | avvTpocvXov V,
abv XaXov M || 5 irpvfiuou; Sternbach: irpvuvoic, L, irptfivou; PV, ocKpoic, M. XII. Matranga
p. 559, Cougny III 255 (pp. 332-333); from Vat. gr. 915, f. 228^ || 4 kwv dpePt] IBpePt
MSS. and edd. | duwv] perh. baujiv. XIII. Boissonade p. 470; Schneidewin pp. 5-6;
Cougny III 256 (p. 333) || 5 wKivalc, Boissonade: mwraU, Schneidewin. XIV. Boissonade
p. 470; Schneidewin p. 6; Cougny III 257 (p. 334).
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is duly recorded in Omont's description of the manuscript,^' nobody
seems to have paid any attention to it, until Father J. Paramelle
rediscovered it some ten years ago.
In the manuscript, the poem itself is preceded by a protheoria in
prose, short and to the point, which sounds like a program rather
than a summary, and must be by Leo himself.^^
The poem can be summed up as follows:
Prologue (1-18). Ours is a message of joy. We must first deal with
the question of character (which may be such as to resist all treatment),
after which we will recount the story of Job and other lights of this
earth. If only happiness were less rare in the world !
Part I (19-38): character. There is no cure for the lachrymose
temperament of Heraclitus, nor for Timon's innate misanthropy.
Part II (39-215): Job. His prosperity and subsequent misfortunes,
grief and resignation (39-101); his disease, his wife's reproaches
(102-154). The visiting friends: Job curses the day of his birth
(155-186); Zophar's [Eliphaz'] answer (187-201). After seven years
( ! ) God intervenes and restores Job's fortunes (202-215).
Part III (216-638): a consolation on traditional lines, with pagan
and Christian examples. We must follow Job's example (216-226).
Though grief over the loss of relatives and friends is natural and
may be overpowering, because the origin is physiological as much as
mental, there are considerations by which we can master it (Thales,
Xenophon) (227-315). The only profitable tears are those we shed
because of our sins (316-338). Examples of David, Abraham, the
mother of a young martyr of Sebaste,^^ the mother of the Maccabees,
Socrates (339-399). Why should we grieve when a loved one has
escaped the miseries of this world? (400-430). Loss of honor and
rank can be borne (Dionysius, Orontes) (431-487). So can poverty
(Jacob, a shepherd; the apostles, fishermen; Artaxerxes, Anacreon,
Antisthenes) (488-608). Whatever happens to us has happened to
others; nothing in this world is stable (609-627). Musonius' prayer;
the poet's own (628-638).
Obviously, the work is written in the tradition of the Siarptj^Tj of
Hellenistic and Roman times, with two important differences: (1) it
^' H. Omont, Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque Nationale, II,
1888.
-'^ The protheoria which Eugenicus wrote to HeHodorus' Aethiopica (A. M. Bandini,
Catalogus codicum Graecorum Bibl. Laurentianae , III, Florence 1770 [Leipzig 1961],
322-323) is totally different in manner: verbose, and heavily rhythmical.
'-" One of the "Forty Martyrs" in whose church Leo taught for many years (above
p. 194).
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is entirely in verse, and thereby different from the Menippean satire
as well as from the Epictetean prose tract; (2) it differs from com-
parable Greek prose works in that, like Cicero's Tusculanae, it attempts
to strengthen the reader against any kind of misfortune: bereavement,
disgrace, poverty. The philosophy is of a homely, unpretentious kind,
not unlike that propounded in Epigram IX. There is nothing, here
or elsewhere, to indicate a metaphysician who could have played a
leading part in the preservation and revival of Neoplatonic literature.^''
When Constantine the Sicilian mentions Proclus among the friends
that Leo will meet in hell
{rjixi- XpucrtTTTTOuq l^o^KpaTtac, re idoLq,
IlpbKXovq r' r}de UXaroovaq, 'A/oio-totcXck;, 'EinKovpovq,
EvKXeidac, re (t)i\ovq /cat UroXenaarpopo/xovq),^^
he may be thinking of the commentary on Euclid; actually, the other
names in the list suggest that he had no distinct notion of Leo's
philosophical interests.
The learning displayed in the poem is less than impressive. Com-
monplaces, such as Heraclitus the weeping philosopher (20), hellebore
used to cure insanity (27), Timon the misanthrope (31), the jealous
Cerberus (33-35), taken by themselves, mean little or nothing; added
up together, they seem to point to a reader of Lucian. Of the
apophthegms cited, no less than three come from Ps.-Plutarch, Regum
et imperatorum apophthegmata; some more, probably, from other works
by, or attributed to, Plutarch (234-235; 256-257; 292-294). Diogenes
Laertius may be another source, and so may Aelian's De natura
animalium.
As regards the formal qualities of the poem, the protheoria is
instructive. Avoiding "harder" or "harsher" words, Leo says, he will
use a "more pedestrian and more Homeric" style, for the sake of
clarity as well as of pleasant effect. The more difficult poetic style
which he has decided not to use is apparently that of Nonnus and of
the later poets of the Anthology, Paul the Silentiarius, Agathias, and
their circle.
Once one has accustomed oneself to the transformation of Homeric
verse into a colloquial, almost Horatian hexameter, it becomes possible
to appreciate the skill and variety with which Leo handles this medium.
He gives a plausible imitation of the manner of the Stoic preacher,
^^ He is, with Leo Choerosphactes, one of the few possible owners of the so-called
"philosophical collection" (nine manuscripts of Plato, Damascius, Maximus of Tyre,
Proclus, Paradoxographi, Olympiodorus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Simplicius), on
which see The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo (above, note 10), pp. 30-31.
2=* Matranga, p. 556 (II, 12-14).
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combined with that of the Christian homilist, which, at least for a
short period of his life, he actually was. With the Homeric language
comes also Homeric meter, or what is supposed to pass for it, and
here we are faced with a problem, that of the prosody of this poem.
In the epigrams, Leo's hexameters (a total of 26 lines), though
they do not meet the rigorous requirements of the Nonnian hexa-
meter, are all sound by classical and Hellenistic standards. Similarly,
his iambic trimeters are regular Byzantine dodecasyllabics, with only
one case of the use of an anapest (III. 10); besides the paroxytone
verse end, which around this time became the rule, Leo also admits
the proparoxytone and the oxytone end. Here and there, but rarely,
a dichronon is given the wrong quantity: a at IX. 1, o6i(t)pova; l at I.
1 , Kvpivoq; u at V. 1 , Ilop^Opie.
The poet of Job, on the contrary, permits himself considerable
freedom in the matter of prosody. I list the principal irregularities.
(1) Elision not expressed in writing (e.g., 146, 154, 160), a practice
not uncommon in the period.
(2) Crasis not expressed in writing (233, 474).
(3) Hiatus after a long vowel without correptio (10, 28, 61, 68, 70,
etc.).
(4) Hiatus after a short vowel (21, 26, 40, 43, 48, 61, etc.); with
lengthening of the short vowel (27, 185).
(5) Intrusive movable v either before a vowel (29, 264, 368, 555),
or before a consonant (125); omission of movable v (103).
(6) Confusion of single and double consonants: 27 iXe^opoio, 34
OTTto-o), 75 (TTTjOtaL, 130 yavvvvrat, 152 dv(T(Top.eu, 262 rooicv, 370
oaovq, 374 (ppL\J/ep, etc.
(7) Lengthening o{ cUchrona: 6 'ApafiLr}q, 41, 112, 199, 211 'Zarav
(short first syllable 45, 102), 53 Tad\ 62 aubptavTa, 63 irapbc, 108
b'i^iac,, 118 ovap, 148 -koKlv, 162 airovra, 195 av, etc.; also of
visibly short vowels: 93, 131, 157 rbv, 115 f'/JctXe, etc.
Most of these can be either discarded as merely orthographical, or
corrected as common errors (though it should be borne in mind that
on the whole the text is in excellent shape), or defended on the
ground of comparable cases in Homer.
Other anomalies are less easy to account for:
(8) Faulty caesuras, especially diaeresis after the second or the third
foot (16, 153, 446, 537, 638; 382, 393, 411, 416, 436, 445, 477,
486, 620); in later Byzantine attempts at writing hexameters these
are the clearest indication that the sense of the hexameter is lost.
(9) Metrical imperfections for which there is no obvious emendation,
e.g., 169 eXKOidevra Kal yvfiuop (short Kal), 174 e^ouro 5' ovtl
(redundant 6'), 195 av 6' et Trore irpodeXvp-vov (short ei), 531 Kal
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rifiiyvfivoq {-yvfx- short), 538 auroaKevrfv wot' 'ApTa^ep^rjq ( 'Ap- short),
598 'AvTiadeurtq (-ti- short), 605 ovx opav yap XPV-
There are two possible explanations: either Leo improved his
technique in the course of a lifetime, or he deliberately applied a
looser standard for what he considered a more popular genre, in
which case the qualification ire^oTepaiq Kal naWou 'OixrjpiKalq [Xe^eai]
would hold for the meter as well as for the style. I do not think that
the anomalies warrant the supposition of another "Leo the Philoso-
pher" or of an erroneous title, all the less so as these lines, whatever
their imperfections, are technically too good to be considered the
work of a poet of later (Comnenan or Palaeologan) times.
Upodeotipia
'H KocffxiKT] XvTT] Kara ttoXXo: Kal yiverai Kal Xiytrai, irepl Ccv ovk
((TTL X67a; diaXa^elv to. bl Ke(t)a\ai(jo5((jTepa Tama iaTi, ttXovtov Kal
do^Tjq airoTVx'i-ai Kal (f)iXu)v Kal avyyevibv davaTot. iretpaTai tolvvv 6
Xoyoc, Tovq irepl TavTa XeXvK-qnevovq octo Trjq KaTO. top 'IojjS loTopiac,,
airo XoyLOfxCov Kal Tvapacviancv Kal iaTopLuiu Kal irapadeLynaTicv Kad'
oaov OLOv T6 Traprjyopelv Kal iiravaKTaadaL. ioTkov b\ otl aa(t)r}ueiac, eyeKa
Kal yXvKVTr]Toq tolc, Tpax^Tepaq b Xbyoc, airoaTp(:<f)eTaL Xe^eLC,, xPV'''<xl be
TTt^oTtpaiq Kal jxaXXov 'OfirjpLKalq.
AeovToq (f)LXoab<f)ov 'loj/? rj irepl aXviriac, Kal vironovrjc,
'Apxofied' eixppoavvrjq' Kal yap TOtbe 4)app.aKa Xvirrjc,
apyaXer]c„ rj brj TroXXovq eKTeive Kal eadXovq.
apxbuevoi be ^vaeiq Kal rjdea irpC^Ta Kpivovp.ev,
o)v avdLCTTanevoou Tefxveiu iroXv kocXXlop vbpav
eiTa Kal avTOV 'IcojS jxviqoiciieda KapTepbdvp.ov, 5
yalt^q ' Apafiirfq kXvtou tJXlov, eha Kal aXXovq
aoTepaq eyxdoviovq, o? evrjvyaaav evda Kal evda,
o4>pa Tiq eK tov eToip.ov exoi irapaphBiov alyXrjp.
Xalpe KO.Tep ixeya Kvboq 'Ico/3, p.eya davp-a ^lolo,
OKpdiTOP aXXo yepoq' xoif^POi-Te be Kal oi eKeipov 10
Lxveaip eaTopepot Kal ix^ia Beta XnroPTeq
evcrTe(t)eeq avpefSrjT' eirl aajS^aTa Kal XeipCbpaq.
AW u)(f)eXX' 6 iSioq to. Kpeooopa nXeiopa (l)ep(3eip,
Tojp be xfpfioTfpojj' aizaPiP eibepaf aXXa to. pep br]
4 Zenob. 6.26 {Corp. Paroemiogr. Gr. I 169) ||
5 fimiaoiJLfea P || 10 oi P || 11 iirontvoi P || 13 o<^€AX' P
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ev TL Ka\ ev vrou oparai eirl (XKOireXoLq, to. b\ x^'^P^ 15
Xoxfictt Kal dpvfia Kal aXXr) xpanfioq ovk fVioTrroq,
icq Trf btvoi ioTrjTi. TrapicrTaTai, ovde tlc, otbiv
vypicTOLO vbov, Kal d ttocvv aXKinoq eartv.
'AXX' rJTOi 4)vaLeq nev eVi \l/vxpotq apapvlai
iroXXovq Kal vvu bpo^aiv amibiac, 'HpaKXeirouq, 20
01 pa vofii^ovTec, baKpvojbea Tvavra yt eivai
wavr' avbp' OLKji^ovat Kal aaxf^Ta baKpvxiovai,
axf^TXioc T] yap ep-eXXov cVi a<pi(Ti. baKpva x^^^^v.
oi bf. Tob' ovx bpboiOLV eV axXvi, iraura b' hatpov
Hvpovrai, Kal ovbe yeXoifievot i^aviaoLV. 25
TLC, TTore Tovq irpoaayoLTo; riq av rabt LTjaaiTo;
ovb' av aitaaav aXa avr' eXXe^bpoLO iroTi^oiq,
vixpetq fj ireiaeLq Kav aapbbvwv p-eibrjaaL.
evdev iareoi eta'' d yap ireipa peralSaXXeLV,
o^vTtpov yoboiaiv eueipovaiv re tlv' vj3pLV. 30
Tovq be k€ Tipuivaq— Kol yap riveq eiVi Kal rjbr]
rdv edewv eKeivov Kal Kpaaewq evfiOLpovvreq—
eq KbpaKaq (SaXeeiv rj Kepfiepiovq eirl x<J^POvq'
€1 fxr) Tovq k' eXaaeuu b KepjSepoq avTLq OTriaaoi,
OVK ideXoiv bpaav ^piapiCTdpov aXXov kavTOV. 35
joXq av \iy\ lyyi^oiq^ e-Kel ovx t'TK^? aweXevaT)'
tv yap a<t)LP yevvecrcn ro/xelq Tre(f)vaaiv obbvTeq,
OL ae KaKov bpaaovaiv, (Kaq 5' vXaovai tl bpi^iv.
AvTap cVtl TOVTOvq l^eCioafitv iq K^vvboapytq,
avToq 5' co Qebriixe, ev (})poveoiv tTvaKOvoiq 40
aSXov 'lojjS Kal ^arav. oq ev^aro rbvbe aaXevaaL,
icq b filv r\v aperyai irepiTrXeoq eixf re rhva
Kebva Kal olkou olkX^tov air' ovpavbdev re eiraLUov
TO) 5' iirl Trvp4>bpou onp,a H/arav fiaXev, Ik 5' airrjaaq
rbvbe Kal afx(f)LXa^iCP ovrooq ixbpeve Kar' avroi). 45
'Aypbdev rjXvde riq KtKovLixevoq IbpCioiv re,
ev be araq irpodvpoiq baKpvo^beoq rjp^aro iivdov
"KXD^i, neyioTe ava^, "A^pap. TrpoipepeaTare Traibu^v,
brjioq riXde (paXay^ KeKopvBfievoL aiyeirjaL,
aivTieq c'/c l!,vpir]q, ccaei rivoq avrwoovToq' 50
€K be I3baq XvaavTO Kal i^Xaoav evpvfxeTOOTrovq,
33 Zenob. 3.87 {CPG I 78-79) || 39 Diogenian. 4.86 {CPG I 246) || 42-43 Job
1.1-2
II
44-45 cf. Job 1.6-12 || 46-53 Job 1.13-15 ||
16 perh. btXir} y}/anoc, || 17 perh. w; || 27 ike^opoio P || 29 amp P || 30 (vtipovm P |
perh. Tiv
II
31 k(] perh. yt \\ 32 read Kiivov || 34 diriau} P || 40 write ivippoptwv \\ 42 «?
P II 43 ocKXarov = cuKKaoTOv or a/cXiror? || 49 aCxaT^m P ||
L. G. Westerink 207
Kocd 5e Kal avdpaq eire4>Pou aoXXeaq ocficl)' apoToiaf
novvoq iyoou viraXv^a re'iv Tad' e^ayopevoiv.''
"fiq ye Tavr' idprjver l^iaTaTO riq -Kodev aWoq,
Iv 5' (TTL^aq Tcpodvpoiq Xiyvpop KaTodvpero ixvdov 55
"KXD^i, neyiare ava^, "A^pap. Trpo(l)epeaTaTe iraidoov,
deairidaeq irvp rjcpdrj air' ovpavodev iravv ddov
KOiVTa re irlova prjXa Kal auepac, oiofioTripac,
rjVTe xoprou eXarpe, iroXvq 6' avadptro Kairvbc;
ixovvoq ey(hv VTraXv^a rdv Tab'' i^ayopevoov.'" 60
HXde Kal iinroTroXoq Kal aiyovbpoq Tabe eipo)P'
Tov 6' aptrr^q kXivuv ovk eadevou avbpiavTa.
^deyyopevoou b' en Tu>ube rapa iroalu aXXoq eireaTrj
aadpaivitiu, Kal pvdov virofiXrjbrjv tov evLairev
''"Q.poL ava^ (l)iX6TeKve, ovvec, to. pt) eibopev epya' 65
Tcalq 6 irpea^vTepoq toc TrpoXoiira aov ayXaa TeKva
balT evTVvapevoq KLKXrjaKeTO, oi be avuriXdov.
icq be (fyiXri ewl baiTl iraprfpevoi eoTiboiVTo,
e'/c 6' opecoj/ poL^rjbbu eireoavTo deacfyaToq rjxoq,
ev 6' eirprjae bbpoi>, Kal avTiKa crolq fVi Traialu 70
rjpLire deaireaicoq, KaTa 6' eKTadev ayXaa TeKua,
7] be Tpaire^a Tacfyoq, Kpr)Tr]p 6' eTciTvp^ioq otvoq-
povvoq eyihv v-KocXv^a, ooq aide poi riu tot' bXeadai.''
Ar] tot' 'Io;/? e(j)avr] Kal aapKLVoq- rjv apa Kal ^coq-
aicXayxva yap oi OT-qdeaoL (})LXo(7TbpyoLoi,v ayepdrj 75
pvrjaaneifu) iraibtcv deoeibeoov, ovq TeKev ainoq
Kal apeTalq aTuaXXe, Kal eXireTO xfipfcii' avTobu,
evTe (j)aoq TrpoXiTrot, ^vvrjq bairjq TeTVXVffai.
Tobv TbT' e-Kipv-qadelq xoiXeiroi) Kal aojpoi; bXedpov
KpaToq awb ^adeov peXavbxpoaq etXKiTO xoiiraq, 80
aCq r]vx^i Kopbwu Kal e(f)aLueTO Tipioq aaTolq,
cxut' avTUiv be kovlv KaTex^vaTo aiaxoq eavTU).
e'/c 5' apa Trop(j)vpeou (papoq kXvtov apcpoTepyaL
pfj^e bibovq Kal tovto, iraX-qv t' ext yvpvbq e'xcijpei.
eq be ybvv KXivBelq Ke(l)aXr]v r' errl yalau epeiaaq 85
X^vev a-Ko 0Xe<pap<ji)v iroTapCuv irvpbevTa peedpa,
<t)ri be ^apv(jTevax(*^v e-KiBapavvo^v re eavTbv
"'fi5e yap e/c prjTpaq vwb riXiov rjXdov aveim^iv,
xdpecLU ovTL (f)epu)v, ovt ap TeKoq ovTe tl aXXo'
54-60 Job 1.16 II 61 (not in Job) || 63-73 Job 1.18-19 || 74-101 cf. Job 1.20-21
54 perh. 'fi;, and comma after ieprjvH \\ 55 KarwdvpfTo P || 57 rjipdv Paramelle: rjadv
P
II 67 ivTuvafiaxx; P || 75 aTfidiai P | perh. iyepdri || 83 4>apoc, P || 84 em P || 87 <t>r]<Tl P
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a)5f dffiLq yvnuop jue iraXLP /cat ovdep exovra 90
/ccia' Lfiev awpoTiixaarop, ololkop, ocTratd', airepiTTOP.
ci 6c ye (^Kai) ixrj pvp, aXX' avpiop (i^Xero Ko.PTa.
ev fiOL ravra avpriXd', tpa top epop rfXtda Trapra
TWP Kal tC)p a0cXa}j' eiq ovpapop apriop A/cco.
ovK ifxa ravra (Trodep;), aa 5e Kal rOiP aCiP ranieioop- 95
eiaoKep otdaq a(l)fiKaq' €<joq edeL inirapedrjKaq'
PVP orap OVK ev exy, ore Xo^lop ov ({)yq eipai,
KaXibq Kal opdCic, kolCjp ttcxXip avrbq airrfvpic,
o^q aiel ra epaprV eiriarpo(l)a aXXoirpocraXXa."
4>ri Kal apaaraq earo rpi^diPLOP ep xpdC Xvypop, 100
Kal n'epep eq rop apoo fivaaop KparepCoq arepi^oiP.
Ovd' aXabq 'Earap rjaro, opipe be hlp rabe fiaXXop-
brj tot' eireppa^ep ru) 'Icij/3 x^^^'rcoTepoi' aXXuiP.
icq be Xecjop ^Xoavpoiizbq evTrroXenotq apdpcc-KOLq
vaniprjpbe fioXu)P, Kal avriKa p.ep KaKO. reuxcoj', 105
evre rvitrj TraXXei, ira/xoorepoq avrbq eavrov,
chq areppC) to? 'IojjS irap.6irepop enireae baip-oiP.
avTLKa Trap rb bepaq e^e^eaep eXKea Beioiq^
beLPolq, a-Kpoairoiq, rapaCop airo ^peyparoq axpt-
Kal rjXyei pep, erXtf be airo^voop Kal opopypvq 110
barpaK(xi Ix^paq ovxvop xpopop' aXXa Kal ovrcoq
ov pediei 'Larap ovb' e^pi^ero, aXXa oi rjyep
pfjxoq b oi KareXei\[/ep exeLP ayKvpap ayCiPoq,
prixoq OJ ov Xap\l/(j}p, ovr' ap HioXopihp apr'eaxe,
prixoq a0' ov Kal bXrjp dcTraPO) Karoj e/SaXe (f)V(rLP. 115
Top 6' airapeL^opept] Karopeibeep tq aXbxoLO'
'"'AdXelq, aXXa parr]P, Kal eq rjepa Kal av ye rvivreiq.
eXwib' exeLq, aXX' earip opap apvwapKrop aeXirrop'
rjTTOv aoL pvara^ei virep kXvtop 'Epbvpiuipa'
TTplp yap rr]pbe 7' eXdetp, otpoL, airoXCiXapev, oipoi, 120
pccpvpoL, ovrt XiTTOPreq, opeibea 6' oia Kal aL^xV-
rb ax^TXiuirarop, oi KaXol Kal apvpopeq vCeq
ai daXepai re dvyarpeq, ep aiq oibtpa Kal erXrjp,
wpip TLPa Kapirop exeip poL 6Xo:Xaro irapreq aptaroL.
riq Tore roiab' oiroiizep ri eKXve; riq rab' epeyKoi; 125
Kal 6' eyo) if bvarrjpoq eXevdepirj Kal abeirf
apdrfcaaa iraXai ynpcc pbxOu) re Kal aibol.
108-111 Job 2.7-8 II 116-136 Job 2.9 || 117 cf. CPG II 111, note; 1 Cor. 9.26
93 avpfiXdiP P
II
96 aaoK P || 99 mg. yvumof P
I
ivavria P || 103 iwippa^t P || 104
mg. Trap{a0o\)fi P || 109 airb P || 116 t6v6' P || 120 perh. Tr}v5' ekdetv \\ 123 evyaripii; P
II 125 tkXvtv P II
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oiKov «7r' oiKov Lovaa, tottov totov, ov8ov air' ovdov.
aWoiq fieu {ovu} (f)i\ou eod' "Tirepiova voodpbv odeveiv,
oCc, b ^ioq x<^P^f^? t*^' f'""' Tifiara fxaKpa yavvvrac 130
Tov 6' eycb rjdeXov iq tou ALyoKeprja dajxi^uv,
(i)c, Tax^ iravoineada iroXvirXaveoq Kanocroio,
ToaaaL /it rpvxovaiv ot^veq aXyivoeaaaL.
vvv 5' OTL Triq x^'^-P^ ^^'^'i to Oavelu p.ey' ap.tivov,
eiwe TL Tvrdbv eiroq Trpbq Kvpiov, ojq ae Ka\ rjixaq 135
daaaov airaXXa^eie TroXvxpoviu^v 6bvva(S)vy
Trjv 6' ocppvq avvayoiv TjvLTraire Kaprepbq 'IcO|S.
" ft yvvai, 7] (T€ eoXira TrepicppoavvrjaLv epi^eiv
ovpavia4>L 'Fe^€KKa, eVei debv otada koX avri]-
viiu be Kal aKXeiC^v iraaeo^v {laXa irbXX' airoXdireLq. 140
bTTiroTe ^ovXeveLU yap (Set BtotiKea ^ovXr\v,
bic, debq LXaoq 6 it/, koI auaKToq wep eovaa,
uvv TOi euauTia av ^vpayeiq, yvvai raXav,
Tocq lieLpriuaq 'lo;/? iiaXa prjibic^iq Kal aaTTTU^q.
et yap 66' b irXacrTrjq to. xPWt' eTrex^veu, euoi/xa, 145
rjnelq a^.(pOTepr)aiv ebexvvjxid', rjVLKa vvv brj
a(f)paoToiq Kpairibtoaiv btaanevoq to. /irj Lop.ev
avTa kolXlv ipvr), Vfiaq 5' edeXet iroueecrdai,
ov ^7} v-K0OT(x>n€v, yXihaoav 5' (Tra(t)U)iJ.ev obovatv;
OVK ayadol depairopreq ol eV daXirjatv avaKraq 150
aLUovvTeq p,eTa bij tl KaKov rpv^ovai, ^ocbcnv.
ttra (TV yivuiaKeiq otl avriKa bvaofiev atau;
€K TLVoq; 77 TTodeu; aXX' fV avaax^o Kal deo X"P^
XetXcai, Kal (V Lad' otl adavarov ireXeL eX-KLq."
"i2q KareTvabonevr] (jLyrju rjveyKe Kal albu^' 155
ixvdoq ivq Kal drjpaq VTrepx^TaL ocTLq cxKOVcrtL.
ToXoL ix(u ovu beov rju KarabvveadaL rbv IxOpbv,
Ik 5' 7' avaLbdr]q Kal Terparov adXov Iklvu.
biq yap raOr' 17x^1x0 Kar' aarea Kal Kara brj/xovq,
Tb(f)pa OL laTLxbccvr' ecrdXol 4>lXol ijyenovrieq, 160
2co0Q!p 6 M-Lvaloq, bvo 6' aXXot KoipavoL rjaap,
0Lp.LV airbuTa tXov
fj bv Trarep' evvooq vibq'
OL p L^ou Trapa(t)aadaL 'IojjS (fnXiriq Kara dea/xa.
aXXa liarav Kal tovto rb abbp.(vov, "$tXo(; earlv
aXXoq eyu)," Kpo4)Baq nera y' erpaire Kai a(t>aq IttoUl 165
137-149 Job 2.10 || 159-163 Job 2.11 || 164-165 Pythagoreans (Hermias In
Phaedr. 192.10-11 Couvreur), cf. Aristot., Eth. Nic. IX 4, 116a31-32 ||
129 virepiwva P || 130 ycevwvToa P || 137 tt)v5' P || 142 TKaoq; X in eras, of 4 lett. P
II 143 (TV ^vvayeu;] av^- from ffwf- P j two syll. missing at end || 146 iSexvvfiida P || 150
oi P
II
152 dvaaotitv P || 154 uxOi P || 160 iarixowpTo P || 163 t^ov P ||
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ocvt' iadXoov KaKLrjq irapaKXrjTopaq, ov Xidov avroq,
oiq (})a(TLU, kluCjv, Trjv 5e ktIolv, o4>pa tl iiapypoi.
Tov 5' ojq ovv eyuuicxav ayaWoixeuou totI /coTrpoj,
eXKoodevra Kal yvp.v6u, odwdora, tov irplu avaKra,
TOV irplv evl KXianolai TeTtpevov apyvpeoLat, 170
(papea pfi^av haoToc, avu)p<jo^av re (rvvap<t>(jo,
8r)v 5' oiveoo euTav Kal edaplSeov v^poc, opwvTeq.
ovde yap eiKova eixov i(j)ivptptv, ovTe iraXaLav
ovTe veav, e^ovTO 5' ovtl (f)pa^ovT€c, dirwcrovv.
AvTap 6 7' OLTjdelq ccq prj tl ye ^vaoobofxovoLV 175
avTa irpovoir]q—r] yap eKiveov e^opevoi tl—
^vaabdtv oxOrjcraq to. kolk avT(f dele, e^oocTO'
"'EppfTco vt^ap epol to yevedXLOv, eppeTO) rj vv^
ev fi TLC, '''A.ppev' e4>r], ev fi eairaoa rjepa irpwTov
Kad 8e Kev hpaoaLTO koll ap(f)0Tepaq deoq avTaq, 180
ojq OV prjTpbq epriq eKXrjLaev ELXeLdviac,'
ovK av eireLprjdrjv adLvao^v Todv obvvaoiv
ovbe irpoaoxOLapoq Kal 'OXu/uttio; rjv Kal eTaLpOLq,
Gvv 6' VTVitxra Kal avToq, oBl KpaTepol fiaaLXfjeq.
delpa TO 7' eLxov viroTTOv, eTpepov, ededoLKeLV, 185
aJcTTf Xeo)v pe avveax^' ovvoida 6e ov8ev ipavTcl}.''
Ylpbc, Tabe ^(jo4)ap e())r], aXXcoq /cara TavTa vorjaaq'
"Kat av be Talc, irTepvyeaaLV, 'Ia;/3 iroXv (j)LXTaTe, ^Xco^.
ei yap eireTpopeeq Kal ebeibrjq, r\v tl ool evbov
epyov aeLKec,, av KpvirTiov prj vireLbepev eLiraq. 190
ev yap ev ocTpeaTOv Kal aKXLveq eoTL paXLaTa,
avdpwTToq TO avveLbbq eXevdepoq ovbe ypv elbihq
evbod'ev or tov /c' ovtl^ eXeyxbpevov KaTeXeyxoL.
TU)be Kal ovpavLt] eaeTaL x^lp k^<^1 ^i-Oi iravToq.
av 6' el TOT e irpodeXvpvov tboLq deoireLdeiov avTa 195
6XXvpevr]v yever]v, ava 6' avdeeL avTLq OTriaaw
OL 5' aae^eXq avTyaLV aiz04)6lvvOoval ye pi^aLq.''
ToLOcbe pLV peiXLaaov eTTLirXr^aaouTeq halpoL
TToXXa' xciviiiv be XvKoq 1,aTav /careXeiTrero x^f^Kociv,
166-167 Zenob. 5.63 {CPG I 146) || 168-174 Job 2.12-13 || 178-186 Job 3.1-26
II
187-197 Job 4.1-7 (Eliphaz !) || 188 Aeschyl. frg. 139 N. = Aristoph. Av. 808 |!
192 Zenob. 5.54 {CPG I 142-143) || 199 Diogenian. 6.20 (CPG I 273) ||
167 <t>a<n P || 168 t6v5' P || 169 delete /cm? || 174 perh. ?tovT' ovn \\ 179 delete eV?
II
180 apaaaro P || 188 mg. irapoitda. role, MKiioic, TTtpou; iaXw iirt twv KpaTOVnevcov rolq
iSloiq Xoyoic, Koi iirixn-PVP-ounv P || 191 mg. yvuiuKov P || 192 ypv P || 195 iron] perh. tov
II 199 mg. inf. irapoinia Xvkoc, tiarr^v xo^vwv P ||
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Kol HpaJTcix; yeyovccc, naXa ixvpioq ovk edvvaadrj 200
Topde 4>o^elv, fiovvo) 5e ol a)00r/ octK'KTOC, ij eXiriq.
'EirraeTeq fxev toIolv evrjdXee Kaprepbq 'Ia>/3,
ovTTd) 5' oyboov rjXdt, Koi Ik u€(f)€(jjv adoKTfTox;
icq avpa wpaeia Xiyvdpooq eirTaro nvdoc,
<j)aq' "Su yap aXXoicjoq vireXan^aveq vypbStv riixac, 205
XPVt^(^Ti(TaL aoi oXuiq, ei ixt] buXr)Xvdac, ovruq;
ovTOi deix^eirjq Kal aXridi.vbq a^v Kal a^vnoiv
TTupaaL iraaiv, oirov (l)aeaiti^poTO(; iKTerar' 'Hoj^."
Ei7r€, Kal avTOi ewet Karrjn (tt€(J)oc, ^dXov ayoipoq,
avdeixbev bcfxapavTOV, bov (reXaq aarpa KaXOxret. 210
Tov Kal air' ayXa'irjq axXvq iriaiv omxaai Sarai'*
TToXXa rerpLyoic, NiojStj reXoq e^e<l)aavdr].
eV 6' ebbdr} Kal ra irplv oXcoXora diTrXa roj 'IaJ|8,
bLwXot Te irXetibveq aixeivoveq' otai Kal eibeu
vieaq vieiov TpLTCtTrju Kal eireira yevedXrju. 215
Tola TO. 'lojjS wpCoTa Kal varara, ravra irpouoirjq
ToloLV aedXevovaiv aedXia. ei be Kal i]H(iq
Totc, avTolq avdpa^i Trvpovneda, del TOiavra
crennaTa, Kal ttoXXoj ytpapCiTtpa' Tpbc, rab' bpav XPV
Kpbc, re a-KXayxva to. avra Trepippvra' o^be yap el'r] 2S0
Kal rabe ra rpvxovr' abpaveffrepa, iraq yap b KCtp-uoov
iXiriffLU ovT€ kottov rbaov atcrderaL ovre avirjq.
ei b' boa -KtiabjieBa Kara rbv ^iou ov p.r} c'xcojuej'
TTpbq ra Utivov oXco(; Kpartp' aXyta iao(l)api^eLV,
bel baov iubeofiev, tooov €vdvp.dv Kal aeibeLU, 225
(j)LXavdp(i)TroTepov rervx^OTeq vxl/Lnebovroq.
ov yap Tiq abafiaq Kal x«^'CfO(; r}u fibvoq 'IojjS.
'AXX' OTi nev KaKO. riq -Kaox^v iroved Kal ax^u
XVP^^dq aXbxov, (rrepedelq iraiboiv re (f)iXwv re
ix-qrpbq re yXvKepriq Kal abeX(t)eio)v bfioOvfioju, 230
ovbelq avTiXeyec <j>v(jiq c'xei olktov €KaoTr\,
17 piv a4>avpbTepov, i] bl irXeov, eari 5' brav brf
Kal (f)LXir} Kal ^doq virep ra iaKafxpeua irrjba.
Kal bide ravTa QaXriq ayaixoq fxeue "AeiSia" (prjaaq
''tov irepl TiKva Tcbdov, Xvirrjv ewl ixaXXov ebvTa." 235
€1 be Tiq U bpvbq Ioti Trap-qyp,tvoq 77 airb irerprjq,
Kflvoq Tolq ibioLq reKpaipeTai aXye' (Kaara.
202 (not in Job) || 203-204 cf. Job 38.1; 40.6 || 205-208 Job 40.8 || 213-215 Job
42.12-16
II 233 Zenob. 6.23 {CPG I 168) || 234-235 Plut., Solon 6 || 236 cf. Od.
19.163 II
209 write Kariei \\ 213 diwXa P || 220 vepippvra P || 226 perh. TcrvxVKcnaq \\ 229
(jTipj)dtu, P
II
233 read TaaKafifieva \\ 250 5o6iVTa(; P ante corn ||
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eiVt fiep, dolv axv K'^'- ^ScKpva, Kotv tlc, avtKKrf
Koi yap 8aKV0fievT]q Kpadirjq vTrodmraL tvbov
TTvevna KaKov doXepbv, (f)vaa be p.LV eiq oaov lax^i- 240
fipidofieuT], aTePotx^i 5f Kal auri/ca 6t7rX6o^ 6\Koq
ovperai Ik ^X€(f)ap(t}v, Kara de (i)\e'yedovaL irapeiac,.
ravTa Kal ovk a<t)ir](TL Traprjyopiaq Karadvueiu
etcFU, eVfi TavavrV avapaia ear' aXXrjXoou.
aXA' enirr)q Kal rOivb' lirl to aKvdpoiTrov aybvTOiV 245
beX brj avaKTOcadai Kal airoKXiueLP oaov iaxvq
eXiriffLU adavaroiq Kal evTOKeeaai XoyKJuolq.
TlpiCTa ixev ovv 4>avepbv yvdvai otl waq avdpuiiroq
dvrjToq e(f)v, Kal ovTLq aibtoq ovbe aitOTfioq.
Tov be bodevToq, otl TedvrjKOTaq old TOKrjaq 250
KXaieL, axpi- P-f^v laoiq rjpiov ov vepearjTov
icu yap i(j)v Tiq, Tovabe papaivopivovq tc Kal a-wvovq
€iCFop6(t)v, Kal r]Xidwq Tiq ex^vaTO bocKpv.
bq be irapeKTeivoLT', ebbKei koI bieTO apa
iraTpbq TlOoovoIo Kal 'Hovq eK^XaoTriaaL, 255
Tj Tccvb' ovq (f)LXir] (TTOLxdcov avpTrrf^aaa,
t(jov avTOiv velKoq Kal airexOeir] btaXvet,
r^PLKa Tw irri^avTi boKel Xbyu) ev Tab' evelvai,.
ei be av TrpobToq e^r}q, b be (f)voaq tlttt' av eTVxOrj',
(f)vaLbq eVri vbpoq, Kal ev exet, ujare TOKTjaq 260
TrpojT' uuat,, Kal e-rreiTa to. Ttaibia. aW eppcoTO'
OVK av aivaq b fiioq rotrcrajj/ dpifvoiv Kal bbvpp(bv
fieaToq er]v. (pei) 5' rj irpaiTt] KaKit} ye Kal avTO
eTpaire Kal neTe^aXev, €0' S Trj Te Kal 'Ap(t>LTpiTrf
bocKpvffiv aXrjKTOLq KaTaTXjKOVT'' aXXa Kal avTOiq 265
Tolq pr] avaivopevoiq TrapaKXrjaiv eoTi ti aXKap.
E£q yap awriXde Traiq, eTepoq irepieaTi tol laoiq'
KeWev ev advpiri eaai, Trapa\pvxv '^vdev Uavei.
el be Kal rjXdev awaLq, Kal vvp(l)iov ovk ibeq vlbv,
ov ai) pbvoq, iroXXol be iraXai Kal vvv Tbb' virecTav. 270
TO) be 'lojjS Kal brjpoq bXoq veodrjXeoov vloov
r]pap eq ev KaTebv bvo<i)epov bbpov eiq 'Aibao.
ovx vp'evaiov aeiae, Kal ovk apeTriq Tev airrjvpa,
aXX' virepeLve Kal eTXr], otl airobbv eloLbev avTbv,
256-257 Empedocles (cf. Ps.-Plut., Plac. I 3, 878A) || 274 Job 42.6
256 fj = fia)0^ov fi (cf. 562) || 262 roauv P || 264 write nerk^aX'} \\ 265 KararifKotuBa
P II 268 iarX P || 269 ^X^e? P || 273 rtv P || 274 canov P ||
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Tou 5'
€<f)VTrepde Kal avrrjq yr/c, Kal aXbq ^aaCKrfa. 275
Tiv be veoyvriq 661 Kal (t)i\T€poc, eirXero naXXov;
aXX' iav a Xeyofieu TLcrrevofieu, evdvueeiP XPV-
(Lire yap' eq ri 6enaq rpvx^iq Kparepalq vtt' avayKaiq,
aypvTvvicv, irtivOiv Kal KaLVOTOnCov aedeu olkov;
aXXov 6r] riuoq ri pa rj ibaTe ruxtiJ' l3a(nXeiT}q 280
Tri(T6e fxourjc,; eirei ian ^Laarr) re Kparepi] re.
et 6e t65' a)6e ex^i, 6 6( vr]Tno<; ov virepaXydc,
p6a<f)L irbvuiv Kal anpSt fxepi^onevoio ttXovtov
eiq TO. iKtlot KaXa aveXrjXvdtu ayXaodvuoc,,
Tj XPV iopra^tiv rj ov XaX'euv a XaXov^ev. 285
aXXax; t' tv6aiii(j)v yap 6 tov ^iov atyp' airoXeixpaq
irplv ra rvxv^i ovvLOVTa iroaac, Soxtoucti nepinvac,.
etra Kal ovk ouroq tov vvv 6Xo(f>vpon€voLO
edprjuovfiev, rj ov6ev
€<f)LaTan€d'; ov6ev aXr}d(cq-
riq wepl tov fir] ovtoc, 60u Xoyoc;, ovkovv Kal vvv 290
IXT]6ev advp-Cofxev oti Kal vvv ov6afiov ((ttl.
KaTTTreoe yap 'Eivo^ibvTOc, hi TrroXt/xco 4>iXoq vloq'
avTOcp 6 fiLKpov ri ouStJ/ airooTaq, etirev "'Ejno(; yap
i]v iraiq, 01 t avTtxi Kai tpioi ixiyaXuov oirai(t)v.
y6ee Kal HeJ'o0aji' otl OvqTO. to. dvrjTobv Iotlv. 295
"
'AXXa Traprjyopirjv iveirouov olkol iovTeq.''
ei 6i deu) tov epcov ov eKuvoic, eixon^v ap,4)l
Tpk\popLtv, apKil TOVTO' TO. 5' aXX' oaa nLKpov iiroxf/ei.
Hv 5' ayadoq 7' 6 ^iXoc,, Kai fiiv irpoopcbv aTCJ'axifciO."
aXX' edeXeq tivai tovtov KaKov, 6(j)pa ov xatp^f;; 300
ei 6' r}v, Kal ovTOiq av eaTeveq. oocrTe tl (f)U)p.€v;
oLKpiTa TaW Tjfilv; jxr} 6r}, <})iXe aXX 6 fiiv eadXbq
aiveiadoi, 6 6e fir] tov 66vpixov TrXeii/ eXeeiado).
"'AXX' k'deXov ^<ji)€iv naKpov xpbvov evdabe tovtov."
aXX' ovTToo 6riXov ft Kal debq rjdeXev ovTwq. 305
"'irXrjv OVK toTi xpovov naKpov xp'^oq;" aXXa tl fiaKpov;
rj OVK oiada Ta avTOc iraddv kuvov yt Kal orpe
aaaa av vvv; ttox; ovv ovk oiKTeipaq Kal eKelvov;
^ (l>iXoq ov 0iXe€t, tovtov x^^Xeirblq Taixuvei;
'Hfielq 5' axpt Tivoq irapafieivofxev ivda6' iovTeq; 310
ovxl P-(6' ooprjv rj p.eTa Tr]v6' em^eioiKV a6ov;
292-294 Ps.-Plut., Consol. ad Apoll. 33, 118F-119A; Diog. Laert. II 54-55
275 i<i>\nrtpdt kou. out^?] above line yp. dtp, bciraar^q 7^ P || 276 read vtoyvbc, | bSt] d
above line between 6 and 6t P || 277 truTTevwufv P || 283 p(6ff<pi P || 284 tVei KctX' P ante
corr.
II 289 ((tuaTafieOa P || 298 aXXa P || 299 *Hi/] ai; P j 7' om. P ante corr. || 300
mg. P
II 301 5( P I ovTw P ante corr. || 309 xa\tir(k P II
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ov KovLc, 7} avTTi eq avpiov iaaoned' avTotq;
oaaoq 06' iarl fiioq, TrapeKV\f/€ riq enTrapaKV\l/aq
6pao6vpr)q, eiV' evdvq edvaaro Tplv irapaKvypaL,
o)be diaypa\f/aq to iroXvxpoPiov ^lotolo. 315
ET 7f p.iv ep peKveaaLP ayappoa bocKpva \ti^(jiP
ov-xX Koi aXXodi wov tovtojp dfrj, ev av iiroUiq'
€L de tip' tlaX Kal aXXa h otq eindevoned' avrwp,
XPV Kal €Ketae naXiaTa nepoq tl 7c roipbi (l)vXa(TaeLP.
c'^ apxv<i yocp anapraq eyeiparo prjXia Xvir-qp, 320
Xvirrjp Kal /xopop aipop, i>0' oiP to yepoq KaTe^aXXep'
€K 6' avTOiP Kal eKeiprj airoXXvTaL axxTrtp ixibprj.
d yap {ixr}] Xvirrjdeiq Tiq eV aixirXaKirj KaTax^vot
dcxKpvop, rjd' avTrj uTayoPL Xuer' r]VT€ Kairpoq.
epda n\p ovp Xvirrj Kal docKpvop epyop apvei, 325
ePTavd' oi}6' r]^aiop i-jnaTaixed' avTolq xPV'^^oci-'
ifXf- 5e nrjdep opuap, iirl (pdinepotq de fiaXiaTa,
'UKiapovq Trjdvq re KaTti^op,tP tK ^X€(f)apoup.
KXaicop 6' OVK apirjq, aireoLKOTa 5' epya TeXeieLq.
EvXoyop TIP t68( ool, ei Tpelq Tipaq rj bvo ixovpovq 330
OLKXavaTOvq airadeiq wov ocKrjKoaq' ei 8e ye iraPTeq
pr]8voq i^ avTriq yoepol Ki-WTOvai.p eV' aiai/,
oiq eV ocp-qpvTOLq *** aGxoiXXop.€P epyoiq.
Eiq nbpoq cxTpeKeuiq TovXvcTOPoq, a^toq olktov
ep 5' aXXoiq KXaioPTeq opoaabned' iju'eaq avTovq, 335
tjplk' ocTroXXrj^aPTeq emypicixep tlpu to. x^H-
Kal ZrjpoiP nep ov8e tov ov dapocTov aXeyi^ep,
eKiTPeofxep 8' rjnelq Kal Tovq hepoiP KadopOiPTeq.
MupfTO ^avl8 Kal eirXvpeTO, eq 8e top viop
KXaiojp, it)q ov8ep KaTaPveTO, TTjq irplp ayoiyr}q 340
fi'Xf''''* ^"^d TO TiXtaBep ap,rix(XPOP tVr' apaXvaat.
ei 8e av top '\aaaK top op vi'ea Bvaai eTaxBrjq,
TT]XvyeTOP 6^t' oPTa Kal aairaatop yXvKepop re,
ov Kal TO. e(t>eTna eirafiv^ao, Kal irplp eKeXpop
avnTro8LaeiP, ttocp apdpop vireKXaffdrjq Kal eXvdrjq; 345
aXX' "A^pap. rjyaye Kal eirTeppiaep eK t' apeTeipe
X^Xpa, ^a^ai Trooq yap 8r} oi ov avpe8oiKe ye rjTop;
313-315 source not found || 322 cf. Aelian, Nat. an. I 24 || 337 prob. Zeno of
Elea, cf. Diog. Laert. IX 27 || 339-341 2 Kings (2 Sam.) 12.15-23 || 343-347 Gen.
22.1-19 II
312 aaavpiop P post corn || 313 irapannl'i] read (e.g.) wapida^f \ riq] mg. 6 irv$ay6pa(;
bj)\{ovoTi) P
II 318 Tim P II 329 reXfiT/q P || 330 nhvov^ P || 333 e.g. {narw) II 334
KOvXvaTovoc] -ov- from -o- P || 335 6voaabni6a P || 336 6fKo\r)^avTic, P ante corn || 339
perh. (Km) AocvtS \\ 344 read rriv i<f)fTnfii> \\
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rj raOr' ovk ocXXcoq Kar' ap' edpaaeu re koI erXrj
rj OTL iv (TTTjdeaoL irodov irvpoevra avveax^
irav TO ireXac, (f)X€y€dovd' virep 'H</)Q!io-toio Kparripac,. 350
o)q 6e dpvaXXlq a/xvdpdi aurjufievrj Iv da'Cdeaacv
rjeXioio ireaovToq aira^ a-KOKibvaTaL vXrjq,
ojt; TTodov aXXov airavra nera (ppealv out' audpooiro^u
aarpayj/aq 6 yt Beioq l-Ktaaviiivoic, KaTe4>Xe^€'
Koi 6ia TOVTo TCx wplv Trepiojaia koI wepa Treidovq 355
paou eKeiuo) avvTO, Kal ft ttoXv fxei^ova rjaav.
Tola epe^e yvvrj KoXxlq iraXaL, riairtp b vibe,
an(f)l IfejSaaTeirj tt) (Kucre (t)aXayyL avurfdXei,
ot XpLGTov oTeppoLffiv (vvvTO Kal avTU} IviKiav.
bia TOVTO Tvpavvoc, ipr]PU Kal a^ac, avdyu 360
X^tti^piv^ oi^^ vvx'^' OTav LCTTaTO Iq ^opkao,
Xaivov
€(; Xip-vr^v yvpvovq aivo iravTaq bXkadai.
ivB' edavov -wavTeq peXavoidivTeq KpvaTaXXcp
KtXvTO Tt TtavvvxiOL KeKa4>7]6Teq aXKipov r)Top.
wpofC Kal oxXoq e^r], Kal croj^aTo: veKpibv ev apa^aic, 365
alpopevoL ttotI irvpabv ayiveov icq 6' iirl iralba
Tovb' e^av, avTap 6— Kal yap erjv ocKocpaq Te KpaTvq rt—
^(xibv (TL TTveuaK', eXeoc, XajSev evbodi dvpo)
Kal ^ioypelv ^ovXevov— ibvuaTO yap irtpulvai—
bvaaefieeq, ol oaovq KTeivovTeq ^coovq a(l)eibeo)q 370
eiV eul TeOvrjooTL eKrjbeov, eXXa^ov olktov.
r) be Tab' icq evbrjae, peTabpopabr]u eXe Tralba
Kai piv aeipopevt] a)/xoiq iirl yqpaXeot-cn
(t)bpTov eXa4>pbv (piiptv tV axdo(t>bpoLcnv airrjvaLq,
aupvTjGTOv eiroq (papevr] Tobe "Bofc/c' t19i, t€kvov, 375
(joawep aedXoGVUjjq, Kal Tibv (TTe((>av(t}u cF(i>i piTOtaxotq,
firfb' cV aei^oJOK; ayadolq Kal 6\l/e TrpoKoxpaq
avdiq VTroaTpe(t)dyq Tovb' Iq ^iov aXyivbevTa.
ovx TeXevTTjaaq "A/SfX adXioq, aXX' 6 en ^(bu
bvapopoq r]v Kal prjTpl Kal avbpaoi Kal dew avTW. 380
(pvcFLoq loTL davtlv wXiiaai re pbpov, Kav pr} vvv,
aXX' ovv 6\pe, Kal ovbelq ov pri (f)ev^€Tai oltov,
OLoq av fi. €1 yap pr) r)u pbpoq, aXXa Ty 'Abap
^u>y aetfojco ^ooeiv ireXeu, rjdeXov au ae
357-389 cf. Basil., Horn. 19.8 (Patrol. Gr. 31.524B); see further BiR Hagiogr. Graeca
1201-1208n (vol. II pp. 97-99) ||
351 mg. irap(a/3o\)»7 P || 359 perh. aripvoia' a'vvvTO \\ 360 perh. (/cat) 6ia || 363
KpvaraXu P ante corr. || 365 fort. veKp' \\ 368 irveUaKev P || 370 Saaovq P || 374 (ppirpiP
P
II 384 f«5] read (e.g.) <i>v\y \\
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^iceixeuai ovv efxol /cat tov irporepov ^l'otolo 385
Iv XeinCjvi uefxeadat aKrjparov ayXabv aXcroq.
vvv b\ ov yap TIC, a\v^€i opov iSporoevd', o<; av elrj,
oX^Loq odTiq eKOJU Kal eu KparepolaLV aedXoic,
yvfiuaadelq aperycLU eiraiveTOU oltov iiricriroi."
Tola eKeivT] edaXire -wipiKXvTov via Kal avTTjv. 390
Tr}v yap utt' 'AvTi6x(p ra a 4)LXTaTa reKva Koirevra
^Xexf/aaav Kal x^p(^l^ ^cn^? Krepiaacrav a4>(hii€v,
ixrj Kal drjXvTepaojv 4)aLV0ip.€d' jJTTOveq opreq,
oiq re eKeluai exo^i-pou 66vp6p,e6' olvt'lov rjnelq.
Et 6e (TixepdaXeov tl Kal aizp'oaiTov nbpoq ^ev, 395
ovK iirl TOJ ye ttotoj eyeyr]dee XcoKpareoq Iq,
ov5' eva naprvpov eideq viravriboiVTa Tvpauuoiq,
ov8e Tiveq baioiv aravpov aveXajx^avov (hixoiq
dvyaKOvrec, etc; €V rffiap, aeidaveeq riueq ovreq.
"
'AXXa Tad' vrpnreTOJv Kal deaireaiiov TreXei a.vbpuiv.''
aXX' edeXeq etvai rOiv ovTibavdv Kal ayevvo)u 401
Kal iirjd' von'ivoiv fxrjd' rjXio) avon€vao)u;
TOVTO fieu ovd' edeXovai TrapiaTaTar at (f)vcneq ra
eiai, Kad' avraq eiVt, pbvov to Kepbiov aXyoc,
€<jtI Kal aXX' aXyoq toXolv IdkXovoi 6e6ex^«i. 405
Kai ovvic; ti aoq eralpoq VTre^e(t)vyev KaKbrrjra,
rjyaXXov Kal exaipeq, r] eareueq olnw^eq re;
''((TKLpTwu, exbpevov, eitiKpbreov Kal aeibov,
Tovq T€ -KiXaq eKaXeaaa ^.tTaoxilJ-iv €v4>poavva(j)v,
co(; J] ^KapTj] €opyeu, on 'Eep^V'i VTrevbaTet.'' 410
ev 7' OTi evpvrepbq hol to) TrapabeiynaTi yivrj'
Kal av ye tov vovv irpbaax^q eTnaTau'evu^q Kal aXrjdCoq,
Kau ixev aXaoTOTepoiv Kal (j)pLKaXeu}u a-Kofiavra
irevaeai ov (f)iXeeiq,— " ei 6' ov, xpovticrepov aXyet.
Ov GTvyeeiq to. ^lov arvxVP-^^TOi ravra, eralpe, 415
(f)ev. Sou oi KO)KVTol Kal eireKeiva Tabeipcou
r)x^vvd'; al be vbaoL i/'nx^? Kal aapKoq eXa(t>pbv;
w(cq yap, 6t' adprjau) irXevpiribaq ainaroeacaq,
rbv re irapoq Tpv(l)b(i)VTa Kal evvvjxevbv Tiva fivoaov
391-392 4 Mace. 8-12 || 396 Plat., Phaed. 117c3-5 || 402 Zenob. 5.53 {CPG I
142) II 416 cf. Apostol. 16.19, note {CPG II 661) || 418 cf. Hippocr., De morb. Ill 16
(VII 142.14-20 L.)
II
419-420 cf. Luke 16.19-24 ||
391 mg. rr^v ixyiiav) aoKondvuv bri\{ovb)Ti P || 393 perh. drjXvripicv (paivoituSa \\ 396
mg. at TTOTw] fiy{ovp) tw kwvow P j awKpaxfo P || 399 read Ov^okov t \\ 405 aXKo P || 406
07rt|t<^u7t P ante corn || 409 tKaXtaa P ante corn || 410 w^ P || 419 ivmixivov P ||
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irXovaiov h 0X071 vvv KaTabaibnevov cxnapavTU); 420
Htjt' av eV eVxQiTif)^ on (V(f)T]^ou to wevixpov.
KOLVTa TO. OiKpa KOLK fVr', aperr] 6' utto p-kaaov eVaiei.
aXX'
€1 /LitJ/ Tri/oiTj (Tf TUXT/i; eVl aidep' aveXKd,
(xaXXov airoKXiveeLV,
€l del weaeeiu ixt} a^' v\povq.
KaXbv TO irpoopav to yeurjcronevou Kal idi^eiv 425
t'/c yap Tiov adpboiv iroXXoi TrapeKo\l/av, oXovto,
oaaoL €v evpeiri Kpabir) ^paxv -Kvevixa <f)opovaLU.
ct 8e uLTOvq aoi ciKXeeic, (TreKXwaaTO fiolpa,
Hrj bvaavaax'^Ti, ovx oi koctoj eicrlv ovocttol,
Tovq 5e KaTepxo/xevovq pe(j)e(t)v caro oide yiXOioiv. 430
Ourog iiev avveToq, b Trpoyivco(TKO)v to. oi eXdeiv
iyyvdeu Iotl, Kal avTOt ao(py fiedbdu) aXicoo-aq"
Kpeiaaoju 5' ewXeTO Keluoq, otlc, nera tovc, KLvbvvovq
ev Ti (f)(:peL Kal aiu apaXXoionToq bpoiTar
bq 8e ireaoop ov bvvaT' eveyKenev, a^KpLTroveiTco. 435
e(TTi ye Kal irXovq bevTepoq, et debq ovpov oTra^oi.
bvoTr}vo)v be re TeKva to. bvcTVx'i-'nc, anvr]Ta,
ovbe Kev evTVx'iW ^TTLTrjbebq ecTi (pvXaaaeiv
bcFTLq bv(7Tvx'i-V^ Kavaixr]xoivbq eoTiv evelKai.
Hac, (f)iXbbo^oq abo^oq, 6 6' ov (f)LXbbo^oq apeiuiv. 440
TTOuXu TL Toi) (ppoueeLV e^ovaia oibev a(t)aLpelv.
vxf/oq oaov to Tvx'nq, ncd bvoTVXLOcq to fiapadpov.
Lodi fjLeXiKprjTO) evaXiyKLOV ep-fxevai evxoq'
tvtOov fxev aaivei Kal ijbvixirjv airoTLKTei
^paaaova, eq be to e^rjq ojairepel e^ apvTaivqq 445
KiKpbTepov irbna tov arpipdiov aXXo TTOTi^eL.
'AXXa Treacbv ax^ri', et p.ev ottl ar]p.epov avTbq,
l'(T(i)q eiq TOvq x^H I^V bpaq (t>pe(jl Tama iradbvTaq'
Trap TTOcrl 5' o\peL baovq KaTaivi-KTovTaq p.eTa bovirov,
ev be Te Tolai KaKolq to ex^Lv {leTexovTaq eXa4)pbv. 450
"X^€(; be TL Kvboq exovTeq eizaiveTol rifiev ev atJTei,
uvv 6' eVi TolaL (f)iXoiq bia^aivonev aveiriyvixioTOi.''
(piXovq Tovabe KaXelq; eirLTpnvTbTaToi Kal ainaTOL.
TOV 5' 'AvTicrdevT] avTOv eTcepxbp.evov /car' ayvtaq
yveaev oxXoq oaoq y\ b 6' ayoivia, "Oi/uoi" eVeiTroji', 455
422 cf. Aristot., Eth. Nic. II 6, 1 I06b36-1 107a6 || 436 Georg. Cypr. 2.21 (CPG I
359) II 445 schol. Aristoph., Eq. 1090 = Suda A 4065 || 454-457 Diog. Laert. VI 5
421 av] af P
II 422 read hmiv} \\ 429 bvaavaax^V P || 433 Sotic, P || 438 imT^buoc,
P
II 441 iroXO P I oi&i P ante corn || 445 mg. apvTaivrj- x(x\kow OKfvot;- i^ ot to tkaiov
ac, Tovq Xvxvovq iyxfovmv P || 447 read 5ti, \\ 455 7' om. P ante corr. ||
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''apa Ti fiOL KUKOV ear I, Kal ov uo€(jl>; iirei aWojq
ovK av Tolaiv eyojv eTnrjvdavou ou6' iKpoTovurfv.''
"
'AXX' ene tic, (f)d6uo<; etXe k'otov 7e TraXat Karairf:\pac,."
avTo Tob' ov nLKpov TTapaiivBiov, OTTiirep aUl
TOL KpeLTTo^ fr/XouTai, airav bt KaKov ap,eyapTOV 460
Kal (TV n(v aivrf aitaaiv, 6 5' ov ^paxv caaxoq o0€tXei.
"'AXX' abiKicc, ra Treirovda Kal i^ abiKiov avOpojiroju.''
aWa bLKai<joq Tavra iraddv Kal virolaat elSovXov;
ov av KaKov tl Tre-jrovdaq, 6 be bpaaac, ttoXv x^f-pov.
Etra Treaoov axOy, ripoq, ?} tI n'eya xpOitcrnovvToq; 465
61 aperriq, vai, Kal yap iira^iov ei be rev aWov
Tcbv ovx i(TTap.ev(ji)v, av p.ev laraao, ravra be TtiiTTei.
2,iKe\iKr\c, apx^ic, Aiowaioq eKirea' 6 irpea^vq'
Ai(t)v Tovbe KadeXX, 6 6' eKaprepei en(t>povL dvnu).
Kai nq KepTOjx'eoiv Kal eyyeXboiv evevLire 470
"NDi' be nXoiTcoi/ TL a' ovr]ae Kal r) Utock, oiaiv e-K-qvxov;'"
"IloXXa naX\'" etire, "tux^i; yocp bpaq ixeTa^aXXonevrjq ixol
ev T€ 06p(o Kal vfijieq eireyyeXboi yeXboiVTaq."
"Xlq Kal 'ApTa^ep^rjq top ebv iroTe yan^pov 'OpbvTav
e^oxov Lax(>(TocfTa KOTeaaap.evoc, KaTepixpev 475
e'^ eo Kal bb^rjc,' 6 be, yevvaiojc, vireveiKiov
Kal bLayuovq bb^rjq (t)vaLV, lax^v "^ftcTrfp 6 avToq
baKTvXoc, apTL p.ev ev tl, ttcxXlu be re fivpia iroLel,
(t)be Kal oi ^aaLXevaL TeTLr]fxevoL v^pLdooiKOLC,
vvv pev avTO to -kolv bebvvrjpeda, vvv 6' eXaxi-f^TOV.'' 480
AvTOL T€ KoipauoL oaaoL eiveaKLpTr]aav c'tt' aLav,
-qeXLOL XapypavTeq, e(j)r]pepoL 5' VTvobvvTeq,
Kr]ir(t)v t' ccKVTepoL tov 'AbiJoviboq e^r^vdrjaav,
XPvabdpovoL KpolaoL YlovXvKpocTeeq Te TvxVP^'-'i^
'AaTvayaL Kpvepol Kal afipol XapbavairaXoL, 485
aXXa Te pvpia TOiabe yijq vi:epr}4>ava TeKva,
a:v Kal at KXrjaeLq ei oXajXaro, KepbLOV avTolq
rieu av aXXa peveL TiaLq acpdLToq, 6<t)pa Kal ijpelq
TTjv KaKLTjp dp6(x)VTeq v'Kep4>epbpeada ye4>vpaq'
7] 6' apeTT] Kal 6 aLUoq a(f)avpoTepoLq pepbireaaiv. 490
458 cf. II. 1.81-82
II
463 cf. Xenoph., Apol. 28; Diog. Laert. II 35 || 468 Plut.
Reg. et imp. apophth., Dionys. min. 3, 176D || 474-480 Plut., ibid., Orontes, 174B |
483 Diogenian. 1.14 {CPG 1 183) ||
456 mg. 5ixw(; dvuarbu apaywCxjKtaOat.- Kal kut air64>{a(T)iv apa ri fioi P || after 458
ocvTO ToS' ompov, iira ireawp axOr]- rivoc, ^ /i«7« (= 459 + 465) expunged P || 459 Snirtp
P
II 461 «6' P II 464 xdpuf P || 470 e»' P || 474 co; P | read Kupra^ip^v';'? (but cf. 538)
II 476 virtvuKwv P || 477 wrx«i'] perh. urirtv = mairtj/, cf. 539 || 481 delete rt \\ 483 perh.
i(i)r)p,ipix>i
II
484 TcoXvKpariK, P (cf. 593) ||
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6 KXrjdelq 'laparjX ov fj.r]Xov6iJ.o(; yeyevrjTo;
TO irXelou 5' otl Kal aXXorpiov eTpe<i>€ Trcou*
ol 5e Xoyov KtjpvKeq eaav riveq; ovx aXifieq;
ri-KTi 5' cxTLnoTepou fioiTTipoc, rj ao-TraXt^o^;
aXX' opaaq, TravTeq Kal T]yefioufieq Kal avaKteq 495
yovva^ovr' avrovc, Kal ecovTovq dopvipdpovq,
Kai (T(f)i neveL Kal 56^a Kal at KXrjaeLq aafiearoi,
oiq irpoTepov nr)vq i^oXXvTaL rj yap iKdvai.
X^cq ^leTa TOiv a^pCbv Kal avayvoov ffvXXeyofxeada
TOiv T€ KaKOiv ixtTixovTec, eripwdned' avrl tov cxXyetv 500
arjuepou apdnrjOevreq ev axpotvToiOL xopdaiq
iuronev 'Ottotol, olvtI tov
€ltuv Euot evav;
firi, fir) 8riT'' iadXbq yap a7ro(TTpe0cT' ax&(oc Koap-ov.
El 8e Toi €v daXapoLq TOLX(jopvxoq lyKaTabvaaq
e^ayeu oX^ou oaov KeKXeipevov, fj Kal 6 brjuoc, 505
B(jir]v TOL iiredrjKeu, ^ aXXo tl toIov vireuTrjq,
€L pkv a(f)' atpaToc, ct tov to3v afiid)^ ^iovvtcov,
TtTXadc ov Ti ire-Kovdaq vir€p4>v\c, ovTt tl KaKov.
Kal yap e'xcoi' ovk eixeq, iirel e'xpo)- ojXXa tov ixp^',
vvu 5' airopelq KaT avTO' ti toi Tohf: Kaivov iTVxOrj; 510
wXriu OTL btLpaivuiv ovbl KXdeLV jSXecpap' eixeq,
aXXa TLq LKTepiicu Kal VTr€aKXr]Kd)q irepLPoaTeLq,
vvv 5' apepLpvoq eoov yXvKepooTepov vtvov Lavuq.
"0cD' apkpLiivoq lyij^yd Kal VTVuiv, ol irXeoveq yap-
7} 6' apepLpPLT] rjv <xv XeyeLq eWoJ tol povvu), 515
T]Haq 6' 17 (i)povTlq ev eKOLTa^e Kal riv^eL.
ovbe yap ovbe Tpvyaloq, oq otvaLq iroXXa Tourjaaq,
evT' av i] oopr} eVeiai AL<jovvcr6v re (f)vXaa(T0L,
axO(TaL aypvKvOiv, ovb' i] irepl to. irpofiaTa (l)pf]v
fiiOTOp' avLa^€L, TO 5' havTLov ti a/xepLixuel, 520
T(bv 6' ov TL ov veKvojv bLepr]vox€ Kaiirep e<hu fax;."
aXX' ov ixa\J/LbL(t)q iroLprjv peueL ovbe Tpvyaloq-
aXX' 6 p.eu eVr' evxpovq Kal TTLOTepoq paX' eavTOV,
ovbe yap ai aTaipvXal (f)va<xia' oXiy'- ovb' apa iroLprjp
VTjoTLq ael ivpoBeeL Kal aveipoiv ev VL(})abea(TLV, 525
aXX' ebeTaL Tvpov irivei Te yaXaKToq apeXyitiv
e/c r' epL(jOv aKeireTaL o-(/)«fei re tl. ei tol aa 5' eixou,
prjbep epijOTrjarjq- av 6' evbodL izavTa KadeLpyvvq,
Tcbv ovb' aKpi^obq eTLOTapevuiv to tl eoTL
495 perh. riytfwvic, \\ 496 yovva^ovnc, P | read ocvrovc, 5o{v)pv<i>opomii> || 498 n Tap]
perh. fiTTtp
II 499 (niXKiybnida P || 502 tl 01. eJ av P || 503 bifra P || 518 bibvmbv P ||
521 write ti otv? \\ 526 rvpuv P ante corr ||
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<j)V(nq Kal aX/c^ o^oXov ttoXv x^^pov odeveiq, 530
avxtJ^fji^i' Kocl puTTOcoj/ Kal rjn'iyvfxuoc, Kal aXriTrjq.
TO) ni] 8r} (l)dov€OLq iTtpoic,., (t>i\e, oi Kara nolpav
XPV(TOVTaL TOVTOLC,, cv 5' anr]x<xvd<; eaai k€XPT}oQoli-
Koj/xacT^q be riq (l Kal avpTOTtKOtiTaTOC, aWwv,
Kal rabe tol ^vve^r]; eadXbv tl croi 6\p' auereiXe 535
4>appaKov r] ireviri rolq iv Tpv(f>y evaroxov eariv,
at T€ /xiTaXXayal o)q liri-Kav ijbelai eiai.
Kal yap airoaK€VT}v ttot' 'Apra^ep^rjq aire^aXXev,
ava be avKa (f)ay(bv Kal Kpidivov aprov eviairev
"Oltjc, rjbvp,ir}q yap aireiprjToq touov r]a." 540
Ovbe Kev oi KoXaKeq aXXux; aedev eKKeKOcbovro,
OL aev en ^Cjvroq a-Kerpayov aXXodev aXXoq,
6(t>daXfiovq Kpabirjq pupov ri oe txx^Xov edrjKau.
vvv 5' OTav o^v bebopKaq, orav ^iov eoBXov e<f>evpeq,
r]VLKa TrjXe KaKo^v dopvfioLO re e^rjXv^aq, 545
Tocpp' ewl aol davarou irpoKaXi^eaf aXX' eTrpewe irpiv,
wXriv 'Aibr]v KaXeoiv prjbev tl Kapyq' b yap ecTLV
o^iiq Kal KXvTOTTOiXoq, aoKUOTaroq irepl irauToov,
Kal irpiv HLV KaXeaetaq, 6 5' avrbparoq KaTOTza^ti.
El be riq eacri. deov poiprfq Kal ewexpote ravra, 550
avToq ea 4)poveicv tov eotKora pvdov ocKovoLq.
€*X€ pev v^^ipeboiv ae ^iXb^evov evairXayxvou re,
axXaiuovq evbvvra, bebeypevov oiKab' aoiKOvq-
vvv 5' edeXei <t' bpaav peyaXrjTopa Kaprepbdvpov,
Kal bLa TOVTO pedriK, eVei aXKipoq ei, rabe a^^eiv. 555
aaaa 6' eKeivu} eab\ eab' oto) avToq eparar
Iraq yap bv av aTepyr), to. boKovvra oi eadXa vopi^eL.
Kal 6' avdo)poXbyeL' ovk ean tl (J)epTepov avbpbq
areppoi), bq ovk (jiKXaae TrepLaraaeoiq avvLOvarjq.
eadXbq 7' OLKTippiJiv' bq Kaprepoq p'ey' apeivo)v. 560
TlavXov opa Kal lad' iv BXhpeGiv evx^Tooovra
Tf TLva KvbLOiovra pera KXeoq evpv Kal oX^ov.
nXrjv ei pev riq airavT' oXeaaq bcKaxoiTO Kal aXyol,
ovTiq ovbaaerai oi axp'npoavvqq ev elbCiq.
foj^ yap Kal ravTa <Ta(j)0^q Xeyerai re Kal eari, 565
Kal bocKTei pev, bonrTei' ex^t- b' bpov ei b' eTLTeivoL,
538-540 Plut., Reg. et imp. apophth., Artax. Mnem. 3, 174A || 547-548 cf. Eustath.
In II. 591.37
II
549 cf. Horace, Carm. II 18.40 || 561 Rom. 5.3 ||
531 aX«T7;; P
II





555 fKOfiKfp P j after aXKtfux;] y' above line P" || 556 Stu] &TTa P
ante corr. || 561 iVflt P || 562 n = fiaWov 77 || 563 aXyet, ol above line, P ||
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irpoc, TOi(; oWvueuoiq kol avrou riq k' oXeaeiev,
ei 5' oaa tlc, KairofiaWei, exet, tl XeXeinfievov iq dCo,
OTTi ye fXT] Kal to ^vvairoiXeaev advu'eeiv XPVI
"karaTov eari (f)V<TLq ttXovtov Kal adanaaroq. 570
iroXXcxKi yap fioxXovq Kal avra ra KXeWp' viroXXvq
avTotaiv (pvXaKeaaiv airedpane Kal avvaTreiTTr].
Kal TO ye dTjrjTov, on TV(t)Xbc, e6)v, OTe (t>evyeL,
ovTe Tl irpoaKoirTet, irT-qvbq de tic, wawep airebpa.
TOic, be <j)vcreiq ovk eoTi Tvpavvrjaai dia -KavTOc; bib
ei OTav rjv 6 irXovToq eVl x^ovbq, b-wwoTe ariTeq
Kal (f)<j)pe(; Xoxoooaiv, e4>r]bbiied\ binrbTe vvv brj
aKtjvalq ovpavirjai Kal aavXriTOLat ixeTeaTT],
ijixelq avT' avTOV KaTabvaofxev; eoT' apa bnrXovv
irfifxa, x^^'5 ^' ^^oc, ovToq UTrep^iaXcoq eirovovfiep. 580
€1 Trepl TOi ^vyx<J^PV^'^VTOL avoodev oXeadai,
TTTicx^v Xei\l/aua bvTa, advu'eonev, b'eov otjxac
Kal eirl toIgl bodelaiv, eirel debq eXXa^e Kal to..
'AXX' 6Xo<pvpbiievoL to. oXojXotq! evprjaaiiiev;
(pei), ei (prjXrjTrjaLV evl 4>pe<jlu e^pvev oiKToq' 585
vvv be (TV fiev KXaieiq, ol 5' eyyeXboiVTeq ebovcnv.
'A.-KavTUiv axi<j^v TrapaiTLoq eoTiv b irXovToq,
TOP 5' r]iielc, iranTrpcoTov oibixed' emxeuai eadXuiP,
Kal TO KaKov voeovTec, eizLTpexop.ev irpoXa^ecrdaL.
ojq 5' eirl irbTnov eov cirevbei (piXoiriCTa irvpavaTrjc,, 590
o)q TTj aTritiXeij] KaTerreiybp-ed'' afx/xiq eavTOiv.
TT)v 6' aXXcoq 4>popeopd' ol T'qq apeT^q depairoPTeq.
HovXvKpaTrjq b Tvxv<i— ^^ 7«P ^afiov ep.^aaiXevoiP—
TOJ T77VCO ttot' eboiKep 'A.paKpeoPTt TocXaPTa
Kepd\ b 5' ebeKTO Kal eix' cVi 5' avpiop eaTpe(t)ep eliraq,
''Aafx^ape raOra, n'ebop' p,iael Kal aTro<TTpe(j)eTaL yap 596
bccpop 'ApaKpeioop, ovk eia Topbe Kadevbeip."
ube Kal 'ApTicrdeprfq pavrjyiov eKTrepLcrojdeiq,
"Eu ye aoL, o) TOx^;," elirep, "17 epbvKeicq Trpopoy p,ov,
eq TO ne avuTeiXaaa tpl^ojplop, ccq ap.epinpwq 600
avXaKa Tt^q apeTriq Kal Triq (xo(t>Lr]q apaTeixpoo."
u}be KpaTTfq Kal aXXoL a-neipopeq, 01 Kal a(t>' avTdp
576-577 Matth. 6.19 || 590 Zenob. 5.79 (CPG I 151); Aelian. Nat. an. XII 8
593-597 Stob. IV 31.78; 91 || 598-601 source? || 602-603 Diog. Laert. VII 87 ||
569 i^i P
II 571 ToWaKiq P || 572 ccvtouti P || 573 einjrbv P | ^rri P post corn || 574
irpoaKanTTTa P ante corn || 577 i<t>i)b'on(.Ba P ante corn || 583 tXa/St P ante corn || 588
oibnida P
II 591 KaTcirayofifda P || 592 rrivd' P || 597 a^ from e'^ P || 598 write «
irepiawdtl;} \\ 599 after tiTrtv] y' P" ||
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6\^ov a.irkppL\pav na\a fivpiov, ovk eaa yap
ovToq eVi ypvxh^ <TO(f)ir]<; KaradvuevaL oX^ov.
Kal TOVTO ^vvui Xvirrjq otKoc; ovx bpav yap XPV 605
k'pya Tro\vKTeau(x)v, oCc, yydta /cat crTix^<i audpCov
Kal db^ai Kal ttcoXoi ivrpix^q- d yap eV avTolq
dv/xop ebv doirjq, Ik d\i\pLoq ovdeiror' (Karyq.
Aei naatv axi^<y(^iv (TnaKOTreeLU Kal ipevvav
et Tiq oXooq tol6v8' rj vvv r\ TzpOiTOv virearr]' 610
Kav TLv' iipevpoifxev— iroXeac, 5' eVt jxti^ooLV lcfooc,—
avTodeu iaaofied' avrol avtKTOTtpoL oaov ovv rr
et 8e fibvoL Xvirriq eirl Trvdfieua ixoxGi^<J^ixiv,
evx^TOOop-ev otl TrXelbv 7' vTrop.LHPop.ev aXXicv.
Tolad' e-rrl iraoLP Kal to avveq, (piXe' oaaa aeXrivrfq 615
v\f/bdev ear', arpt'nra. re koli Ko.yia irpbirap icTLV,
oaaa 8e vepde ireXei, TpeireTai re Kal aXXoiovraL,
ypvxv 5' ovpavLTfu tlv' virbaraaiu evdeou lax^t-
bq ph T€ 4^vxv<i TrXeioj Xbyov epya^oiro
Kal Ttapa (f)avXou ravra yiveraL d)5' eVioi'Ta, 620
TO} 5' viroTepueTat ixXyoq, eivavTeXXei be yaXriurj.
bq be paKpav xatpet" t^ Kpeaaovi poipri eviairoL
Kal TO. Tpe-KT' aTpe-KTa deXet Kal ouTat eipai,
Tw be peXtaaaoiv KaTO. top vbpov edvea XvTrrjq
^op^ovvt' rjyepedovTO, ai^avTa re brjpbv a(peLbC)q 625
Kal pveXbu ^baXXovai, to. 5' oaTea povvov aaapKa
Trepirova' eiv 'Aibrj, l3el3poT<jopeva Kal Tabe, oi'poL.
^evyopev ovv ocKOVTeq eKOVTeq tolxQ^oc Kbapov.
OL ye pev apcjn peyav M.ova6}viov, ft ZeD, e(f)6:vovv,
ve TrepiaTaaiaq yvpvaapa aedev depairbvTOiv. 630
Tibv 5' eyoi avTia (t)7]pl Kal evxopai, ^ft Xbye XpLaTe,
pr]bepir]v boiriq vireprjvopa pr}bevl Xvirrjv,
7) KpaTepbv bocKvova' avTr]q TeXeaei vbov rjpoiv,
aXXa yaXrjvoTepoiiq aXa TavTT]v ap4>L'KepriaaL
Kela'e Te brj aK-qv(baai aXv-KOTepyaL povyaiv. 635
el 6' ovbelq "ATXavTa biabpapoi a(3poxov avr}p,
KTTjpaai Kal aypolq Kapax(^poiTi]q tl yeveadai
Kai TLai ToioLq, olq apevrjvoTepov KaKbv eaTiv.
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In 1973, Dr. M. C. Lyons of the University of Cambridge published
an edition entitled An Arabic Translation of Themistius, Commentary on
Aristoteles, De Anima, Oriental Studies 2 (Thetford, Norfolk). The
Arabic version, which comes from a manuscript discovered in the
Qarawiyyln Mosque in Fez, is the work of the well-known translator
Ishaq ibn Hunain (ob. 298 A.H. = 910 A.D.). Lyons describes the
quality of the Arabic as follows:
The word-for-word translation is entirely adequate . . . and, allowing
for the difficulties of the original, the Arabic is surprisingly clear.
Further, Ishaq's knowledge is shown to have extended well beyond
technicalities. He is not baffled by a reference to the shirt of Nessus'
and he is acquainted with the peculiarities of the Hippocentaurs and
of Scylla.^ Nor is his competence confined to prose, as he shows
himself capable of producing a version of the cryptic hexameters of
Empedocles.^ (p. xii)
Regarding the Greek text that Ishaq had at his disposal, Lyons
observes that it
had a considerable chronological advantage over the oldest extant
Greek manuscript. In the introduction to his text of Themistius in
' L(yons) 120. 13 = H(einze; see below, note 4) 73. 5.
2 L 156. 2 = H 89. 12-13.
3 L 29. 11-13 = H 33. 12-14. L 31. 10 = H 34. 8, L 33. 17-18 = H 35. 13-14,
L 152. 14 = H 87. 22.
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the series Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Heinze"* notes as his oldest
manuscript one of the eleventh century, Parisiensis Coislinianus no.
386, which he uses extensively, together with a later representative
of the same tradition. His other manuscripts he traces, in the main,
to the recension of "a not unlearned Byzantine."^ Ishaq's original
must antedate this tradition by some two hundred years or more. Its
age alone, of course, is no guarantee of its accuracy and consequently
there is included in this edition a list of comparative readings found
in the Arabic and in Heinze's manuscripts. It must be admitted that
the readings derived from the Arabic are in every case tentative, but
their accumulation should present a reasonably accurate conclusion.
This is that the Arabic represents no known branch of the present
Greek manuscript tradition. It has a number of errors peculiar to
itself, but in many places where there is a division in the Greek Mss.
it follows the better reading and in a certain number of cases it seems
to have preserved a better text than any to be found in Greek, (p.
xiii)
Unfortunately, as I learned from Lyons, 13 years elapsed between
the time when he submitted his typescript to the printer and the
actual date of publication. During that period, the publisher mislaid
the list of comparative readings, and consequently it is not to be
found in the edition.^ In working through the Arabic and comparing
it to Heinze's Greek text, I have accumulated a similar list of readings;
from this— in the notes that follow— I choose those that show that
the Arabic translator's Greek Vorlage is superior to the manuscripts
that form the basis of Heinze's edition. The number of these passages
is significantly large, and the changes introduced into the text are
often of considerable impact, so that the future editor of the Greek
Themistius can ill afford to overlook the Arabic version. In this
article, I cite the Greek in accordance with Heinze's edition, from
whose apparatus I select pertinent data. Note that I use Ar to stand
for Lyons' Arabic text. Passages from Aristotle's De anima conform
to the critical edition of P. Siwek, Aristotelis Tractatus de anima graece
et latine (Rome 1965). I had the opportunity to discuss the Arabic
text with Dr. Lyons when I was a Visiting Fellow of Clare Hall in the
fall of 1984, and I am grateful to him for valuable criticism.
'' R. Heinze, Themistii librorum de anima paraphrasis, Commentaria in Aristotelem
graeca, edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae 5. 3
(Berlin 1899).
^ "A Byzantino quodam non indocto"—Heinze p. v.
^ In his paper "An Arabic Translation of the Commentary of Themistius," Bulletin
of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University ofLondon 17 (1955), 426-35, Lyons
printed a few emendations obtained by comparing the Greek and the Arabic for the
beginning of Section 7 of Themistius (L 214 - 217. 7 = H 116. 24 - 118. 5).
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27. 38-39 OVTCO koI ovx V 4^^XV c'Affi aXX' 6 ctvOpooiroq, ry /xeuTOL
\f/vxv-
For this segment of text, Ar has an additional clause:
^l
^^_
Ul JLJVI 'j\ VI jLJVI J. ^y j:i\ y> jJLi\ c^ Si:S
cr^k ol^Vl J.^ ^1 ^ ^1 ^:,
thus it is not the soul which feels pity, but man, although it is by the
soul that man feels pity, and it is not the soul which learns, but man
by the soul (18.3-5)
This suggests that the translator's Vorlage should be reconstructed as
ovTU) Kal ovx V ^^XV f'^f" ocW b audpooiroq, ry jxevTOi, i/'uxK' ^^^^ ^
4^vxv fiocvdavet aXX 6 avdpoiiroc, ry ypvxv} • • Homoioteleuton may
have caused the omission in the rest of the tradition. As reconstructed,
the text is quite close to the corresponding passage in Aristotle:
^eXriov yap taox; firj XeyeLV Trjv 4^vxv^ (Xeelv rj p,avBavuy y biavodadat,
aWa Tov audpooirou ry ypvxv (408b 13- 15). Note that jAr also renders
^lavdavuv on 81. 4 (= 55. 31 of the Greek). For the use of the particle
Ul to bring out the emphasis implicit in the Greek, cf. H. J. Polotsky,
Etudes de syntaxe copte (Cairo 1944), pp. 26 and 65-68 as well as my
comments in "Ad Artemidorum Arabum," Le Museon 97 (1984), 208
(9. 5-6) and 209 (52. 15).
29. 3-5 oxTTC brjXovoTL holxoito av ov Trpbq to KiveXadai, irpoyyovixevoiq
TT]v ypvxWi oiXXa irpbq to [ht]] Kivetadai Tocq tov a<jOfiaToq KLuriaeiq. {ixfi
delevit Heinze)
Here Ar reads:
jjji oir^ ii'j^ iji jii ji jO iij>^
and so from that it is clear that his opposition is not primarily against
the one who says that the soul is moved but against the one who says
that it is moved in the movements of the body. (20. 9-11)
The Arabic version supports Heinze's deletion of ^t) and also suggests
that Trporjyovixeuicq should be transposed: I reconstruct the Vorlage as
(jO(tt( byXovoTi fxaxoiTO av ov Trpoyyoviievooq wpbq to KivtlaBai t^v xpvxw^
aXXa TTpbq to Kivuadai Tac, tov aijjfxaToq Kivyatic,. Possibly itpoyyovniviaq,
fell out because of homoiarchon with the following itpbc;, its subsequent
insertion may have been responsible for the addition of ^t).
30: 20-22 /cai oXcoc; u xpvtocl 6pyav<a a<l>av€(TTepa}y ircoq ovk evXoyou Kal
TTjv ypvxw TTjv aiaBr)T LKr)v x<^Pi-<^TW t^ouIv tQ)V opyaviav;
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For this Ar provides a fuller text, which, unfortunately, contains
a lacuna:
jj.\cj> y^ w^—" 104. jir_j <)T J,^7.„| JLJI jlT jl <UsJl»_j
and in short, if the mind uses an organ and is for this reason itself
not an inseparable category [and also if] it uses a hidden organ, then
how is it not necessary, in accordance with this reasoning, that we
make the sensible soul also separable from the organs? (23. 11-13)
Regarding the lacuna, Lyons notes: "haec verba desiderantur ap. H."
I venture to restore o\ Lkjjj , which is incorporated in the above
translation; for the phraseology cf. e.g. 7. 3. Note that the use of
the 3rd pers. masc. sg. J**-~i after the lacuna shows that the subject
is JiiJI , not ij-^\ . The Greek underlying the passage as a whole
may have been kolI oKixic, d xp^rat opyavip (^nrjd' avrbq cov bcxoipioTov
etdoq, Kal ravra opyavoi) a<t>avi(TTf:p(p, ircoq kt\. Assumption of hom-
oioteleuton {opyaucp - - - opyavw) can explain the absence of the
intervening words in the rest of the tradition, Arabic ^j> elsewhere
translates eiSoq (see pp. 304 and 334 of Lyons' index), and Jjl^ jJ.
renders ax<j^pt-OToq on 192. 2 (= 105. 28 of the Greek) and on 197.
18 (= 108. 30).
32. 7-9 ibiov Se, on klvovol to ^Coop utt' apidixoVy Kadaivep koX ArjuoKpiTOV
€(i>aH(:V VTTO Toi) apidflOV TOiV (Tipatpcbv.
For the clause on klvovoi to ^uov vt' apidp-ov, Ar reads
the fact that they say that the living creature is moved by number
(27. 5-6; literally ". . . that it is by number that the living creature
is moved": see above, on 27. 38-39).
Examination of the Arabic readily suggests that klvovol should be
emended to KLv(dadai. Xiy^ovai; cf. especially the similar phrase
ToXc,
. . .
KLvtladai Xeyovai Tr)v ^vxw below in line 35, rendered by Ar
as
dj^j ^1 'j\ Jli JL
to whoever holds that the soul is moved (28. 14-15). Cf. also below,
on 87. 23-25.
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33. 9 ov yap drjirov ro) eV rfixtv unro) top e^co iirirov (sc. oTroiira^iev: cf.
33. 7).
Here Ar shows that its Vorlage had a clause absent in the rest of
the tradition. From the translation,
^>I1 Vj LJ (iJJl jLJVl. rjl^l jL-iVI bjj l'i Jli j\ \^_ ^-J -o'u
for it is not possible for it to be said that we have seen the external
man by means of the man who is within us, nor the external horse
by means of the horse that is within us, (29. 7-8)
we may restore the Vorlage as ov yap difirov (toj eV i]nlv avdp<j^Tr(p top
e^oj audp(t)Tov ouSe) ro) ev r\pXv nrTro; top e^oj lttitov. The extra material
could have dropped out of the manuscripts used by Heinze through
homoiarchon. As now reconstructed on the basis of the Arabic, the
passage reflects the man-horse typology that appears in Aristotle,
Cat. lb4-5 and 2a 13- 14: olov b tXc, avdpoiTroc, ^ 6 t\<; lttttoc,.
33. 22-25 TO. hi yevrj Kal to. KadoXov ircoq yvoiput, a dLrjpidixrfTai tv
KaTtjyopiatc,, olov ovaiau, iroabv Kal Trpoq tl Kal to. l<t)t^ric;, ov yap dr] Kal
ra 7€I't; aroLXf^a, aW ovde e'/c roiv UTOLX^iijiv, aXXa to. fiev irXeico Twvbe
Kal TToppco T^avra-waaL tov Kal vonLcdfiuat. aroLX^'i^a. . . .
The vigilant reader will look in vain for a correlative to the phrase
aXXa TO. pikv ttXcico rOivhi. The Arabic shows that the passage in
question is corrupt; it reads
1 Uil U-i ^^.
jl
but the things that consist of elements are more than ten, and the
genera are very far from being considered to be elements. (30. 8-10)
This interpretative translation permits us to emend the text in Heinze:
aXXa TO. piv irXdic tCov (St/ca, ra) be Kal irbppiii KavTairaai tov Kal
vopLoBrfvaL (jToixda. Themistius is of course referring to the ten
categories of predication specified by Aristotle in the fourth chapter
of Categories. Note that there is a similar reference in Themistius on
42. 17-18: iroXXaxii^c, be Kal to etvai Kal to ev nvaL {beKax^<i yocp).
Visual similarity between beKa and be Kal was probably responsible
for the loss of beKa, to. in the manuscripts utilized by Heinze.
34. 22-24 KpelTTov be aul to avvexov tov aKebavvvp'evov. oi be ovk
aiaxvvovTaL Kal tov vov to. oTOix^oc iroLovvTeq aTOtxf^la [to yap ^eXTiov
aul TTotei]. . . .
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In his apparatus Heinze writes "'aroLx^la (alt.) suspectum | to - - -
KOLil seclusi, fort, collocanda post oKibavvvtiivovy Beginning with oi
b\ ovK aiox^vovTUL, the Arabic version is as follows:
but these are not embarrassed either in that they make the elements
better than the mind, for the maker always is better (32. 9-10)
Ar's Vorlage was free of the defects that troubled Heinze; I reconstruct
it as oi be ovk alax^vovTai koX tov vov to. aroix^'ioi itOLOVvr^q ^eXriova,
TO yap ^(Xtlov aid (o) Trotei. . . . The appropriateness of reading
TOLovureq ^eXriova is also apparent from the next clause, where similar
phraseology is clearly to be understood: oocnrep av d kol tov Texv'irov
TT]v v\t)v (sc. TTOLoXev ^eXTtova) (34. 24-35). Ar here makes the text
explicit:
and in that they are like one who prefers the material to the craftsman.
(32. 10-11)
34. 25-26 KaLTOL ye evXoyop to ^eXriov etvai Kal irpoyeveoTaTOV Kal
KVpCOiTaTOV, ov TO. (TTOLxda.
This clause continues from the passage discussed in the last note.
Here Ar has
however, it is proper that it be the best and the oldest of what is
related to it and the most distinguished, not the elements. (32. 1 1-12)
The use of the emphatic pronoun J^ suggests that Ar's Vorlage should
be reconstructed as KaWoL ye evXoyov (^avTov) to ^eXTiov etvac ktX.;
avTov, referring to vovq, seems required, in order to give ov to. oToixda
something to balance, and the word could have dropped out through
homoioteleuton with evXoyov. Compare Aristotle 410bl4-15
evXoyov yap tovtov etvai irpoyeveaTaTou Kal Kvpiov Kara ({)vaLV (without
ov Toc cToixela). For the structure of the sentence cf. e.g. 40. 28-29
Kal eLC, TO -Koaov avuTeXecret to? fojo; rj \pvxv> ovk eiq to ttolov.
43. 18-19 TraXiu be ooairep eKel b irpiicv, OTe aibrjpoq rjv Kal to TOLOvbl
(Txfma buov. . . .
Regarding ore Heinze notes: "fort, delendum," but clearly we are
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to articulate as o re (comparable to the structure in the clauses
following: rj re Koprf Kal i\ o^iq ^ tc i/'ux^ ohov koI to adua). The
Arabic translator correctly understood the passage:
and also, just as there the saw was the iron and such-and-such a shape
at the same time. . . . (53. 6-7).^
43. 28-29 ouTTOj yap brjXov, d KaX ovtoc, adp-aTOc, rtvoq evreXexn-a apa
TOLavTT} Q)<TT€ ax<j^PLcrTo<; €ivai. . . .
The particle apa is surprisingly late in its clause. From the Arabic
we see that the text printed in Heinze requires emendation:
JLCl-I
_^ > VUCl-I jir jU U ^ JLCl-I -gI Xu ^_ ^ i^
because it is not yet clear whether it is a completion of some body,
and if it is a completion, whether it is a completion like what is
inseparable (53. 16-17)
We should alter apa to ^pa and add a short protasis: outtco yap driXov
(i Kal ovToq aoip-aTOc, Tivoq IvrtKiXf^^ot (^KaX d cVrcXtx^ia,) ^pot TOiavrr)
axrre ax^pitrrcx; etWi. . . . For the general structure cf. 45.
25-27 . . . d irporepov b(,aKpivaLp.iv irbrepov (Kaarrj tovtoiv tC^v irpoei-
prifxevoiu dwa/jLeoov lari ypvxh xad' eavrrfv -q pLopibv tl ^vxvq, Kal d nbpLOV,
KOTtpov ovTcoq. . . . Note also that, although it lacks the equivalent of
Kal d iuTeXexiid, the Medieval Latin translation of William of Moer-
beke here has utrum,^ reflecting ^pa, which is also found in the editio
princeps of the Greek text (see below, note 14).
47. 2—4 Kal eoTiv airXCic, oUtia vXr] (KaaTO) ciSti, oUeia p.€v r^bi, kolptj
be ijbt, Kal f^cico /xev airXCiq to <t)voLKOv aOijxa opyaviKov, Toiuibe be faJOJ to
TOLOvbe opyavov. (ante opyaviKov add. kou. as)
Here the Greek text underlying the Arabic is somewhat different
from what Heinze prints; Ar reads:
^ Note incidentally that in the same section (43. 19) Heinze's o^floX/ws should be
corrected to (6) 6<t>0akfwq: it is parallel to 6 irpiuv (in the passage quoted in the text);
Ar reads j-Jl (53. 7) and shows that b 6<t>6aKtuxi stood in its Vorlage.
^ G. Verbeke, Themistius, Commentaire sur le traite de I'ame d'Aristote: Traduction de
Guillaume de Moerbeke, Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum 1
(Louvain/Paris 1957), 102. 41.
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and in general to each form there is matter suitable to it: to the
house, this (matter); and to the bed, this; and to the animal in general,
the natural and organic body; and to such-and-such an animal, such-
and-such an organ. (61. 14-16)
Ar's Vorlage I assume ran as follows: kuI eartv airXciciq oUeia v\r] kKaon^
eldiL, oUia nlv rjdi, kXIvj) de ijdi, Kal fojoj fiev airXoi to 4>^(nKov aOitia
opyavLKOv, roLUide 8e ^oiu) to Toibvbi opyavov. I suspect that olkloc
KXivri is what Themistius wrote: first olkloc became oLKtia through
assimilation to the preceding oUtia, and kXlvtd was "emended" to
KoivT] to provide balance with the corrupt OLKeia; note that in 41. 28
kXlut} is rendered by j,j— (49. 1), the same word employed in the
present passage. The assumption that Ar's Vorlage had fcbco /xev aTrXo?
instead of fciw nev awXCiic, proceeds from the use of the adjective jlk*
.
If the Greek had been cxtXCx;, we might expect a prepositional phrase
like J>U'VI Je- , which renders airXCbq in 39. 33 (Ar: 45. 1). There is
no way of ascertaining whether the Arabic translated a manuscript
which had Kal before opyavLKou (see the apparatus in the passage quoted
above), but the conjunction is not needed: cf. 42. 15 oiJjfiaToq (pvaLKov
opyavLKOv (rendered in Ar as 'jy ^j, .^.l 50. 13-14).
48. 30-31 Koi yap €l ixrjde ovToq ye TeXeioq ocTraa-qc, ^vxv<i^ (xXXa KOLVOTaToc,
yi bfKavT(j)v toov vvv Xeyop.eu(i)u.
Heinze emended TeXeiojq, the reading of his manuscripts, to TeXeLoc,.
Ar shows that its Vorlage is to be reconstructed as o^Toq (^KOLPoq) ye
TeXeiwq:
y] 4i'ii ^ Jo j^ij jii. ^ L.L 1ji iJu jc^ ^ jij Ji aiij
for even if this definition is not common in the manner of one for
each soul, it is the most common definition for all these things that are
now mentioned. (65. 7-9)
Note the symmetry of the passage as now emended: (kolvoc^ ye
KOLUOTaToq ye.
48. 36 - 49. 2 top be n'eXXovTa aKpL^eaTepov opieladaL airoboTeov ibia,
t'u; eoTL Xbyoc, eKaaTtjq xf^vxvq, otov Triq <j)VT0V, otl evTeXexn-ot tov irpbq
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Tpo<i>r}v opyavLKOv, kol at; iraXiv rriq dr^piov, on ivTeXex^^^Oi tov irpoq, rpo<t>r]v
re Koi ope^LP opyauLKOv.
The Arabic that translates this passage is badly lacunose in Lyons'
manuscript, but its phrase
j^\j .iJuU 'juil J^\ ^_*U jLCi-l
a completion of the organic body intended for nurture and growth
(65. 16)
corresponds to evreXex^i-oi tov irpoq Tpo(l)rjv opyavLKOV and shows that in
the Vorlage this segment should be reconstructed as evreXex^Lcx tov wpbq
Tpo(t>7fv (re Kal av^i]aiv) opyavLKOv, exactly balanced by the following
eVreXexfia tov irpoq Tpo<i)r)v re koi ope^LV opyaviKov; cf. 39. 31 ttjv
Tpo<))r)v re Kal av^rjaiu, which Ar renders as ^«Jlj ^cJudl "nurture
and growth" (44. 13-14).
55. 34-35 WdTe iKti p-lv <l)dopa ttjc, Trpovirovarjq iroioTrjToq, ivTavda de
TeXeiooaLq naXXov.
Ar's wording reflects a slightly different text; it reads:
JJC JU iJl* JUj <J i.llll LiJO) JL^ JU Jli JU jjCzi
and so the condition of that is a condition of destruction for the quality
that precedes in its case, and the condition of this is a condition of
completion for the nature that is in it. (81. 7-8)
I believe that the Vorlage ran as follows: oiare eKel nev (t)6opa ttjc,
KpovTTOvaijq TroLOTijToq, evTavda 5e TtXtioiaic, (rriq ivovarfc, (t>vaeuiq). In the
course of transmission, we may assume that r^q evovarfq (pvaeooq dropped
out through homoioteleuton (reXeiujo-K; (f)vae<jo<;) and that naXXov
was added to obtain at least a semblance of balance to the preceding
(()dopa TTjq irpovTvova-qq iroLOTrjToq. For the phrase reXeiojo-K; Triq ^uaeox;
cf. 56. 12 TTJV Triq (t>vaeoi}q TeXeioTT^Ta, rendered in Ar as /»JJI JUT
"the completion of the nature" (82. 6).
58. 5-11 KaTOc avyL^i^y]Koq bt Xe7erai atadrjTa a Kad' avTot fiev ovk
ecTiv madrjTa, roj 8e avfx^efirjKevai Tolq cxTrXCiq madriTolq- aiadrjToq yap 6
ALCtpovq vibq rj 6 Ataprjq ovx V Aiaprjq, aXX' otl avu^efirjKe ro) Aiapei Kal
Xeu/coj eLvat. 'ApLCTTOTeXrjq de to. KaTO. avfi^e^rjKoq aiad'qTa ovTOiq
iptn)vtv€f KaTO. avfifiefirfKoq yap tovtov aladavtTai, 8l6ti rw XevKu tovto
(Tvixfi€l3riK€v ov aladaviTai, ojcwep av a Xeyot. otl KUTct avufiefir^Koq tov
Aiapovq aCadaueTai, otl ro? XevKU) avfxfie^rjKe ALapei itvaL.
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In his apparatus to tovto (rvufie^rjKev ov aiaSaviTai, Heinze notes:
"scripsi ex Arist.: ov aiaBavtTm^ tovto (tu^/S." For the passage in question,
the Arabic version is based on a text that deviates from Heinze's
emendation and from the reading of his manuscripts; it reads:
10
IJL* jlT j\ <-jw (^aJI ^'^U J^j- *i\ J—
J
because it has befallen the white which he senses that it be this. (87.
5-6)
Ar's Vorlage may be reconstructed as hoTL to) XeuKW oy madaueTai tovtu)
(eiWi) (TvnlSe^TiKev. The replacement of tovto) eLvai by tovto may have
arisen through a desire to bring the text closer to that of Aristotle,
which, as Heinze notes, here reads on ro) Xfu/coj avu^e^rjKe tovto ov
aioBaviTaL (418a22-23"); with Heinze's reading, the passage is brought
still nearer to Aristotle's, but, as the Arabic suggests, it is probably
not what Themistius wrote. In order to show the appropriateness of
the proposed bt'oTi Tib XevKU) ov aiadaveTai tovto: (^etvaC) avulSe^rjKev, I
have quoted the entire context at the beginning of this section. Note
in particular the balancing effect of /cat Xeu/cu; eivai tovtw (etmi)
AiapeL €LvaL.
63. 25 evdpvTTTOc, yap (sc. 6 arjp icTi) /cat evoXLcdoq. . . .
Here Ar reads
CJLilllj »_;_^lj C.T.^TII »}y^ Ai] liAJij
for it is quick in dispersion and dissolution and slipping away. (100.
6-7)
Since this translation does not characteristically use two Arabic words
to render a single word in Greek, Themistius may have written
evdpvTTToq yap {/cat evdiaxvToq) /cat ev6\t.<7doq, and the second term could
have dropped out through a combination of homoiarchon and hom-
oioteleuton. For the triadic structure cf. e.g. 64. 23-24 tvdpviTToc, /cat
wdiaipeToq /cat eveiKToq, which Ar translates as
' Note that ourdodviToa in Heinze's apparatus, both in the lemma and in the citation,
is a misprint.
'" 1-1* is added by the scribe in his capacity as reviser (see Lyons' introduction, pp.
viii and xviii).
" In his critical edition, Aristotelis Tractatus de anima graece et latine (Rome 1965),
P. Siwek lists some variant readings for the passage: t^ Xcuk^] to Xoikop, ot] ^,
aurOowtrm] aurdaveadca (see his apparatus for details).
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quick in dispersion and scattering and easy to curtail. (102. 13-14)
Themistius does not elsewhere employ the adjective evbLaxvroc, (for
which see LSJ),'^ but of similar formation to evOpvirroc, evdiaxvToq
is the phrase Opvirreadai Kal Siaxcio^^at in 64. 24, rendered in Ar as
dispersion and diffusion, (102. 14)
as well as 65. 12 dpOwTeadai koL diax^'lcrdm, which Ar turns as
^
*--. j i_>^r-^ "being dissolved and diffused" (104. 4). It is on the
basis of these doublets that I propose evdpvTTOc, yap (/cai evdiaxvrcx;},
but it is also possible that the text should be restored as evdpvTToq yap
(^Kal tvbiaiptToc^, as in 64. 23-24 quoted above.
63. 26—27 ...
€1 Ka\ rvnivavov xu/LtTrai/co rfpe/xa irpocrayoLc,, ov iroifiaeu;
\p6(pov.
For this Ar offers the following translation:
if you gently bring that with which you strike a drum close to a drum,
as a result of that it will not produce a sound. (100. 8-9)
I suspect that Ar's Vorlage read 6i 6t' od TvirreLq Tvniravov rvniravo)
ripena irpoaayou; kt\. After TvirreLc, dropped out (through homoiarchon),
61' ov, no longer construable, was altered to Kai. The reconstruction
provides a more reasonable text than Heinze's (since one does not
characteristically bang two drums together) and may approximate what
Themistius wrote. For tvtttuv cf. 63. 30-31 t'ov (sc. \byov) re toO
TVKTop'fiVov (TOifxaroq Kal tov tov iv a> TvimTai, rendered in Ar as
y^j-ai\ *—i A—J (^AJI -—aJI ,_^J ^j^^\ -—aJl ^^^
the sense of the body that is struck and the sense of the body on which
falls the blow. (100. 12-13)
'^ Note especially the collocation aipa wkaxvrov ovra in Placita philosophorum (ed.
H. Diels, Doxographi graeci [Berlin 1879], 404), 4. 13. 11.
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For ^ rendering Sta + gen. cf. e.g. 122. 5 (Gr. 74. 3).
63. 36 avaKKarai fxev yap ael 6 wXriyelq eu; afip. . . .
Here Ar has
for the air that is struck is always reflected (100. 18)
and shows that we should emend the Greek to 6 -KXtiy^ic, {c^} (xr\p
(dittography); cf. also 64. 7 6 7rX777et(; a^p, which Ar likewise translates
as ^jjill •l>_4ll "the air that is struck" (101. 11).
65. 1-2 KOii TOVTo 7} 4>vavc, evXa^ovnevr) eV to? dia roiv uiTOJV wdpuj raq
(kiKaq efxr]x<xvr](TaTO. . . .
This Ar renders as follows:
j^ji JrJJS' i^' Cl«7- JS C.atil< <^JiJI Aljj^ ^^j^\ jA \Xaj
and this is that of which nature was wary, and so it became delicate
because it made the holes of the ears spiral. ... (103. 12-13)
The Arabic is rather free here, but it suggests that its Vorlage had a
clause absent in Heinze's text: Kal tovto t} (})vavc, evXa^ovnevrj (/cat XeTrrrj
yLvoijLevrjy iv tuj 8ia Tcbu wtooj' Tropoj raq eXiKaq ifirjxocvrjaaTq. Cf. 60. 24
XeiTTOTepou, which Ar renders with
,ji^\ "more delicate" (92. 15).
Assumption of homoioteleuton can explain the disappearance of kol
Xeirrr] ytvon^vt) in the manuscripts available to Heinze.
75. 10-14 ixeaou jxkv ovv tl Hvat dereov koL ravTrfc, rriq accrdrfaeu^q, koI fir)
Kara tovto uvai Trjv bLa(i)opa.v Tr)c, a<j)f)q Kal ttic, yevaeooc, irpbc, Tocq
aXXaq, aXXa Kar' eKeiuo fiaXXov otl fV (Keiuoou yitv ov to n'eoov ovto
aXXoLOVTai aXXa dia tov ixeaov to aiodr)Tr]piov {to bl oiziiiq aKovoTiov tov
aXXoLovadaL TrpoeiprjTai).
The entire context has been quoted, so that the pertinence of the
final parenthetical remark may be clear. In his apparatus, Heinze notes:
"toO aXXoiovcrdai suspectum." The Arabic translation shows that we
must correct to to aXXoLoixrdai:
'^ To be read instead of the manuscript's \^ ; see 83. 9 cited below.
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and we have already said how one must understand the meaning of
"changing." (125. 13-14)
For similar patterns of expressions, cf. 56. 30-31 to be dvvaixei oirojq
(XKOVGTkov irpoeiprfTai., which Ar turns as
ij2i\> ^^ ^ j^ J»^_ <JlS \—JjX ^-V—iir Oij
and we have previously said how one must understand the meaning of
"in potential," (83. 8-9)
and also 56. 34 7ra)(; h\ eV avjov to iraax^^^ otKOVuTiov . . . T^potiprjTai,
rendered as
[J-i5l] IJ_^ <J ^ j\ [(^J ^i' Uj* c-vi- aij
and we have previously said how one must understand concerning it
our statement "he was affected." (83. 13)
Note further that the Latin version of William of Moerbeke also
supports the reading to aWoLovadai: hoc autem alterari qualiter sit
inteUigendum, praedictum est (ed. Verbeke [see above, note 8] 1 72.99-00).
76. 5-10 oxTirep irXeiovq atadijaaq oi/'k; /cat cxkot], 8i evbq be tov p.(Ta^v
evepyovcTLV, ouTcoq ovdlv /ccoXuei TrXeiovq fiev (Lvat, aLcrdr}a€Lq Kad' eKaaTrjp
TOiv Xcyo/jLevoov btivTibv evauTKjoaecov, hi 8e xPV<^^oci to) fiera^v, Xeyco de
Ty aapKL. irepl to avTO /xopiov olov ttjp yXojTTap Kal yivaiq icTi Kal a4>r),
Kal op,(oq TrXeiovq eLalv ai aiadr]Oiic; ovbtv ovv KO)XveL koI irepl Kotaav T-qv
oapKa TavTov avp.^aivuv. . . . (^v^c, Q': omoiox; PQ(?)C)
Ar translates the sentence beginning Trepi to ocvto nopLov as follows:
J^j t^tj JjJ^I JLJll dUi J11.J <!-. Jb^lj jJie, J 'j] iSj
and just as in the case of one and the same part, like the tongue, there
are taste and touch, and in a similar way the senses involving it are
more than one, nothing prevents that very thing from happening in
the case of all flesh too (127. 9-1 1)
The Arabic suggests that its Vorlage read koI ccairep before irepl to
avTo n'opiov and—along with some of Heinze's manuscripts (see the
apparatus quoted above)
—
buoioic, instead of o/tcoc;. I believe that Them-
istius probably wrote koI o^airep irepl to ocvto p.bpiov ktX.: proximity of
-TTfp and Trep- could have caused the omission in the manuscripts
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available to Heinze; after Kal uiairep dropped out, an ovv was inserted
between ovdh and /ccoXuci in order to establish some logical relation
between the two clauses.
77. 17-20 aWojq ovv fxeaorrjq 17 a;0^ kol aXXooc, at aXXai, iKtivai fiev
TO) nr]8€v exctJ' ojv dexovTai, avrrj 8e to) (X^iv rjdrj to nera^v tov depfiov
Kol ypvxpov Kol TOV (TKXrjpov Kal tov fiaXaKov.
Beginning with avTrj 5e, Ar offers the following translation:
^J' Od'.J ^jU'j jl*^l ori -^J^^ ^Sl V 'jt i*^ ^ -kly iJuj
and this is an intermediary because in it exists the intermediary between
hot and cold, and between wet and dry, and between hard and soft.
(130. 12-13)
Its Vorlage can be reconstructed as avTt) 8e to? ex^iv ijdr] to ^cra^u tov
depfioi) KOL (tov^ \pvxpov (kuX tov vypov koI tov ^rjpovy kol tov aKXrjpov
Koi TOV p,aXaKov. For the triplet of opposites, each opposite having the
article, cf. 72. 30—31 ovx ovtu) de ex^t to depfibv kol to \pvxpov, kol to
OKXripov KaX to ixaXaKov, kol to ^apv Kal to KOV<f)ou, and for the sequence
hot-cold and wet-dry cf. 76. 34-35 toov ttpooto^p aToix^icov depnoTtjq
rpvxpoTTjq, vyp'oT-qq, ^-qpoTrjq, rendered in Ar as
the heat of the first elements and their coldness, and their wetness
and their dryness. (129. 2-3)
78. 12 6 Xoyoc, fiePToi Kal to. aXXa Kal Xoyov Kpivei. . . .
For this segment of text, Ar translates
^1 j-uj ^1 jJ, .L_-^S|I J^ ^. ^^ ^:-il Uli
now as for the concept, it distinguishes the rest of the things without
concept, and it distinguishes the concept. (132. 9-10)
This readily suggests that Ar's Vorlage read as follows: 6 Xoyoq fxePToi
Kal TO. aXXa (aXoya^ Kal Xbyov KpiveL. . . . For a similar expression
(though with aXoyoq in a different sense) cf. 67. 10 tcov aXbyoiv fcowj/,
which Ar turns as
of the animals without the faculty of speech. (108. 12)
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80. 25-27 . . . Toiiv fxev airXwu madrjTrjpiojv ovdev av rj/juv eXXeiTroi'
exofiev 8e Kal to avvderop eV TrXeiopojv.
Ar shows that its Vorlage should be reconstructed as tojv ntv
bi-nXOiv aLadr)T7]pL(jiv (koI tCiv avvBiTitiv) ovblv ktX.:
-<S^\j ;L-JI J.\j^\ j. .^ L_-:-aiJ ^
we do not lack any of the simple sense organs and the compound ones.
(138. 1-2)
Examination of the context makes it plausible that /cm tcou avuderojv
goes back to the author's autograph: /xep with tCjv . . . ctTrXccv
at(Tdr]Tr]pi<j)v implies a contrast, and Kal preceding to avvdirov Ik irXubvo^v
,
which Ar renders as
•-^'j J* J^^ cf ^y ^ ^ '—*J
also what is compounded of more than one, (138. 2-3)
suggests a previous mention of the compound sense organs. Cf. also
80. 17 Ik tojj' airXcibv Kal (k tccv (rvvdercov (sc. (To^narcov), translated by
Ar as
from the simple bodies and from the compound ones. (137. 8)
83. 7-8 aXXa irpbc, pev XP<^M<^ ^o axpovv (sc. iariv), izpoq b\ \pb<povc, to
a\}/o(t>ov.
The Greek has a needless lack of balance: xp^l^oc . . . ^p6(})ovq. The
Arabic translation shows that its Vorlage had the harmonious
XP<j^poiTa . . . \l/6(f)ovq, corrupted in the manuscripts available to Heinze:
but in relation to colors there is that which has no color, and in relation
to sounds there is that which has no sound. (143. 10-11)
83. 22 (pauepbv tolvvv otl ovx avrXox; XeyeTaL to aiadaviadai.
This sentence is modelled on the following in Aristotle: <t>avf:pov
TOLVVV OTL OVX «»' TO Ty o^u aLoBavtodaL (425b20). The Arabic translator's
Vorlage also had tti o\p€L, which seems necessary for the sense of the
passage:
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and so we say that it is clear that perception by sight is not spoken of
in an unrestricted way. (144. 7-8)
83. 22-23 Kal yap orau fir) opcbuev, ry dxpei Kpivonev. . . .
This duplicates a sentence in Aristotle (425b20-21), but the Arabic
version has an extra clause:
for we judge by sight when we do not see, to say nothing of when we
do see. (144. 8-9)
I believe that Ar's Vorlage should be restored as Kal yap orav ixrj
bpu>n€V (^KaX orav bpoifxtvy, ry 6\ptL Kpivofiep.
85. 8-10 TpdCchv yap 6 Xoyoq evprjaei nrj irepl rrjv aapKa tovto p.bvov
avu^e^rjKevai aWa Kal irepl to. Xonra aLadrfrrjpia, oCov Xiyiti Tr}v Koprjp
Kal Tovc, 5ia to:v ootojv wopovq.
For the clause beginning with oiov, Ar provides the following
translation:
I mean in the case of the eye, for example, and the passages of the
nostrils and the passages of the ears. (147. 23 - 148. I)
The underlying Greek is to be reconstructed as olop Xcyco ttjv Koprjp
(^Kal Tovq 8La rOiv ixvKrrjpoiv irbpovq) kol tovc, bia to)P (iOtoop irbpovq. Cf.
62. 23-24 OLOP to) irbpcf tccp ojtcoj' r] toj Tropco toji/ hvkttjpoop, which Ar
turns as
the passage of the ears or the passage of the nostrils, (97. 14)
and 75. 23-24 ro) vropco toj bia toop hvkttjpojp, translated as
the passage of the nostrils. (126. 5-6)
In both places Ar renders irbpoq by iSj^ , while in 147. 18 it translates
the plural irbpoi by the construct dual ^
.
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87. 23-25 Kal "Onrjpoq de awTpiittadai tov uovu vwoXan^aucju /cat
avvaWoLoixxdaL ra> irepuxovri (TOifictTLKriv ourai rffv <i>vaiv tov Xbyov. . .
.
The words ra> Treptexoi'Ti seem strangely unspecific. Thanks to Ar
we can see that the passage is corrupt in the manuscripts utilized by
Heinze:
/j^ jkJl ^-i, 'Jb
and Homer too is of the opinion that the mind is changed and altered
with the body that encompasses it, and that the nature of the rational
faculty is moved. (152. 16-17)
We should emend the Greek to the following: "Onrjpoc, 8e awTpiireodai
TOV vovv viToXan^avoiv koI ovvaWoiovodaL ro) -KtpuxovTL a6ip.aTi, Kiv(dadaC)
ouTai TT}v (pixTLv TOV Xoyov. . . . Cf. above, on 32. 7—9.
90. 5-8 e-KeiTa madrjau; fxtv iraaLV virapxn- Tolq ^oooiq, (l)avTaaia 8e Tolq
nev Tolq 5e ov, ixvpurfKL fiev Laccq Kol neXiTTrj kol ttoXXu fiaXXou kvvI koI
LTTTO} Kal oaa ixeTex^L atV^^aecoc;, aKooXrjKi 8e ov.
Regarding aiadijoeoiq Heinze sagely notes "falsum." Ar renders<he
clause in question as
everything that is said to have a share in discernment. (158. 1-2)
Elsewhere Ar uses j::-^ "discernment" to translate diauoia (see Lyons
298), and presumably its Vorlage here read biavoiac, instead of madrfaeox;.
90. 28-29 (f)auepbv ovv otl ovt€ 86^a fieT' aLadrjaeux;, ovTe avfXTXoKr} So^rjq
Koi aiadrjaeii^c, ij (pavTaaia. {ovv] 5e Qs)
For this segment of text, Ar provides the following translation:
and it is clear that imagination is not itself also opinion together with
sensation, as Plato says, nor opinion by means of sensation, nor a
composition of opinion and sensation. (159. 1-2)
Ar's Vorlage should be reconstructed as <i>av€pov bi (cf. app.) oti ovt€
bb^a h€t' madrjaeoiq, (ccq Xeyei, UXaTOju, ovTt bb^a bC aiadi]af:UK,^ ovTe
avfiirXoKr) bb^-qq Kol madrjaeoiq 17 <t)avTaaia. As now restored, Themistius'
text faithfully adheres to the Aristotelian original: (i)avtpbv toIvvv oti
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ovde do^a ner' madrjaeox;, ov5e 8i madifaeoiq, ovdi avuirXoKr] bo^rjc, kol
atadrjatooq (t)avTaaLa av €tr] (428a24-26). The restored clause was lost
through homoioteleuton in the manuscripts available to Heinze.
98. 4 . . . ooare eiKorooq voelraL filv ra TOiavra, poel 5e ov.
Here again the Arabic version reveals additional material:
^j J>^ L-fri. ^\j jTj JLJ Vj ^- •Lj'^I -!•
-r^^A ^J^
and so obligatorily these things are thought, but they do not think;
and each one of them is an object of thought, but each one of them
is not mind. (167. 13-14)
After vod 8e ov, I suggest that Ar's Vorlage had the following clause:
Koi uorjTov nev eKaarou, vovc, de ov. The loss of this material in the
manuscripts used by Heinze is due to homoioteleuton (Se ov . . . di
ov); the content is similar to what Themistius writes a few lines later:
o^Toq act Kol povq afia kol vorjrbq (98. 8-9), rendered in Ar as
that is continually mind and an object of thought at the same time.
(168. 2)
99. 13-15 ov yap e^u^dev Trjq vXriq i] rex^n, oJCTrep x^^'^euTt/c^ Toi) x«X^'oO
KOi TdKTOVLKT} TOV ^vXoV, ttXX' IvbvtTai oXu) TO? bwajXH V(h 6 TTOirjTLKOq. . . .
Ar shows that its Vorlage contained a clause lost in Heinze's manu-
scripts:
;ll-Ji 'j\ IS i'jiii jui jc UjU. jA ^ JlJji j—sji 'jl
.^l i'jiil JUI Ji.ljb JUII JLJI J, ,^\ J, ^jU ijU^lj
because the active mind is not outside of the mind in potential, as art
is outside of matter, as, for example, the smith's art is outside of brass
and carpentry is outside of wood, but the active mind penetrates the
mind in potential entirely. ... (179. 1 1-14)
This suggests the following reconstruction for the Greek: ov yap
(^(jodeu (tov dwafKL voi) 6 iroLrjTLKoq, Hoairep t!^<j)div) ttjc, vKrjq rj TexfV ktX.
99. 34-35 Kal ovro^q 6 povq, oirep ^Stj /cat KpoTtpov tiprjTai, xcoptaroc; Kal
airadrjq Kal afiLyriq. . .
.
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The clause oTrep rj5rj koI irpoTepov eiprjrai refers to 98. 30-31: koL
eoTLV ovToq 6 uovq x(^P'-<^toc, re koI airadf}q koI afiiyriq, and accordingly
we should emend ovTcoq 6 vovq to odroq 6 vovq. Themistius is contrasting
two types of vovq: one in potential (dwafxei), the other in actuality
(evepyeia), and odroq 6 povq refers to the latter Ar's Vorlage had the
correct reading:
JJUt- jJ.j J*i-* jJ. jjLL. UjT L-ii US' jUI iJbfcj
and this mind, as we said before, is separate, unaffected and unmixed.
(180. 17 - 181. 1)
107. 12-15 biOTtep ov yiverai iv roiq aXbyoiq ^uioic, aW rjdovrj /xoprj /cm
XvTTt] iwl Tvapovcn toIc, ifdeaiv rj Xvirrfpolq, kol ravra wavTairaaLV
avcKaiadTjTa \6yov koI vov' iv avdpCii'KOLC, b\ ovroiq apa kol to. wadrf neroxot
Xbyov. . . .
For the last clause Ar has
jui ;r,L^ u«i ^ ^1 ^ji^ 'js3 dDir ^ui j ^S' ^,
and the matter is not thus in the case of men, but the affects of their
soul too share in reason. . . . (194. 20 - 195. 1)
The Arabic version suggests that its Vorlage should be reconstructed
as eV avOpo^TTOu; be (^ovx) ovroic, aWa Kal to. Kocdr) neroxa Xbyov. This
suits the context better than what Heinze prints and may be what
Themistius wrote.
107. 31-35 6 56 povq irCoq irore e^ijodep oiv koI o^crirep eTrideToq o/xooc, avfKpvrjq;
Kol TLc, i] (f)vaLq avToiJ; to p.ev yap nrjbeu eLvaL Kar' evepyaav, bvvanei be
iravTa, KaXo)q, o^airep Kal i] ataOrjaLC,. ov yap ovrcoq XijTrreov icq ovbe
avToq {epioTLKOV yap) aXX' ooq VTroKetnevrju Tiva bvvaixtv Kadairep Kal eirl
tO)v vXikCov.
This is part of a quotation from Theophrastus which Themistius
introduces into his discussion of the mind. Concerning the words icq
ovbe avToq Heinze writes: "scil. 6 'ApiaroTeXrjq eXafiev." This is possible
though somewhat strained: the context suggests that avToq refers to
uovq, not to Aristotle. Here the Arabic can be of help; for the passage
beginning with ov yap ovto)c, it provides the following translation:
lj> 'jU %^] »^ ^ <_JJ j 4jt <J jJLm j] ,y^_ ^-J ^li
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for it is not necessary for us to believe about it that in itself it is nothing
at all (for this is contentious). . . . (196. 1-2)
Instead of ojq ovde avrbq, Ar's Vorlage appears to have offered a;q ovblv
avToc,, a clause which clearly refers to the preceding to fiev yap nrjSev
Hum and is much more appropriate to the argument than is the reading
of Heinze's manuscripts.
108. 25-27 €1 n€V ovv (Tvix(t)VTO<; 6 klvcov, koI €vdv<; expw '^"^ «ft' fi 5e
varepov, ixera rivoc, Kal irCbq i) yeveaic,; eoiKe 5' ovu ooq ayevrjroq, eiVcp Koi
a(f)dapToi;. tvvivapxo^v 5' ovv bia ri ovk aei;
According to Heinze's apparatus, the editio princeps, followed by
Spengel,'"* emended 5' ovv iic, to ovv koI, presumably to allow the
argument to proceed more smoothly than it does with the sequence
6' ovv ... 6' ovv. Another approach to removing the textual difficulties
emerges from study of the Arabic, which translates the sentence
beginning with ebi/ce as follows:
JL-li jJ. jlT j[ JjC:l> jl Ij*^^ j^_ jt <^j
and it seems to be substance without genesis, if it is imperishable. (197.
14-15)
The presence of ^yr "substance" suggests that Ar's Vorlage read
eoiK( 5' ovaia ayev-qroq, which was corrupted to ebi/ce 5' ovv ioq ayevrjToq
in the rest of the tradition. Our Arabic translator regularly employs
j*j»- to render ovaia (see Lyons' index, pp. 242 and 363), and the
correspondence is well established in other Arabic versions of philo-
sophical Greek: see G. Endress, Proclus Arabus: Zwanzig Abschnitte aus
der Institutio Theologica in arabischer Ubersetzung (Beirut 1973), 78, 89
and 262 n. 1.
112. 30-32 ovTOic, Kal rj tov vov -rrpbc, to. vorjra eTL^oXrt [ovde] i} tov rrfv
e^LV txovToq ijdr], ccairep tov eTTiaTrjixovoq i] irepl to. iinaTJjTa evepyeia Kal
iiTL^oXri ov KLvrjaLq aXX' Ivepyeia. . . .
Heinze deletes ou5c, but Ar shows that more drastic surgery is in
order:
so the mind's encounter with thoughts is not the activity of one to
''' V. Trincavellus, Omnia Themistii opera, hoc est paraphrases et orationes; Alexandri
Aphrodisiensis libri duo de anima et de fata unus (Venice [Aldine] 1534), 64-95";
L. Spengel, Themistii paraphrases Aristotelis librorum quae supersunt (Leipzig [Teubner]
1866), 2. 1-231.
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whom accrues the natural disposition, as you would say the scholar's
encounter with data is not movement but activity. (205. 16-18)
The Arabic text is not free of corruption, for Lyons has had to add
,_pJ before ~iS
_f , but it allows us to get closer to the original reading,
which I reconstruct as follows: ovrooq koI ij tov vov irpoq to. vorjTa iin^oXri
ovx V TOV rriv i^tv exovToq rj8r] (^evepyeiay, ccairep tov eTiaTTjixovoc, i] irepl
TO. eTnaTTjTa {ivepyeia koI} eVi/SoX^ ov KLvrjaic, aW ipepyeia. If this
reconstruction is correct, it would seem that for some reason or other
evepyeLa had been inadvertently transposed at an early stage of trans-
mission, and that this transposition led to the somewhat garbled
rewriting of the passage that Heinze's manuscripts display.
113. 14—16 rfi 6e diavorjTLKy \l/vxv to. p,\v (pavraa/xaTa KpOKurat.
icairep kol to. aLadrjixara ry aicrdrjcrei, to dl ayadov koL to kukov uxnrep
eKeiPTj TO ifdv koI to XvTrrjpov.
The clause running from to 8( ayadov to the end of the quotation
is defective: something must balance iKeivj). Themistius may have
written Ty be to ayadov Kal to kukov oiawep eKeivrj to ijdv Kal to XvwTfpov,
which can also be postulated as the reading of Ar's Vorlage: here Ar
reads
jijllj JbJOil 104) LT dUJ '^Ij jJJl^
and the good and the evil are to that as the sweet and the painful are
to this. (207. 2)
115. 6-7 oq yap Kal toc evvXa etdrj x^pifw Triq vXrjq voei, dijXovoTt, ir€(j)VK€
naXXov TO. K€x<j^P'-<yiJ''^i'Ci vodv. . . .
Here Ar reads:
-^^ or^' ^ J^^ ^ l^A] ^\ J^ '^^' j>-II >". LG
for, just as it thinks of the forms involved in matter by its separating
them from matter, it is clearly more apt to be its inclination to think
of the things that are separate. (210. 6-8)
Instead of oq, contextually hard to justify, Ar's Vorlage read coq, which
suits the logic of the passage and is surely what Themistius intended.
118. 8-11 cVel yap Slttoc, 6 vovq, 6 filv dewprjTLKoq ovdev deoopei tccp
TrpaKTO)v ovde irepl (l)evKTOV Kal opeKTOv Siawcirai, ^ KLvriaLq 8e ij KaToc
Toirov rj <j)tvyovToq ^ biCiKovTOc; 6 5e irpaKTiKoq voei fiev tl irepl TovTUiv,
KvpLoq 6e ovk ecTL Tr\q Kivrjaecoq.
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For this section Ar reads
for the mind is of two sorts, of which one is contemplative and the
other practical; now as for the contemplative, it does not contemplate
practical things nor does it distinguish anything that is avoided and
pursued (217. 10-12)
Ar's Vorlage had a segment of text missing in the rest of the tradition:
eVel yap dnrcx; 6 vovq, 6 ixev d€(jopr]TLKb<; (6 5c irpaKTLKoq, 6 p,ev diiaprjTLKOc^
ovbiv de(t)pei tCop ivpaKrCiv ktX.
120. 17-21 . . . coaTe /cat iroLrjTrju divoiv tov xpovov tov audpoiirov 6
i^r)yr]Tr]q 'AXe^avdpoc, ovk ouTat (t)av\(joc, eiprjKevaL, avTiKpvq eirivoLav
rffxerepav ttoluiv tov xpovov, vwoaTaaiP de oUiiav ocvroi fxr] didovc,' ovk
opdCbc, ov5(
€TroiJi(v<joq 'kpiaroTiXu, eurep tl bd irpoaex^LV tou; iu ry ^vaL-
Ky ocKpoaaei.
Here is Ar's translation:
^J3 i^ijoe. -» L?j3ti" jUjll \»-\j^ o_,---Aj Ail » Jlii L ^_j-L ii] '-iki
^^^j\ w*J-. ->_ Jj *iili J . aj_ J <.^L-. Ul_^ <l J.*)_ jl
^y^l ^L-JI j [v] ^^ ^ J\ ,^. J^ ^. -^ [Jl^ Jl]
so that the commentator Alexander said that man is the maker of time
as well, and what he said does not seem to be wrong, but in his making
time to be purely a fabrication of our minds and in his neglecting to
give it a state that characterizes it, in that he was not right, nor did he
follow the school of Aristotle, if it is necessary to pay attention to what
he said about it in the lecture on Physics. (221. 19 - 222. 4)
Ar's archetype did not have the asyndeton evidenced in Heinze's text
(. . . bibovc; ovk opdCoq . . .) but instead should be reconstructed as
follows: . . . OVK ouTUL (t)av\(jo<; eipyKevaL, (aXX') aPTLKpvq iirlvoiav
ijlx€T€pav TTOLUv TOV xpovov, vTzooTaaiv bi oiKeiav avTO) fir) bibovq, om
opBoic, ovbi
€Ton(V(t)q 'AptaTOTeXeL ktX. For _i rendering aXXa cf. e.g.
85. 1 7 aXXa . . . bei, which Ar turns as ^,.*. Aii "but it is necessary . . ."
(148.8).
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120. 24-26 ep fiev ovv ciSei to optKTiKOv, ev de Kal to irpb tovtov to
optKTOV, oirep rjdrf Kivei ov Kivovnevov toj vor}drivaL rj <f)avTaadrivai,.
Ar translates the first clause, €v n\v ovv ciSei to optKTLKov, as follows:
and so it is necessary that the desired be one in form. (222. 7-8)
The Vorlage should probably be reconstructed as eu p.ev ovv etbei
(^eivai Set) to 6p€ktlk6v. The words (Lvat del, which could have been
lost through homoioteleuton in the manuscripts available to Heinze,
may go back to Themistius himself, for they clearly reflect the modal
ocv (LTj in the Aristotelian original: ciSei fiev ev av etri to klvovv to
opeKTLKOv (433bl0-ll). For
,y^^ jl_» corresponding to Set cf. e.g.
222. 3-4 = Greek 120. 21; both passages are quoted above, in the
note to 120. 17-21.
123. 5—7 OV yap iyyvdev exei (sc. ra foja toc TopevTiKoc koI yevrjTa Kal
(}}BapTa) TTjv Tpo4>r]v t-Kippiovaav ovbe eK TOiv (TTOixdoiiv fV oiq iOTcapr] Kal
e(f)VTevdt], aWa del Tropi^eadai avToc Kal fieTLevai.
It is disquieting to read that self-propelled animals are associated
with elements iv OLq eairapr] Kal i<f)VTevdrj, and we suspect that something
may have dropped out of the text. Ar here confirms our suspicions;
it translates the sentence thus:
J: a->-' >. ^ lt'' oL-ik-Vl j-j s^J ^ OUI -oJi*, \J
for none of these attracts nutriment from nearby or from the elements,
as plants attract it from nearby and from the elements in which they
are sowed and planted, but they need to proceed and move to it. (227.
10-12)
Ar's Vorlage can be reconstructed thus: ov yap lyyvBev
€X€i Tr)v Tpo<f)r]v
iwippeovaav ovde Ik tCov oTOLXiidiv, (axxTrep Ta (i)VTa iyyvBtv ex^i Kal eK
Tcoj/ (jToix^icovy ev oCq ecnraprj Kal e(l)VTevdr] ktX. Homoioteleuton occa-
sioned the omission in the manuscripts that Heinze used.
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Two Views of Soul:
Aristotle and Descartes*
THEODORE TRACY, SJ.
In the fourth century B.C. Aristotle rejected the tripartite psychology
of Plato in favor of his own hylomorphic theory of the body-soul
relationship. In the seventeenth century a.d. Rene Descartes rejected
the prevailing Aristotelian psychology in favor of what he considered
a more scientific notion of body controlled by an immortal, spiritual
soul or mind. Comparisons between the Platonic and Aristotelian
views of soul, their similarities and differences, arc commonplace,
going back to the works of Aristotle himself. Comparisons between
the Aristotelian and Cartesian views are perhaps not so commonplace.
In this paper I should like to draw attention to a few of their
similarities and differences. I cannot claim to add anything new to
our knowledge of either Aristotle's or Descartes' views of soul. But
perhaps the juxtaposition of the two may highlight some interesting
features of both.
What first attracted my interest to a possible comparison was the
realization that, unlike Plato, both Aristotle and Descartes shared the
view that, first, there is but a single soul and, second, that this soul
operates principally through a single specific bodily organ. Given his
own understanding, I believe Descartes could agree totally with
Aristotle's statement that the soul's "essential nature cannot be
* This paper was originally presented at the University of South Carolina in April
1981' as a contribution to a symposium on "Soul and Mind in Ancient Philosophy,"
organized by Professor Rosamond Kent Sprague.
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corporeal; yet it is also clear that soul is present in a particular bodily
part, and this one of the parts having control over the rest":'
dfiXou 6ri ovx oihv r' tivai adua rffv ovtriau ocvrfiq, aW 5fi(t)c, Sri 7' iv tlvl tov
(TUifiaToq inrapxii^ nopiw (t>avtpbv, kcu iv tovtw tivi twv ixovruiv bvvafiiv eV roJq
nopioic,. {Parva Naturalia 467b 13- 16)
For Aristotle, as we know, that particular controlling organ is the
heart. In his treatise On Memory, for example, Aristotle declares that
in blooded animals, including man, "the source and control center
{otpxvY of both the sensitive and nutritive soul must be in the heart":
apayKT) Koi rrfc, ataQr]TiKr\c, kou rriq dpeirTLKfic, ^vxri<i ^v ry Kapb'ux rffv otpxw
etW. {PN 469a5-7)
Again, in the De Partibus Animalium, the heart is designated as the
control center of sense perception and emotional response: "For it
is in the front and center of the body that the heart is situated, in
which we say is the source and control center of life and of all motion
and sensation":
f; p.lv yap Kapbia iv roiq tp.irpoaQev koll ev neaui Ketrm, iv y Trjv apxw <t>citi^v
T^q ^(iirfc, Kot iraar^q Kivr^aedq, re koi aLcrdrjaeojq. {De Partibus Animalium
665all-13)
Later, Aristotle adds: "Moreover, the motions of pain and pleasure,
and generally of all sensation, plainly have their source in the heart,
and find in it their ultimate termination":
en 6' ai Kivr}(TeL<; rdv ifbeoiv Koi rdv XvinijpCiiv Koi Skuiq iraar^q aiadfjaeuq evrevdep
apxbfieuai (j>aiuovTai Koi irpbc, ravrrju irepaivovaai. (666al2-13)
In the De Anima, in a context emphasizing the bodily aspects of
psychic states, Aristotle specifies: "... We may regard anger or fear
' The following are the sources for the text of the Greek, French and Latin
passages quoted. From Aristotle: De Anima, edited with introduction and commentary
by Sir David Ross (Oxford 1961); Parva Naturalia, edited with introduction and
commentary by Sir David Ross (Oxford 1957); De Generatione Animalium {Generation
of Animals, with an English translation, by A. L. Peck [Cambridge, Mass. 1953]); De
Partibus Animalium {Parts of Animals, with an English translation, by A. L. Peck
[Cambridge, Mass. 1955]); De Motu Animalium, with translation, commentary, and
essays by Martha Craven Nussbaum (Princeton 1978). From Descartes: Oeuvres de
Descartes, publiees par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery (Paris 1899) (= A-T).
The translations from Aristotle are adapted from Ross, Peck and Nussbaum, and
in the case of the De Anima from R. D. Hicks, Aristotle: De Anima (Cambridge 1907).
The translations from Descartes are from The Philosophical Works ofDescartes, rendered
into English by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1967) (= H-R).
^ On the notion of 17 dpxv as "source and control center," see Metaphysics
1012b34-1013aI4.
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as such and such movements of the heart, and thinking (dLauoeiadai)
as such and such another movement of that organ. . . ."^
. . . oiov TO opyi^taOai rj (f>o0€ladai to tt^v Kapbuxv wSl KivetaOai, to 81 biavodadai
fj Ti TOiovTOv ujooq rj erepov ti. . . . (408b8-9).
Clearly, then, for Aristotle the psychic functions of sense perception,
consciousness of pleasure and pain, emotional response, initiation of
external movement, even thinking or reasoning (diauoeladai) are
centered in the heart, the control center of the human organism.
For Descartes, the soul is principally present in, and operates
through, the pineal gland, which he situates inside the cavity of the
brain. In his treatise On the Passions of the Soul, for example, describing
how soul and body act on one another, Descartes begins: "Let us
then conceive here that the soul has its principal seat {son siege
principal) in the little gland which exists in the middle of the brain"
("Concevons done icy que I'ame a son siege principal dans la petite
glande qui est au milieu du cerveau . . .", Passions, Art. XXIV; H-R
I, 347; A-T XI, 354). Again, he refers to the pineal as "the small
gland which is the main seat of the soul" (". . . la petite glande qui
est le principal siege de I'ame, . . ." ibid.) and maintains that "the soul
cannot have any other seat in all the body than this gland wherein
to exercise its functions immediately" (". . . I'ame ne pent avoir en
tout le corps aucun autre lieu que cette glande, ou elle exerce
immediatement ses fonctions, . . ." Passions, Art. XXXII; H-R I, 346;
A-T XI, 352).
A closer examination of the psychology of both Aristotle and
Descartes reveals, of course, that neither conceived the soul as locally
confined to a single organ, but united with the entire body. In the De
Aninia, you recall, Aristotle defines soul as "the first actuality of a
natural body furnished with organs:"
ej/reXexeia T? TrpcoTTj aic^iaTOc, <f)vatK0v opyauiKOV (412b5-6).
Then, after comparing the unity of soul and body to that of eyesight
and eye, he continues: "What has been said of the part must be
understood to apply to the whole living body; for as sensation of a
part of the body is to that part, so is sensation as a whole to the
whole sentient body as such":
del 8fi Xa^elv to (ttI nepovq e'<^' SKov tov ^uiPToq aCinaTOc,. avaXoyov yap ex«i
wq TO nepoq irpbc, to fiepoq, ovtojc, t; 5\ri aiad-qau; irpbq to SKov adfia to
oacevTLKbu, ^ TOIOVTOV. (412522-25; cf. 4 14a 14- 19)
Since the soul is the first actuality of a natural body furnished with
' Oxford translation, and cf. Hicks, p. 274 ad b9; also 403a31, 432b31.
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organs, however, it can be conceived to be especially present and
operating in a principal or controlling organ of the body, as is the
case for the heart in Aristotle's psychology.
Likewise, Descartes maintains clearly that
the soul is really joined to the whole body, and ... we cannot, properly
speaking, say that it exists in any one of its parts to the exclusion of
the others, because it is one and in some manner indivisible.
. . . fame est veritablement jointe a tout le corps, & ... on ne peut
pas proprement dire qu'elle soit en quelcune de ses parties, a I'exclusion
des autres, a cause qu'il est un, & en quelque fa^on indivisi-
ble .. . {Passions, Art. XXX; H-R I, 345; A-T XI, 351).
However, he also maintains:
It is likewise necessary to know that although the soul is joined to the
whole body, there is yet in that a certain part in which it exercises its
functions more particularly than in all the others. . . .
II est besoin aussi de sgavoir que, bien que I'ame soit jointe a tout le
corps, il y a neantmoins en luy quelque partie, en laquelle elle exerce
ses fonctions plus particulierement qu'en toutes les autres. {Passions,
Art. XXXI; H-R I, 345; A-T XI, 351-52)
That part is, of course, the pineal gland.
How do Aristotle and Descartes conceive the soul as operating
especially in or through this central organ? The process is, of course,
far too complex for detailed description here. However, the sensory-
motor mechanism in Descartes can be summarized broadly in his
own words as follows:
Let us then conceive here that the soul has its principal seat in the
little gland which exists in the middle of the brain, from whence it
radiates forth through all the remainder of the body by means of the
animal spirits, nerves, and even the blood. . . .
Concevons done icy que fame a son siege principal dans la petite
glande qui est au milieu du cerveau, d'ou elle rayonne en tout le reste
du corps par I'entremise des esprits, des nerfs, & mesme du sang. . . .
{Passions, Art. XXXIV; H-R I, 347; A-T XI, 354)
This gives us the general structure. He then provides for reflex
or instinctive reaction as follows:
And recollecting what has been said about the machine of our body,
i.e., that the little filaments of our nerves are so distributed in all its
parts that on the occasion of the diverse movements which are there
excited by sensible objects, they open in diverse ways the pores of the
brain, which causes the animal spirits contained in these cavities to
enter in diverse ways into the muscles. . . .
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Et nous souvenant de ce qui a este dit cy-dessus de la machine de
nostre corps, a sgavoir que les petits filets de nos nerfs sont tellement
distribuez en toutes se parties, qu'a I'occasion des divers mouvemens
qui y sont excitez par les objets sensibles, ils ouvrent diversement les
pores du cerveau, ce qui fait que les esprits animaux contenus en ses
cavitez entrent diversement dans les muscles. . . . {Pass. XXXIV; H-R
I, 347; A-T XI, 354)
Sense perceptions from external and internal stimuli are accounted
for thus:
... let us here add that the small gland which is the main seat of the
soul is so suspended between the cavities [of the brain] which contain •
the [animal] spirits that it can be moved by them in as many different
ways as there are sensible diversities in the object; but that it may
also be moved in diverse ways by the soul whose nature is such that
it receives in itself as many diverse impressions,— that is to say, that
it possesses as many diverse perceptions as there are diverse movements
in this gland.
Adjoustons icy que la petite glande qui est le principal siege de I'ame,
est tellement suspendue entre les cavitez qui contienent ces esprits,
qu'elle peut estre meue par eux en autant de diverses famous, qu'il y
a de diversitez sensibles dans les objets; mais qu'elle peut aussi estro»
diversement meue par I'ame, laquelle est de telle nature qu'elle recoit
autant de diverses impressions en elle, c'est a dire, qu'elle a autant de
diverses perceptions, qu'il arrive de divers mouvemens en cette glande.
(Pass. XXXIV; H-R I, 347; A-T XI, 254-55)
Motor responses are provided for as follows:
Reciprocally, likewise, the machine of the body is so formed that from
the simple fact that this gland is diversely moved by the soul ... it
thrusts the [animal] spirits which surround it towards the pores of the
brain, which conduct them by the nerves into the muscles, by which
means it causes them to move the limbs.
Comme aussi reciproquement la machine du corps est tellement
composee, que de cela seul que cette glande est diversement meue
par I'ame . . . elle pousse les esprits qui I'environnent vers les pores
du cerveau, qui les conduisent par les nerfs dans les muscles, au moyen
de quoy elle leur fait mouvoir les membres. {Pass. XXXIV; H-R I,
347; A-T XI, 355)
The process is that sense impulses, transmitted through the nerves,
are mediated by "animal spirits" to the pineal gland, where they
cause the conscious experience of sense perception in the soul.
Likewise, the soul can move the pineal gland, setting up movement
of the surrounding "animal spirits" which is thus transmitted to
nerves and muscles as motor impulses.
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In this the critical role of the pineal gland and what Descartes calls
"animal spirits" must be evident. He goes on to describe how the
visual perception of an object takes place through images in the optic
nerves ultimately transmitted by the animal spirits in the surrounding
brain cavities to the pineal gland which, he says, "acting immediately
upon the soul, causes it to see" ("agissant immediatement contre
I'ame, luy fait voir. . . ," Passions, Art. XXXV; H-R I, 347-48; A-T
XI, 356). Awareness of interior passion also,— fear, for example—
comes about by reaction of the animal spirits "to give movement to
the gland by which fear is placed in the soul" ("donner le mouvement
a la glande, par lequel la peur est mise dans I'ame . . . ," Passions, Art.
XXXVIII; H-R I, 349; A-T XI, 358).
Descartes conceives these animal spirits as "a certain very subtle
air or wind" (". . . un certain air ou vent tres-subtil, qu'on nomme
les esprits animaux . . . ," Passions, Art. VII; H-R I, 334; A-T XI,
332); and again, "material bodies of extreme minuteness. . . . they
move very quickly like the particles of the flame which issues from
a torch" (". . . ce sont des corps tres-petits, & qui se meuvent tres-
viste, ainsi que les parties de la flame qui sort d'un flambeau . . . ,"
Passiotis, Art. X; H-R I, 336; A-T XI, 335); elsewhere, "a very subtle
wind, or rather a flame which is very pure and very vivid" (". . . un
vent tres subtil, ou plutost comme une flame tres pure 8c tres vive . . . ,"
Discourse on Method V; H-R I, 115; A-T VI, 54). He explains that
animal spirits are the product of "the most animated and subtle
portions of the blood which the heat has rarefied in the heart"
(".
. . les plus vives & plus subtiles parties du sang, que la chaleur a
rarefiees dans le coeur. . .") and sent up to fill the cavities of the
brain {Passions, Art. X; H-R I, 335; A-T XI, 334). Incidentally,
Descartes, like Aristotle, considers the heart to be the center of vital
heat in the body. He says that
so long as we live there is a continual heat in our heart ... a species
of fire which the blood of the veins maintains, and . . . this fire is the
corporeal principle of all the movements of our members.
. . . pendant que nous vivons, il y a une chaleur continuelle en nostre
coeur, . . . une espece de feu que le sang des venes y entretient, & . . . ce
feu est le principe corporel de tous le mouvemens de nos membres.
{Passions, Art. VIII; H-R I, 335; A-T XI, 333)
Descartes' "animal spirits" reminds us immediately of the myste-
rious (TVn<t)VTov TTVivna— the "connate spirit" or "breath"— which is
for Aristotle the principal medium by which the soul present in the
heart is affected by sensory impulses and emotional reactions, and by
which it initiates external response. Like Descartes' "animal spirits,"
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the avn<i>VTov Tvevfia, as the term implies, is a kind of breath or air;
but warm air, involving an element of heat that is, as Aristotle says,
"analogous to the element of the stars" {avaXoyou ovcra to) tcop
a<TTpo)v oTOLX^io), De Gen. Animalium 736b38-737al), giving it special
capacities for the communication of life and vital functions {ibid.
736b30 ff.r
As Descartes' animal spirits surround the pineal gland, so Aristotle's
avn4>vTou TTvevixa operates within and around the heart especially,
which at one point he calls the "pneumatic member" (fTri to)
TTvev/xaTLKO) ixopio), De Gen. An. 781a31). The avyi(t)VTov Trvev/xa mediates
sensory impulses coming from the sense organ to the soul present in
the heart (e.g., De Gen. An. 781a21-33); and mediates motor impulses
from the soul in the heart to the joints and sinews. Aristotle says:
All animals both possess symphyton pneuma and derive their strength
from this. . . . This [pneuma] seems to bear a relation to the soul-as-
source similar to that which the point in the joints,— the one which
imparts movement and is itself moved— has to the unmoved. And
since the soul-source is . . . situated in the heart, it is clear that the
symphyton pneuma is also there" {De Motu An. 703a9-16 Nussbaum,
adapted).
iravra 81 <f)aiveTai tu foia koI (Xovtu Trvevfia (Tvn(f)VTOv koo. Cax^ovTa
TOVTW. . . . Tovro de irpoq tt) apxw ttiv ypvxt-KriP toiKtv op^ioiq ex^iv o)(nrtp to iv
Talc, Katiiralc, ar\peiov, to kivovv kou. uvovpevov, Trpbq to akivrjTov. eiret 6' i] apxv
Tolc, pev iv Ty Kapb'ux . . . 5ia tovto koI to irvevpa to avp4>VT0V ivTovda (jyaivtTai
Sv.
Thus in Aristotle the avpcjyvTov Trvevpa functions as immediate agent
of the life processes originating in the soul operating through the
heart. The details can be found summarized elsewhere.^ I only mean
to suggest here that there seems to be a close analogy between
Descartes' "animal spirits" and Aristotle's avpcpvTov irvivpa with
relation to the central organ (pineal gland or heart) through which
soul principally operates. Although Descartes' knowledge of anatomy
and physiology, especially that of the central nervous system, repre-
sents a considerable advance over Aristotle, when it comes to ex-
plaining the body-soul relationship he is still left with Aristotle's basic
model: soul operating in a central organ through the medium of a
^ M. Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium (Princeton 1978), p. 162: "We can
only say that pneuma is, apparently, air with a special kind of heat in it that makes it
behave unlike ordinary air, more like a different element."
' See A. L. Peck's De. Gen. An. in the Loeb Series (1953), Appendix B, 576-93;
F. Solmsen,/ of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957), 119-23; M. Nussbaum, 143-164 (Essay
3).
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special subtle kind of matter (a warm air). He sums up the process
as follows:
Hence in our very selves the mind [or soul] by no means moves the
external limbs immediately, but merely directs the subtle fluid, styled
the animal spirits, that passes from the heart through the brain toward
the muscles, and determines this fluid to perform definite motions,
these animal spirits being in their own nature capable of being utilized
with equal facility for many distinct actions.
. . . adeo ut nequidem in nobis ipsis mens immediate moveat membra
externa, sed dirigat tantum spiritus a corde per cerebrum in musculos
fluentes eosque ad certos motus determinet, cum ex se isti spiritus ad
multas actiones diversas aeque facile applicentur. {Reply to Objections
IV, H-R II, 103; A-T VII, 229)
Despite these superficial similarities in their psychology, however,
Descartes' view of soul differs radically from that of Aristotle. There
is little need to remind this audience of the implications of Aristotle's
hylomorphic view of soul and body as developed in the De Anima
especially, where the relationship is that of form to matter in consti-
tuting the living individual organism; where soul is ''the first actuation
{ivTeX(x^La) of a natural body furnished with organs" {evreXix^La i)
-KpiOTt] (TixiixaToc, (pvaLKov opyauLKov, De An. 412b5), and where all second
actuations (even some noetic) are adequately described only as events
of the body-soul compound, having both psychic and somatic aspects.
As Aristotle explains, when the person experiences anger,, tenderness,
fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, hating, even thought "... simulta-
neously with these the body is modified in some way" {oi^a yap
TovToiq Traaxei ri to a(cp.a, De An. 403a 18). The unity between body
and soul, matter and form, is as close in the living compound as that
of wax and the impression in the wax; the axe and axeness; the eye
and the power of sight {ibid. 412b6-413a3). A material eye without
sight is no more an eye than a corpse is a man {De Gen. An. 735a7-8;
and cf. 734b25-27, 726b23-25).'^ Body and soul are simply two
inseparable aspects of the living organism.
The same kind of unity exists, by implication, between the psychic
and somatic aspects of all second actuations as well. For Aristotle
maintains that it is as inadequate to describe the experience of anger
simply as "the desire for retaliation" (6 ixkv yap ope^Lv auTLXvirrjaeo^q,
its formal aspect) as it would be to describe it simply as "a boiling of
the blood around the heart" (6 de ^eciv tov irtpX Kapbiav aifiaToq, its
''
"No part of the body will be such in more than name unless it has some Soul
in it (e.g. the eye of a dead person)" {ovn nopiov earai ^lr) fifrixou [4^XV<i] otXk' tj
b^ujivvntjii;,, wairep redviwroc, oipdaXpcx;). A. L. Peck, De Gen. An. 735a7-8.
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But Aristotle goes beyond this, as you recall, to describe the soul,
once implanted and joined to appropriate matter, also as efficient cause
in the development and maintenance of organs and life functions in
the individual. The De Generatione Animalium details the process by
which the implanted soul forms the heart first, and thereafter the
rest of the organs as outgrowths and extensions from the heart
(742a 16 ff.). The De Anima generalizes on this:
Moreover, the soul is also the origin of motion from place to
place. . . . Qualitative change also, and growth are due to soul. For
sensation is supposed to be a sort of qualitative change. . . . The same
holds of growth and decay. ...
aXKa nfjv Koi ddev irpCyrov i] Kara rbirov Kivrjcnq, ^I'VXV- • • ecTi de kol aXKoiuiaiq
Koi av^rjaiq Kara ypvxw- v fiev yap ataOijaic, aXKomaiq tk; uvai boKtl. . . .
onoiuic, 8e Kot TTcpt ocv^ifaewq re Koi (f>diaiU3q Ixti. {De An. 415b21-26)
In the De Anima and elsewhere Aristotle describes both psychic
and somatic aspects of the nutritive, sentient, movent, and desiderative
functions in man. But when he comes to grips with the problem of
man's highest function, the intellectual, his hylomorphic account
breaks down,— at least to the extent that one so-called "part" of the
soul, the intellect {vovq: the power of comprehending non-material
reality), is denied a specific bodily organ:
If the entire soul holds together the whole body, then each of its
"parts" ought properly to hold together some part of the body. But
this seems impossible. For it is difficult to conjecture what part the
intellect will hold together or how it can hold any part together.
a yap rj Skt] ypvxn i^btv to aobfia avvexei, irpoariKei koi tu}v piopioiv tKaarov
avv'tx^LV Ti Tov aConaroq. tovto 5' eoiKev advvaTU}- iroiov yap nbpiov rf -KUiq b
vovq avvi^H, xoi^^TTov Kal irXaaaL. {De An. 4 11 bl 5- 18)
When he comes to analyze the intellectual function closely, however
{De An. 429a 10 ff.), Aristotle distinguishes two "parts" of intellect:
(1) the receptive intellect, the potentiality for receiving the intelligible
forms transmitted in the phantasms, and (2) the activating or agent
intellect, which actuates this potency "as light brings out the colors
present in a darkened room" {tpottov yap Tiva koL to ^ox; ttouX to.
hvva.n€L ovra xP^I-*^<XTa evepyeia xP<J^I^<^TOi> De An. 430a 15- 17). The
receptive intellect is apparently closely involved with those faculties
of soul that inform and operate through a material organ, namely,
the central sense power, ^ai/raata, and memory, operating in the
heart. The agent intellect alone seems to actuate no material organ,
which implies for Aristotle that it actuates itself as pure form or act.
Consequently it is capable of separate existence, for any "part" of
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heart. The agent intellect alone seems to actuate no material organ,
which implies for Aristotle that it actuates itself as pure form or act.
Consequently it is capable of separate existence, for any "part" of
soul not actuating material body is separable (De An. 413a3-6).
Aristotle must have this aspect of vovq in mind when he says:
It would seem to be a distinct species of soul, alone capable of separate
existence, something eternal (aidiov), as it were, distinct from the
perishable.
a\X' (OLKe \pvxv<i y^voc, erepov eivm, Koi tovto nbvov ivSex^adai X'*'Ptf«o'^«i.
Kadairep to oilbiov tov (t>6apT0v. {De An. 413b25-27)
If this "part" of the intellectual soul is eternal, it must have
preexisted before the individual human organism was conceived.
Aristotle seems to have accepted this consequence, but is vague about
the manner of its joining the compound, explaining that while the
nutritive and sentient "souls" with potentiality for the rational are
supplied by the parents,
the nous alone enters, in addition, from outside and is alone divine;
for bodily activity has no share in its activity.
XeiireraL dfi tov vovv hovov dvpadiv eTreiauvai Koi detov eivai nbvov. ovdev yap
ocvTOV Ty ivepyeia KOivoivd aoinaTiKT} ivepyeia. {De Gen. An. 736b27-29)
Likewise, since this activating povq is eternal, it must survive the
dissolution of the compound at death.
But nous seems to be engendered in us as a self-existing substance,
and to be imperishable.
6 5e vovc, wiKtv iyyiveadm ovaia tic, ovaa, koi ov (t>9€ip€adai. {De An.
408b 18- 19)
Hence Aristotle does affirm the immortality of this part of soul. But
this seems in no way to constitute personal immortality. For Aristotle
asserts that
reasoning, love, and hatred are not attributes of the nous but of its
individual possessor. . . . Hence, when this possessor perishes, there is
neither memory or love; for these never did belong to the nous but
to the composite whole which has perished; while the nous is doubtless
a thing more divine and impassive.
TO 5i biavodadm Koi (fnXetu rj fuaeiv om tOTw iKOVov [vov\ iradri, aWa tovSI
TOV exovToq Ikhvo. . . .bio Kcii tovtov (f>daponevov ovt( p.VT]px)v(va oirre (JkXh-
ov yap (Kfivov rju, aXXa tov kolvov, o airbXuXev. b bi vovc, ixrox, daintpov n Koi
airaSeq eaTLv. {De An. 408b25-29)
Even the receptive nous perishes with memory:
Theodore Tracy, SJ. 257
. . . TOVTO nbvop ccdavaTov kcu ciihov {ov nvrjuovtvonep 8e, 5ti. tovto fiev
airade;, b be iraOriTiKoq povq <f>6apTb(;y koi avev tovtov ovdep poet. {ibid.
430a23-25)
The surviving soul is pure act, independent of matter and self-
existent, without memory of previous existence, without acquired
knowledge or modification of any sort (airadeq) resulting from its
operation in the living individual. This is hardly personal immortality.
On the other hand, one of the propositions that Descartes considers
most important to establish is precisely the proposition that the
personal soul is immortal. His Discourse on the Method indicates that
his whole discussion of the human soul is linked with the problem of
its origin and destiny. He claims to have shown that the rational soul
"could not be in any way derived from the power of matter. . . but
that it must be expressly created" (". . . ne peut aucunement estre
tiree de la puissance de la matiere, . . . mais qu'elle doit expressement
estre creee" . . . , Disc. V; H-R I, 118; A-T VI, 59-60). And again,
"that our soul is in its nature entirely independent of body, and in
consequence that it is not liable to die with it" (". . . la nostre [ame]
est d'une nature entierement independante du cors, & par consequent,
qu'elle n'est point suiette a mourir avec luy. . . , Disc. V, end; H-R I,
118; A-T VI, 59-60; cf. dedication to the Meditations, H-R I, 333*34;
Med. II).
Descartes begins his search for truth, as you recall, not with
Aristotle's attempt at objective analysis of the external universe, of
living beings, and of man in the total scheme of things, but modo
geometrico, with a clear, distinct, and undeniable proposition drawn
from inner experience: cogito; ergo sum— "I am thinking; therefore I
exist." In the Discourse on the Method (Pt. IV) he reasons that it is
inconceivable that he, the "thinking thing," does not exist. But, he
continues,
I saw that I could conceive (1) that I had no body, and (2) that there
was no world nor place where I might be. . . . From that I knew that
I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think; and
that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend
on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by
which I am what I am, is entirely distinctfrom body, and even more easy
to know than the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not
cease to be what it is. . . .
. . . voyant que je pouvois feindre que je n'avois aucun cors, 8c qu'il
n'y avoit aucun monde, ny aucun lieu ou je fusse . . . je connu de la
que j'estois une substance dont toute I'essence ou la nature n'est que
de penser, & qui, pour estre, n'a besoin d'aucun lieu, ny ne depend
d'aucune chose materielle. En sorte que ce Moy, c'est a dire, I'Ame
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par laquelle je suis ce que je suis, est entierement distincte du cors,
& mesme qu'elle est plus aisee a connoistre que luy, 8c qu'encore qu'il
ne fust point, elle ne lairroit pas d'estre tout ce qu'elle est. {Disc. IV;
H-R I, 101; A-T VI, 32-33)
There we have the essence of the Cartesian logico-introspective
method; his identification of the thinking subject with the soul; and
the basic reason for soul's complete independence of body and
consequent immortality.
The same line of reasoning is found in Meditations VI:
And although ... I possess a body with which I am intimately con-
joined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea
of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing,
and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it
is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I is
entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without
it.
Et quamvis . . . habeam corpus, quod mihi valde arete conjunctum est,
quia tamen ex una parte claram & distinctam habeo ideam mei ipsius,
quatenus sum tantum res cogitans, non extensa, & ex alia parte
distinctam ideam corporis, quatenus est tantum res extensa, non
cogitans, certum est me a corpore meo revera esse distinctum, &
absque illo posse existere. {Med. VI; H-R I, 190; A-T VII, 78)
Soul, then, is for Descartes the "thinking thing" {res cogitans) with
which I, the person, am identified. It is a substance, "a thinking and
unextended thing . . . entirely and absolutely distinct from my body,"
which is another substance, "an extended and unthinking thing," as
he describes them. The consequence is for him that this "I," that is,
my soul, since it is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, can
exist without it. The same reasoning in extended form appears in
Meditations II (H-R I, 149-151).
Descartes identifies soul also as "mind," or "understanding" or
"reason" ("sum igitur praecise tantum res cogitans, id est, mens, sive
animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio . . . ," Med. II; H-R I, 152; A-T
VII, 27). And "thinking" includes for him a range of psychic events
far beyond what Aristotle would classify as functions of the rational
soul, i.e., as "thought." "What is a thing that thinks?" he asks. "It is
a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills,
refuses, which also imagines and feels."
Res cogitans. Quid est hoc? Nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans,
negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, &: sentiens. {Med. II; H-R
I, 153; A-T VII, 28)
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In his Principles of Philosophy Descartes summarizes his position on
what thought (cogitatio) is:
By the word Thought I understand all that of which we are conscious
as operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing,
imagining, but also feeling, are here the same as thought. For if I say
I see, or I walk, I therefore am, and if by seeing and walking I mean
the action of my eyes or my legs, which is the work of my body, my
conclusion is not absolutely certain; because it may be that, as often
happens in dreams, I think I see or walk, although I never open my
eyes or move from my place. . . . But if I mean only to talk of my
sensation (sensu) or my consciously seeming to see or to walk, it becomes
quite true, because my assertion now refers only to my mind, which
alone is concerned with my feeling or thinking that I see and I walk.
Cogitationis nomine, intelligo ilia omnia, quae nobis consciis in nobis
hunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est. Atque ita non modo
intelligere, velle, imaginari, sed etiam sentire, idem est hic quod
cogitare. Nam si dicam, ego video, vel ego ambulo, ergo sum; & hoc
intelligam de visione, aut ambulatione, quae corpore peragitur, con-
clusio non est absolute certa; quia, ut saepe fit in somnis, possum
putare me videre, vel ambulare, quamvis oculos non aperiam, & loco
non movear. . . . Sed si intelligam de ipso sensu sive conscientia videndi
aut ambulandi, quia tunc refertur ad mentem, quae sola sentit si^e
cogitat se videre aut ambulare, est plane certa. {Princ. Part I, IX;
H-R I, 222; A-T VIII, 7-8)
Descartes considers all the data of consciousness, then, as "thought"
belonging to the soul, assuring the conscious subject of his existence.
What of the body? And the external world? Descartes is assured of
their existence only through the veracity of God, the Creator, whose
existence is known with a certainty second only to that of his own
existence. For Descartes discovers within his consciousness the "idea
of a Being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely perfect"
(".
. . unam [ideam] esse entis summe intelligentis, summe potentis
& summe perfecti . . .", Princ. Part I, XIV; H-R I, 224; A-T VIII,
10). And from the fact that his mind "perceives that necessary and
eternal existence is comprised in the idea which it has of an absolutely
perfect Being, it has clearly to conclude that this absolutely perfect
Being exists" (". . . ita ex eo solo quod percipiat existentiam neces-
sariam & aeternam in entis summe perfecti idea contineri, plane
concludere debet ens summe perfectum existere," Princ. Pt. I, XIV;
H-R, I, 225; A-T VIII, 10). Now the first of the Creator's attributes
is that He is "absolutely true and the source of all light, so that it is
evidently a contradiction that He should deceive us" (". . . summe
verax, &: dator omnis luminis: adeo ut plane repugnet ut nos fal-
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lat . . . ," Princ. Pt. I, XXIX; H-R I, 231; A-T VIII, 16). Hence it
follows that "the faculty of knowledge which God has given us can
never disclose to us any object which is not true, inasmuch as it
comprehends it . . . clearly and distinctly" ("Atque hinc sequi-
tur . . . cognoscendi facultatem a Deo nobis datam, nullum unquam
objectum posse attingere, quod non sit verum, quatenus ab ipsa
attingitur, hoc est, quatenus clare 8c distincte percipitur," Princ. Pt. I,
XXX; H-R I, 231; A-T VIII, 16). Again, "because God is no deceiver,
the faculty of knowledge that He has given us cannot be fallacious"
in assenting "to things that we clearly perceive" (". . . cum Deus non
sit fallax, facultas percipiendi quam nobis dedit, non potest tendere
in falsum . . . cum tantum ad ea quae clare percipiuntur se extendit,"
Princ. Pt. I, XLIII; H-R I, 236; A-T VIII, 21). What are some of
these things "we clearly perceive"? Descartes replies: "Of this nature
are mathematical demonstrations, the knowledge that material things
exist, and the evidence of all clear reasoning . . . about them" ("Tales
sunt Mathematicae demonstrationes; talis est cognitio quod res ma-
teriales exsistant; 8c talia sunt evidentia omnia ratiocinia, quae de
ipsis hunt," Princ. Pt. IV, CCVI; H-R I, 302; A-T VIII, 328). (This
is obviously a world apart from what has been called Aristotle's
"naive realism.")
Descartes asserts the existence of only two created substances^
{Princ. Pt. I, XLVIII; H-R I, 238; A-T VIII, 23): ". . . the one is
intellectual things . . . pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance;
the other is material things, or that pertaining to extended substance,
i.e., to body" (". . . unum est rerum intellectualium ... ad mentem
sive ad substantiam cogitantem pertinentium; aliud rerum materi-
alium, sive quae pertinent ad substantiam extensam, hoc est, ad
corpus"); for we have "two clear and distinct ideas, the one of created
substance that thinks, the other of corporeal substance" (". . .
possumus duas claras & distinctas habere notiones, sive ideas, unum
substantiae cogitantis creatae, aliam substantiae corporeae . . . ^ Princ.
Pt. I, LIV; H-R I, 241; A-T VIII, 25). Each has its principal attribute:
".
. . extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature
of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking
substance" ("Nempe extensio in longum, latum & profundum, sub-
stantiae corporeae naturam constituit; 8c cogitatio constituit naturam
substantiae cogitantis," Princ. Pt. I, LIII; H-R I, 240; A-T VIII, 25).
' "By substance we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that
it needs no other thing in order to exist" ("Per substantiam nihil aHud intelligere
possumus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum," Princ .
Pt. I. LI, H-R I, 239; A-T VIII, 24). Descartes clearly understands that this definition
cannot be applied univocally to God and created substances.
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Functions of the soul, of the body, and of the compound are
described thus {Princ. Pt. I, XLVIII; H-R I, 238; A-T VIII, 23):
Perception, volition, and every mode of knowing and willing pertain
to thinking substance; while to extended substance pertain magnitude,
or extension in length, breadth, and depth, figure, movement, situa-
tion, divisibility into parts themselves divisible, and such. Besides these
there are, however, certain things we experience . . . which should be
attributed neither to mind nor body alone but to the close and intimate
union that exists between the body and mind. . . . Such are the
appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of
the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone, as the
emotions of anger, joy, sadness, love, etc.; and finally all the sensations
"
such as pain, pleasure, light and color, sounds, odors, tastes, heat,
hardness, and all other tactile qualities.
Perceptio, volitio, omnesque modi tam percipiendi quam volendi, ad
substantiam cogitantem referuntur; ad extensam autem, magnitudo,
sive ipsamet extensio in longum, latum 8c profundum, figura, motus,
situs, partium ipsarum divisibilitas, & talia. Sed & alia quaedam in
nobis experimur, quae nee ad solam mentem, nee etiam ad solum
corpus referri debent, quaeque . . . ab arcta & intima mentis nostrae
cum corpore unione proficiscuntur; nempe appetitus famis, sitis, &:c.;
itemque, commotiones, sive animi pathemata, quae non in sola cogl-
tatione consistunt, ut commotio ad iram, ad hilaritatem, ad tristitiam,
ad amorem, &c.; ac denique sensus omnes, ut doloris, titillationis, lucis
& colorum, sonorum, odorum, saporum, caloris, duritiei, aliarumque
tactilium qualitatum.
We have already seen the broad outline of Descartes' physiological
psychology by which soul and body were described as interacting
through the nervous system, the animal spirits, and the pineal gland,
the "principal seat" of the soul, where soul receives and reacts to
material impulses from inside and outside the organism, and sets up
physical changes relayed to the muscles that control bodily motion.
What we now appreciate, however, is that soul and body are conceived
basically as two completely distinct and independent substances which
somehow join to cooperate in this manner.
The body is, in fact, conceived by Descartes as a machine, created
in such a way that it could exist independently of soul, operating by
purely mechanical principles, principally through the vital heat cen-
tered in the heart. Descartes considered all material substances, even
heat, to be composed of minute bodies or corpuscles having only
those attributes he mentions,— extension in length, breadth, depth,
figure or shape, movement, situation, and divisibility. The sole type
of change or motion is mechanical— by impact or collision of particles,
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by pushing or pulling in larger structures. Descartes compares the
body specifically to "a watch or other automaton (i.e., a machine that
moves itself)" which is "wound up and contains in itself the corporeal
principle of those movements for which it is designed along with all
that is requisite for its action" (". . . une montre, ou autre automate
(c'est a dire, autre machine qui se meut de soy-mesme) ... est montee,
& ... a en soy le principe corporel des mouvemens pour lesquels elle
est instituee, avec tout ce que est requis pour son action . . . ," Passions
of the Soul Pt. I, Art. VI; H-R I, 333; A-T XI, 331). Unlike Aristotle,
Descartes does not consider soul to be cause of the ordinary life-
processes of the body "since they do not depend on thought at all"
(".
. . en tant qu'ils ne dependent point de la pensee . . . ," Pass., Pt.
I, Art. IV; H-R I, 332; A-T XI, 329).
... I consider the body of a man as being a sort of machine so built
up and composed of nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin that though
there were no mind in it at all, it would not cease to have the same
motions as at present, exception being made of those movements
which are due to the direction of the will, and in consequence depend
upon the mind. . . .
... si considerem hominis corpus, quatenus machinamentum quod-
dam est ex ossibus, nervis, musculis, venis, sanguine & pellibus ita
aptum & compositum, ut, etiamsi nulla in eo mens existeret, eosdem
tamen haberet omnes motus qui nunc in eo non ab imperio voluntatis
nee proinde a mente procedunt. . . . (Meditations VI; H-R I, 195; A-T
VII, 84)
Death of the body is not caused by departure of the soul; rather, the
soul departs because the body breaks down, as "a watch or other
machine when it is broken and when the principle of its movement
ceases to act" (". . . montre, ou autre machine, lors qu'elle est rompue
& que le principe de son mouvement cesse d'agir," Passions Art. VI;
H-R I, 333; A-T XI, 331).
Soul and body chiefly interact, as we have seen, through the pineal
gland, which Descartes specifies as "the portion of the brain by which
the mind is immediately affected" (". . . in ea parte cerebri quae
immediate mentem afficit . . . ," Med. VI; H-R I, 197; A-T VII, 87);
it receives the mechanical reactions of the body and itself acts, in
Descartes words, "immediately upon the soul" (". . . immediatement
contre I'ame . . . ," Passions, Art. XXXV; H-R I, 348; A-T XI, 356).
Of pain perception he says ". . . the movement [of the nerves]
passing ... to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a sign to the mind,
which makes it feel somewhat, to wit, pain" (". . . ille eorum
motus ... ad intima cerebri pertingens, ibi menti signum dat ad
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passing ... to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a sign to the mind,
which makes it feel somewhat, to wit, pain" (". . . ille eorum
motus ... ad intima cerebri pertingens, ibi menti signum dat ad
aliquid sentiendum, nempe dolorem . . . ," Med. VI, H-R I, 197;
A-T VII, 88). Conversely, he says that when the soul "desires
something, it causes the little gland to which it is closely united to
move in the way requisite ..." (". . . veut quelque chose, elle fait
que la petite glande, a qui elle est estroitement jointe, se meut en la
fagon qui est requise . . . ," Passions, Art. XLI; H-R I, 350; A-T XI,
360).
But how does Descartes conceive these two separate and distinct
substances to be "closely united"? As far as I know, his best response
is contained in Meditation VI where he declares that nature, through
the sensations of pain, hunger, and thirst, teaches
that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that
I am closely united with it, and, so to speak, so intermingled with it
that I seem to compose with it one whole . . . these sensations of
hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are in truth none other than certain confused
modes of thought which are produced by the union and apparent
intermingling of mind and body.
. . . me non tantum adesse meo corpori ut nauta adest navigio, sed
illi arctissime esse conjunctum & quasi permixtum, adeo ut unum quid
cum illo componam. . . . Nam certe isti sensus sitis, famis, doloris, &:c.,
nihil aliud sunt quam confusi quidam cogitandi modi ab unione &
quasi permixtione mentis cum corpore exorti. {Med. VI; H-R I, 192;
A-T VII, 81)
"Intermingling" can be easily understood of two different material
substances; but what does it mean when applied to the union of a
material with a completely non-material substance, one incapable of
physical contact or location in place? When one of his critics (Arnauld)
accuses Descartes of conceiving man as "a spirit that makes use of a
body" (". . . animum utentem corpore. . . ," Objections IV; H-R II,
84; A-T VII, 203), Descartes claims that his argument from the
consciousness of pain, hunger, and thirst have "proved that mind was
substantially united with the body" ("Nam in eadem sexta Medita-
tione, in qua egi de distinctione mentis a corpore, simul etiam probavi
substantialiter illi esse unitam . . . ," Reply to Objections IV; H-R II,
102; A-T VII, 227-28). Though he uses the expression "substantial
union" of mind and body, it cannot be understood in the Aristotelian
sense of form and matter uniting to constitute a single substance,
since Descartes has rejected the notion of substantial form. Another
critic (Gassendi) continues to press him on the point. "For there is
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sine partibus commiscibilibus utrique. . . . Quaenam vero corporeae
cum incorporea intelligi potest?" Objections V: H-R II, 201; A-T VII,
344). Descartes replies testily: "At no place do you bring an objection
to my arguments; you only set forth the doubts you think follow
from my conclusions" ("Nihil ullibi in meas rationes objicis, sed
tantum dubia proponis, quae tibi ex meis conclusionibus sequi viden-
tur," Reply to Obj. V; H-R II, 232; A-T VII, 389-90). Finally, when
his friend Princess Elizabeth asks the same questions,—how a thinking
soul could move the animal spirits— Descartes can only answer: "I
may truly say that what your Highness proposes seems to me to be
the question people have most right to ask me in view of my published
works" ("Et je puis dire, avec verite, que la question que votre Altesse
propose, me semble estre celle qu'on me peut demander avec le plus
de raison, en suite des escrits que j'ay publiez," A-T III, 663; A.
Kenny, Descartes, 1968, p. 226).
There we have it, then. Two models of human nature, soul and
body,— Aristotle's hylomorphism and Descartes' dualism. Each has
its problems: If body and soul are united as matter and form, how
do we account for the soul's apparent power to transcend matter in
conceiving the non-material, the universal? How satisfy man's almost
universal longing for personal survival after death? On the other
hand, if soul is a thinking substance entirely independent of matter,
and body a mere machine of well-coordinated material parts, how
can they possibly be united and interact in a single composite
organism? We can, of course, go a step further, as did La Mettrie a
century after Descartes, and discard the notion of soul altogether,
settling for the bleak view that all living beings, including man, are
merely quasi-machines. But that view also has its problems. Perhaps
most important is that we continue to search, to think about the
problem of body and soul. Or at least that we continue to think. For,
as Descartes points out in the second Meditation (H-R I, 151; A-T
VII, 27), "it might possibly be the case that— if I ceased entirely to
think— I should likewise cease altogether to exist" (". . . nam forte
etiam fieri posset, si cessarem ab omni cogitatione, ut illico totus esse
desinerem").
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Plato and Stoa in Hippolytus' Theology
MIROSLAV MARCOVICH
In his masterpiece, Refutotio omnium haeresium (written in Rome,
between a.d. 222 and 235), Hippolytus stresses the significance of
his own Theology, as opposed to countless heretical doctrines, and
especially to the Patripassianism of his archrival, Pope Callistus (Proem
6; X. 4; X. 5. I & 2; X. 31. 6 & 34. 1). He calls his own doctrine
Truth, and I think the term has a special meaning for him. In my
opinion, it stands for the Holy Ghost as the conveyer of God's truth
to man, as Spirit of truth, in one word, as Truth itself.' The suggested
interpretation seems to find support in Hippolytus himself.
Consider such expressions as these. (1) By simply appearing. Truth
will refute any heresy (X. 5. 1 ^ibvov (f)avelq eXey^eL rrju irXavqv)} (2)
Hippolytus' statement (Proem 7), "we proclaim whatever Truth has
ministered to men, after receiving it from the grace of the Father
{oaa ij aXrjdeLa virb rriq tov iraTpbq xocpi-Toq wapaXa^ovaa avOpwiroiq
dLTjKovrjae, ravra . . . Kr]pvaaon€u), is only a synonym for his preceding
expression (Proem 6), "we generously communicate to all whatever
has been offered by the Holy Ghost" {oaa irapex^L to ayiou irveviia
irocGLU a.4>dbv(jic, Kotuonvovvreq).
Hippolytus' True Doctrine comprises the three closing chapters
of his magnum opus (X. 32-34), as its Kopijoviq (X. 5. 2). His Theology
' Cf. G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford 1961), s.v. akrfitia, B, 4,
and ocvToaXrfitLa, 4.
^ The text is quoted from my edition of Hippolytus: Patristische Texte und Studien,
im Auftrage der Patristischen Kommission der Akademien der Wissenschaften in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland herausgegeben von K. Aland und E. Muhlenberg, Band
25 (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 1986).
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is highly elaborate, learned, and peculiar enough.' In this philosophical
volume of ICS, we shall limit ourselves to pointing out the main
philosophical sources of Hippolytus' inspiration. They are two—
Plato and Stoa.
Plato. According to Hippolytus, prior to the Creation, God first
conceives in his mind the ideas or forms of the future beings— ai
€v roj iraTpLKo) (I'oj) epporjdelaai ibiai (X. 33. 2). This act is called "the
Father's mental conception" (17 tov Trarpoq evvoLo). Now leaving apart
Greek antecedents of the term evvoia, I think the most likely sources
of Hippolytus' inspiration are Justin Martyr (1 Apology 64. 3 evvorjdevTa
TOV debv 61a: A670U TOV Koanov iroLrjoai) and especially the Valentinian
Gnostic Ptolemy, who is quoted by Hippolytus at Ref. VI. 38. 5.
According to Ptolemy, the Father (or Bythos) has two consorts,
dispositions or powers
—
"EvvoLav koX QeXrjaLV TrpCoTov yap evevorjOrj ti
irpo^aXelv, eVeira rjdeXrjae. Notice that both acts of the God creator—
Conception and Will— recur in Hippolytus' own Theology— oTe
(^avToq) rideXrjae ttouIv (X. 32. 1); oaa yovv rjdeXTjaev ttouIv 6 debq . . .;
OTe de (oaa) rj^deXrjaevy ox; rjdeXr^ae Kal eTToirjaev . . . (X. 33. 6-7); Abyoc,
iv eavTQ) (t)€p(jov to deXeLV tov yeyewqKOToc, (X. 33. 2); to aptoKov deo)
(ibid.).
^
As the next step, God creates the four basic principles (apxai) or
first substances {ai Trpajrat ovcriai) for the future beings— fire and
spirit {-Kvevna, not air), water and earth (X. 32. 2 and 33. 4). According
to Hippolytus, beings are made either out of a single substance (toc
fiovoovaia) or a combination of the four elements. This process of
combination is called "binding a living organism together" {avvbtanoc,,
X. 32. 2), and is most probably Platonic in origin (compare, e.g.,
Tim. 73 b 3 ^ 'A^X^ t^ aoonaTi (rvvdovnevq; Symp. 202 e 6 ojare to ttocv
avTO avTw avvbtbtadaL).
Following this theory of "fastening the elements in a whole (an
organism)," Hippolytus concludes that only the beings made out of
one single substance are imperishable, since they cannot be "undone"
— Ka\ TO. pikv f'l hoc, adavaTa rjv {Xvaiq yap (avTolq) ov irapaKoXovdet'
TO yap (V ov XvdrjaeTaL irooiroTe), to. be Ik bvo rj Tpidv r) Teaaapo^v Xvtol.
bib /cat dvqTO. ovona^eTai' davaToq yap tovto KeKXrjTaL, 17 tu)v bebep,ev(j)v
XvaLc, (X. 32. 3).
Now, the idea that all which has been fastened together may be
undone and perish, is Platonic. Compare, e.g., Tim. 41 a 7 to p-ev
ovv 5r} bedev irav XvTbv. I need not engage here in the discussion about
^ On Hippolytus' Theology compare M. Richard, in Dictionnaire de Spiritualite,
44-45 (Paris 1968), s.v. Hippolyte de Rome, pp. 545-571; L. Bertsch, Die Botschaft
vom Christus und unserer Erlosung bei Hippolyt von Rom (Augsburg 1966).
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whether Hippolytus is consistent in his theory. Briefly stated, I think
he is consistent but elliptical {Uavov ovv vvv (ioTi Tama) toIc, €u
4>povo\)aLV airoKeKpiadaL . . . to bl vvv Uavov (boKu) eivai (Kdeadai Taq
aiViat;, X. 32. 4-5). Presumably, the only being composed of one
single substance is the Holy Ghost (Uvevna). Jesus, the Logos, consists
of the divine substance of the Father {ovaia vivapx<^v deov, X. 33. 8).
Sun, moon and the stars are made of fire and spirit, thus perishable.
So is the world (6 6t Koafioq . . . tViSexfToii Kal Xvcnv, X. 33. 8). If my
restoration of the corrupt text is correct, the angels too are made of
fire and spirit (compare OT Psalm 103:4 and Gregory Naz. Oral,
theol. 28. 31 and 31. 15). Consequently, they too are potentially
perishable. Finally, when Hippolytus states that fish and birds are
made of water, while reptiles, beasts and other animals are made of
earth, I think we should understand, ''primarily of water or earth,
respectively." For, evidently, the animals are not to. p-ovoovaia and
thus imperishable.
Man is created out of all four elements— e'/c iraoO^v (xvvdeToq ovolCov
(X. 33. 7). This idea too is Platonic. Compare Tim. 42 e - 43 a, and
Albinus clearly states, ol b\ Seol eivXaaav nlv Trporjyovp.€v<ji)<; tov avOpo^irov
eK yriq Kal -Kvpoc, Kal aepoq Kal vbaToq {Epitome 17. 1, ed. Hermann,
Plato vol. VI, p. 172).
A third encounter of Hippolytus with Platonism seems to occur
in his reinterpretation of the Delphic injunction, TvCidi aeavTov (quoted
at I. 18), in the sense of, "Man, recognize that thou art godlike''—
(^Kaiy tovt' ((ttl TO ''yvcbdL aeavTOV,'' eTriy vovc, (eV a-eauro)) tov ire-KonqKOTa
dibv (X. 34. 4). Doubtless, Hippolytus is building upon OT Genesis
1:26 (referred to at X. 34. 5)— Man is made in God's image and
likeness. But there is no injunction, "Know thyself," in the Old
Testament. On the other hand, a reinterpretation of the Tvibdi aeavTov
in the sense of TvcbdL to deiov iv aeavTo: is to be found in the first
Alcibiades 133 c 4— "Then this part of the soul resembles God, and
he who looks at this part, having realized all things divine, will be
most likely to know himself" (To? ^co) apa tovt' eoiKev avTriq, Kai tk;
€LC, TOVTO ^XeiTd^v Kal irav to delov yvovq, . . . ovtoo Kal eavTov av yvoii)
p,a\L(JTa).
In conclusion, throughout the Elenchos, Hippolytus dismisses Pla-
to's pagan philosophy—and he calls Valentinus HXaToiviKo:;, ov
XptaTLavbq (VI. 29. 1)— only to succumb to the Platonic spell in his
own Theology, as did Athenagoras half a century before him.
Stoa. Hippolytus' Christology displays a peculiar blend of Stoic and
Christian ideas. Contrary to the doctrine of Noetus and Callistus,
according to Hippolytus the Son does not coexist with the Father,
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but is being first mentally conceived and then born by the Father as
any other being
—
OvToq ovv (o) fiouoq . . . debq Abyov irpOiTov evvorjddq
ctTToyevva (X. 33. 1). The only difference of significance between the
"first-born" son (NT Col. 1:15) and the rest of the creatures is in
the fact that the Son consists of pure being, i.e., of the same substance
as the Father (tovtov (ouy) novov e^ ovtcjov eyevva' to yap bv ambc, b
Trarrjp tjv, e^ ov to yevprjdep, X. 33. 1; 6 Abyoq . . . ovoia uvrapxcoi' diov,
X. 33. 8), while the rest of the beings are made out of one or more
of the four basic elements.
The "first-born" Son exists in the Father as his immanent reasoning
about the universe {ov (Sf) kbyov ice, (poourjv, aXX' evbicedeTov tov iravTbq
XoyKTIxbv, X. 33. 1). When the Father decides to create the world,
presumably, he opens his mouth, and his imvianent reasoning {IvbLadeToc,
Xbyoq) becomes at once an uttered Word {Trpo(f)opLKbq Xbyoq). It is this
uttered Word that becomes the Father's only agent of Creation— koI
aiTLOv Tolq yivon'ivoLc, Kbyoq 7]v (X. 33. 2); iva Kbyoc, virovpyy (33. 4);
bcra yovv rjdeXijaev iroulv b debq, Tama A67CO ibrjfiiovpyei (33. 6); Ttt^Ora)
be -KOLVTa biwKei b Abyoc, b deov (33. 1 1). Hippolytus' elliptic account is
perhaps best illustrated by the Christology of Theophilus of Antioch
{Ad Autolycum II. 10 & 22): "Excof ovv b debq tov eavTov Xbyov ivbiadeTov
ev Tolc, ibiotq awXayxfOLq (cf. OT Psalm 109:3), eyevvrjaev ambv . . .;
b-KbTt be rjdeXrjaev b debq iroifiaai baa IfiovXevaaTo, tovtov tov Xbyov
eyevvrjaev Kpo(t)opiKbv, ''irpoiTbTOKOv rraarjq KTLoeooq . . ." (NT Col. 1:15).
Now, the distinction between the two kinds of Logos— "mental
reasoning" {evbtadeToq) and "uttered word" {Kpo4>opLKb<^— is clearly
Stoic,^ with possible antecedents in Plato {Sophist 263 e) and Aristotle
(e.g.. Anal. Post. A 10, p. 76 b 25). But, as the examples of Theophilus,
Irenaeus {Adv. haer. II. 12. 5), or Origen {Contra Celsum VI. 65) show,
it was well established in the time of Hippolytus.^
The problem, however, is in the function of the Logos as a Voice
{(f)u)vr{). We can understand that a Stoic Tvpo(t)opLKbc, Xbyoc, is no other
thing but an uttered voice, or, as Hippolytus puts it,— 6 Abyoq b
deov . . ., 17 Tpb eo)a(t>bpov (f)o)a(f)bpoq 0aji'T7 (X. 33. II); {Xaoq) virb Abyov
(Ixjovriq fir] KaTaXaix(j)dev (X. 34. 2); (f)(x)vr]v (pdeyybfievoc, Kal (t>(bq eK (fxjOToq
yevvCiv Tcpor)Kev ttj KTiaei Kvpiov tov ibiov vovv {Contra Noetum 10, p.
253. 5 Nautin; cf. NT II Petri 1:19).
We can also understand that Logos serves as a "voice of God" to
men (Adam, the prophets and others). Consider, e.g., X. 33. 13 Kal
' Cf., e.g., Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa^ I (Gouingen 1959), pp. 39; 185; 373 ff.; 412;
435; 451.— II (Gottingen 1955), Erlauterungen.
' It suffices here to refer to M. Muhl, in Archivfur Begriffsgeschichte (Bonn, Bouvier),
VII (1962), 7-56.
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ravra (Se) 6 debq (KeXeve Aoyo}, 6 8e Abyoq i({)deyyeTO Xeycov (^tolc,
Trpo(t>r]Tai<;y . . ., or Theophilus (II. 22) '0 be Xbyoq avrov, 5i' ov to.
KOLVTa ireiroirjKep, . . . apaXan^avo)^ to irpoaojirov tov irarpoq, . . . oiiroq
co/xiXeL Tip 'Adaix. . . . (pwurj 8i tl aXXo IotXv aXX' rj b Xbyoc, b tov deoi),
bq iffTLU Kal vlbq avTov;
What is peculiar in Hippolytus' Christology is the fact that Logos
bears in himself the Father's ideas as a voice— afxa yap ro) e'/c tov
ytpurjCFavToq irpoeXddv . . . (b^q) (i>(j^vr]v etx^v ev eavTU) Tocq eu tu) xarpi-
Ko) (j^o)) evvor]deiaaq ibeaq (X. 33. 2). If I understand Hippolytus
correctly, he is trying to tell us that Logos is fulfilling his Demiurgical
duty by transforming the Father's immanent ideas into uttered words.
How can we explain such a function of Logos? Certainly we are not
dealing here with the folkloric motif of the creation of the world by
a Demiurge's sound of music. Nor is it likely that Logos brings beings
into existence simply by naming them, by giving them a name (in
the sense of Basilides' ovbuaTi nop<t)ovv, Ref. VII. 18. 1). For we learn
from Hippolytus himself that the naming of the beings did not
coincide with their very creation— OTe be (oaa) r)(diXr]otvy Icq rjOeXirjae
Kol €TroLr](T€P, bvbfiaatv (^avTO) KoXiaaq ear]iir}vev (X. 33. 7).
Since no Stoic theory of language seems to be of avail in our case,
the only suggestion I am at present able to offer is that Logos
transforms the Father's ideas into voice in his role of the traditional
Old Testament "voice of God^ Compare, e.g., OT Genesis 1:3 kol
eiirev b debq- TevrjdrjTijo <t>0)q. Kal iyevtTo (i>u)q, with Basilides' interpretation
{Ref. VII. 22. 3), ov yap yeypairTai irbdeu yeyove to <j)oiq, aXX' avTO
nbvov (to yevbfievovy eK Triq 4>o:)vf)q tov XeyovToq. . . . Or Hippolytus
{Contra Noetum 10) Qebq ixbvoq UTrapxcof Kal fxr]b\v e'xcoj' iavTcx) ovyxpovov
€^ovXr]6r} Koop-ov KTiaar bq Kbopov evvorjddq deXrjaaq Te Kal (l)dey^aiJ.ei'oq
e-Koir](Tev.
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